



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

2684

(A12.)

2684

(412)

2684

(A12.)

2684

(412.)

CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING AND ITS ANTAGONISTS

**VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF PRINCIPLE AND OF
CONTEMPORANEOUS HISTORY**

**BY
JOSEPH MAUSBACH, D.D.
PROFESSOR AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MUNSTER**

**TRANSLATED FROM THE SIXTH REVISED AND AUGMENTED
GERMAN EDITION**

By A. M. BUCHANAN, M.A. (London)

**NEW YORK
JOSEPH F. WAGNER**

This One



Digit

Null Obstat

REMIGIUS LAFORT, D.D.

Censor

Imprimatur

JOHN CARDINAL FARLEY

Archbishop of New York

NEW YORK, November 12, 1914

COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY JOSEPH F. WAGNER, NEW YORK

AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

THE work which is herewith in an English version presented to a new circle of readers, appeared originally as a publication of the *Görres Gesellschaft*, an association of learned men, whose chief object it is to preserve and advance the Christian-Catholic spirit in profane science and education. A number of augmented new editions increased the work to its present size and scope.

Intended at first as a defence against certain attacks made upon Catholic Moral Teaching, in popular literature as well as in scientific treatises, my book has thus gradually become an exhaustive statement and vindication of the principles of Catholic morality — principles which in our day receive much discussion in Protestant and liberal-philosophical circles, and which are often represented as being inconsistent with the demands of modern culture.

In dealing with these principles I followed a method, which, while firmly rooted in ecclesiastical teaching and tradition, nevertheless strives to keep in view the demands of modern religious and scientific life, and it has not only found much approval among educated Catholics, clergy as well as laity, but has also made in many instances a deep and favourable impression upon unprejudiced Protestants.

It is obvious that the demands made upon apologetics, and upon the treatment of its subject, differ according to the various needs of different countries and peoples. However, it is just as obvious that the principles and most important points of controversy, especially in matters of morality, are to-day universal and they recognize no intellectual boundaries.

In English and in German speaking countries the influence of Protestant thought and sentiment is much the same. The accusations, partly malicious, against the practise of confession, against casuistry in morals, etc., find a ready reception with nearly all opponents of the Church. Serious lack of understanding and

iv AUTHOR'S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION

radical misconception, regarding the conscience and its relation to God and to Church authority, sin and salvation, the moral law and its relation to liberty, justification, interior and exterior action of grace, ecclesiastical and worldly life, permeate contemporaneous non-Catholic theology and literature. To these must be added the important questions of public morality, of obedience to State and Church, of economic independence and unity, of Catholic organization and permissible union of action with other creeds, all questions upon which even within the Church there exist differences of opinion that have led to important expressions by ecclesiastical authority. The discussion of such matters must arouse in every thinking man a lively interest, and there are many points in science and economics that interest equally the people of America, England, and Germany.

Some statements, especially in the introduction, indicate that the matters that gave rise to them had their origin in Germany, so that an adaptation to conditions closer to readers of this English version might have seemed in place. The translator, however, has refrained from any such attempt, and I believe correctly so, because such matters do not interfere here with the objective statement of questions and points, they rather aid by giving it a concrete form. Furthermore, I remember that in reading German translations of English works, those of Newman, Manning, and Gibbons for instance, the tracing of thought and principles to their origin and individuality seemed to me to be rather an attraction than an obstacle to their full appreciation.

May my book in this English edition spread and deepen the conviction of the truth, grandeur, and beauty of Catholic moral teaching, and thus contribute to the honour and better understanding of the Church, and to the consolation and encouragement of the faithful.

THE AUTHOR.

MÜNSTER, August, 1914.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

	PAGE
ATTACKS UPON CATHOLIC MORALS	3
VIEWS REGARDING THE CONTRAST BETWEEN CATHOLICISM AND PROTESTANTISM	10
THE PRESENT ASPECT OF THE RELIGIOUS POSITION.	
<i>a.</i> Its relation to the Reformation	15
<i>b.</i> The present position of Catholics and Protestants:	
Mutual Understanding	33
Toleration in General	39
The Question of Civil Equality	47

PART I

THE POSITION OF CASUISTRY IN CATHOLIC MORALS

I. TEACHING AND TEACHERS	57
II. THE ASCETIC AND SPECULATIVE, AS COMPARED TO THE CASUISTIC TREATMENT OF MORALS . . .	69
III. CASUISTRY AND LIFE. MORALS AS A MATTER OF REASON AND OF SENTIMENT	79
IV. PARTICULAR TOPICS OF CASUISTRY. MISUNDER- STANDINGS AND EXAGGERATIONS.	
" The End Justifies the Means "	92
Fides Implicita	98
Imperfect Contrition	101
Sins against the Sixth Commandment	103
The Question of Intention, with reference to Oaths and Promises	108
Mental Reservation and the Duty of Veracity	113

PART II

PROTESTANTISM AND THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION
OF MORALITY

	PAGE
I. THE LAW OF GOD AND CONSCIENCE	131
II. SIN AND JUSTIFICATION	150
III. LAW AND FREEDOM. PROBABILISM	176
IV. MORALITY AND HAPPINESS	215
V. INTENTION AND ACTION. MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN	237
VI. COMMANDMENTS AND COUNSELS	270
VII. THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL	312
VIII. CHURCH AND STATE	337
IX. THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH AND THE LIBERTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL	376
X. RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE . .	427
INDEX OF SUBJECTS	499

INTRODUCTION

CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING

INTRODUCTION

ATTACKS UPON CATHOLIC MORALS

THE first edition of this book appeared at a time when a very violent and noisy attack upon Catholic morals was being made in Germany.

Grassmann, a publisher in Stettin, had circulated in Protestant and Catholic circles innumerable editions of a pamphlet abounding with the most offensive charges against the moral teaching of the Church, the practice of confession, and particularly against the teachings of *St. Alphonsus Liguori*. This pamphlet was favourably received wherever inherited prejudice or ignorance caused people to be hostile to the Church, or where her present development was unwelcome for political reasons. An active propaganda distributed this work, teeming with repulsive details of moral casuistry, also amongst the Catholic laity, men and women alike, in order, if possible, to set on foot in Germany a *Los-von-Rom* movement.

The attack, however, was devised and carried on too vulgarly to make any impression upon Catholics with some knowledge of their faith. A writer who would assert that the immorality of a great number of the Popes was a well-known fact, that the nuns and priests massacred in the French Revolution had deserved their fate because they had been notorious perverters of morality; a writer who in all earnestness computed how many million women were annually seduced by their confessors, could arouse only contempt and pity in Catholic circles.

But how may we account for the deep impression made upon Protestant readers by pamphlets of this kind? Why is it that such offensive charges, though coming from most questionable sources, are at once believed, or receive at least serious considera-

tion, in spite of the publicity with which the Catholic Church carries on her work, in spite of the extensive intermixture of the different denominations, and of the obvious moral and social activity of Catholics? Over and above the difference of religion and the spiritual estrangement which unhappily still results therefrom, over and above the taste for the scandalous and sensational that so often destroys all sense of truth and justice, are there, perhaps, other reasons, of a graver nature, for this attitude of mind on the part of Protestants? Are there, perhaps, reasons on the Protestant side based upon its scientific conception of the whole of Catholicism, or objections and doubts about Catholic morals produced, not by the bigotry or ignorance of some rabid pamphleteer, but by the judgment of learned men and by the mind of Protestant theology? Are there reasons even on the Catholic side, a neglect to justify in practice the teaching and organization of the Church, deficiencies and defects in the traditional practice of morality, or an indifference to the calumnies and misrepresentations which, in the interests both of truth and charity, it ought to correct?

An incentive to the consideration of the first question, the attitude of scientific Protestant theology towards Catholic morals, was furnished by the publication, in 1900, of Professor *W. Herrmann's* book "*Römische und evangelische Sittlichkeit.*" *Herrmann* is a follower of *Ritschl*, and in his dogmatic and ethical writings he lays great stress upon the theory that the Christian faith is an absolutely free, personal act, the expression of individual experience, bound neither by revelation nor by an ecclesiastical authority. In the writings referred to, his more remote purpose is to banish from Protestantism as immoral any conception of faith that is not purely subjective, any that accepts objective truth, as guaranteed by Bible and creeds. He argues that from such a faith the idea results that the moral law is a force outside of man himself, and that thereby there are produced an untruthfulness of the inner man and a tendency to evade the law. This perverted attitude towards truth and morals is found, according to *Herrmann*, most conspicuously in Catholic moral theology and, especially, in Probabilism. Hence he writes: "Any one amongst us who desires to be a follower of Christ, and who is conscious of

being an heir of our forefathers of the Reformation, let him consider it his duty towards God and his people to resolve firmly to lay aside *the Catholic kind of faith*, which eventually causes every man to be submerged in Romish morality."¹

Herrmann makes perfectly clear to his readers what he means by "Romish morality." We shall speak of his specific charges later on, contenting ourselves here with a few select specimens of his wholesale condemnation. "What the Roman Church *officially* calls morality is a *decay* of the moral sense."² "The Roman Church is earnestly striving to suppress any such perception (of the essence of morality) in the people whom she professes to train as Christians."³ The morality of the Church is a "degenerate Christianity." "It is not merely because of the perverted principles of the Church that some of her members develop an absence of conscience, nay, the Church places herself with her whole power of authority at the head of this development; she *demand*s an absence of conscience."⁴ The approval of Probabilism "has now become the gate that *shuts Roman Christianity into hell*."⁵ At the same time the author expresses his "hearty desire" that what remains of Christianity in the Church may succeed in forcing the doors of this prison. Repeatedly he praises the earnestness of Catholics individually in the face of this system. But he adds, in a resigned spirit, "We can scarcely indulge a hope that the Roman Church will be able to work her way out of her *moral morass* and return to Christ."⁶

Herrmann's mode of controversy has been criticised even by Protestants, who think that its acrimony tends to shock readers unaccustomed to his style, and that others, besides Catholics, feel its want of moderation.⁷

Others say that we must ascribe the harshness of his utterances to the inexorable spirit of his dialectics, which is not limited to attacks upon Catholic theologians.⁸

When so-called Jesuitic morality is under discussion, even

¹ Römische und evangelische Sittlichkeit, 2d ed., Marburg, 1901. Italics here and further on are by me.

² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁷ *J. Werner*, Theolog. Rundschau, 1902, p. 383.

⁸ *Hoepel*, Die Christliche Welt, 1903, p. 726.

theologians who otherwise regard the Catholic Church with less prejudice are seized with a similar vehement indignation.

Harnack, for instance, says: "By the aid of Probabilism this Order has transformed almost all (!) mortal sins into venial sins. It has again and again given instructions to wallow in filth, to confuse conscience, and to blot out in the confessional sin by sin. . . . The method has remained unchanged, and to-day it exercises *its ravaging influence* upon dogma and ethics, and upon the conscience both of the confessor and the penitent, perhaps in a more disastrous degree than at any previous time. Since the seventeenth century the forgiveness of sins in the Catholic Church has become in many respects a crafty art . . . and yet, how indestructible is this Church, — and how indestructible is the conscience that seeks its God! It is able to detect Him even in the fetish, and to detect His voice even where the chorus of hell resounds in accompaniment."¹

In order to disprove such serious accusations, it was necessary to go back to the fundamental ideas of Catholic morals, as established in the dogma and in the general consensus of the Church, and as they underlie all casuistic discussion. Only thus can their truly moral and Christian character be vindicated. The fact that the attacks were couched in a tone of unquestioned superiority forced me to draw a comparison between the Catholic and the Protestant conception of the most important questions of morality. These fundamental discussions formed the chief part of my work, and they have won recognition even in non-Catholic circles; even *Herrmann*, though declaring that he is not convinced by my defence of Probabilism, acknowledges that I have "brought forward suggestions deserving thorough consideration from the Protestant point of view."²

¹ *Dogmengeschichte*, 1st ed., III, p. 641. In the 4th ed., p. 748, the words "in individual cases" are inserted in the first sentence after "mortal sins," and the concluding clause is modified so as to read: "it distinguishes His voice even there where very different tones sound with it."

² *Römische und evangelische Sittlichkeit*, 3d ed., p. 72. Compare the opinion expressed in the *Grenzboten*, 1903, I, p. 810: "For the second part . . . all honest Protestants will be grateful to the author, because his short, intelligible statements, based as they are on documentary evidence, afford us a convenient and trustworthy basis for argument; and, what is more important, for agreement, . . . this justification of Catholic moral teaching is so convincing

I did not, however, avoid the further question, viz., whether in the historical growth and the present form of Catholic morals there were any points of attack and friction which might be removed by a vigorous discussion and scientific development of fundamental ideas. In the first chapter I dealt with casuistry, as it, with other forms of moral teaching, has grown up within the Church. Showing that it is indispensable to a complete moral system and a successful method of moral instruction, I readily admitted its natural imperfections and a certain danger in applying it in a merely external and mechanical manner. In the third chapter I passed on from defence and criticism to practical suggestions. If the pure gold of moral wisdom, that abounds so much in the teaching of the Church, is to be revealed in all its beauty and value, it must be freed from the trammels of obsolete methods and presented to men of the present day in an acceptable form. There is no need of essential alteration or innovation, there can be no surrender of valuable points of view; on the contrary, the tradition of the Church itself supplies us with the best examples, and the intrinsic spirit of Catholic ethics affords the inexhaustible living source, from whence such new forms and developments may be readily derived.

Soon after the appearance of the second edition of this book, Count *Paul von Hoensbroech*, an ex-Jesuit who had become a Protestant, joined the ranks of those who assail Catholic morals. In his book "*Das Papsttum in seiner sozialkulturellen Wirksamkeit*,"¹ he has collected not only all the charges made by previous opponents of the Church, but also all their mistakes and unfair assertions. After a thorough examination of his material and his methods, I expressed, in a work dealing exclusively with this subject, the following opinion: "*Hoensbroech's* book gives a most unjust and much distorted account of those matters of Catholic moral teaching and discipline which he selected for discussion. His quotations are chosen with a decided bias and they are frequently mutilated or falsified with regard to their meaning.

that it is simply impossible to uphold any longer certain charges that are usually brought against it." See also *Paulsen*, *System der Ethik*, 6th ed., I, 178 A; *Wendt*, *Theolog. Lit.-Zeitung*, 1902, 483.

¹ Vol. II, *Die Ultramontane Moral*, 1-3 ed., 1902, p. 621.

The author's own remarks show an absolute failure on his part to penetrate to any depth into the ideas and history of the moral teaching of the Church, and he often flagrantly contradicts himself."¹

That this judgment was not too severe became soon apparent, even to those critics who had at first thought that the author had done good service by collecting materials. *Karl Jentsch*, for instance, soon discovered a startling instance of the untrustworthy character of *Hoensbroech's* materials, and described his method in mutilating quotations as the "climax of dishonesty."²

In the tendency throughout *Hoensbroech's* work to make obscure things accessible to the great masses by translating them from cumbrous Latin works, intended to supply the means for combating immorality, into succulent German, *Jentsch* saw nothing but "unspeakable vulgarity, and at the same time foolish hypocrisy."³

A far more searching criticism of *Hoensbroech's* honesty and knowledge of his subject was undertaken by Dr. *V. Naumann* (*Pilatus*), a freethinking scholar, far removed from Catholicism. He concluded his review with the crushing remark: "In all historical literature known to me — in fact in all literature in general — I cannot recall any other work — and I may, without boasting, claim to have read a great deal — that is written even approximately in so reckless, frivolous, and absolutely reprehensible a manner as Count *Paul von Hoensbroech's* book on Catholic morals."⁴ If then, casuistry, the practical and secular part of moral teaching, found defenders, as we have seen, in men who combine a clear and unbiassed insight into facts with a deep

¹ *Mausbach*, *Die Ultramontane Moral nach Graf Paul von Hoensbroech*, Berlin, 1902, p. 30.

² *Die Zeit*, Vienna, 1903, No. 454.

³ *Ibid.*, No. 448.

⁴ *Pilatus*, *Quos ego! Fehdebriefe wider den Grafen P. v. Hoensbroech*, Regensburg, 1903, p. 472. In his later work, *Der Jesuitismus*, 1905, 538, after passing in review all the anti-Jesuitical literature extant, *Naumann* says that, in his hatred of the Order and in his mode of attacking it, the anti-Jesuit *von Hoensbroech* was surpassed, even in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, only by *Jarrige*, and has been equalled by very few writers. . . . Nevertheless a prospectus, issued not long ago, could state that the popular edition of "*Die Ultramontane Moral*" had reached a circulation of thirty thousand.

knowledge of life, the inner, spiritual part of Catholic moral teaching, its uprightness and educational wisdom, although attacked vigorously by *Herrmann*, found appreciation by an eminent non-Catholic scholar, *F. W. Förster*, a man with whom few contemporary students of ethics can be compared, so broad is his grasp of moral ideas, so profound his knowledge of the human heart. He not only recognizes the important bearing of religion upon morality in general, but does justice to many fundamental doctrines and institutions of the Catholic Church, from the standpoint both of a student and a teacher of morals.

While in *Herrmann's* opinion moral and religious truth is merely a matter of personal experience, *Förster* emphasizes its objective and social character. While *Herrmann* condemns the acceptance of any doctrine which, instead of being subjectively evolved, is derived from some external source, as an outrage upon the *ego*, *Förster* sees in such an acceptance, where it rests on a moral basis, an act of genuine self-renunciation, by means of which the *ego* breaks through its natural limitations and renders itself worthy of higher enlightenment. While *Herrmann* brands all submission to authority in matters of religion as immoral, *Förster* considers it the only way of overcoming the bias and poverty of the individual conscience and of attaining true independence. While *Herrmann* looks upon the gospel and all dogma merely as aids to the personal knowledge of God, *Förster* maintains that "the definite formulæ of faith and the interpretations which the greatest followers of Christ, from the depths of their spiritual experience, have given to the fact and meaning of His appearance on earth, are alone capable of producing that strong sense of humble susceptibility and subordination, and that firmness of faith in this truth, which only can form the necessary foundation of a civilization based on Christianity."¹

While *Herrmann* reproaches the Church with attempting to suppress in her members all perception of the true nature of morality, *Förster* admires her wisdom and knowledge of the human soul and sees in her saints and in her religious and ascetic institutions and ideals models for modern ethics and modern ethical teaching.

¹ *Jahrbuch moderner Menschen*, 1907, p. 121.

VIEWS REGARDING THE CONTRAST BETWEEN CATHOLICISM AND
PROTESTANTISM

The attacks upon Catholic morals that we have been discussing were not provoked by any challenge or aggressive attitude on the part of Catholics. In the introduction to my book I was able to show that Catholic theology refrains from controversy to such an extent that we actually do not possess any scientific handbook of polemics, although there are several written by Protestants. With the very reasonable desire to refute many of the old historical falsehoods invented in the interests of Protestantism, has been combined an attempt to exercise an honest censorship over writers of our faith. Unfounded accusations, such as the assertion that *Luther* committed suicide, were at once opposed by leading Catholic writers. In the midst of the excitement aroused by *Grassmann's* publications, we undertook a public inquiry into the deficiencies of Catholic handbooks on moral teaching, which was absolutely impartial. The common reproach of a general inferiority of Catholics was investigated very thoroughly, and both the charge and the facts were discussed with perhaps at times excessive humility.

On the Catholic side nothing was ever organized resembling the vast organization of the German Evangelical Alliance, in which anti-Catholic activity and the prejudice of Protestantism have free scope. When the establishment of a similar alliance was suggested, the leaders of the Catholic party in Germany rejected the proposal as against the interests of confessional peace, and preferred to found, as a protection against modern assaults upon faith, the *Volksverein*, with positive aims on behalf of Christianity and social welfare.

Nor is there on the Catholic side anything analogous to the flood of vehement and factional pamphlets and articles spread broadcast by the Evangelical Alliance.¹

Although the *Los-von-Rom* movement was plainly involved with

¹ In pamphlet 223, issued by the Evangelical Alliance, the Protestant minister, Dr. *Fey*, explicitly approves of describing the Catholic Church as "a creature of hell."

political, and even unchristian, aims, it was welcomed enthusiastically by German Protestants and it received their active and, to some extent, official support, — a fact that is explicable only by an eagerness to strike a vigorous blow at the hated Catholic Church, while there is nothing analogous to such eagerness on our side.

This state of affairs must be kept in view in considering the vigorous assault made by *Denifle*, in 1904, upon the Protestant researches about *Luther* and his theology, in his book “*Luther und Luthertum, in der ersten Entwicklung quellenmässig geschildert.*”

In his preface *Denifle* remarks that the preliminary work was undertaken at a time when a violent attack upon the Catholic Church was being made by Protestant theologians, but that he did not begin his study of the Reformation for the purpose of warding off this onset, still less was it aversion to *Luther* and his work that caused him to make researches into that period. He explains, in the introduction, that his study of the deterioration of the secular and regular clergy in the fifteenth century led him on to the great upheaval of the sixteenth century, and so to *Luther* himself. In any matters upon which he brought his vast industry and his critical spirit to bear, masses of historical material were unearthed and brought to light, and in the same way, when he turned his attention to *Luther's* writings, he had soon accumulated the documentary and critical material for a comprehensive work. No historian can at the present time question the importance of *Denifle's* investigations. They are indispensable to all critics of *Luther's* works and to all interested in the origin of his doctrine and in its relation to the exegesis and the asceticism of the Middle Ages. That his appreciation of *Luther* is one-sided and far from complete is acknowledged by *Denifle* himself. His aim was to clear the way for a more general criticism by removing deeply rooted prejudices and by the collection of materials.

It is, however, not surprising that *Denifle's* work on *Luther* aroused great excitement in Protestant circles. The accounts given of *Luther's* moral conduct and of his literary methods cast such deep shadows upon his character and his scientific honesty that the picture thus drawn of the reformer becomes most unfavourable, in spite of the presence here and there of pleasing features. The

force of sensuality, of which *Luther* complains, and the necessity of sin, which he avers as the result of his own experience, are discussed by *Denifle* in a manner that must inevitably offend *Luther's* admirers, and it is actually exaggerated because *Luther* often speaks of sin and the stimulus to sin as if they were identical. Moreover, it would have been better if *Denifle* had taken into account *Luther's* passionate temperament and excessive imagination, instead of describing, as he often does, his many misrepresentations and false quotations as wilful lies.¹

Great offence was taken at the blunt tone in which *Denifle* brings his charges against *Luther* and against *Luther* students of the present day. Moreover, though *Denifle* possesses a wonderful amount of knowledge regarding the history and the ideas of scholasticism, he is somewhat lacking in sympathy with modern thought and feeling, and thus fails in some degree to make his controversial arguments appeal to the general public.

In justice to *Denifle*, it is only fair to point out that his severity is a peculiarity of his literary style to which we had grown accustomed. Besides, he could truthfully maintain that his expressions were no more scathing than those used by Protestant theologians against the Catholic Church, but that there is the difference that the latter often judge without having real knowledge of the facts, whereas *Denifle* formed his opinion after a conscientious and laborious study of *Luther's* writings. His superiority in this respect, clearly displayed on various points, filled him with indignation at the superficiality and partisan spirit of most of *Luther's* admirers. The insight that he obtained into *Luther's* actions, into his unfair opposition to the mediæval spirit and his untrustworthiness in autobiographical statements, aroused in *Denifle* an even stronger censure of *Luther* himself, intensified by the reformer's action in dragging down the ascetic ideals of the Church, and in defending, in the coarsest language, the right to satisfy sensual instincts. Any admirer of *Luther*, who is not blind to his defects, must find in his personality such striking and difficult problems that he cannot help understanding why others, of different thought and less inclined to make allowance, have so harshly condemned him. Catholic critics, furthermore, have not only deprecated *Denifle's* severe language, but have even on some points questioned his statements. Especially *H. Grisar's* essays not only contain corrections of this kind, but some valuable original remarks which, being derived from his own knowledge of *Luther's* time and rise, contribute to a fair and impartial estimate of the bright, as well as of the dark, side of his character.²

In *Grisar's* great work on *Luther*, [that subsequently appeared, it is admitted

¹ *Grisar*, *Luther gegenüber dem Gesetze der Wahrhaftigkeit*. Zeitschr. für kath. Theol., 1905, p. 417, seq.

² *Literarische Beilage zur Köln. Volksztg.*, 1904, Nos. 1-3; 1905, Nos. 40 and 41.

even by Protestants that he has dealt in a strictly scientific, dispassionate, and, as far as possible, objective manner with the material at his disposal.

From the Protestant side there appeared several replies and rejoinders, the authors of which rivalled *Denifle* in vigour of language, showing their strong religious prejudice by reiterating discredited charges against the Church. However, in other quarters, quite apart from the honour paid to *Denifle* by the University of Cambridge, voices were heard calling for justice and for peace.

In my opinion the most thorough and intelligent discussion of the subject, based purely on principles and in keeping with an objective historical understanding of the whole matter, is Professor *K. Sell's* "Katholizismus und Protestantismus in Geschichte, Religion, Politik, und Kultur."¹

Sell thinks that proposals to lessen the religious antagonism must proceed from the Catholic party, simply because Protestantism of the present time cannot be anything but tolerant (p. vi). This statement seems hardly to agree with the sentence: "The Protestant principle is essentially the personality of *Martin Luther*" (p. 40). The author means that the Lutheran faith, involving as it does a purely personal conviction of salvation in Christ, has rendered the Church, with her hierarchy, sacraments, and learning, altogether superfluous. He acknowledges that the principle of justification by faith alone did much harm in the Reformation period, that no Protestant theologians now accept it in the sense assigned to it by *Luther*, and that amongst the laity there are very few who understand this vacillating and obscure expression at all. According to *Sell* faith is essentially independent of any historical revelation, it is a perfectly independent mental act whereby we realize God in our minds. A Catholic bases his faith on the authority of the Church and surrenders to it his own intelligence, even to the point of accepting propositions that he can only "respect" and not really believe. The dogma of the Incarnation does less, in the Catholic Church, to bring men to God and Christ than to strengthen the power of the Church. This power, however, does not exist only for its own sake; the Church

¹ Leipzig, 1908.

aims, by her doctrines and sacraments, by public worship and moral perfection, at securing to her children the happiness of heaven, to which a Catholic looks forward as to a definite reality.

The imposing certainty and objectivity of Catholicism gives it a tendency "to do violence to Protestantism, whilst Protestantism is inclined to treat Catholicism with contempt" (p. 124). Here *Sell* makes the interesting remark: "As the purpose of this dissertation is to give an historical and psychological analysis of the essential principles of the two religions, rather than to criticise them, the charges brought by one against the other can be discussed only when I am speaking of the attacking religion [i.e., Protestantism] and not of the one attacked" (p. 142). *Sell* thus admits that aggressiveness is characteristic of Protestantism. Hence he says nothing of the charges brought against it by Catholicism, and states as grounds of complaint alleged by Protestants the Catholic use or misuse of the Bible, compulsory celibacy, and the practice of confession. He sees in the last two institutions the danger of corrupting the relation of the sexes and of degrading woman to a mere object of desire and a plaything of passion (p. 146).

Sell finds that a real cultus is much more intimately connected with the Catholic idea of the objective presence of God and the visible Church than with the Protestant relegation of religion into the conscience of the individual. He speaks with admiration of the beauty of Catholic worship, and sets a higher value upon the social activity of the Catholic Church (the outcome of its social and universal character) (p. 155) than upon the Protestant tendency to regard more the rights of the individual (p. 187). Many of *Sell's* remarks on the subject of the alleged inferiority of Catholics, the comparative education of adherents of the two Churches, reveal much discretion and true historical insight.

In their attitude towards the state and its authority the Protestants were originally quite as intolerant as the Catholics; it was only by the help of the state that their religion prevailed. "Very gradually did Protestantism come to comprehend the essential separation of Church and state, based not upon its own principles, but upon the earlier idea of the secularization of all power" (p. 162). However, since the faith of the Protestant is something

interior and free, he is more ready to accept the idea of toleration; and as his Church is only an assembly of the faithful, and not a Church ruled by a hierarchy, there is obviously more room left for patriotism, "for a religious reverence of ruler, government, and law" (p. 202). Catholicism, in itself, is indeed compatible with absolute political trustworthiness, but as much cannot be said "for Curialism, the *ultramontane* form of Catholicism, which still demands in mediæval fashion that the state be subordinate to the Church and strives to force Catholic truth upon the modern world by compulsion, if possible, and if not, by *all other effectual means*" (pp. 164, 176, 188). "Curialistic Catholicism is nowadays regarded as a danger by all states. Against it, and in the interests of all creeds, the Evangelical Alliance undertakes proper resistance, having recourse even to political measures. Under the influence of this harsh, curialistic tendency, many Catholics stand as much as they can aloof from intercourse with adherents of other creeds, whilst in modern Protestants the desire to maintain religious peace and toleration have become a second nature."

These discussions undoubtedly show considerable improvement over the old-fashioned methods of controversy, but we must not overlook the fact that articles written in such a peaceable spirit come from but a very limited party amongst Protestant writers of the present day. Hostile opinions and misunderstandings continue to abound to such an extent that I can here only attempt to approach real facts with reference to a general survey of the existing state of affairs, by means of a more equal distribution of light and shade. As to the questions of doctrine and principle, the discussion in the second part of this work will give me an opportunity of referring again to the views expressed by the authors above mentioned.

THE PRESENT ASPECT OF THE RELIGIOUS POSITION

a. ITS RELATION TO THE REFORMATION

A form of theology which has ceased to regard Christianity as the positive and essentially unchangeable revelation of God, and which therefore no longer considers itself bound to Christianity in

any definite form, ought, one would suppose, to approach in a perfectly impartial spirit the question of *Luther's* right and claim to act as reformer of the same. Rationalists and the modern religious philosophers, who regard faith as a subjective, personal realization of an everywhere present deity, in many cases actually display this impartiality of judgment, provided their insight is not obscured by an ignorance of facts. The profession of Protestantism however, and particularly of Protestant theology, produces in its adherents a psychological disposition which makes it difficult for them to correctly estimate *Luther*, no matter how anxious they may be to judge facts honestly and independently, — more so than for a Catholic, in spite of his dogmatic point of view. *W. Köhler*¹ remarks that recent historical research has in some important particulars produced a modification of *Luther's* sweeping condemnation of Rome, and he goes on to say: "*Whatever is gained in this way by Catholicism, is a loss to Protestantism*" (p. 51). This admission shows us the real cause of the phenomenon to which I have referred. It is equivalent to this: If the life work of *Luther* — viz., Protestantism as an aggressive, negative force — is right, it follows that the Catholic Church must be wrong. The degree of *Luther's* justification depends upon the degree in which the Catholic Church was wrong. *Luther* broke with the Church and established Protestantism on the strength of certain definite charges brought against the Church; viz., that by her teaching and organization she had falsified and corrupted Christianity in such a radical and irremediable manner that a Christian was in duty bound to wage war upon her so as to bring about the victory of a purer form of Christianity. The numerous practical abuses and scandals of his time served *Luther* as convenient and gross illustrations of this corruption. But all this could not justify a falling away from the Church, so long as she was inwardly sound and preserved intact her religious principles, her authority, and the means of grace; for by this inner vitality she retained the capacity to eliminate any diseased matter that had penetrated into her system. *Luther* was bound, therefore, to show also that the teaching of the Church had degenerated, and that her claim to be the channel of grace and truth was false.

¹ *Katholizismus und Reformation.*

It behooved him to offer to mankind in his new gospel a conception of Christianity more true to the original, and one more moral and more fruitful than that of the Catholic Church. Viewed in this way, we see indeed that whatever is a gain for Catholicism is a loss to Protestantism. When *Janssen* undertook to throw fresh light upon the gloomy picture usually drawn of the state of morals and civilization at the close of the Middle Ages, and when he refuted many of *Luther's* gross exaggerations, he inevitably destroyed the sense of contrast generally produced by highly coloured accounts of the Reformation, and thus he contributed to a justification of Catholic dogma. A careful study of the teaching of the Church, a recognition of the fact that scholasticism indeed based all salvation upon faith, that in Catholicism faith, like contrition, was an act of interior conviction and devotion to Christ, and that God's grace and the love proceeding from it formed the very soul of Catholic piety, — these things at once gave rise to a doubt as to whether *Luther's* doctrine of justification by faith had been really such a magnificent advance in the theory of salvation as he had avowed it to be and as Protestantism has always proclaimed.

Catholics experience no such inherent difficulty in surveying impartially the facts of history. If anything is gained for Protestantism by modern research, it is not necessarily lost to Catholicism. The Church confronted *Luther* with her apostolic authority, and he could not turn his back upon her without absolutely denying in principle that authority. On the other hand, in accordance with her principles, she could, and had to, cast out *Luther* if he separated himself from her on even one single point of dogma, even had he been a priest of most blameless life and a most learned theologian. Whatever in his writings is really Christian and edifying, whatever thoughts derived from the Bible and tradition continue to flow pure and true, they are certainly not losses to the Church; on the contrary, she recognizes them as her own property, like the Bible itself, and the doctrines which *Luther* adopted from her. In opposition to *Luther*, *Jansenius*, and others, she has always maintained that sinners, heretics, and pagans are able, by the aid of reason, to grasp moral ideas and religious truths, and possess will power to perform natural good works. Why, then, should she hesitate to recognize what is true and good in her adversaries? The

Fathers of the early Church already remarked that the danger of errors of faith, and the success of a new faith, stood oftentimes in a psychological connection with a powerful and abounding intellect. "No one is capable of starting a heresy who does not possess an ardent spirit and great natural gifts, such as only the Creator could bestow upon him."¹

From *Tertullian* down to *Lamennais* and *Döllinger*, there have been many instances showing that such men, although their separation from the Church was severely criticised and deeply lamented, were not delivered up to reckless persecution and hatred, nor to defamation. In principle, therefore, a Catholic is at liberty to do justice to *Luther's* character and doctrine on all doubtful points; but Catholics and Protestants agree in acknowledging that he was a heretic from the Church's point of view, and as such the Church was bound to condemn him. The interests of Catholicism do not require us to deny or minimize the evils and scandals in the Church that paved the way for the Reformation. There were voices raised, even before *Luther's* time and contemporaneously with him, against these evils, and the Council of Trent, in the very first sentence of its proceedings, declared that its task was not only to combat heresy and to establish the Christian faith, but also to effect a necessary reformation of the clergy and of the Christian people.

It will be objected that actual Catholic controversy does not show much trace of this broad-minded and impartial spirit, but I am speaking here of liberty to choose a point of view, as a matter of principle. The actual form of controversy is influenced by other tendencies and presumptions, more or less accidental. The distinction, however, between the positive and assured status of the Church and the negation contained in the very name and nature of Protestantism is apparent also in the actual mode of carrying on the conflict. *Harnack* remarks: "A false mode of warfare consists in comparing the excellent theory of one's own Church with the faulty practice of the other. It were better to compare theory with theory and practice with practice. Useless are squabbles in which the Churches taunt one another these days with the sins of the past." The discussions of *Köhler* and *Harnack*, however, show

¹ *Origen*, in *Osee*, II, 10; *St. Augustine*, En. in ps. 124, 5.

that the corrections made by impartial research in theoretical and controversial theology were for the most part corrections of Protestant prejudices, dating from the time of *Luther* and still finding frequent expression in popular Protestant literature. In attacking the Catholic Church, it was tempting and easy to seek confirmation of alleged "bad theories" by bad practices, because, in comparison with Protestantism, her "past" is so much more extended, her responsible agents and institutions so much more public and accessible, and the contrast between her lofty ideals and their defective realization, where such actually occurs, so much more striking. For any one with a keen eye for such things it was easy to compile a copious *chronique scandaleuse* of sins and follies in the history of the Church. However, no one can deny that Catholic controversialists have never displayed any such versatility in enumerating scandalous incidents for the sake of arousing aversion. In this respect they have limited their activity almost exclusively to the person of *Luther*; and truly few historical characters offer so much scope for this treatment as his, especially since Protestants have always put him forward, and still do so, as the very incarnation of the Protestant spirit. On this subject, however, more thorough investigations, such as are now being made, were required on the part of Catholics, in order to be perfectly just towards the founder of Protestantism and to be able to give an intelligible account of the influence that he exerted upon the history of the world; we require an accurate statement of his doctrines, an appreciation, based on facts, of his intentions and actions, and we must study him calmly and objectively, never accepting as true anything, however probable it seems, unless it is fully proved, even though we are dealing with an unfair antagonist.

In questions relating to theories and the history of dogma Catholic theology, unlike Protestant theology, has never been compelled to abandon earlier positions. Protestants, of the past and the present, regard it as *Luther's* greatest achievement and merit that he secured freedom from the Papacy, destruction of hierarchical power, abolition of the Mass and other *ceremonies* and of the veneration of saints and relics, the denial of the possibility of merit; and we have never questioned the fact that he did all this. If modern theologians extol *Luther* for making man depend upon himself and

his own inner consciousness, and for regarding religion as a subjective matter, thus giving unbridled freedom to that independent and self-glorifying daring of the individual which still affects modern civilization so much, — these ideas, though they may suggest many critical limitations, give us no reason to abandon our old positions in apologetics or to revise them. Catholics and Protestants will always assign different moral and religious values to these things, but in the historical recognition of facts both go a long way on the same path.

On one point only is the opposition in their historical conception as great, and the conflict between them as sharp, as it was fifty years ago; in fact the energy formerly displayed on the subject of dogma seems now to centre upon the historical discussion of what *Luther's* doctrine actually was and just what he meant by *justifying faith*. In the last few years, whenever Catholic theologians have attacked *Luther's* teaching, their arguments have been aimed especially at this point. On this subject controversy at the present day still presents the same features as of old, — on the one side admiring appreciation, on the other unreserved condemnation. According to the Protestant view the theory of "justification by faith alone" resumes and expands *St. Paul's* teaching, and has given liberty and increased vigour to the religious life of Christians without affecting their moral life; according to the Catholic view it has accomplished a violent separation between faith and charity, between religion and morals, a separation, itself immoral and unchristian, that must inevitably lead to a weakening of morality. And both parties claim with equal assurance to be expressing *Luther's* real opinion, and justify their respective views by abundant quotations from his writings and speeches.

To what cause can we ascribe this sharp antithesis, this exception to the equalizing influence of historical research? One reason for it may undoubtedly be found in the central position assigned by *Luther* to faith. *Sola fides* is the material principle of his system, just as *sola scriptura* is its formal principle; and justification by faith alone is the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiae*. To prove the original meaning of this proposition to have been serious, noble, and Christian is a matter of vital importance from the Protestant standpoint, whilst to discover in it the root of *Luther's* other fatal

errors appears to a Catholic controversialist a real triumph. But have not "Protestant scholars since *Lessing's* time perceived that the written word is inseparable from tradition,"¹ and does not this involve abandoning the formal principle of the reformers? This is a fact closely connected with the development of liberal Protestantism with regard to its conception of Revelation, going in this beyond *Luther*; for rationalistic theology does not stand at all in the same relation to the Bible and tradition as *Luther*. These theologians assert that, in his version of the formal principle, *Luther* was influenced by false historical views; but by putting unfavourable interpretation upon his *sola fides* doctrine, is he not charged with misunderstanding the true nature of religion and morality?

Without doubt the whole question becomes still more complicated and confused if strong emphasis is laid with partiality upon certain support for modern ideas found in *Luther's* conception of faith, or upon some of its non-essential features as the advocates of free, undogmatic Christianity usually do.²

To confuse the question with other doctrines put forward by the reformers is also an obstacle to a clear comprehension of it, for instead of explaining the *sola fides* doctrine in its true sense, many writers proceed to defend it by referring to the blessings of the Reformation in civilization and the way in which it delivered mankind from priestcraft and penance, from indulgences and monasticism. This is particularly questionable when an author begins by depicting the Catholic doctrine of justification by works in the traditional manner, and then goes on to speak of the *sola fides* doctrine as adding depth and sincerity to this mechanical kind of Christianity. This style of writing is plainly biassed and inaccurate,³ and even if it were correct, it would be very doubtful whether a man of such vigour as *Luther* has found the happy mean in this controversy, and has not rather gone to the opposite extreme.

Even if such errors as these are avoided, there are still great difficulties in the way of agreement. *Luther* is not consistent in his

¹ *Harnack*, 22.

² *Ibid.*, 22, note; *Sell*, 125, *seq.*

³ Cf. *Köhler*, pp. 44, 50.

utterances; at one time he speaks of faith as a purely passive attitude of mind, having no ethical value, in which the soul acquires Christ's merits without being in any way bound to renounce sin, as a kind of reliance, regardless of all good works. At another time he describes faith as a living, active force, needing no stimulus of the law, but being compelled by inward constraint to show zeal in good works. *Luther's* works are full of contradictions, but nowhere is this so apparent as with regard to this central point of his teaching and view of life. It is therefore a student's duty, not to be one-sided in choosing quotations in support of his own view, whilst rejecting any contrary to it. Theologians on both sides have undoubtedly erred in this respect. It is permissible for a commentator to attempt, as far as he can, to show that opposing expressions may be referred to one fundamental opinion, — and what the Protestant theologians say regarding the precise meaning of justification, as distinct from (subsequent) sanctification, certainly tends to remove some difficulties, — but it is not right, from motives of mistaken loyalty, to represent clear definite statements as meaning the exact opposite, or as being mere exaggerations of expression.

How are we to get over the difficulty as to which conception of faith ought to be considered *Luther's* own, according to his own testimony? I hope later on, when discussing the Catholic and Protestant doctrines of justification, to establish the important point that we must regard, as *Luther's* own conception of faith, the one that agrees most naturally with his other characteristic doctrines, such as the absence of free will, the impossibility of fulfilling the law, the equality of all sins, absolute certainty of salvation, etc.

According to the ordinary rules of historical criticism, the following assertions are incontestable:

1. *Luther's* essential and characteristic doctrines must not be sought in things in which he agrees with the Church and her classical teachers, *but in what is new and peculiar to himself*; i.e., on points where he is in opposition to the Catholic, traditional teaching. It is on these lines only that we can account for the tremendous movement connected with his name and the embittered conflict regarding his idea of justification; it is only for this reason

that he deserves to be called a reformer, a pioneer opening up a new religious life. But *Luther's* doctrine would be neither new nor revolutionary if *Tschackert* is correct in his definition of its essence. *Tschackert* writes: "*Luther* often declared that his whole doctrine consisted of two things, faith and love. The practice of charity is, in the eyes of Protestants, inseparable from faith. It is a radical mistake to charge Protestantism with teaching justification by mercy alone on condition of faith, without paying any attention to man's ethical duties. Protestantism has never disregarded these, but has only laid particular stress upon the justification of a sinner in God's sight, in order that man might first of all be brought into his right relation with God; from this relation of faith springs a life of holy charity in all its various forms" (p. 27). What *Tschackert* here describes is precisely the Catholic doctrine as it was taught by all the scholars of the Middle Ages, and as it was defined by the Council of Trent. If this were indeed the quintessence of *Luther's* teaching, the whole schism would be an inexplicable mystery, and the catchword *sola fides* would be most unhappily selected to designate *Luther's* views.¹

2. There is a psychological aspect of the matter that is perhaps still more important and decisive. The moral conception of faith and the importance attached to good works are so natural, so much in harmony with the Christian and natural conscience, that we need not be surprised if *Luther* often bears witness to this truth, although it contradicts his own principles as a reformer. On the other hand, the exact definition of his conception of faith, the extolling of a faith that permits a man to continue in sin, is so audacious, so offensive to the Christian and moral consciousness, that we absolutely cannot understand how any one with a highly gifted intellect could go to such lengths, unless he had desired to

¹ Cf. *Krogh-Tønning*, *Erinnerungen eines Konvertiten*, Trèves, 1907, p. 302. "In my account of *Luther's* doctrine of atonement, I certainly did not intend to deny that he taught much that did not imperil Christian morality, but was perfectly compatible with it. It is, however, just on this side that *Luther's* doctrines are organically connected with those of the universal Church of the past. . . . Not in this way did he become a reformer. If we are to describe and judge him as such, as a reformer, it must be on the ground of his *innovations*." More precise evidence is given in *Krogh-Tønning's* earlier work, *Die Gnadenlehre und die stille Reformation*, Christiania, 1894, written whilst he was still a Protestant.

proclaim thereby to the world his own personal preference. The heat of controversy is not enough, by far, to account for the harshness, energy, and tenacity of *Luther's* utterances on this point. If we mentally pass in review all the heretical and revolutionary spirits known to us in history, we shall find that they became such, not because their teaching was exclusively false and revolutionary, but because, in the course of what was otherwise perhaps a very estimable career, they permitted themselves to be carried away by certain propositions or demands which placed them in opposition to Church or state. In answer to *Möhler*, *F. Chr. Baur* tried to excuse *Luther's* famous dictum, *Pecca fortiter*, by saying that we did not know under what precise circumstances the letter to *Melanchthon* was written. *Möhler* replied: "I will give him [*Baur*] twenty years to reflect under what *possible* circumstances *Luther* or any other Christian could bring such words in harmony with the Gospel."¹

Even if we may see in this expression a striving after rhetorical effect, there are other passages, both numerous and emphatic, in which *Luther* not only separates justifying faith from morality of life, but even places them in opposition. These passages are explicable only if we assume them to be the outcome of a conviction that had completely mastered his intellect, and so was able to defy the opposition of Christian consciousness and the objections of a practical nature.

3. It is obviously important to trace the *development* of *Luther's* fundamental principle in the sequence of his writings, in determining the question how far he himself was responsible for the blunt formulation of this principle. The historical development which began with him, or reacted upon him, may likewise serve to reflect the characteristic features of his teaching. The Council of Trent, which surely possessed full knowledge of the condition of affairs with regard to religion, and desired to deal with them seriously and circumspectly, would have missed its aim and would have attacked a phantom instead of a real enemy if, in condemning fiduciary faith, it had failed to understand *Luther's* real meaning.

¹ *Möhler*, *Neue Untersuchungen der Lehrgegensätze zwischen Katholiken und Protestanten*, 2d ed., p. 225.

There have always been Protestant theologians who boasted of preserving their inheritance from *Luther* with scrupulous fidelity. They have watched with distrust every attempt to attach more importance to the necessity of a moral life. Ever since the time of the Majoristic controversy "the aversion to any interpretation or expression which brought obedience on the part of man, or his good works, into relation with eternal life grew year by year stronger and more general among German Protestants," and theological works with a strongly marked moral tendency incurred at once the suspicion of heresy.¹

Apart from the veneration of *Luther's* person by Protestants, there is something else which makes it difficult for them to assign the true historical meaning to his definitive teaching, and this is the fact that, in the course of time, Protestant preachers and theologians have stripped *Luther's* doctrine of justification of its contradiction and, as we have seen in the case of *Tschackert*, have changed *sola fides* into "faith and charity."

This is the so-called *silent reformation* which *Kroggh-Tønning* describes as a "reaction in the heart of Protestantism in favour of Catholicism." It is at the same time a very decided "condemnation of the essential point in *Luther's* teaching." In consequence of this gradual transformation, as this Norwegian convert points out, the relation of faith to good works is now a doctrine upon which Catholics and Protestants are practically agreed. Protestant theology has abandoned those of *Luther's* tenets that are unchristian and subversive of morality, and so it now teaches a form of Lutheranism that is not historical, for "it has given up the principles antagonistic to the Church, and by means of a silent reformation has again taken up the moral point, endeavouring all the while to assert its Lutheran origin, even in matters that are irreconcilable with the thoughts and the teaching of the Reformation."²

¹ *Döllinger*, *Die Reformation*, 1848, III, 523; cf. *Lagarde*, *Deutsche Schriften*, p. 46.

² *Erinnerungen*, p. 303. *Kroggh-Tønning* refers to the proofs given in his "Dogmatik" (4 vols., 1886-1894). On page 319 he remarks that the incessant praise given to *Luther* for ideas utterly alien to him has become most repulsive and savours "of sailing dishonourably under false colours."

We have here a direct confirmation of the traditional meaning, held by Catholics, of *Luther's sola fides* doctrine, and it is given by one who is exceptionally well informed and who was formerly a zealous adherent of Lutheranism. The same thing, however, is acknowledged more or less frankly by German theologians.¹

Köhler blames Catholic theologians for their incapacity to understand the freshness and joyful activity imparted by the Lutheran certainty of salvation, the principle "sinner yet just." But immediately afterwards he admits that *Luther's* denial of free will requires some correction on the lines of Catholic claims. Further on he writes: "As the ethical moment in the process of salvation is pushed into the background, occasionally disappearing altogether, this process finds its resting point or centre of gravity in the ultimate end of reconciliation with God. The result of this is to deprive ethics of protection against a twofold danger, against quietism on the one hand and laxity on the other."²

Köhler acknowledges with regard to the phrase, "at the same time a sinner and saved," that it contains a compromise between ethical supernaturalism of being without sin and the realism of experience, which forms the transition either to pessimism in sinning, to that common opinion "we are once for all sinners," or to an exaggerated laudation of God's grace which carries a sinful soul into a sinless heaven. He says that if Catholics always recur to *Luther's Pecca fortiter* — sin lustily — he "is bound to confess that they are not beating the air, for there are really defects here." We have here indeed the *fundamental* defect of Lutheranism, the untenable compromise between realism and supernaturalism, be-

¹ *Hase* remarks (*Handbuch der Protest. Polemik*, 7th ed., 1900, p. 261, etc.) that the "Semi-Pelagian tendency" (?) of Catholic dogma approximates to the modern Protestant consciousness more closely than the dogma of the reformers with its gloomy dignity. "Hence it has come to pass that Protestant theologians of the present day, even such as consider themselves exponents of pure Lutheranism, describe faith that makes for salvation as *faith active in charity*, exactly according to the scholastic conception of *fides formata*, and oppose it to what they assume to be a Catholic dogma of justification by good works."

² *Ibid.*, p. 56. In order to avoid misunderstandings, *Köhler* remarks on this passage that he knew of course "how the Lutheran *fides-fiducia* presupposes a change in the whole personality of a man and also therefore of his moral sense. But this is entirely different from an active participation in moral actions." That *Luther's fides* presupposes a change in the whole disposition of a man is certainly not true, whatever may be the effect of faith upon his moral sense.

tween sin and grace, that makes *Luther's* idea of justification essentially different from the Catholic view. Even if it were true, as *Köhler* says, that by a happy inconsistency *Luther* never fails to see the advantage of good works, — a statement that we emphatically challenge and that *Köhler* himself withdraws with reference to the *Pecca fortiter* maxim, — it would still be an irremediable defect in *Luther's* system that the interests of morality obtain recognition only through the back door, by a "happy inconsistency."

In his discussion *Harnack* puts this matter under the heading: "Justification by faith alone, or by faith and works?" This heading is inexact in so far as the Catholic Church does not ascribe justification to good works, but requires good works as necessary to righteousness. With regard to justification, she requires of man, besides faith and hope, also a love of God, or at least an inward disposition which is an honest devotion to morality, and therefore a love of God in its wider signification. This definition appears subsequently in *Harnack's* discussion where he says: "If there were no religious controversy, no Evangelical Christian would object to the proposition that only that faith is of value which reveals itself in the love of God and of one's neighbour. No one would then discuss the perplexing further question whether in that case value was to be given to faith or to love; for the sort of faith which is here referred to is absolutely inseparable from love." He says that such pointed definitions, while common to the methods of teaching and controversy prevalent on both sides in the sixteenth century, are now foreign to our mode of thinking and feeling. *Harnack* maintains "that in the Catholic Church then as now, although she always has taught that all merit is dependent upon the grace of God and faith, a certain laxity in practice has prevailed, and an idea of sanctification by works, which, though originally of a pedagogic nature, has ended by being theoretically justified and put to use for the purpose of making money." It was in opposition to this that "the *furor teutonicus et christianus* broke out and asserted the correct doctrine in the sharpest terms." As soon, however, as Protestantism was no longer obliged to fight for its existence, it softened the harshness of its formula, and so the Catholic Church need only emphasize such of her principles as are

akin to the Evangelical standpoint and renounce the laxer views, in order to draw the two religions more closely together.

Harnack admits that many Protestants still refuse to agree to the proposition that *that* faith only is valuable which reveals itself in love of God and of one's neighbour, and that their refusal to agree to it becomes more obstinate when they engage in religious controversy with Catholics. This is due not to any interior, ethical, or even biblical difficulty involved in the proposition, but to a consciousness that it contradicts *Luther's* doctrine of justification, which they are unwilling to surrender. Moreover, if the antithesis "faith alone," and "faith and love" is defined as *Harnack* defines it, the former receives a meaning which forbids us to say that *Luther* asserted the *correct* doctrine in the sharpest terms. A Catholic is certainly not led to consider the delicate question whether value is to be attached to faith *or* love, because he abides by the principle of faith *and* love, — faith as the root, love as the blossom and fruit of justification. On the other hand, with the principle "faith alone," the question is already settled in a most fatal and incorrect manner. That faith is absolutely inseparable from love is true of that view of faith mentioned by *St. Paul* in Galatians v. 6, which scholasticism describes as "faith inspired by love," and which *Luther* also occasionally has depicted very nicely. But elsewhere he emphatically combats this *fides caritate formata* of the scholastics and denies that love bears any relation to justification; he represents justifying faith as compatible with sin even so emphatically, that it is impossible to say that his conception of faith necessarily includes charity. We are not now concerned with the alleged laxity in Catholicism, nor with the abuse of indulgences and such things; we are only considering the meaning of dogmatic opinions as matters of principle. When the two points of view are compared, it certainly is impossible to impute "principles of greater laxity" to Catholicism.¹

¹ In his "Wesen des Christentums," p. 180, *Harnack* gives a similar justification of *Luther*, with the even more explicit admission that, in consequence of the *sola fides* doctrine, charity and obedience to the commandments had been thrust into the background, so that the German Reformed Churches very justly complained of laxity in matters of morals. *Harnack's* "Dogmengeschichte," on the contrary, contains an interpretation of *Luther's* opinion

Sell discusses most clearly the difference between the Reformation's idea of faith and that now prevalent amongst Protestantism of the present day, though he does it in such general terms that the contrast remains obscure on the most important point. He says: "It is a well-known fact that dogmatic Protestantism and most of the Evangelical theologians still regard the so-called doctrine of justification by faith alone as the fundamental principle of Protestantism. It is also well known that very few Protestant laymen understand this expression, for it is inexact and vacillating, it varies in its meaning. Historians are aware that this doctrine did very much harm at the time of the Reformation, because it was broadly interpreted to mean: Faith is everything, and it does not matter at all what one does. It gave rise to lawlessness among the people, as the reformers themselves sorrowfully admitted. The full theological meaning of this doctrine, however, as formulated at the time of the Reformation, is not, I suppose, accepted nowadays by a single one of the strictly ecclesiastical theologians, for it is based upon the presumption that the human will possesses no freedom and that predestination is absolute, so that man of himself cannot contribute in the smallest degree towards his admission to grace and salvation. It is based, moreover, upon the presumption that God allowed Himself to be appeased by the death and blood of Christ, in the meaning that He was induced to modify His great wrath at sin." After commenting adversely upon this view of the redemption, *Sell* continues: "In spite of the fact that the real Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone is *no longer accepted anywhere*, Protestantism has not only stood its ground in its intrinsic nature, but has continued to *develop consistently*, and, as a religious principle, it is an intellectual and moral force of inexhaustible fertility, no less comprehensive than Catholicism."¹

We ought to be glad to have so frank an acknowledgment of the contrast between the old and the new views held by Protestants, but in another respect this statement is unsatisfactory. *Sell* had just remarked that faith is "*the absolute characteristic* of Protest-

which appears to be an acceptance of the *sola fides* in its extremest form (4th ed., III, pp. 886 *seq.*).

¹ *Katholizismus und Protestantismus*, p. 126.

antism as a religion. *Its mode and substance constitute the essence of Protestantism*" (p. 125). Faith assumed this position from the outset, through its connection with the problem of justification; it was from this problem that it derived its "mode and substance." Is it not exceedingly strange that very few Protestant laymen understand the meaning of justification by faith alone, and that they are exonerated because it is a vacillating and inexact expression? Is it not still more surprising to hear that the real Protestant doctrine of justifying faith is described as untenable even by strict theologians, and that nevertheless "Protestantism has not only stood its ground, but has continued to develop consistently"? The mode and substance of faith constitute the essence of Protestantism, but the mode and substance of justifying faith, as *Luther* understood and taught it, are no longer accepted anywhere. Apparently self-annihilation is the consistent development of Protestantism, according to these statements, and yet earlier in his book *Sell* called *Luther's* personality the essence of Protestantism; consequently he now wishes to show that the newer kind of faith, that has taken the place of the real Protestant faith of the Reformation period, is still *Luther's* faith. He describes it as a personal realization of God, as an act of the will whereby we recognize God and stand up for Him: it is a "ceaseless amalgamation of the *ego* and of the supernaturally divine that is realized by the *ego* as a living and overpowering force" (p. 128). The two or three passages, however, which *Sell* quotes from *Luther* in support of this view do not in the least suffice to prove that he held this absolutely modern kind of self-willed faith. On the contrary, *Luther's* faith is based entirely on the absence of free will in man, upon the redemption effected by Christ as man's representative, and upon the historical gospel.

The tendency to explain and to increase lucidity, which we have noted, will have to be developed still more if we are to have an historical basis for an honest understanding. Instead of the complete obscurity or the vague ideas which now stand in the way of all real knowledge, laymen may ask for information regarding the true meaning of the *sola fides* doctrine. Any one who is convinced that it is untenable should say so without circumlocution and hesitation. Let him say: "Just as *Luther* was wrong in isolating Holy

Scripture, so was he mistaken in his view of justifying faith. He went wrong, therefore, on points that he regarded as essential, as the very fundamental doctrines of the Reformation." He may, if he chooses, continue: "Apart from these erroneous ideas, *Luther* said many things that were true and beautiful, and as a result of his conflict with the Church he delivered us from many doctrines and institutions that are incomprehensible and intolerable to men of the present day, so that we, though we reject his gospel, continue to honour him as a powerful factor in the new development of the human race." With such an honest admission much would be gained and the path for further investigation cleared. No objection would be raised if, in order to account for *Luther's* mistakes, any one should propose to take into consideration the circumstances of the time which irritated him, and his own psychological tendencies and development. In fact we could to some extent join in this work and approach the question as to whether an error, which so powerfully excited and influenced the minds of men, may not have been the expression of a deeply felt religious need, though it was caused to flow into wrong channels. Yet such moderating considerations do not remove the fault and the wrong done; they give it at best a tragic aspect. The truths of Christianity are so exalted, and the obligation of observing the moral law so sacred, that it is impossible to justify *Luther's* obstinate advocacy of false theories and views dangerous to morality, and to say that he was forced to emphasize the *sola fides* doctrine in opposition to Catholicism. For he stubbornly maintained his one-sided view against men who were more anxious to instruct than to argue, and who certainly did not uphold a merely external form of Catholicism.

Harnack thinks that Protestantism has some right to reproach the Catholic Church with her sins of the past, because she never retracts anything¹; but is it not even worse to retract an old error by means of a *silent reformation*, and at the same time to bestow fresh glory upon the perpetrator of the error, crediting him falsely with the corrected opinion? This is just what is to a great extent going on amongst Protestants. The Church does not retract her dogmatic decisions, — the *silent reformation* is a proof

¹ Protestantismus und Katholizismus, p. 28.

of her wisdom in so doing, — but she does reform herself and her writings on points of law and discipline, as the Council of Trent did, and she is quite willing to abandon what is obsolete in science and culture (e.g., the Ptolemaic system, prohibition of lending at interest, etc.).

A positive definition of *Luther's* teaching on the subjects of redemption and justification would also make good an old wrong done by Protestantism to Christianity as a whole. If we trace the origin and literature of Rationalism and, furthermore, read the personal views of prominent freethinkers, we again and again find that their antagonism to positive Christianity is based upon an understanding of its doctrines which are not those of the primitive and Catholic Church, but of the orthodox Protestant body and based upon *Luther*; it comprises his theories of the complete absence of free will, of the power of original sin, of justification by mere faith and imputation, and of the impossibility of fulfilling the law and attaining to sanctity. These misunderstandings extend to most recent works on ethics and are responsible for the resulting aversion towards all that is specifically Christian. In his discourses to the German nation, *Fichte* says that the method of education hitherto invoked has taught to "its students from their youth that there is in man a natural repugnance to God's commandments, and that it is absolutely impossible for him to conform to them."¹

Goethe, as a young man, was horrified by hearing a preacher say that it was Pelagianism to assume the existence in man's nature of anything good which, by the help of God's grace, might develop and bring forth fruit.² Similar ideas, and especially the exaggeration of evil, of saving faith, etc., led *Tolstoi* to set all ecclesiastical dogma aside as "perfect nonsense" and to put in its place a kind of Christianity that he devised for himself.³

¹ Reclam edition, p. 50.

² *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Bk. XV, *init.*

³ *Tolstoi*, *Mein Glaube*, 1902, pp. 30, 160, 171, 176. In George Macdonald's "David Elginbrod" (1871, p. 37) the father, after listening to a sermon on imputed righteousness, says to his daughter: "Dinna ye believe, ma bonny doo, 'at there's ony mak' ups or mak' shifts wi' *Him*. . . . He sees us jist as we are, and ca's us jist what we are. It wad be an ill day for a' o's, Maggy, gin He war to close His een to oor sins, and ca' us jist in His sicht, whan we cudna

In this way the gloomy, violent feature in *Luther's* teaching has, to a great extent, been to blame for the fact that, in subsequent ages, men of powerful intellect have turned away from Christianity and sought a more cheerful, reasonable, and humane view of life. Latter Protestantism has not freed itself from the same reproach, but continues its occasion by regarding *Luther*, in a partisan spirit, as the apostle of liberty and progress, while, on the other hand, it represents the Middle Ages as sunk in bondage and darkness, whereas in reality they possessed a joyful and fundamentally harmonious Christianity.

b. THE PRESENT POSITION OF CATHOLICS AND PROTESTANTS

Mutual Understanding

In discussing the present relations existing between Catholics and Protestants in Germany, Protestant theologians have expressed regret at the cleft that still separates them and at the want of true comprehension and sympathy, which exists not only in matters of religion, but extends to other things also, and spoils the social and national life of the country. Surely every Catholic shares in this regret and desires that the adherents of the two Churches in their civil life might find a common ground in the interest of Christianity and of its defence against the inroads of unbelief, in the interest also of patriotism. The fact that Catholics are in the minority in Germany, and especially in Prussia, makes them particularly susceptible to the hardships and friction of a religious conflict. We have seen, in the foregoing pages, that Protestant authors tend to lay the blame for intellectual and social separation upon the Catholics, because they are alleged to have cut themselves off from the intellectual and social life of the country and to display less toleration than the Protestants. These writers assume the superiority of Protestantism with such an absolute certainty that it makes a peculiar impression upon Catholic readers, which is deep-

possibly be just in our ain or in ony ither body's, no to say His." Further on (p. 39) the father questions his children on the sermon and asks: "An' what called he them, Johnnie, that put on the robe (of righteousness)?" "Whited sepulchres," answered Johnnie, indebted for his wit to his wool-gathering.

ened by the tone of well-meant reproof used by these authors. *Sell* thinks that any proposals tending to mutual understanding must come from the Catholics, because modern Protestantism is incapable of intolerance (p. vi). He supposes, however, that the prohibition to read books placed on the Index makes it absolutely impossible for educated Catholics, with few exceptions, to form an independent opinion regarding the religion of others (p. 252).

Tschackert says that we cannot complain of want of charity on the part of the Protestant clergy, for amongst them the spirit of evangelical liberty reigns supreme, and that the Protestants, being intellectually free, ought to make many allowances for the Catholics of Germany.¹

Sell remarks that Catholicism is anxious to overpower Protestantism, whilst Protestantism is apt to treat Catholicism with contempt (p. 124). In our discussions we are concerned less with any external struggle, in which one party might "overpower" the other (although, considering the large majority of Protestants in Germany, surely no Catholic could seriously have such a mad idea), than with the contempt shown by Protestants to the Catholic religion as being a debased and for the most part superstitious creed. This contempt is very widely spread and forms a very real obstacle to peace. It is psychologically inevitable that such contempt must increase, more so even than open hostility, the ignorance and want of comprehension that rises like a barrier between Catholics and Protestants. "Freedom" to study the institutions and doctrines of others does not by any means imply an inclination to do so. Men are only too ready to disregard that which they despise; in fact the wish to despise anything is often enough reason to ignore it.

It is notorious that at all times "evangelical freedom" has carefully excluded everything Catholic from its literature, and for most Protestants there exists a strictly observed, though invisible, Index with regard to Catholic books. This has been a great hindrance to a knowledge of the Middle Ages and of the Reformation period, as Protestant scholars themselves admit; and in everyday life we learn, by sad experience, how many grotesque misrepresentations and spiteful caricatures find their way even into

¹ *Tschackert*, pp. 38, 41.

the better class of literature, and thus are spread amongst the people. *Sell* refers to some Catholic writers who, after becoming Protestants, have expressed to him their boundless astonishment at the difference between Protestant doctrine as it really is and as it was represented to them. Instances of the reverse kind are certainly far more numerous. In discussing the reproach brought against the Church of being a foe to nature, *F. W. Förster* says: "*Catholica non leguntur*; statements are made in which the exaggerations of some Catholic writers are used with design, not from original sources but at third and fourth hand; and consequently one after another repeats the charge of antagonism to nature, without taking the least trouble to find out if this is really the official teaching of the Church."¹

"Who amongst us," writes *Krogsh-Tønning* concerning the Protestant theologians in Norway, "knew of these sources of learning? I do not exaggerate when I say: *Almost no one*. . . . What they fancy they know is information obtained at second, third, or tenth hand, and — mark this well — *the hand is that of an enemy*."²

Even *Zinzendorf* in his later years complained that the Protestants talked a great deal about *libertatem*, but *in praxi* they were far less tolerant than the Catholics. And *M. Schiele*, a modern writer who calls himself "a decided Protestant," but whose eyes were opened at Catholic conventions and similar occasions, writes: "How little do we know the religious strength of Catholicism! How completely is all access to the interior life of Catholics barred to us even by our *customary instruction for Confirmation*, which is still carried on according to the controversial methods of ancient orthodoxy! How great are the tasks that still await theologians who aim at studying the history of religion! . . . Do we take as much pains to understand Catholicism as we do to study the Vedas, Buddhism, or Islam?"³

Although nothing can excuse this attitude toward what even

¹ *Sexualethik und Sexualpädagogik*, 2d ed., 1909, p. 225.

² *Erinnerungen*, p. 276.

³ *Evangel. Freiheit*, VIII, 1908, 491. *A. von Ruville* remarks that on reading and studying Catholic works in their original form "he was filled with amazement," perceiving that from his early life he had been falsely instructed

Protestants acknowledge to be the oldest and most imposing form of Christianity, we must not overlook the fact that it is more difficult for a Protestant to arrive at a complete comprehension of Catholic thought and life than for a Catholic to form a correct opinion of Protestant ideas. It is true of course that the Church forms one great, visible whole, stating plainly what is universal and unalterable in her teaching, whilst in Protestantism we have to deal with a multitude of independent and variously shaded forms of religion. Still, that which may be considered common to all forms of Protestantism, and may be compared with the Catholic religion, is after all something so universal, and in our opinion so little, that we can grasp it without any great exertion. But in Catholicism there are so many religious thoughts and laws, so many institutions connected with cultus and equity, whilst the dogmatic element sometimes appears so inextricably interwoven with matters of history and civilization, that a real, life-like comprehension of it is extremely difficult for one of another faith.

The Church is Catholic, i.e., universal, and universal also in that she has laid hold of all the elements of religion and human life and made them serve the purpose of Christianity. In her are welded together, so as to form one vast whole, faith and philosophical speculation, mysticism and the impulse to activity, the solitude of the desert and the publicity of life in the world, ascetic severity and artistic display, individualism and strict obedience, ardent devotion and a stern sense of justice. All these apparent contrasts which are otherwise found distributed amongst different religions are in the Catholic Church welded together into one tremendous whole. *Aristotle* says that it is possible to judge of the parts from the whole, but not of the whole from the parts. Thus a Catholic,

about the Church. "I saw," he says, "that the teachers, pastors, and theologians to whom I owed my knowledge understood nothing about Catholicism, and yet did not hesitate to condemn it in the harshest terms, even to pour out their sarcasm upon it. This offended my whole scientific instinct" (*Zurück zur hl. Kirche*, p. 24). Cardinal *Newman*, after his conversion, expressed himself still more strongly with regard to the falsehoods and prejudices fostered by English Protestantism, and actually charged his fellow countrymen with possessing a "traditionary view" of Catholics, which involves "bearing false witness." "To Protestantism false witness is the principle of propagation" (*Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics*, 1851, p. 122).

living in the whole of his religion, can interpret its manifold organization and understand the mistaken, extreme construction of false doctrines. He can grasp with equal facility the pietistic as well as the rationalistic side of Protestantism, the English High Church and the Salvation Army. But a Protestant surveying the Catholic Church continually discovers something new and strange; what pleases a Puritan is ridiculed by an advanced thinker and arouses the repugnance of an "artistic temperament."

With regard to Catholic morals we must notice, first of all, that in the scientific works dealing with this subject, and especially in those intended for the use of confessors, there is very little to be found concerning the peculiar sanction and life imparted to morals by their connection with the cultus, the asceticism, and the whole life of the Church. The saying "*magna vivimus, non loquimur*" still applies to a great extent to the moral life of the Church. When the unfair controversial methods of our opponents drive us to reflection, we often have laboriously to collect the rays of light shining forth from these departments of the life of the Church, in order to do justice to the magnitude of the active force. For instance, modern Protestants often miss, in the Catholic view of marriage, that which uplifts and impresses the mind; and yet, quite apart from direct testimony derived from our liturgy and doctrine, the raising of marriage to the dignity of a sacrament, the stress laid upon its unity and indissoluble character, and the solemn way in which the voluntary conclusion and the natural consummation of marriage are insisted upon, form a far better guarantee for the perfection of married life and the moral equality of the wife than any number of pleasing descriptions and panegyrics could supply. How inadequate an idea of the motives and achievements of the religious life, and of the abundant activity both of the individual and of the community in countless religious houses, is given by what is said and written on this subject!

Humility and self-effacement are considered so much to be the only ideal in the life of the cloister that even the important considerations of apologetics or social statistics receive very little attention. Casuistical investigations regarding the practice of fasting, the observance of Sunday, etc., certainly reveal very little of the

religious and moral spirit pervading the solemn and joyful periods of the ecclesiastical year. It is only then when one studies the liturgy and our devotional literature that he discovers, under the dry exterior of casuistical rules, a stream of vigorous life, giving rise to free moral activity.

The idea that, owing either to the Index or to their own reserve, the Catholics know of the Protestant intellectual life of the country less than do the Protestants of the Catholic, is easily refuted by another very simple consideration. Modern fiction and scientific literature, the daily press and public education, are stamped in our country in a paramount degree with Protestant ideas, and even the Catholic who would wish to stand aloof cannot avoid being affected by these Protestant influences. A Protestant, however, is far from being equally compelled to acquaint himself with the thought of Catholics. Every Catholic schoolboy reads the classics, which are with hardly an exception Protestant; every Catholic student of philology and history uses Protestant authors, and is reasonably afraid of failing in his examinations if he cannot show a knowledge of *Kant* and *Schopenhauer*, whilst his Protestant colleague feels no necessity to study *St. Thomas Aquinas*. Moreover, every Catholic inevitably comes into contact with Protestantism at lectures, at the theatre, in reading belles-lettres and the daily papers, and in the general tone of society; for in our country all these things are overwhelmingly determined by Protestant influence. Thus a Catholic can form a fair opinion of the intellectual life of Protestants, whereas the Protestant cannot by any means derive from these sources a true idea of what is really Catholic; indeed too often he is confirmed in his inherited, erroneous views.

It is not my aim here to trace the reasons for this state of affairs; but when we consider the numerical and political ascendancy of Protestants in our country, there is no difficulty in recognizing the coercion that lies in these factors. The Index would be powerless to overcome this constant influence, even if it aimed at so doing, but it is a well-known fact that the Index does not forbid the reading of newspapers or secular books, nor attendance at lectures, plays, etc. The tendency of modern journalism is to lay undue emphasis upon and to laud all that is new and negative, whilst it depreciates what is traditional and positive; of course this tendency is more inju-

rious to Catholicism than to Protestantism. Moreover, it is quite a mistake to suppose that a dispensation from the prohibition to read books on the Index can be obtained only as a special favour, or that it is granted to laymen only under protest.

I do not wish to shut my eyes to the fact that amongst scientific Protestant theologians increased interest is now taken in Catholicism and a greater impartiality shown in its criticism. In historical studies on the subject, both of the primitive and of the later Church, Catholics and Protestants meet on common ground. Protestants attend lectures on the history of the Reformation given by a Catholic professor, and Catholics are found present at courses on documents and investigations bearing upon early Christian literature. With regard to biblical exegesis, however, not nearly so much attention is paid by Protestants to Catholic works as is paid by Catholics to Protestant books on the subject. Very little interest in, and comprehension of, our dogmatic theology is displayed by Protestants, although it is from this that any true insight into Catholicism as a whole must be derived.

Toleration in General

With reference to the behaviour of the many millions in Germany who belong to different religions, but are to be brought into touch with one another, *Tschackert* advises that the matters of division between them ought to be placed as much as possible into the background, but without seeking to hide the points of difference. The manner in which this well-meaning theologian views these matters of division, at a moment when he is making conciliatory proposals for peace, is characteristic of practical toleration as understood by Protestants. He begins with the admonition to the Protestants, already quoted, in which he says that they, being "intellectually free," can make "an infinite number of excuses" for Catholics. They must leave off hunting up grievances in the past: such as offences committed against Protestants by the Pope, the clergy, the Jesuits, and Catholic governments; the bitter expression occurring in the Roman Catechism implying that the Protestants are guided by the devil rather than by the Holy Ghost; the executions of Protestants, the horrors of the Thirty

Years' War, — mentioning among further matters the epithet "*Monstrum terribilissimum*" applied to *Luther* in the Roman Breviary."¹

These are the instances given of Catholic intolerance in the past. If we wish to compare with them the old charges that Catholics might bring against Protestants, there is, according to *Tschackert*, only one, — viz., "that *Luther* called the Pope Antichrist"; but this, he adds, is excusable when we take the manners of the time into consideration! If he assumes that no reasonable Protestant nowadays would use such an expression, let him remember that so highly educated a Protestant as *John Henry Newman* confessed that, until shortly before his conversion, he believed the Pope to be the Antichrist.² It may be mentioned here that the corresponding strong term, *monstrum terribilissimum*, is no longer to be found in the Breviary now in use. Might we not have expected some allusion to the countless deeds of violence perpetrated by Protestant governments during the Reformation period, such as the ruthless plundering of churches and the oppression and persecution of defenceless religious women? Were not *Luther's* inflammatory writings against the Pope and his "minions" and *Justus Jonas's* challenge to exterminate "idolatry" direct incentives to such violent deeds?³ Can all the blame of the Thirty Years' War be laid upon the Catholics, and did not the Protestant princes sin most grievously against the peace of the country by conspiring with foreign powers, and among themselves, to annihilate Catholicism?

It is, however, more important and more interesting to see what grounds of complaint the one Church can bring against the other at the present time. *Tschackert* advises the Protestants to put aside the annoyance felt for nearly twenty-five years at the fact that the Catholic party has had the deciding vote in the imperial parliament, to the great vexation of the Protestant majority of the population (p. 42). We should expect, after hearing of "martyrdoms" and "horrors" in the past, that *Tschackert* would be able to refer to some startling injustice on the part of Catholics in our

¹ *Modus vivendi*, pp. 41, 48.

² *Apologia pro vita sua*, 1902, p. 7.

³ See *N. Paulus*, *Luther und die Gewissensfreiheit*, 1905.

own day, but apparently he has nothing more than his own annoyance to bring forward as a cause of separation. After all, what can a united party do better and more profitably than give a deciding vote where others are at variance? Any annoyance at it can proceed only from a deep-seated aversion to the fact that there is so strong a Catholic minority in existence, and that it refuses to be condemned to silence on political matters. Has the Catholic party offended the Protestant majority by any unfair or outrageous demands, or by a refusal to coöperate in important legislative measures? That this was not the case in the days of its alleged "supremacy" is acknowledged by all responsible leaders of the German government.

The second admonition, to treat Catholics with consideration, is equally characteristic. "We must set aside all our dislike of Roman Catholic credulity, the veneration of saints, the worship of Mary, . . . and many other things inwardly most repugnant to our Protestant consciousness." Here again we have no provocation on the Catholic, but subjective feelings on the Protestant side! *Tschackert* himself admits that these things belong to the inner life of the Church when he says: "If the Catholics want to keep all this, it is their affair and does not concern us at all." Yet shortly afterwards he advises the Catholics to give up "everything calculated to cause annoyance, *everything that offends our Protestant consciousness.*" How is this possible when so many things, "that do not concern Protestants at all," nevertheless annoy and offend them deeply? When such a demand is made, all that *Tschackert*, *Harnack*, and others say, about preserving the character of each Church and the impossibility of union, appears illusory. Would *Tschackert* venture to suggest in such general terms to Protestants that they should give up "everything that offends the Catholic consciousness"?

As far as we have gone, therefore, *Tschackert* has discovered no recent instance of offensive action on the part of Catholics, but soon after he refers to the "notorious brawls" over graveyards, to the "outrageous audacity" of the clerical press, and to the "bitter style of controversy" adopted by men like *Evers* and *Majunke*. I admit that in this respect some offence has been given by Catholics, and *Tschackert* himself does not deny that the

better sort of Catholic journalism has publicly recognized and regretted this fact. As to the disputes about the right of burial in cemeteries, the following considerations should be kept in view: (1) The question turns as a rule, especially in what was formerly French territory, upon decisions and applications of the *civil law*, long familiar to the communities affected and regarded by the Catholic part of the population as long-standing rights, in opposition to later claims that have not always been made with any degree of tact. (2) From the point of view of Canon Law, burial in a consecrated graveyard is permitted only to those who have died at peace with the external body of the Church, and this principle is connected with the idea and discipline of the visible Church. Exclusion from such burial is a disciplinary measure that is by no means an expression of opinion regarding the ultimate destiny of the departed. For instance, according to the strict rules of the Church, no one killed in a duel can be buried with the rites of the Church, although he may have made his confession and received absolution. This regulation, made in the interests of the religious community and of public order, is intended to inflict the loss of those honours paid by the Church, for which the dead man did not care during his life. If the Church were to allow Protestants the right of burial in Catholic graveyards, she would be treating them better than her own children, to whom she does not grant the privilege indiscriminately, but after examining their way of life. (3) According to the old liturgical idea a graveyard is added to the church so as to form part of the consecrated place. Catholics set a higher value upon consecrations and blessings than Protestants, and as the Church never forces the means of grace upon any one against his will, she tries to limit the use of places and things which partake even remotely in the consecration of the altar and sacrament to those who are, by reason of their faith, susceptible to this mystical influence. In Protestant circles a contrary disposition prevails, altogether hostile to "mysticism" in matters of public worship.

The further we go, the more curious we become to learn what faults and discourtesies *Tschackert* will find on the Protestant side to censure, and to commend to the indulgence of Catholics. We can discover nothing but a request addressed to the Evangelical

Alliance to remember "its primary object and to strive to suppress in its members all display of hostility." He lavishes praise upon the establishment and general principles of this alliance, but he sees in its activity a constant danger "of overstepping the mark and of *promoting strife*" (p. 42, etc.). This activity of the Evangelical Alliance certainly is the most disturbing element in the domain of religion in Germany; but did it not suggest itself to *Tschackert* when admonishing the Catholics to examine the Protestant conscience on a few points? Against the "graveyard scandals" and other difficulties connected with marriage and cultus, the Catholics can set instances of much worse and even legal intolerance in Brunswick and Saxony, as well as of aggressive proceedings on the part of individuals. What *Evers*, a convert, has written against *Luther* is nothing at all in comparison with the public controversial effect of *von Hoensbroeck's* writings and speeches against the Catholic Church. The many bitter polemical pamphlets, such as *Grassmann* published in enormous editions, have no parallel on the Catholic side. The daily press is extremely powerful, but it is so completely in the hands of Protestants and of Jews that, in comparison with the innumerable articles written against the Church, the occasional discourtesies of which Catholic papers make themselves guilty are hardly worth notice. Publications hostile to the Church delight in horrible accounts of convent life and of bad priests, often forcing upon Catholics the recourse to legal measures in self-defence.

Upon the subject of *proselytism*, *Tschackert* made a few remarks in his previous chapter revealing some embarrassment on his part. After laying down the principle that all attempts to make converts should cease on both sides, referring, without giving proofs, to the zeal shown by individual Catholics, he has to acknowledge that a Protestant society has been founded to *spread the Gospel amongst Catholics* (p. 38). *Tschackert* remarks in a conciliatory fashion that this society attracts very little attention and will probably never become popular. But the very existence of such an association is apt to give provocation, especially as the Catholics believe that they have possessed the Gospel for some fifteen hundred years longer, and have preserved it better, than the Protestants. The soothing suggestion that in Germany it is Protestantism

that must look after its present possessions is at variance with his statement that "far more people pass from the Catholic into the Protestant Church than vice versa" (p. 35). Still more unsatisfactory is his excuse for the *Los-von-Rom* movement.¹ Even the most prejudiced witness must acknowledge that anything like such a reckless and organized attack by Catholics upon "the Sister Church" — thus *Tschackert* proposes to designate the two religions — is not only unheard of, but inconceivable. The very name *Los-von-Rom*, "free from Rome," shows beyond all question that the aim of this movement is proselytism. The enormous sums of money raised in Germany to support this movement — the *Gustav-Adolf-Verein* alone contributed, according to Pastor *Fischer*, in ten years over 15,000,000 florins — show that, when it is a matter of opposing Rome, the odium of proselytism does not worry such societies. *Tschackert's* expressions on this subject seem rather mild, especially when we remember how, in speaking of foreign missions, he insists that Catholic missionaries must not intrude upon regions where Protestant missions are established, but limit themselves peaceably to their own sphere of action (p. 115). I cannot here discuss the unfairness of this reproach, or show whether it is borne out by facts; I would only ask whether greater consideration is due to Madagascar and Uganda than to our own country, and whether a scrupulous regard of the rights of ownership of each Church is not very emphatically required in dealing with our own citizens.

Regarding the Evangelical Alliance, *Tschackert* and *Sell* both acknowledge that it is a Protestant association antagonistic to Catholicism; the latter does so openly, the former, less directly, by trying to impress upon the Alliance the idea that its "chief task" is to do positive work amongst its members. If Catholics would follow the Protestants' example, and found a similar association, Germany would at once be divided into two hostile camps. In every argument, and especially in religious controversy, each party claims to be in the right; hence, if there is to be real civil equality, it must be laid down as a fixed principle that no religious organization may be of a combative nature. Many Protestants have realized this truth, and they cannot but feel ashamed that,

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 10.

with regard to this formal basis for religious liberty, it has been the ostensibly free and tolerant Protestantism with its Evangelical Alliance that has transgressed, and not Catholicism, which is accused of being far more narrow and quarrelsome.

If we look at the actual foundation of the Alliance, *Sell* tells us that it aims at "warding off the attacks of political Catholicism" and at fighting, not for any *one* form of religion, but "to maintain the rights of *all*," in opposition to a party that rejects, and must reject as a matter of principle, all forms of religion except its own (p. 212). I should like to ask when and where the Evangelical Alliance has upheld the rights of Catholics? If, in speaking of principle, *Sell* is referring to dogmatic opinions, he is guilty of an equivocation; for he is here discussing the rights of the various Churches in the state, and Protestantism, too, rejects the Catholic Church from the point of view of dogma. Has the Catholic party ever rejected the right of Protestants to political equality or even attempted to make an "attack" upon its rights? Neither *Sell* nor *Tschackert* in their entire discussion adduce a single instance in which Protestant rights have been *really* threatened. *Tschackert* states that the Evangelical Alliance was established at a time "when the Prussian state had made one concession after another to the Roman Church, when *Bismarck* had invited Pope *Leo XIII* to act as umpire between Germany and Spain regarding the insignificant Caroline Islands, thus adding greatly to the prestige of the Papacy, and when the Catholic party was making its influence felt on the most vital interests of the German Empire, whilst there was no one on the Protestant side able to say a word against all this, for both the Church assemblies and the synods were forced to be silent" (p. 43).

Apart from the complaint that the Catholic party was making its influence felt in the affairs of the German Empire, which cannot be resented since the government urgently invited its coöperation, there are here charges against the only guilty ones, — the Prussian state, *Bismarck*, and the Church assemblies and synods; but *Tschackert* cannot refer to any attacks made by political Catholicism which would have necessitated the organization of a fighting body. According to his own impressions, the meetings of the Alliance became occasions for "furious agitation," and the

speeches against ultramontane Catholicism degenerated into a "stormy flood of empty phrases," which unhappily were welcomed with applause "by the majority of the audience" (p. 44). If we sum up even cursorily all that the Evangelical Alliance has said and written in the course of its agitation against ultramontaniam, we must say that, whereas its very establishment and existence constituted a danger to religious peace, its activity has given rise to so profound a disturbance of that peace that German Protestants, desirous of boasting of their toleration, must condemn this activity with much more unanimity and vigour than they have done hitherto.

Tschackert thinks that it ought not to be difficult for German Catholics "to grasp the hands of their brethren, the Protestants, in spite of all that separates them" (p. 48). It is not difficult for us to grasp these hands if they are offered to us in an honourable spirit, and there are, thank God, not only many individuals, but many associations on both sides that understand each other and work together with mutual confidence. But to speak plainly, and alluding to the Evangelical Alliance, I cannot help mentioning the painful occasion when the hand of all Catholic Germany was stretched out in a friendly spirit and roughly rejected by the Evangelical Alliance. Conventions of Catholics have always avoided anything that could disturb religious harmony. The Catholic Day at Essen, in 1900, particularly and through the mouth of Cardinal *Fischer*, invited all Christians in a most conciliatory manner to work harmoniously together. The Evangelical Alliance, at a General Assembly held soon after, rejected this invitation as "dangerous to our country and to the Evangelical Church," seeing in it "nothing but a crafty attempt to strengthen the power of the party representing Roman interests." Even Protestant papers regretted this resolution as unjustifiable and as manifesting bitter animosity. The *Deutsche Tageszeitung* asked: "To what lengths shall we be led if, in religious disputes, we question the honesty of our opponents and impute to the adherents of another faith motives for the existence of which there is no evidence at all?"¹

It is indeed indispensable to every understanding, and a most elementary Christian duty, to believe the explicit assertions of others who have done nothing to incur any suspicion of insincerity. When, however, we see that assemblies of Catholics, in spite of all asseverations to the contrary, are assumed to be merely opportunities for displaying the power of the party, we must acknowledge that the people in Germany are still far from having

¹ Cf. *Verhandlungen der 53. Generalversammlung der Katholiken Deutschlands, Essen, 1906*, pp. 417, 670, *seq.*

arrived at this indispensable basis of any agreement on matters of religion.

The Question of Civil Equality

In his one-sided consideration of the things of modern times that tend to separate Catholics and Protestants, *Tschackert* omits to mention, as grievances of Catholics, the *Kulturkampf*, and all that at the present day justifies their complaint that there is no equality in matters of religious practice. No one desirous of understanding the religious position in Germany and the prospects of a friendly approach between the two parties can shut his eyes to these facts, unpleasant though they may appear. In speaking of the foundation of the Evangelical Alliance, the question was raised whether Protestantism in Germany was really constrained to take this step in self-defence against attacks, just at a time when Catholicism had emerged from a violent struggle of ten years' duration, and whether it was not rather the indignation at concessions by the state that impelled large numbers of Protestants to new exhibitions of religious hostility. *Sell* passingly alludes to the *Kulturkampf*, describing it, very mildly, as an attempt "once more to return to the practical supremacy of the state over *all* Churches, which has now been given up." There is, however, no need of showing that the conflict was chiefly, in many respects exclusively, aimed at the Catholic Church. The first Chancellor may have been influenced by purely political motives, but he seriously suspected danger from Catholicism, suggested by the hatred of Rome felt by Protestants and Liberals. During the struggle he relied upon Protestant prejudices and disposition, which were strong enough to overcome in Conservatives all fears for their own Church, and in Liberals their otherwise ostentatious enthusiasm for freedom. *Bismarck* saw subsequently that it was impossible to carry on the government in opposition to the conscience of two-fifths of the population, and his sound political insight discovered a way out of the difficulty. If we try to-day to realize the various incidents of the struggle, the violent measures taken to repress purely religious convictions and actions, the fines and sentences of imprisonment, the expulsion of harmless communities of women

who took no part in politics, — we can easily understand that the impression produced by all these things still remains with the Catholic population and cannot be wiped out by merely ignoring the facts. To talk of the state as having “continually favoured” the Catholic Church is mockery in the ears of Catholics.

Harnack rightly lays down as an indispensable condition of peace that “the strictest justice must everywhere be observed, so as to secure to each his own, and not to interfere with the inner life of the Churches.” During the *Kulturkampf* this principle was in abeyance, and the treatment of the Jesuits shows us how hard it is even now for Protestants to adhere to it consistently. Although *Tschackert* accepts the principle that things affecting the clergy and religious orders belong to the internal administration of the Church, he tries to show Catholics what they need of religious orders and what they do not need, and he approves also of the control which, according to the law still in force, the state continues to exercise.

In order to give a true idea of the condition of affairs, and at the same time to show how little real ground the Protestants have for fearing that any further *rapprochement* would give the minority unfair advantage, it would be necessary to include in the discussion the general kind of pushing into the background of which Catholics complain. This is connected, partly, with the historical development of the Prussian state and its inhabitants, partly with the traditional idea of “Protestant superiority,” and with deeply rooted maxims of administration, so that Protestants control the government, and the material and intellectual resources at its disposal, to a degree altogether disproportionate to their numbers. I have already alluded to the petty hindrances, so contrary to the spirit of liberty, that are put in the way of Catholic worship in some states possessing a Protestant majority; such things are acknowledged by both Liberals and Conservatives to be anachronisms. Considering how sensitive men are nowadays in what touches their honour and liberty, and how keen a sense of justice is possessed by the people, and how much intellectual and material progress has been made by the lower classes, we see at once that the demand for full civil equality is inevitably spreading and obtaining recognition. I lay no stress here upon the conviction, uni-

versal amongst Catholics, that they are pushed into the background; but they may fairly feel aggrieved and out of humour at the fact that almost always whenever any step is taken towards removing the present inequality, either in government offices or at the universities and in the elementary school system, there is at once an indignant protest or a feeling of concern and alarm. Much intolerance is displayed, for instance, by Protestant towns that refuse to build schools for Catholic minorities or to provide religious instruction, even in cases where the government recognizes the need of it. What unfair treatment is meted out to the rising generation in Prussia, where seventy thousand Catholic children are being taught in Protestant schools and only seventeen thousand Protestants in Catholic schools!¹

We need only reflect upon the actual consequences of the present state of affairs to become convinced that Catholics have not much chance of overestimating their importance in Germany. After the enormous material loss suffered by the Church through secularization, there followed an increasing slighting and setting aside of Catholics from all share in civil and intellectual life; the result in both cases was greatly to diminish their wealth, and so to check their progress in every department of higher education. During the *Kulturkampf* still further obstacles were put in the way of any material advance on the part of German Catholics, even though their religious consciousness and their tendency to hold together were intensified. Every one knows that there is a sort of glory attached to influential posts at court and in the government, so that the recommendations, testimonials, etc., of those holding such posts are of great advantage to the party to which they belong. This kind of prestige gives to the favoured classes assurance and confidence and a knowledge of "how to get there"; whereas Catholics, however talented, when competing for desirable appointments, are hampered by the novelty and strangeness of their aim, the uncertainty of their chances, and a timidity that is the result of much sad experience. There is no "mechanical equality" within sight for Catholics for some time to come, and even were it carried

¹ Cf. the remarks made by *Jentsch*, p. 452, *seq.*, and the evidence that he adduces; also an article by Judge *Marz*, entitled "Der Fall Landsberg," in the *Köln. Volkszeitung*, 1911.

into effect in due proportion to the population, in all probability Protestant supremacy would in external matters soon again make itself felt. If we think of the effect of the celibacy of Catholic priests there is nothing on the Catholic side comparable to the recruits supplied so abundantly by Protestant parsonages to all the professions. The very earnestness and practical energy with which the Catholic Church keeps in view the future life and the supernatural, must be in itself antagonistic to a great prosperity in, and a firm hold upon, this world. No Protestant at the present day may excuse his fears of religious equality by alleging alarm lest the Catholics eventually obtain a majority, either by simple numerical increase or by proselytism. Nor do such fears harmonize with the fact that Protestant controversialists profess to agree with atheists and socialists in the belief that Catholic dogmatic teaching, and especially submission to a "curialistic" Papacy, is at last dead and gone, and that the Church has lost all living hold upon mankind!

It is very surprising that a man like *Sell*, who deals so fully with so-called curialistic, political Catholicism, in his account of the same shows that he does not possess even the most elementary acquaintance with documents bearing on the subject. He maintains that political Catholicism reached its full development under *Leo XIII*, and describes it as "an attempt to win the recognition of all *states* and nations for Curialism, and eventually to give it a dominating position, since with all its internal and external *political* resources, it has already secured in the Council supremacy over the Church," (p. 77). In contrast to Curialism, according to *Sell*, stands the purely religious Catholicism that "adheres to the principle that *in all secular matters* the secular power is *independent* of the Church" (p. 174). Does *Sell* not know that the Vatican Council's definition of Infallibility bears a purely religious character and, according to the judgment of shrewd Protestants, tends more to deepen the line between dogma and politics than to obliterate it? Can we not trace in the life and actions of *Leo XIII* an advance beyond certain "curialistic" traditions and an ever-increasing, impartial comprehension of the age in which we live? Did not this Pope in his encyclical expressly declare that the state, and not the Church, is the supreme authority in purely secular

matters, and is not this precisely what *Sell* describes as real religious Catholicism?¹ If it is, *Sell's* hostility to political Catholicism seems to depend essentially upon an unscientific conception of it.

Sell, like many other Protestants, bases his last argument against religious equality upon the "inward want of consideration" that a Catholic must necessarily, for *dogmatic* reasons (his being the only religion assuring salvation), feel towards Protestantism, and this must, in *Sell's* opinion, be counterbalanced by a judicial preponderance of Protestantism (p. 182, note). No mutual understanding is possible, he thinks, unless Catholics regard the establishment of the Protestant religion as morally binding and renounce all attempt to enforce the Canon Law on points where modern legislation is at variance with it. "This does not involve any renunciation on the part of a Catholic of his fund of *religious* truth. We on our side begin by granting *more*, for we grant *Christian* equality, equality in the sight of God. This does not exclude all argument as to the greater measure of truth, an argument which in our own camp certain groups carry on with one another" (p. vi). These statements are not remarkable for lucidity, and the same may be said of *Tschackert's* words: "The German Evangelical Church expects to be regarded as a Sister Church by German Catholics. We do not expect a judicial recognition of title, but a *moral* recognition; it is the attitude of mind upon which we lay stress, since upon it depends the practical attitude" (p. 46). I think it well to distinguish here between the dogmatic, the moral, and the civil or judicial recognition of the two creeds.

1. A *dogmatic* recognition of Protestantism by the Catholic Church is equivalent to what *Tschackert* calls a "judicial" recognition, which, he says, no one could expect. It is in fact a fundamental doctrine of the Church that Christ established only *one* religious body possessing the means of salvation, and that this body is the Catholic Church.

When the Evangelical Alliance demanded that Catholics should declare Protestantism to be a legitimate form of Christianity the *Kreuzzeitung* replied: "This demand can be justified only if the Evangelical Alliance is also willing to recognize Catholicism as a

¹ Cf. *infra*, Part II, Chap. VIII; also the utterances of *Pius X* quoted there.

legitimate form of Christianity, and to do this is out of the question. We, as Evangelical Christians, would *protest most decidedly against it*."¹ It is therefore incorrect to say that Protestants "begin by making larger concessions." All who believe in an essentially undivided form of Christianity, revealed once for all by Christ, must inevitably deny the dogmatic and Christian equality of various Churches. But *Sell*, too, contradicts himself. If one Church possesses "a *greater* measure of truth," there can be no *equality* of religious rights; and yet he proceeds unconcernedly to identify the "perfect" with the "generally accepted" form of Christianity, the "best" with the "true." The same may be said of the organization of the Churches as of the measure of truth that they contain. Christ bestowed definite rights and powers upon the one Church that He founded; therefore, if the official Protestant Church is "an institution of merely human origin," as *Sell* admits (p. 224, note), it cannot consistently demand that the Catholic Church should recognize it as having "Christian equality." But it is plain that *Sell* will not allow that the Church of Rome possesses equal rights with his own, if there is still in him any of *Luther's* spirit, which he regards as the true principle of Protestantism.

Moreover, Rome looks upon Protestants as Christians in error, exactly as *Sell* looks upon curialistic Catholics (p. 211). It was precisely because *Pius IX* acknowledged the validity of baptism administered by those of other faiths, provided the proper form be used, that he spoke of Protestants also as belonging to his flock and subject to his jurisdiction, — an expression that *Tschackert* regards as an insult. It was, however, prompted by a very beautiful and conciliatory spirit, and as it can have no practical effect upon Protestants, it ought to offend them only if in every case the Pope considered the averse attitude of non-Catholics as subjectively and morally reprehensible.

2. What is meant by *moral* recognition? Every educated Catholic at the present time knows the claim of the Church, that in her alone salvation can be found, does not mean that separation from the visible Church is invariably a moral offence involving exclu-

¹ *Kreuzzeitung*, Oct. 14, 1906; cf. *Verhandlungen der Generalversammlung zu Essen*, 1906, p. 672.

sion from salvation. The phrase has an objective meaning, referring to the actual authority given by Christ to the Church; but as all men do not perceive her privileged position, and as the visible Church comes into contact with some men only in an imperfect way and with others not at all, non-Catholics and even non-Christians who live in pardonable ignorance, following their conscience and the inward grace given them, are subjectively free from sin, though remaining outside the Church. This is by no means a new theory, but it has been more clearly formulated and established in the minds of the people in general since other bodies of Christians, separated from the Church, have been founded and have grown by progeny and propaganda. *Pius IX* frequently expressed this tenet, and it is taught in the Catholic Catechisms.¹ In judging our fellowmen with regard to their moral condition we are certainly not more severe than the Protestants. In fact, occasionally it seems as if the difficulty or impossibility of appreciating the personal standpoint of others, that was formerly felt in dealing with heretics, now causes orthodox Catholics to be treated with unfair severity. *Herrmann*, at least, appears to be convinced that every Roman Catholic and every one whose faith is based upon authority is inwardly insincere and is carrying on a sort of game with religion.²

3. The *civil* or *judicial* equality of Catholics and Protestants is not only accepted by us, but we regard it, as I have already said, as a fundamental principle of that form of government which we are most anxious to have, since it will secure us religious equality. We respect the constitution and organization of the state, not merely under compulsion but as a matter of conscience; and as this includes the right of the Protestant Church to exist, we must accept this right as "*morally* binding" upon us. The Canon Law now in force does not interfere with any such attitude on our part, and the Syllabus, too, protests only against giving *general* preference

¹ See *infra*, p. 98, and Part II, Chap. VIII.

² Röm. u. evangel. Sittlichkeit, pp. 75, 79. To show the difference between objective and subjective opinions, I may remind my readers that in the Heidelberg Catechism of the present day the Mass is described as "accursed idolatry." If all Protestants who retain this material definition really accused Catholics of subjective idolatry it would of course be almost impossible for the adherents of the two religions to live peaceably together.

to a constitution that secures equal religious rights, rather than to one that is purely Catholic.

A word more must be said on a condition that *Tschackert* thinks very regrettable; viz., *the tendency of German Catholics to associate only with members of their own Church*. Peaceable and friendly intercourse between the adherents of different Churches is in many respects less easy now than it was in the time of Romanticism and the years following it. The present growth of class hatred, of anti-Semitism and exaggerated nationalism, shows that while outwardly men increasingly meet and associate, inwardly they are becoming more estranged. I have already said enough to reveal some facts in modern history and in modern public life that have inevitably caused Catholics to cling closely together and to stand aloof from others. The embittered feeling that prevailed against them during the *Kulturkampf* drove them, either by actual or by moral force, from many previously neutral circles. Over and above the evidence to which I have referred, I might give many instances of the persistence, even to the present day, of many odious prejudices which make it very difficult for Catholics to share in social intercourse. This is especially the case in districts inhabited by more Protestants than Catholics. In Catholic circles the feeling towards Protestants is not one of prejudice or aversion, but rather a kind of timid or distrusting reserve. Wherever Protestants have overcome this feeling by making friendly advances, there are as a rule no obstacles on the Catholic side to joining in common interests and to a mutual understanding. A proof of this is the development of Christian trades unions, in joining which Protestant workmen showed much more hesitation and reluctance than their Catholic colleagues. Against recent charges of religious exclusiveness it was usually easy to point out a Protestant counterpart of the Catholic instance, and the further we carry our investigations into districts where Catholics predominate the more plainly can we trace a tendency to exclusiveness amongst Protestants. Of course it is not possible to speak of exclusiveness in the case of associations established solely for religious purposes or closely connected with religious undertakings. We shall have to allude to this side of the question again, when we discuss the relation between religious belief and civil life.

PART I

THE POSITION OF CASUISTRY IN CATHOLIC MORALS

CHAPTER I

TEACHING AND TEACHERS

OUR recent antagonists for the most part take as the basis of their attacks the assumption that the whole moral teaching of the Church, and the character of her moral science, may be adequately described as "probabilistic casuistry"; i.e., as a system of deciding cases of conscience according to the method of Probabilism. During the last century, and especially since *St. Alphonsus Liguori* was declared to be a doctor of the Church, Protestants have believed Probabilism to be the dominating element in the Church and the true exponent of her spirit. *Herrmann* remarks that the Church herself has "by an irrevocable decision concluded an alliance with profound depravity. This took place when *Pius IX* proclaimed *Liguori*, who had already been canonized, to be a *Doctor Ecclesiae*, thus committing the Church to Probabilism." Any change of policy is almost impossible "in face of a decree, issued not many years ago by a Pope who had become infallible" (p. 45, etc.). "It is a very remarkable phenomenon that a Church professing to have been founded by Jesus Christ, one that honours His name in every conceivable way, should come to such an end" (!) (p. 30, etc.).

Harnack, following *Döllinger* and *Reusch*, draws a terrifying picture of the morality of the Jesuits and of *St. Alphonsus*, and remarks that the Church, by honouring the latter, has set him up in place of *St. Augustine* and has restored complete ethical scepticism in morals and, indirectly, in dogma. "Whatever remained of *St. Augustine's* teaching in the nineteenth century has been thrust aside by *Liguori*. Casuistic morals, together with the doctrine of attrition, have forced all dogmatic teaching into the background. It has been torn to shreds by Probabilism and Papalism.

It is at the present time a legal system either rigid or elastic as circumstances demand.”¹

We certainly have no desire to diminish the importance of the Pope's utterances regarding *St. Alphonsus*, but we cannot understand the assertion that he and his casuistic morality should have thrust the whole dogmatic teaching of the Church into the background, nor that *St. Augustine* has been cast out of his position in Catholicism. Casuistic morality is not simply the *Summa moralis* of Catholicism; far less is it the *Summa theologica*. Moreover, *St. Alphonsus* was not declared to be the model teacher of morality — in *Pius IX's* brief of July 7, 1871, there is express mention of *alii ecclesiae doctores*; and he is certainly not set up as the *Augustine* of our own times. It is only necessary to open any book on Catholic dogma to see that *St. Alphonsus* practically plays no part at all in it, whilst *St. Augustine* is cited as one of the chief authorities on every topic. The highest authority in the Church emphatically desires modern theologians to follow *St. Thomas Aquinas*; this fact is patent to every one, and *Harnack* himself says that *St. Thomas* and the Dominican Order endeavoured to bring back *St. Augustine's* theology to its pristine condition. How, then, is it possible to speak of *St. Augustine* as being ousted at the present time by *St. Liguori*? *Harnack* is greatly mistaken if he supposes that the dogmatic works still being written have only a fictitious value for Catholicism now actually dominated by casuistic scepticism. Theologians nowadays devote more attention to dogma and the history of dogma than to morals, and we may say of casuistic writers, *St. Alphonsus* included, that their works appeal only to a limited number of readers, and even for these they do not occupy a prominent position in their intellectual life.

Protestant scholars have recommended *Scheeben's* “Die Mystereien des Christentums” as a dogmatic work, useful because it enables the reader to appreciate the religious meaning of the old dogmas and to understand the connection between modern Catholic feeling and that of the *primitive Church*.² *Harnack* himself acknowledges with regard to the practice of the Catholic religion that “to the present time the interior vital piety and its outward ex-

¹ *Dogmengeschichte*, 4th ed. III, p. 755, seq.

² *Titius*, *Theol. Rundschau*, 1901, p. 251.

pression are still essentially *those of St. Augustine*.”¹ But the pious people who feel and act thus have been brought up to this sentiment and speech by the Church’s teaching on the subjects of faith and morals, and they regard auricular confession as a means of imparting fresh life to their piety. How would it be possible for them to have anything of *St. Augustine’s* spirit if Catholic priests were trained in a manner antagonistic to this spirit, and if they learnt how to hear confession as others learn “the art of gambling on the stock exchange”? If *Harnack* possessed a better knowledge of penance as practised by the Church, he would perceive that the “painful yet happy sensation” that he calls “the hopeful relief from the misery of sin,” and declares to be a special feature of *St. Augustine’s* piety, is most intimately connected with the sacrament of penance, as dispensed at the present day.

Non-Catholic writers, in discussing any development within the Church, are inclined to discover *contrasts* that appear to be such only because the universal or Catholic character of the Church is not understood. The promotion of *St. Alphonsus* to be a doctor of the Church was not intended to diminish the prestige of other, earlier doctors; *St. Alphonsus* in his modesty certainly never dreamed of stirring up discord in the Sacred College of *Doctores Ecclesiae*, or of wishing to push the *Doctor gratiae* into the background! The Church does not identify herself with any one doctor; they all labour, in their own departments and each in his particular historical and personal manner, at the task of throwing more light upon the depth and manifold aspects of Christian truth as a whole. The Pope who gave to *St. Alphonsus* the title of doctor of the Church conferred the same dignity upon *St. Hilary of Poitiers* and *St. Francis of Sales*, a proof that, besides morals, dogma also receives recognition, and that within the scope of morals there is to be room for spiritual and devotional asceticism as well as for casuistry, if we choose to regard *St. Alphonsus* as the representative of the last named exclusively.

If any one wants to know what the Church herself teaches about the essence and form of morality, let him examine the decisions of the various councils and the *ex cathedra* utterances of the Popes

¹ Das Wesen des Christentums, Leipzig, 1900, p. 161.

regarding moral principles and questions. He will find that ever since the time of the Montanists, Gnostics, and Pelagians, the teaching authority of the Church has defended the law of Christian morality, against mystical distortion and rationalistic shallowness no less than against mistaken rigorism. In the controversies of modern times not only have rigoristic theses been condemned, but by far a greater number of propositions that appear to be excrescences of an extreme kind of Probabilism have been censured.

Of far greater importance to the present discussion is what the Church, in the ordinary course of her instruction, sets forth to the faithful throughout the world as being Christian morality. This *ordinarium et universale magisterium* is also an authentic source of faith, equivalent to solemn decisions.¹ On difficult points of dogma this source is of course less important, for such questions have no place in ordinary instruction and are certainly not presented as truths of Christianity that we are bound to believe. But with regard to the teaching of morals and of the duties belonging to a Christian life, it is clear that these things occupy a prominent position in sermons and instructions to the laity, and that they are to be accepted practically and not merely intellectually. Let any Protestant examine the catechisms of the various dioceses, even of the whole world, — for they contain the quintessence of teaching in general, — and I have no doubt that he will acknowledge Catholic morality, as set forth in the Catechism, to be on almost all points that of the Gospel. How, then, can it be possible that the Catholic Church, which is otherwise admitted to know her own mind and to adhere to her principles, has at the same time concluded an irrevocable alliance with “profound depravity”?

Another prominent source of information on the subject of the life pulsating in the Church is her liturgy. According to *St. Augustine*, up to his time the doctrine of grace was expressed more clearly in the prayers than in the teaching of the Church. The same is true to some extent also of the moral spirit that the Church calls her own. Some one has said that a mother shows how she regards the task of educating her children, not only in the form

¹ Vatic., sess. 3, cap. 3.

in which she speaks to them of God, but also in the manner in which she speaks of them to God. This remark applies also to the *Mater Ecclesia*. How many misunderstandings of the spirit pervading Catholic worship and life might be removed by a study of the treasure of liturgical prayers contained in the Missal alone! What unction, fervour, and vigour, what intimate union of the history of our Redemption with morality, appear in the plain but pithy prayers of the Missal!

Leo XIII, as well as other Popes, has been held responsible for the "degeneration" of Catholic morality, because he followed his predecessors' example in praising *St. Alphonsus*. The brief dated August 28, 1879, to which many refer, was called forth by the publication of a translation, made by two French Redemptorists, of the saint's dogmatic and ascetic works. It is characteristic of this kind of controversy to claim that such letters of thanks for books received are *ex cathedra* and infallible decisions.¹ Would it not have been better to study the Pope's numerous and varied encyclicals on religious, social, and moral subjects in order to estimate the moral influence of the Papacy at the present time? They are the solemn official pronouncements of the Head of the Church, though not directly *ex cathedra* decisions. We find in them nothing about Probabilism, or Attritionism, or any other things inspiring such terror, and they give the impression of being inspired by an enlightened wisdom, surveying life, in all its aspects, with the deep moral purpose of repairing the evils of modern civilization and with an enthusiasm for Christ that does not only "heap honours upon His name," but strives to make His words and His spirit leaven the whole of human existence. Besides *St. Thomas Aquinas*, the Bible is there designated as the source of Christian science as well as of morality²; their due value from the point of view of morality is ascribed not only to the Church and the *ascetic* life, but also to the *state* and to secular education; the *freedom of men* is defended and stimulated to action, at the same time the *Holy Ghost* is invoked and stress is laid upon the importance of *prayer*; on both the ruling and the labouring

¹ *Grassmann*, p. 6.

² *Encycl. Providentissimus*, p. 15. The italicized words are allusions to well-known encyclicals issued by the Holy Father.

classes their rights and duties are impressed; the Christian *family* is to regain its sanctity, and the Church, the family of the nations, its *unity*. The close of the century gave occasion to an impressive and glorious act of homage to *Christ* as the centre of faith and love, as *Via, Veritas, et Vita*. And yet, whilst the Church is displaying such activity, *Herrmann* is troubled because he does not see how she is ever "to find her way out of her moral quagmire and return to Christ"!

Let us now consider more closely how matters really stand with regard to an infallible approbation of *St. Alphonsus* and his teaching on morals. Our handbooks on dogma discuss in detail the manner and form of the *ex cathedra* decisions of the teaching Church, but nowhere do we find that the proclamation of a *doctor ecclesiae* is included amongst them. With regard to the title itself, it is scarcely possible to connect it with truth or error; it is primarily a title of honour, conferred by the Pope in recognition of the activity displayed by some saint in writing or preaching; it is a general testimony on the part of the teaching authority of the Church to his exalted merits and the trustworthiness and accuracy of his teachings; but it is no proof that all his opinions are correct or that his methods are in every respect perfect and better than those of other doctors of the Church. As praise of the same or similar nature is given to *various* doctors of the Church, differing in talents, in ways of thought and opinions, it follows that this interpretation of the title is the only possible one, and it has long been so accepted by Catholic authors.¹

*Von Hoensbroech*² exaggerates in a fantastic manner the responsibility of the Church and the Papacy for everything that has been taught and is being taught on the subject of morals by theologians and by theological schools. At all times there have been in theology various schools of thought, sharply antagonistic to one another; and even when the Popes have favoured one rather than another, they have as a rule expressly forbidden any one to consider the other heretical. They have left many disputed points unsettled for

¹ *Bouquillon*, Theol. Moral. Fundam., Burgis., 1890, n. 66; *Chr. Pesch*, Theol. Zeitfragen, II, Freib., 1901, 104, etc. What *Pesch* says in this passage (note 1) of the style adopted by the Oriental Councils and of their "pompous panegyrics" may in some degree be applied to the *stilus curiae* and to Latin panegyrics in general. They affect more vigorous expressions than we use nowadays in scientific appreciation of the merits of individuals.

² *Die ultramontane Moral*, pp. 2, 7, 576.

centuries, in order to allow scope for the natural development of thought and for the general enlightenment of Christian principles. Even in the case of opinions which might have involved danger to faith or morals, toleration was possible as long as their injurious effects were *practically* averted by other factors. Every one knows that there are *pronouncements* of the teaching authority in the Church that make known the spirit of the Church in no ambiguous terms, and any one who, like *Hoensbroech*, tries to deduce dogmas from *silence* on the part of the Church must soon bring down ridicule upon himself. In reply to *Herrmann's* statement already quoted, to the effect that in *St. Alphonsus* Probabilism had become, so to say, a dogma of the Church, *Ter Haar*, a Redemptorist, remarks that his Order, like *St. Alphonsus*, does not accept Probabilism in the narrower sense, and that the *Æquiprobabilism*, really taught by *St. Alphonsus*, has not been made binding upon the Church. He also maintains that theologians are free to reject *St. Alphonsus's* individual opinions, and that it is the duty of every Christian honestly to seek the truth and to follow in practice what he perceives to be true.¹ *St. Alphonsus*² himself says of Probabilism, in its usual form, that it prevailed almost universally in the seventeenth century, and yet he rejects it as lax — a proof that he was far from regarding toleration by the Church as equivalent to decided approval.³

With regard to *St. Alphonsus* himself, we cannot too strongly condemn the disdainful and even contemptuous way in which so-called Old-Catholics and Protestants criticise him, but at the same time we need not assent to all that Catholic admirers of the saint have said in praise of his learning.⁴ Because a man deserves credit as a teacher, the *eminens doctrina* of Patrologists does not mean that he must have been a creative genius or a profound scholar cutting new paths in our sense of the words; the expression is justified if he displayed remarkable energy in one or other department of teaching, and if his activity was beneficial to the age in which he lived. Who could for a moment compare *St. Isidore of Seville* with *St. Athanasius* or *St. Augustine* on the ground of intellectual originality? Yet it was *Benedict XIV*, a very learned

¹ Das Dekret des P. Innozenz XI. über den Probabilismus, 1904, pp. 169, 185.

² Homo apost., I, 1, 31.

³ The decision of the court at Nuremberg, confirmed by the Imperial Court, in 1901 declared, with reference to *Grassmann's* affair, that "*Liguori's* moral theology is devoid of any dogmatic character, so that its contents are not doctrines of the Church. The decrees raising *Liguori* to the dignity of a doctor of the Church and recommending his moral teaching are seen from their whole contents not to have been *ex cathedra* decisions of the Popes *Pius IX* and *Leo XIII*. Therefore it is impossible to say that the Church can be made responsible for *Liguori's* moral theology."

⁴ Cf. *Bouquillon*, n. 71.

Pope, who raised him to the dignity of a *doctor ecclesiae*, and with full justification, if we consider the man's historical importance. We can read much theology without coming across the name of *St. Peter Damian*; he earned the title of doctor of the Church by his vigorous words and writings against the vices and the ecclesiastical troubles in his day. *St. Francis of Sales* did not do much to further learning, but used his own knowledge in throwing light upon the circumstances of life through the principles of faith, and so his writings became models of devotional works adapted to modern conditions. We need not, therefore, expect of *St. Alphonsus* that he possess the depth and powers of thought of *St. Augustine*, or the universality and philosophical spirit of *St. Thomas*, or the historical erudition and critical acumen of the Maurists.

In the brief conferring upon him the title of doctor, reference is made to his works on morals, as serviceable in the practical direction of souls, to his popular writings on apologetics, and to his merits in raising the standard of piety. His works intended for the instruction of the people are very valuable from the ecclesiastical point of view. They warded off the assaults of unbelief and served the same purpose as the Order which he founded, primarily to increase the religious knowledge and morality of the lower classes. His ascetic writings, the "Practice of the Love of Christ," "Visits to the Blessed Sacrament," "Instructions on the Religious State," and others, soon became the common property of the Catholic world, and thus *St. Alphonsus* "has comforted and helped innumerable people in the hours of temptation and trial."¹ In his more learned, dogmatic treatises he does not display any extraordinary critical faculty, but rather a considerable knowledge and an accurate sense of the true meaning of the Church's traditional teaching, and he does his best to reconcile differing views on matters of theology. His Moral Theology displays a similar conciliatory tendency; on the one hand it was intended to check the spread of Jansenistic rigorism, and on the other to assign narrower boundaries to probabilistic "freedom." Adherents of Jansenism were then as now not friendly to *St. Alphonsus*, for he remarked that Jansenism understood how to assume a semblance of the piety and

¹ Meffert, *Der hl. Alphons v. Liguori*, 1901, p. 267.

the spirit pervading the early Church. The actual results of Jansenism in the guidance of souls in France show plainly that *St. Alphonsus*' attitude was highly beneficial and necessary to the life of the Church.

The papal briefs commend this conciliatory tendency in *St. Alphonsus*, and also his tact in deciding particular questions. Not even his most ardent admirers interpret this as meaning that his opinions are accepted in all cases as true, or as even probable. In some points of Canon Law the Roman congregations have declared *Liguori* to be wrong,¹ and thus the attitude adopted by the ecclesiastical authorities, as well as the light thrown by science upon questions of morality, and finally an individual discovery that the saint was mistaken in one of his solutions, destroy the probability based upon his prestige and *forbid* the observance of a precept which has been recognized as erroneous.²

Ballerini's criticism has undeniably succeeded in proving *St. Alphonsus* to have been deficient in scientific acumen on many points and in logical consistency on others. There is no need to apologize for these defects; they are due to the burden of anxiety and official labour that weighed him down at the time when he was writing the works in question. His views regarding the lawfulness of ambiguous expressions have been sharply criticised by Catholics as well as by Protestants.³ I shall recur later on to this question of casuistic morality and discuss it from a more general point of view.

How far *St. Alphonsus* was from possessing any ambition to be regarded as an authority on the higher or scientific side of morals

¹ Cf. *Bouquillon*, l. c.

² *Vindiciae Alphonsianae*, 2d. ed., Paris, 1874, I, LXXXVII, ss.; *Aertnys*, Theol. moral., Paderb., 1890, I, 45. Certain opinions held by *St. Alphonsus* on matters of morals, as well as on points of Canon Law, are now universally abandoned (cf., e.g., *Alphonsus*, Theol. mor., II, 76, and *Aertnys*, I, 104). *St. Alphonsus* himself stated repeatedly that theories, even though widely accepted, must give place to clear, scientific convictions: "*Omnes docent auctoritatem extrinsecam sapientum magni non posse esse ponderis, ubi INTRINSECA ratio certa videtur et convincens*" (Theol. moral., I, 79).

³ Cf. Cardinal Newman's words in his *Apologia*, 1902, p. 279: "I plainly and positively state, and without any reserve, that I do not at all follow this holy and charitable man in this portion of his teaching. There are various schools of opinion allowed in the Church. and on this point I follow others."

appears from the fact that he chose *Busenbaum's* "Medulla," a compendium of casuistry, as the foundation for his chief work. It is misleading to conclude from the Church's commendation that his teaching constitutes *the* moral teaching of the Church; the commendation can obviously refer only to that department of morals with which *St. Alphonsus* really dealt. He wrote nothing at all comparable to *St. Thomas'* wonderful investigations into the nature and object of morality, the moral faculties of man, and the subjects of law and virtue contained in the second part of the "Summa." Who could deny that the moral theological works of *Suarez*, *Molina*, *Vasquez* far excel those of *St. Alphonsus* in penetrating power of thought, in expansiveness of view, and historical conception? Any one would be treating *St. Alphonsus* himself and his literary labours unfairly who did not estimate his importance within the limits that the saint himself assigned to his work.

A study of the *personality* of the saint, based especially upon his letters, reveals him to us as a man with an ardent zeal for souls, of a very lovable nature and noble popularity, who aimed at reviving religion and at sanctifying the men of his own time, and not at all at investigating past ages or abstract theories. To a great extent his own modesty and devoted attention to the task of caring for souls prevented him from developing more fully his great intellectual powers. He welcomed all kinds of scientific progress; he advocated the use of modern books on natural science and philosophy in the schools belonging to his Order, rather than the usual Aristotelian works. His ascetic severity towards himself and all those under his spiritual direction was the outcome not of narrow-mindedness, but of his enthusiastic love of the crucified Saviour. The religious songs that he composed and set to music reveal the childlike nature and the depth of his piety.¹ He requires all sentimentality, all feeble dependence upon human consolation, to be sacrificed to respect for God's will. Far from holding that "each conscience can find rest only in the absolute authority of a confessor"² he tries to keep the dependence of the conscience upon spiritual direction within due bounds; and in writing to a religious he says: "Jesus Christ is our true consolation,

¹ *Meffert*, p. 2; *Stimmen aus M. Laach*, XLIX, pp. 441, *seq.*

² *Harnack*, *Dogmengeschichte*, 4th ed., III, p. 755.

our true brother, the true director of our souls and their true and only love.”¹

If the personality and life work of *St. Alphonsus* be kept in view, it becomes impossible to reproach him with laxity or with a petty conception of morality. No one who judges him with due reference to the demands of the time in which he lived, or the ends for which he laboured, will think that the Church has paid him too much honour.²

The more recent development of moral theology proves, moreover, that this branch of study did not end with *St. Alphonsus*, nor did it lose the impulse to advance independently of him. The German works on morals by *Sailer, Hirscher, Propst, Werner, Simar, Pruner, Schwane, Linsenmann, Göpfert, Koch, Schindler*, and others differ considerably from the casuistic treatises on morals, not only in their design and method, but also by laying greater stress upon what is positive and based on principle. There are also Latin works which, whilst adhering more closely to tradition, nevertheless show progress with regard to their matter and methods. We owe to the contact with modern scientific and practical requirements a number of monographs on moral philosophy, apologetics, political economy, and asceticism. Nor does Probabilism reign supreme in matters of conscience; it is criticised by many theologians,³ and there are two views regarding its real meaning, one more strict than the other. A certain amount of Probabilism is accepted by all Catholic theologians, as by all other reasonable people, — a conviction, namely, that in moral practice there is a difference between what is distinctly demanded by morality and what is merely an opinion, against which cogent arguments may be adduced. In the case of doubtful demands of the law or disciplinary regulations even our opponents grant that an assertion of freedom on the basis of probability is justified, and yet the laws

¹ *Histor.-Polit. Bl.*, CXVI, 325.

² Cardinal *Capecelatro* says of *St. Alphonsus Liguori* and *St. Francis of Sales* that their teaching is less exalted, less speculative, and less clearly defined than that of their predecessors. It appeals more to the heart of man, to remedy his ills and to lead him to penance, and to give him a helping hand in all circumstances of life (*Hist.-Pol. Bl.*, CXVI, 422; cf. *A. Weiss*, *Apologie*, 3d ed., V, 855; *Berthe*, *S. Alphonse de Liguori*, Paris, 1900).

³ *Dieckhoff, Martin, Linsenmann*, etc.; cf. *Bouquillon*, n. 288.

laid down by state and Church discipline are binding upon the conscience of Christians. How far Probabilism may be applied to the rest of morality is a question that we shall have to discuss thoroughly further on. I will only remark here that reference to external authorities, e.g., to *St. Alphonsus*, has more force when we are speaking of positive rules of a liturgical and canonical nature than when we are dealing with the subject of morality itself. When questions of the latter kind occur, a Catholic knows generally how to think the matter out for himself, without consulting authorities and books.

CHAPTER II

THE ASCETIC AND SPECULATIVE AS COMPARED TO THE CASUISTIC TREATMENT OF MORALS

I HAVE said enough to show that it is altogether a mistake to identify the morals, not only of the Church, but of her schools and writers, with casuistic morals. In theological works, morals are dealt with in three ways: viz., the speculative or really scientific, the ascetic-mystical, and, lastly, the casuistic manner. The last is based partly upon the judicial side of the duties imposed by the Church and partly upon the needs of the confessional. The beginnings of its former element are found in the collections of decretals of the early Middle Ages, and in the *libri poenitentiales* of the same period. In the latter part of the Middle Ages the mass of ethical, canonistic, and liturgical matter was gathered for the pastor of souls systematically or alphabetically in the so-called *Summae casuum* or *Summulae confessionales*. The results of scholastic investigations into the underlying principles of moral actions, virtues, etc., afterwards came to be more or less interwoven with these practical *Summae*, so that in the period following the Council of Trent, *Theologia Moralis* had become a union of scholastic principles with a great amount of casuistry. Actual morals are treated chiefly as *instruction on duty*, for those intrusted with the charge of souls are required to know upon what to insist as an indispensable duty, and what must be mentioned in confession because it is a grievous sin. It is obvious that in works of this kind little attention is paid to the bright side of Christian life, viz., to efforts to attain perfection.¹

¹ This is acknowledged by J. Werner, a Protestant theologian, who writes as follows: "Justice requires me to say at this point that the real object of those writers on moral theology is often overlooked. . . . They have no intention

A kind of moral teaching that lays stress on the idea of duty, and allows no tampering with the fearful nature of mortal sin, cannot possibly regard lightly any question as to degree of obligation; duty is once for all the backbone of morality. In Holy Scripture we read of some sins that deprive a man of the state of grace and of his right to the kingdom of heaven, and of others to which even the friends of God are liable. This shows us at once the importance of distinguishing mortal and venial sins. The fact that they are distinguished, and that a minimum of morality is required even of the weakest of mortals, does not mean that everything else is left to one's own discretion, any more than the fact that a foundation is laid indicates that the building is completed. A physician is glad when a patient is out of danger and he can watch his recovery without any great anxiety, and in the same way a director of souls feels relief when a penitent honestly renounces grievous sin which made him unworthy of God's friendship. However carefully a priest is bound to discriminate when it is a question of giving or withholding absolution, he does not need special deliberation or advice from some theologian to decide what is better, expedient, and honourable. The border line is often difficult to see, but what lies beyond it on either side is perfectly clear. A confessor refers to books on morals, not in order to find pious exhortations on the beauty of virtue and condemnation of vice, but in order to obtain information in doubtful cases. The authors of such books would altogether fail to attain their object if they were to do what *Harnack* requires (p. 748), viz., "with the vigour of the prophet call down upon the burden of evil a still heavier burden of judgment." If a sinner stands in need of such admonition and of being filled with fear, a conscientious confessor will supply what is needed. These Latin books are not put into the hands of penitents, and their clerical readers are supposed to possess enough knowledge of Holy Scripture and of the doctrines of faith to enable them to utter an impressive admonition. As far as the duties of a confessor are discussed at all, it is impressed upon him

of stating what is morally right and good, but of supplying the confessor with the knowledge which he requires in order to judge of the moral shortcomings of his penitents, assuming such moral shortcomings to exist" (*Theol. Rundschau*, 1902, p. 382).

very emphatically that he is to be not only a judge, but a father, physician, and teacher, and that it is his business not merely to hear confessions and give absolution, but also to awaken a horror of sin and to prescribe remedies for sin and passion.

In his "*Praxis confessarii*" *St. Alphonsus* gives instructions of this kind, full of earnestness and genuinely paternal zeal for souls. He suggests to the confessor to use earnest words of encouragement so as to awaken a true contrition that will proceed from love rather than from mere fear of God. In admonishing a penitent he is to reveal his detestation of sin and also his hearty sympathy with the sinner. As a rule a Catholic priest, especially one educated along modern lines, does not need paradigms of this sort to help him to follow the prophet's example and, according to circumstances, either to terrify the sinner or to soothe him, to rouse him, or to console him. The ascetic training that he has received as a student in the seminary, and the atmosphere in which he lives as a priest, will suggest suitable words. Moreover, as I have already pointed out, there exist in abundance works of an ascetic, mystical, and homiletic character, bearing on the positive side of morality.

Any one who overlooked this powerful tendency in Catholic teaching of morality would form a totally false idea of our moral theology. It is the *oldest* form of ecclesiastical moral literature; the Fathers of the Church never ceased to inculcate the practice of virtue and the performance of duty from the time when the treatise on the "*Duo Viae*" and the "*Shepherd of Hermas*" were written. In the Middle Ages mysticism flourished alongside of scholasticism, and the greatest theologians, men like *St. Bernard* and *St. Bonaventure*, discussed moral questions in a vigorous and lively manner, whilst *Tauler*, *Suso*, and *Thomas à Kempis* knew how to subject the innermost life of the soul to the purifying influence of the Christian idea of perfection. After the Council of Trent this side of moral teaching was by no means neglected; *St. Louis of Granada*, *St. John of the Cross*, *St. Teresa*, *St. Ignatius*, *St. Francis of Sales*, and many other less famous writers may be mentioned in proof of this statement. The men who in their works on casuistry discussed ethical questions with apparent indifference knew well enough how to use the language of unction and enthusiasm in their ascetic writings, and *St. Alphonsus* and *Lessius* belong to this class.

There is also a very extensive homiletic literature in which what is ideal and positive is as prominent as what is negative.¹

This kind of literature has a far more general and permanent influence. It is not intended exclusively for confessors, but appeals to Christians of every rank. Being regularly read, it has a more lasting effect upon the spiritual life than any books of reference can have; it imparts its definite moral character to the province of sentiment, that is of so much importance in our actions. "This mysticism," says *Linssenmann*,² "actually contains the Christian teaching on the subject of morals."

No one will maintain that either our higher or lower devotional literature encourages moral laxity, neglects the inner life of the soul, upholds liberty rather than duty, or dwells on particulars to the neglect of the general spirit. Every one will admit that it inculcates strict conscientiousness, stern self-discipline, a religious view of things, both great and small, and often heroic love and delight in self-sacrifice.

Some may regret that this wealth of more pleasing and helpful ethical teaching is quite distinct from works concerned with casuistry. It is, however, not a sign of poverty, but of wealth, that the desire for holiness and perfection has called into existence a distinct kind of literature in such abundance. In any case there is no excuse for our opponents if, in criticising Catholic morals, they overlook a class of works so important, so well adapted to the needs of the time, and so widely diffused.

The elimination from our handbooks on morals of all that is emotional or that appeals to the heart, and the absence of prophetic force and unction, are due, as I have already said, to the purpose that these works are intended to serve. There is, however, an-

¹ *Stäudlin*. *Gesch. der christl. Moral seit dem Wiederaufleben der Wissensch.*, Gött., 1808, p. 607. "Mysticism had now (i.e., in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) a very prolific period in the Catholic Church, and developed vigorously at the same time as the moral teaching of casuists and Jesuits. It occupied a great number of authors, and some of them attained to a high degree of excellence and are numbered amongst the most intellectual writers of their time." *Ziegler* (*Gesch. der Ethik*, II, Strassb., 1886, p. 531) and *Ritschl* ascribe to the Protestants of the seventeenth century, until the age of Pietism, a limited intellectual ability due to their "unfamiliarity with sentiment in general and its conditions and bearing upon the spiritual life."

² *Moraltheologie*, p. 27.

other historical reason, that applies also to the third method of dealing with morals, which still remains to be mentioned. Ever since the time of scholasticism, theologians have refrained from introducing into their discussions any emotional element. The method adopted by the great thinkers of the Middle Ages is not that of *Plato*, in whom thought and poetry meet, nor that of *St. Augustine*, whose thought turned into prayer, but they followed *Aristotle*, the sober, impassionate thinker, as the "master of those who know." Their investigations aimed simply at truth, not at moral improvement or edification, and in their opinion truth was to be found, not in the variety of phenomena, but in the everlasting truths. In ethics and psychology, as well as in the abstract questions of metaphysics, they tried to pass beyond the fluctuations of the empirical to clear and firm conceptions, and to discover their intellectual associations.

Such being the stern trend of their thought, they, like *Kant* at a later date, assigned greater value to sobriety and lucidity of language than to any rousing of the affections, however praiseworthy. Hence *St. Thomas Aquinas* speaks of the highest and the lowest things with indifference, and no expression of inward enthusiasm or indignation is to be found in his most clearly expressed thought. He remarks theoretically that in searching after truth it is detrimental to arouse the emotions, although it is expedient to do so in practising it. It does not follow that to men of this type Christianity was only a scheme of thought or the Christian life a barren syllogism. On the contrary, they believed that in their writings they ought to record not their piety so much as their intellectual labours, precisely because their lives were full of religious enthusiasm, and because the æsthetic and emotional side of Christianity was visible to all in a time when art had reached its highest development.

No one judging *St. Thomas Aquinas* by his learned works would think him capable of the fervour and tenderness of feeling that he displays in his eucharistic hymns and in many touching incidents of his life. Other instances show no less plainly that true scholasticism, in spite of its cold, intellectual style, was the sister, not the opponent, of mysticism. Still it is no doubt due to the influence of scholasticism upon later writers in the Church that a cold and

purely intellectual method prevails in Catholic theology. Thoughts are presented plainly, there is no attempt at rhetorical persuasion or edification. Even in learned works a Protestant theologian is accustomed to give expression much more freely to his subjective feelings, and he may dislike this reserve on the part of Catholic authors. He ought not, however, to say that scholasticism, and the moral teaching of the Church subsequent to the Council of Trent which is based upon scholasticism, deal with the most terrible subjects unfeelingly. He ought to take into account the historical reasons for this peculiarity of style to which he objects. There is a good deal of evidence showing that, even at the present day, scholastic dryness contributes more than pious effusions to clearness in the discussion of moral problems.

A few words must be said regarding the scholastic and speculative treatment of morals.. The great scholastics of the thirteenth century were as eminent for their ethical as for their metaphysical and dogmatic learning. *St. Thomas*, the greatest of them all, in the second part of his "Summa," created a system of morals that wins the admiration and respect of every serious student, so deep are its foundations, so clear and uniform is its design, so harmonious are its parts, and so exquisite are its details.¹

This magnificent achievement as a whole has never been surpassed, and its spirit has never ceased to influence Catholic theology; but, as the means of acquiring knowledge have increased, the results attained by individual workers in separate departments of learning show a considerable advance upon *St. Thomas*. The philosophical spirit in which he dealt with questions of ethical principles was retained in the schools; the significance of ideas and principles was examined with infinite acumen, and whatever has appeared incontestable after these battles of thought undoubtedly possesses the strongest possible guarantee of truth. *Hugo Grotius* expresses his conviction that this is the case particularly with regard to morals, and extols not only the intellectual modesty of the scholastics, but their great powers of thought. "*Ubi in re morali consentiunt, vix est, ut errent.*"²

With a detailed discussion of questions of principle the theolo-

¹ Cf. *Gass*, *Gesch. der christl. Ethik.*, Berlin, 1881, p. 347, seq.

² *De iure belli et pacis*, Proleg., § 52.

gians subsequent to the Council of Trent have combined that of questions then for the first time arising on the subjects of natural law and economics. They include a great deal of canonistic and patristic matter in their special works, and deal with it in a way that displays a rare combination of logical keenness with juristic and theological training.

No one can study the great commentaries produced by the Thomists, or the ethical works of men like *Suarez*, *Vasquez*, and *Molina*, and carry away an impression that their views are fragmentary and unscientific; he will rather be astonished at their thoroughness and comprehensiveness. Particular cases are seen to be merely extensions of the speculative development of thought, serving to illustrate the doctrine taught or to solve practical difficulties. Hence it is not surprising that these scholars enjoyed a great reputation even outside the Church; the ethical works produced by the Jesuit Order have had considerable influence upon Protestant theologians, and for some time *Suarez* was preferred to *Melanchthon* at Protestant universities.¹ If the assailants of Catholic teaching on morals wish to learn its real nature and spirit, why do they not use these scientific statements of moral principles, which explain the connection and true value of the duties of individuals?

Is it because, in its later development, morality has abandoned its philosophical and dogmatic basis and lost itself in casuistry? No, such a mistake would have been averted by the respect shown by Catholic scholars for traditional methods, and the value that they ascribe to the philosophical foundation of theology. Moreover, in the present century there is a great revival of enthusiasm for *St. Thomas*. It is true that these discussions of the fundamental principles and ideas of Catholic morality do not often occur in our current compendia on the subject; but there are many works on moral philosophy and natural law that contain clear statements regarding the natural principles of morality. The larger works also on dogma, after the fashion of the mediæval *Summae*, deal more or less with the practical side of revelation and include apologetic and historical discussions on some special departments of ethics. It is, therefore, by no means impossible for non-Catholics

¹ *Stöcklin*, *et supra*, pp. 257, 260; *K. Werner*, *Suarez*, Rgb., 1861, I, 224, note.

to obtain a deeper insight into the scientific groundwork and the inner spirit of Catholic moral teaching.

Whether it is a mistake or not to exclude this higher morality from books intended for the use of confessors is a question apart, and various arguments can be adduced both in support of and against the practice. As a matter of fact, in many books the casuistic element predominates to a considerable extent. What are merely extensions and lines of demarcation in the larger works to which I have referred, are presented here as the chief objects of interest, apart from the ideas suggesting and controlling them. An early writer on casuistry remarks that his aim has been to collect the fruits of others' labour, so that the reader can gather the harvest without having toiled with the scholars preceding him. We must not overlook the fact that this division is only a relative one; even the handbooks on casuistry allude briefly to the principles of morality and to the more concrete grounds for it, based on reason and Revelation. If these books do not contain special arguments in defence of these principles, and if the principles seem to an unaccustomed eye to be lost in the maze of questions on doubts, this is not because slight importance is attached to them, but because the principles themselves are taken as a matter of course by the readers of such works and by every Catholic, whereas there may easily be some obscurity as to their concrete application in cases where duties are in conflict with one another. The authors of such books knew that their readers had studied the principles and spirit of morality, both theoretically, through the channels of moral philosophy and dogma, and practically, in the course of their ascetic training and education.¹ Such authors reckon also upon oral lectures to complete their work in the case of theological students, since the lecturer must inevitably lay stress upon principles, in order to bring his aphoristic theses and illustrations into connection. Most critics, however, shut their eyes to the plain tenets — which are stated as the rule and are to be regarded as such — and single out certain exceptions, claiming that these are the rule, in order thus to be able to charge casuistry with being nothing but moral scepticism.

¹ Even at the present day a whole year is devoted in the seminaries of religious orders to the study of ethics before the students begin moral theology.

One word more regarding this "complete ethical scepticism," which is supposed to have been restored in modern casuistic morals, and indirectly also in dogma.¹ It seems as if such a charge could not seriously be brought against the Catholic Church at a time when she stands almost alone in maintaining the objective, permanent character of knowledge in logic, in morals, in ethics, and in dogma; and when she is accused on all sides of realism, of overestimating thought, and of an unhistorical, rigid view of morality and religion, just because she preserves this anti-sceptical attitude.

In discussions on moral philosophy at the present day, Catholic moral philosophers are the most decided opponents of ethical scepticism. On every point where opinions are openly in conflict, as on questions regarding duelling and divorce, any politician knows that the Catholic conception of law is unalterable. In every book on morals a number of things such as calumny, suicide, duelling, and unchastity are represented as objectively sinful under *all* circumstances, although modern ethics easily finds excuses for them, and even Protestant moral writers do not always display sufficient energy in condemning them.

Far from succumbing to the attacks of sceptics, Catholic morality, including that of the casuists, is firmly based upon an inward conviction of the unchanging importance and sanctity of morals. It deduces the binding character of all morality and a whole series of particular rules from the very nature of things, the inner force of ideas, originating in God yet independent even of God's freedom of choice. It attributes to every deliberate moral decision an infinite importance, affecting our eternal happiness or misery. It reveals God, the guardian of morality, as the God also of love, as our Father and Redeemer; it regards the whole moral life of man as evidence of his being the child of God and of his association with the Son of God. All these ideas have, outside the Church, either vanished altogether or have become obscured, but within her they retain their original force and life. Just because on the vital points of moral life she emphasizes her demands, and unfolds aid to improvement and perfection in so very many forms, she can allow some amount of leniency on less important matters. Because she

¹ *Harnack*, p. 755.

attaches such infinite importance to real duties and leaves no ambiguity regarding their absolute character, she must be careful to scrutinize things closely before declaring them to be duties. A strong man may use his power with moderation, a weak man, aware of his weakness, is apt to overexert it. All those systems that tamper with the foundations of morality, either by ignoring the moral forces in man or by separating morality from God, are impelled to compensate for the loss of what is really the quintessence of morality by displaying great strictness in estimating the importance of individual duties, especially of those belonging to external honesty and truthfulness. And at first sight this appears to be better than the "lax moral teaching of the Jesuits." The difference is this: Catholic morality, including its casuistic form, is in its kernel vigorous, full, and complete; any defects and uncertainties that there may be are on the periphery. But modern Protestant morality gives an impression of being ideal and strict on the periphery, whilst the kernel is rotten and decaying.¹

¹ *Sell* regards casuistry as a compromise-morality combating "the natural rigorism of conscience, which, when in a state of true contrition, is inclined to accuse itself more severely than necessary" (p. 270). We see here again how the motives and points of view of casuistry are unduly narrowed down. The fact is that casuistry is not intended to combat either rigorism or laxity, as personal tendencies; it does combat false and inaccurate thought in interpreting moral rules. We are not now concerned with the question whether rigorism — i.e., an excessively severe manner of judging things — is to be encouraged or resisted. A bare statement of the truth can of itself never be harmful, and it is useful to a confessor in as far as it supplies him with objective standards by which to judge, whilst at the same time it remains left to his discretion to stir or soothe the feelings of contrition in his penitent.

CHAPTER III

CASUISTRY AND LIFE. MORALS AS A MATTER OF REASON AND OF SENTIMENT

THE impression of which we have just been speaking is to a great extent connected with the theoretical, or soliloquizing, attitude assumed by most modern writers on ethics. They record their own ideas and feelings, well knowing that their works will not alter the course of the world in general, but at best will be appreciated, like other such works, by students of philosophy or theology. *Rousseau* remarked that the strictest views of morality were possible on paper, while in stern reality what is strict and exalted is often inimical to what is good. Catholic theologians come into close contact with real life, and this, as well as the influence exerted in giving advice and instruction, makes it incumbent upon them to take into account the realities and needs of existence far more than Protestants are obliged to do. Recent Protestant writers express regret that their moral theology moves in a sphere too high and too general to influence practically the circumstances of real life.¹

M. Rade, in one of his speeches, drew attention to the gulf between the lofty ethical teaching of the Bible and modern reality, in which Christianity plays no part. He says: "A professor, who is in a position of social independence, is in teaching ethics but little disturbed by the conflict between the duties of a Christian and the demands of society. Our ethical system

¹ *Von Nathusius*, Die Mitarbeit der Kirche an der Lösung der sozialen Frage, 2d ed., Leipzig, 1897, p. 13. "Theological ethics has on the whole no place at all among the realities of life. Whenever I pass from the sphere of political economy to theological ethics I cannot get rid of the impression that I am entering fairyland."

is on the whole one for those independently situated; for this reason it possesses no value for the great majority of our fellowmen and for the members of the community. This ethical system demands a moral strictness easily conformed to by professors and pastors, but demanding unheard-of heroism on part of the great mass of mankind who live from hand to mouth."¹ He then proceeds to discuss coöperation in the production of immoral articles, in the printing of bad books, etc., all matters of the same "pettifogging," casuistic nature as those discussed by Catholic moralists. We may say of most theologians what has been said of *Schleiermacher's* ethical speculations, that they are brilliant displays, but have no more effect upon real life than the wind has upon the grass. Any rational consideration of the actual matters connected with morality is viewed with horror. The simple moral feeling, full of love of virtue and of hatred of vice, is described and extolled as the guiding star of life. Men are apt to forget, however, that there are other feelings in the human heart, most powerful and not of themselves morally reprehensible, such as love of life, of property, etc., and these often come in conflict with the direct moral feeling. In such cases modern man, because guided by his feelings, disregards the law much more radically than a rational consideration would permit him.

Where the old casuists are accused of giving lax decisions, they generally have had in view conflicts of this kind. As far as they give advice at all for the direction of souls, they do so whilst confronted with a doubt whether, by imposing upon a penitent sinner some hard duty, the existence of which is not even positive, they may not repel him, and thus throw him back onto the path of vice.

It is in some degree a result of the very nature of Protestantism, and the way in which it regards faith and law,² that its theological and ethical teaching does not touch the individual acts of life, and so has lost all influence over them. Conversely, however, the abolition of confession and the general weakening of the connection between clergy and laity have caused moral casuistry to be considered superfluous and to be misunderstood. In former times,

¹ *M. Rade, Religion und Moral. Streitsätze für Theologen, Giessen, 1898, p. 11, seq.*

² See *infra*, Part II, Chaps. I, II and V.

when Protestant theologians were more frequently in a position to counsel rulers, to act as spiritual directors, and to express an opinion on moral questions, they, too, discussed questions of casuistry, and certainly not always with success. Every one knows what advice *Luther* gave to *Philip of Hesse*, and of noted casuists of a later date historians of ethics confess that they were not blameless in matters of truth and superstition, that they expatiated with unpleasant details upon matters of married life.

Still greater harm has been done to the reputation of ecclesiastical ethics by those who went to the other extreme of mistaken, pietistic severity, which caused Protestant theologians for over a century to quarrel amongst themselves with much heat and subtlety about the depravity of such really indifferent actions as smoking, playing cards, visiting theatres, or the wearing of wigs. The natural effect of such severity was to bring ridicule upon moral precepts.¹ If Protestant theologians of the present day are fairly immune from both dangers, it is due to the slight importance ascribed nowadays to their utterances in most departments of economic and public life.

It is a well-known fact, often exaggerated to suit certain purposes, that Catholic confessors and learned religious were frequently asked by secular rulers to give advice on political affairs, especially in the centuries when casuistry flourished. The *Medici* often visited the convent of San Marco in Florence, Spanish kings consulted the Dominicans, and Jesuits held prominent positions at courts of Catholic princes. *Rade* remarks ironically that in politics we are now free from "false idealism." "We have grasped the secret of power and without scruple treat questions of power as such. In our world of thought a very considerable region has imperceptibly been occupied by this new view of things and withdrawn from the control of Christian ethics" (p. 13). Our predecessors are blamed for not recognizing the social and moral importance of trade and money-making, but it cannot be denied that men like *Molina* and *Lessius* showed great understanding of economic life and dealt with it with circumspection and moderation, and that

¹ Even matters connected with the intercourse of the sexes have been discussed, with disgusting zeal, by pietistic circles. The detailed manner in which *Zinzendorf* dealt with and regulated the affairs of married life is notorious.

casuistic moralists laid down sound principles and decisions on the questions of *meum* and *tuum*.

Nowadays law and morality are separated, the regulation of the material side of life is left to legislation and judicial decisions, and Christian morality is regarded as something too exalted to have anything to do with things of this kind. It is, then, easy to describe in fine words the Christian indifference to worldly possessions and to speak of inward liberty and heavenly disposition; but there is a danger that, by assigning such a lofty position to morals, free play is given to another disposition — viz., the plain greed for money which fears only the penalties of the law — or to business maxims that are laxer by far than the moral teaching of the casuists. *Rade* remarks that hitherto “no one of our writers on ethics has written a book on the ethics of business, although it must be possible to do so. Business has only one great object — the making of money. After a business man has safely passed through all the troubles and risks of his early career and has gathered his harvest, he can perhaps afford to carry on his business on the noblest principles. But whilst working his way up and facing dangerous competition, it is impossible (!) for him to be a Christian and at the same time to push on his business interests” (p. 12, etc.). Another writer on theology complains that “the Church possesses no practical system of ethics; she has no bearing upon the chief factors of life. . . . But in the course of time it becomes intolerable for the people to have ethics cut off from life, and life from ethics.”¹

At the present day Catholic theologians are not often consulted by the rulers of states, but the priest, both in the confessional and outside of it, very frequently has to give a decision regarding moral obligations in private matters; e.g., compensation for wrongs inflicted, disputes about inherited property, divisions of money, claims upon insurance companies, etc. The simple plan, to recommend always the safest and highest course, is often impracticable, because what is advantageous to one is harmful to another. For instance, a man, acting in the interests of his family, can and must pay only what strict duty requires of him, not what Chris-

¹ *H. Kötterke in the Christl. Welt*, 1904, col. 38.

tian idealism might be willing to give. In many cases it may be best to leave doubtful cases to the decision of secular courts of justice, but even the secular court does not aim at excluding all moral rules from the domain of business life; and occasionally the intervention of a priest is sought for the express purpose of avoiding the necessity of going to law. Owing to the absence of confession amongst Protestants, their clergy are not treated with the same general confidence as Catholic priests, and this in itself is a reason, and a very creditable one, why Catholic ethics goes more into detail and must put up with the reproach of being hair-splitting.

Modern *social* development is very similar. In agreement with the view taken by liberal political-economists, that the economic life is independent of the moral law, is the opinion of Protestant theologians that "in social and political affairs the Church does not possess the word of God." This certainly saves their ethics a great deal of trouble, but it causes a fatal cleavage between Christian morality, which then leads with its strict principles and high ideals a purely contemplative existence, and the practical forces that control the business of life. Intelligent supporters of Protestantism look with a certain envy at the Catholic Church, whose ministers, from the Pope downwards, regard it as the duty of all those in charge of souls not only to preach in general the moral tenets of the Gospel, but also to use insight and zeal in applying these tenets to the circumstances of modern, industrial life. In social matters, too, in addition to an active Christian spirit and a proper enthusiasm for social improvement, we must, in order to win recognition for the demands of morality, examine circumstances in a rational way, not overlooking details; we must distinguish clearly between justice and charity, between obligatory honesty and a large-hearted generosity. The text that a "labourer is worthy of his hire" does not decide the question whether the hire ought to be enough for a numerous family to live on; the employer who raises such a question does not care whether he would do a noble deed by paying for the support of a family rather than of an individual, he rather wants to know whether he is in justice bound to do so, apart from the further consideration that his indiscretion on the side of generosity may impose an unrightful burden upon

others. Nor can we apply the proverb "honesty is the best policy" indiscriminately to all cases in which an insured person has made a false statement, if we have no real knowledge of the nature and aim of the insurance.

It is quite true that the essence of morality and perfection is to be found, not in minute regulations for conduct, but in inward purity and energetic enthusiasm for God and virtue. But it is doubtful in the *first* place whether the most effectual means of diffusing this sense of morality is to begin by describing and recommending virtue. Of greater efficacy are practical training in right conduct, affecting every action, the silent influence of example and environment, and the impression produced by heroic deeds and dogmatic representations. The history of Western Christianity shows that the Catholic Church is unrivalled in following this mode of educating nations and individuals. However great an importance may be assigned to ethical principles in training the intellect and disposition, there remains in the second place the necessity of applying these principles to individual cases and of supplying a field of beneficial activity to the noble impulses of the heart. *Aristotle* pointed out that moral instruction on particular points was more useful than such as dealt only with what was general. Perfection in ethical science lies in the harmonious union of the practical and the theoretical element; where the former is undervalued, morals are regarded too much as a matter of speculation.

Even *Kant*, who lays great stress upon the interior and general character of moral maxims, raises some "questions of casuistry" at the end of the theoretical section in his work on ethics. How plain and concrete, and to how great an extent casuistic, are the rules for religious laid down by *St. Pachomius* and *St. Benedict*! How readily do they pass from general instructions on virtue to the regulation of daily life, of dress, etc.! Modern theologians or any society for ethical culture, in undertaking to write a guide to perfection, i.e., to the highest form of moral life, would set to work very differently and present their readers with enthusiastic exhortations and glorious prospects.

Yet these plain and almost illogical rules have done more to promote the perfection of innumerable Christians and the civili-

zation of nations than any deep and ingenious theory of morals. *St. Augustine*, though able to soar in spirit to God Himself, did not think it beneath him to attend to the externals of everyday life, and his rule for religious women contains instructions regarding their meals, dress, and outward behaviour. In numerous letters he answers questions asked by laymen on matters of conscience, and these replies invariably display his intellectual powers and dignity, though taking into account even small, exterior matters.

Later casuists may, it is true, sometimes be blamed for their want of intellectual grasp and their inability to take a wide view of their subject, so that chief points are obscured by minute investigation of detail. But every one is not bound to equal *St. Augustine*; and our modern science, which almost loses itself in minute inquiries, should not be too ready to condemn, as trivial and ridiculous, details that may not bother the modern conscience. Every particle of a language, now regarded as formed by the creative intellect of man, the minutest elements as parts of the economy of nature, every pathological malformation as a deviation from the biological standard — they are all alike considered important enough for long and learned dissertations. Why, then, should it be unscientific to pay attention to details in matters of morals and to examine in them, too, any pathological phenomena by the standards of law? *Gauss*, the eminent mathematician, says: "There are questions upon the answers to which I set an infinitely higher value than upon mathematics; viz., questions on the subject of ethics, on our relation to God, and on our future." Why, then, should a moralist be forbidden to display that thoroughness and careful consideration of every detail in his problems which strikes a layman, who happens to open the book, as trivial and hairsplitting? Upon this layman the theoretical or mathematical discussion of any other matter would make the same impression.

But does not the *moral sense* decide immediately in questions of conscience? Is not a scientific examination of such questions superfluous and confusing? This is undoubtedly the opinion of many modern writers on ethics, and this view appeals to Protestant theologians more than the acceptance of moral ideas as objective rules of thought and action.

However, this conception of morality as a matter of feeling is based on false principles, as *von Hartmann* has shown in his severe criticism of *Herbart's* conception of morality as a matter of taste,¹ and it is practically misleading. I cannot refer, in support of the latter statement, to any more conspicuous instance than an affair that was much discussed a few years ago. An officer shot down another, who had insulted his brother, in order to save this brother from fighting a duel, the result of which would probably have been fatal to him. The motives for this action were apparently most noble — love for his brother and the brother's family, courage and self-sacrifice even to the point of giving up his own happiness in life. But in the whole folly of duelling so much stress is laid upon the sense of honour that people fail to judge the fact reasonably. They overlook the fact that it is possible for an action to be *in itself* so reprehensible that no nobility of motive can make it objectively excusable. In this case, therefore, the blind impulse of an apparently heroic feeling drove a man to commit actual murder.

Such fatal confusion of thought is encouraged by modern ethics, because it denies or undervalues the inner morality of actions. Modern writers on ethics declare even suicide to be permissible in certain cases, and they allow a physician, with certain limitations, to use poison to deliver an incurable patient from a painful and useless existence. Such writers maintain that nothing is *in itself* good or bad, that an action becomes so through the intention and circumstances under which it is performed. They regard the "laws" of morality from a purely empirical standpoint; the general idea is only an abstraction, not a binding rule. Protestant teachers of moral theology do not combat this nominalism with sufficient decision; they even encourage it by setting an excessive value upon sentiment and purely subjective reason. *Otto Ritschl* regrets that there is still so little individualization in matters affecting moral life and thought, and rejects "ethical rationalism with its tacit assumption that all men possess the same amount of reason, and that this reason has to determine for all alike their moral intentions and actions." He says that when the question is asked whether a lie is permissible to save a persecuted person, we still

¹ *Phänomenologie des sittl. Bewusstseins*, p. 317.

care too little for "what the conscience of the person concerned decides and what he *feels* to be quite definitely his duty." We still fail, he thinks, "to perceive that one's own conscience is *the ultimate judge* of what is morally good and bad, and that the judgment of conscience frequently does not coincide with the generally accepted code of morality!"¹

To prevent such a complete abandonment of the general ideas and rules of morality, other theologians recommend that ethics should proceed more in accordance with reason. "It is only worth while to touch upon details when the broad outlines have been defined. Without dogmas, fundamental ideas, and abstractions, Christian knowledge must finally go wrong. . . . We have become very weak in our conceptions, and so much stronger in sentiment." The widely spread obscurity on the subject of moral perception is ascribed chiefly to the evangelical style of preaching. "It is important to make up for lost time in this respect, lest the obscurity due to making morals a matter of feeling alienates minds of a thoughtful and practical tendency even more completely from religion and the Church than is already the case."²

Do we Catholics, then, possess, instead of deceptive feeling, a clear insight based on reason, and are we able to settle every moral question with infallible accuracy? Do we agree with *Kant* in thinking that "it is quite easy for the most ordinary intelligence to perceive without hesitation what the moral law requires" by means of the categorical imperative? Certainly not! And precisely because we do *not* share *Kant's* opinion do we regard some amount of casuistry as indispensable. *Paulsen* gives an excellent refutation of *Kant's* exaggerated view of the principle of reason, and shows that it is often difficult for the conscience to arrive at any decision. But he is wrong if he supposes *Kant's* exaggeration to be connected with the essence of every kind of intuitive morality that accepts laws to which there are no exceptions. An intuitive morality concerned simply with *a priori* formulæ, and not deriving its ideas from reality, has certainly no need of casuistry; and, conversely, a purely empirical morality, that recognizes no absolute laws, has no clue to guide it out of the labyrinth of confused indi-

¹ Christl. Welt, 1903, pp. 418, 421.

² *Ibid.*, 1903, p. 425; 1902, p. 872.

vidual motives. Taking into consideration the manifold aspects of life, we may well find it difficult to give to such a commandment as "Thou shalt not kill" so clear and definite an interpretation that it will assume the form of a law admitting of no exception. But as, in spite of varieties of race, human nature is everywhere the same, some general laws governing human actions can be laid down, to which every conscience must assent in so far as it has attained light and truth. Catholic ethics examines according to the reason of the act the exceptions to the fifth commandment — the taking of life in war, in self-defence, and under the criminal law — and distinguishes directly wilful and deliberate from indirect and merely permitted killing. In this way it arrives at a scientifically precise statement of what is absolutely forbidden to take the place of the current form "Thou shalt not kill." Having done this, it is able to answer without difficulty in a uniform and conclusive manner such questions as whether duelling is permitted.

There is, of course, no better way of working out clear conceptions than to investigate individual cases that seem to lie just on the border line and to make an exception to the law unavoidable. In casuistry as a whole we are far too apt to overlook the fact that, besides the practical motive for our investigations, we are aiming at clearing up our thoughts on the subject. It is the boast of natural science that, by the observation of individual instances, it tries to form general concepts and to throw light upon the nature of certain laws. Can ethics be reproached for adopting the same method as much as is possible? What is regarded as a matter of course in the case of natural science, jurisprudence, etc., is looked upon as superfluous in the case of ethics; viz., a lucidity of concepts and a strict formulation of laws. Instead of these things, the conscience is advised to rely upon the voice speaking within one's own heart, or to seek special enlightenment in prayer. Of course Catholic teachers of morals do not presume that all cases can be decided on paper, and when difficulties arise it is advisable to examine the facts carefully and to ask in prayer for the counsel of God; but nevertheless there are a number of fixed, unchanging rules facilitating the examination of facts. *R. von Ihering* remarks with reference to such *casus conscientiae* that, when they concern our

neighbour, we should refrain from judging, unless he himself confides in us and asks our advice, as often happens to a confessor in the Catholic Church. *Ihering* speaks of confession as "an institution, the justification and value of which I, though a Protestant, cannot deny, since it sets the objective Church as a support before men in their perplexities *instead of their own merely subjective authority*, and it has caused the teachers of the Church to deal with the theory of morals, not exclusively from the purely scientific standpoint of ethics, but also from the practical point of view of *moral casuistry*." ¹

With reference to some forms and manifestations of casuistry there is some ground for the charge that it views things in a petty, one-sided, and superficial way. When it is considered, however, that this charge is made against all casuistry, and with such slight foundation, we cannot help saying that it applies perfectly to those who make it. They themselves judge in a petty way, because they think only of the emotional needs of the educated people of to-day, and do not realize that it is the great, universal task of the Church to give moral training to *all* mankind, including ferocious savages and degraded criminals.²

They judge in a one-sided way, because they do not see that casuistry aims at clarifying ideas and at establishing a basis for what is generally accepted, but they imagine that it contains the whole moral teaching of Catholicism. They judge in a superficial way, because they allow themselves to be misled by the prepon-

¹ *Der Zweck im Recht*, 4th ed., 1905, p. 39. *K. Jentsch* considers it "not very conscientious for a Church to limit itself to unctuous trivialities, and to tell a plain man who wants to know how to act under certain circumstances that his conscience alone must decide." He says that, apart from some high-flown generalities, there is at the present time great diversity of opinion regarding most important questions of morality, and yet there is no "autonomy," but every one follows "some one else's lead." "How," he asks, "is ultramontane morality to be resisted if we have nothing to oppose to it? And at the present moment we have nothing. Each of us has, I suppose, his own moral code, but we possess no moral code that would be accepted by the great majority of non-Catholics" (*Die Zukunft.*, Jahrg. X, 51, p. 467, etc.).

² Even such abstruse *casus* as whether a man may commit suicide if commanded to do so by a superior, and if it can ever under certain circumstances be permissible to eat human flesh, no longer seem altogether fictitious when we remember the fate of Christian officials in China, or the experiences of those who have been kept in captivity by savage nations.

derating bulk of casuistry and by some peculiarities that strike them, and so they overlook most important instructions on matters of principle and significant limitations that cast quite another light upon decisions of individual cases. As this one-sidedness and superficiality is the outcome of a careless, contemptuous, and overhasty mode of proceeding, it offers in this respect a very discreditable contrast to the methods of the old casuists, who undeniably displayed thoroughness, fairness, and regard for the opinions of others. *Their* one-sidedness is, as a rule, due to conscious self-repression, to limiting the point at issue to what is essential, and to failure to record circumstances. However formalistic this method may occasionally appear to us, we must say of it *Abstractionem non est mendacium*. If in a treatise *de jure et justitia* a moralist of this kind comes to the conclusion that such and such an action is not required by law, he may consider it superfluous to refer to virtues such as love, gratitude, etc., which might perhaps render its performance desirable. When he insists on outward reverence and does not mention inward devotion at Mass on Sunday, he has in mind obedience to *the law of the Church*, and at most he may remark that the *natural law* and *respect for God* obviously require also the inward participation in the holy sacrifice.

That there is something to be said in favour of this kind of one-sided abstraction has already been pointed out, and I shall refer to the subject again in my next chapter. It is plain that this *logical* limitation ought not to be interpreted as *moral* limitation. Probabilism is based upon such an abstraction, and not upon a lax view of the moral law; it assigns limits to individual laws, not to morality itself.¹

¹ *Herrmann* (p. 66) does not realize this fact when he supposes that, should the police prohibit the use of mantraps, a conscience trained in Probabilism need not bother about any possible injury to a neighbour if there was any ambiguity about the order. As if the natural law, and the fifth commandment, did not make it a *positive duty* to refrain from injuring one's neighbour! He is mistaken also when he remarks (Christl. Welt, 1904, p. 125) on the *casus* whether a Christian may, in order to prevent murder or adultery, counsel the committing of some lesser sin: "Whatever sacrifices and dangers may be involved, he does his best to prevent adultery or murder, and keep his hands clean of contributing in any way to the perpetration of another sin." The whole discussion in this case is dependent upon the express presumption that it would be impossible in this particular case "to prevent" the murder or adultery (Christl. Welt, 1904, p. 125).

These critics might, with advantage, take to heart a sentence of a historian referring primarily to mediæval theology, but applicable also to later moral theology: "The outcome of such knowledge is inevitably a *refinement of methods that is urgently needed* in considering works on theology. We have had to pay a bitter penalty for apparently harmless inaccuracies, on our part, in studying books in which scrupulous exactitude in distinctions counts for everything, and which are some of the most subtle works ever compiled."¹

How much need there is of such refinement in the methods employed, if a just judgment is to be formed, will appear in the discussion of some particularly "offensive" points. I may remark here that my aim in writing the following sections was not to examine the various problems critically, but rather to throw light upon their real meaning.²

¹ s. d. *Leyen*, Allg. Zeit., 1896, supplement 46.

² Reference to abuses in casuistry is made in a decree of *Alexander VII*, dated September 24, 1665, which condemns explicitly the "license of extravagant minds" and their "manner of putting forward opinions completely at variance with the simplicity of the Gospel." Opinions of this kind were condemned not only by *Alexander VII*, but also by *Innocent XI* and *Alexander VIII* (see *Denzinger*, *Euclidion*). For other complaints made by energetic bishops and theologians of the seventeenth century, and later by *St. Alphonsus*, see *Ter Haar*, *Das Dekret des P. Innocenz XI über den Probabilismus*, 1904, p. 32, etc.

CHAPTER IV

PARTICULAR TOPICS OF CASUISTRY

MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND EXAGGERATIONS

"THE END JUSTIFIES THE MEANS"

THE charge most familiar and almost invariably brought against casuists, and especially against Jesuit moralists, concerns the maxim *The end justifies the means*. In its true sense, in which it is accepted by almost all moralists, it means that a good and holy purpose bestows a higher moral value upon means that are in themselves *either good or indifferent*.

But the Jesuits are accused of declaring even *sinful* actions to be permissible or to be morally good, if only they tend to the attainment of some good and holy object. In 1852, and several times subsequently, *P. Roh* offered a reward of one thousand florins to any one who could show that this principle was stated in any book written by a Jesuit. The reward has never been claimed, nor were others, offered in later years. *O. Zöckler*¹ explains this fact as follows: "The theory that the end justifies the means is taught by the Jesuits not explicitly but implicitly, in the form of certain equivalents." But *P. Roh* had stated that he would be satisfied even with such "equivalents." Also *Pascal's* formula of the *directio intentionis*, of including good intentions in sinful actions, has, as *Zöckler* admits, never yet been found clearly expressed in the works of any Jesuit, but "a fuller knowledge of the Jesuit writers on casuistry *will probably reveal it*"! Instead of obtaining this fuller knowledge, the opponents of the Jesuits since *Pascal's* time have only brought forward a number of passages that they

¹ Die Absichtlenkung, oder, Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel, 1902, p. 31.

either completely distorted or else interpreted in a way not justified by their context.

For a long time they quoted an expression occurring in the works of *Busenbaum*, a Jesuit, who died in 1668. In discussing a debated point he actually uses the words: *Cum finis est licitus, etiam media sunt licita*.¹

In 1895 *P. Grünberg*, a Protestant writer, examined the context of this sentence and found to his astonishment, as he says, "that it here has none of the objectionable meaning imputed to it by controversialists. Apart from the fact that the means are said to be sanctioned, not justified or sanctified, *Busenbaum*, in using these words, had no intention at all of laying down a new or even a moral principle, but he employed them as a universally recognized logical rule, or as stating an obvious fact."²

The sentence means: "When an end is permissible, the (natural) means for attaining that end are also permissible, as there must be means of attaining it." In the instance chosen for discussion, the question is whether a prisoner, trying to escape from execution or lifelong confinement, may deceive his warders, without using violence, and break his fetters. *Busenbaum* argues that if it is not a sin to attempt flight, the preparations for it cannot be forbidden as immoral. It would be absurd to say to a prisoner: "You may run away, but you must not break a lock or chain." *Grünberg* remarks (p. 437, etc.): "The meaning is, strictly speaking, not that a morally good or permissible end is enough to render bad actions good, — note in the first place the clause *praecisa vi et injuria*, — but that, where the completion of an action is allowable . . . the attempt to perform it must also be allowed, just as the beginning or any part of the action is allowed."³

It would have been easy to arrive at the same conclusion from Catholic works, but it was *Grünberg's* explanation that had the effect of making *Tschackert* speak only of an "instinctive" recognition or a "transparent" attestation of the principle.⁴ In arti-

¹ *Medulla*, IV, 3, 7, 2.

² *Ztschr. für Kirchengeschichte*, XV, 437.

³ We may here remind of the present-day opinion on the escape of *Karl Schurz* and on the flight of prisoners from Siberia.

⁴ *Ztschr. für Kirchengeschichte*, XIX, 368, *seq.*

cles contributed to the "Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte" and in an excellent historical monograph on the subject, a Jesuit, *M. Reichmann*, has replied to both *Tschackert* and *Zöckler*, bringing forward historical arguments to prove the injustice of the accusation.¹

Again, on March 31, 1903, *Dasbach*, a member of the House of Deputies, offered two thousand florins to any one able to show that the Jesuits really maintained the principle with which Protestant writers of controversy charged them. The money was promised to any one who could prove that they taught that *any* sort of means are permissible provided the end is good. *P. von Hoensbroech* professed his readiness to do so, and attempted to furnish the required proof in an article published first in the "Deutschland" for July, 1903, and afterwards printed separately under the title "Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel," Berlin, 1903. A court of arbitration could not be formed, as Protestant professors refused to have anything to do with it, so *v. Hoensbroech* went to law to claim payment of the sum offered. One admission that he made is of peculiar interest: "Criticism has refuted all the evidence adduced from the time of *Pascal* to the present day in favour of the occurrence of this notorious principle in the works of Jesuit writers. . . . The evidence now brought forward is new."²

The Court of Appeals at Cologne declared, on March 30, 1905, that the required evidence had *not* been supplied. The verdict was based upon the following considerations: "All the passages quoted by the complainant from the writings of Jesuits refer exclusively to *definite*, individual actions, and the authors answer the question whether, assuming certain definite things to be the case, these actions are permissible. In a particular case the question is discussed whether it is permissible to advise a man to commit a lesser sin, who is fully determined to commit a greater one, there being no other means of deterring him. We must not lose sight of the fact that the point is always whether it is permissible

¹ *M. Reichmann*, *Der Zweck heiligt die Mittel*, 1903.

² *Ibid.*, p. 5. Cf. *Dasbach*, *Dasbach gegen Hoensbroech*, 1904, and the correspondence between *Dasbach* and *v. Hoensbroech*. *Heiner*, *Des Grafen v. Hoensbroech neuer Beweis des jesuitischen Grundsatzes*, 1904; *Duhr*, *Jesuitenfabeln*, p. 542.

to advise a man to commit a slight sin, never whether slight sins are permissible, so that the whole question turns upon a very definite action, viz., the giving of scandal. . . . If it be regarded as permissible to give such advice, the supporters of this opinion take pains to show that the action does not become permissible *ex fine*, but is good *ex objecto*, and they explain in very various ways that the object of the action or advice is not the perpetration of a sin, but the *diminution* of a greater, or the choice of a lesser sin, and that this is a good object."

The court stated that while it was possible to challenge this argument, it was impossible to discover in it the required principle. Furthermore, that the same remark may be made with regard to another class of *casus*, which turns upon the question whether under certain circumstances it is permissible to offer a *possibility* or *occasion* of sin; e.g., in order to detect or convert a thief.

The judicial decision was on all essential points correct and convincing. Liberal-minded men like K. Jentsch and V. Naumann had rightly ridiculed the hypocritical severity which doubted the right to advise a vindictive ruffian, on the point of shooting a man who had offended him, to give him a flogging instead; whilst it raised no protest against the far more disastrous dominion of unscrupulous utilitarianism in modern life. According to the principles of Catholic morals, we are always bound, in discussing such a question, to lay emphasis upon the fact — and the more prominent works of casuists do this — that one may never advise a man offhand to commit a smaller sin, but the advice must either expressly or unmistakably contain the condition or presumption that one or other of the two sins will certainly and in any case be committed.

Speaking generally, we may point out that even a moralist has "the right" to make a mistake in his solution of a difficult *casus* without thereby at once incurring a charge of holding an immoral principle. Every mistake, every sin, is a denial of some theoretical or practical principle, but only a fanatical desire to discover heresy, or a pedantic narrow-mindedness, can find in such inconsistencies any evidence of maxims hostile to faith and morals. Otherwise we should eventually arrive at the point of considering every one who used an illogical argument or a contradictory line

of thought fit for a lunatic asylum. A Catholic moralist, above all, cannot give to the maxim under discussion the meaning that it is charged to have, because in his fundamental studies *the contrary is too clearly laid down as an axiom*. St. Augustine says emphatically that, however great a bearing the end to be attained may have upon the moral value of an action, nothing *in itself wrong* may ever be done for the sake of attaining a good end.¹

St. Thomas Aquinas quotes and confirms this principle: "*Ea, quae secundum se mala, nullo fine bene fieri possunt*,"² and distinguishes precisely the moral quality, that a human action has in virtue of its immediate object, from the further determination given it by the ultimate end in view; and he lays it down, as absolutely indispensable to the goodness of an action, that both its nature and its end must be good. "Evil proceeds from various defects, but goodness only from perfection and completeness. Hence the will is always bad, *if it desires anything bad in itself from the point of view of good*, or good from that of evil. For its goodness, however, it is necessary that it should desire the good as good; i.e., *that it seeks what is good for the sake of what is good*."³

This principle recurs in a stereotype form in handbooks of ethics and serves as a guiding star in special casuistic investigations. Laymann, for instance, says: *Circumstantia finis boni nihil confert actui ex obiecto malo, sed relinquit simpliciter et undequaque malum*. He bases his statement not only upon St. Augustine, St. Dionysius, and St. Thomas, but also upon St. Paul, who in Romans iii. 8 denounces as a principle worthy of all condemnation: *Faciamus mala, ut eveniant bona*.⁴ In the same way St. Alphonsus declares that, "if the object is immoral and inconsistent with what is naturally reasonable, the action is rendered *essentially immoral*."⁵

It is important to notice that, according to all these writers,

¹ Contra mendac., n. 18.

² S. theol., I. II, q. 88, a. 6 ad 3.

³ Ibid. q. 19, a. 7 ad 3. Cf. *ibid.*, q. 18, a. 4 ad 3: *Nihil prohibet actioni habenti unam praedictorum bonitatum deesse aliam. Et secundum hoc contingit actionem, quae est bona secundum speciem suam vel secundum circumstantias, ordinari ad finem malum vel e converso. Non tamen est actio bona simpliciter, nisi omnes bonitates concurrant; quia "quilibet singularis defectus causat malum, bonum autem ex integra causa."* Dionys. Arcop., De div. nom., 4, 30.

⁴ Theol. mor., I, 2, 9, 7.

⁵ Ibid., (ed. Gaudé), V, tract. praecamb. XXXVII.

the standard which determines the moral relations of a man to the various objects and aims of his actions is to be found not in vague and changeable feelings, but in reason, which judges according to general principles and reflects the eternal laws of God. Many actions are sinful because of their inward and essential irregularity, and are forbidden by a natural law of morality, so that God Himself could not make them good and lawful.¹

Luther, by his whole disposition and theological tendency, was in far greater danger of infringing upon the absolute character of moral prohibitions. As a nominalistic theologian and a man of strong emotions he was inclined to put pious feelings before reason, and to prefer the positive law of God to the *lex aeterna* and subjective suggestions to objective rules. If, according to *Luther*, faith is able to make an inwardly sinful man appear just and holy by the imputation to him of a justice not his own, this same faith must also make it possible to sanctify a sinful *action* by means of a pious intention. With regard to the Hessian marriage question, *Luther*, it is well known, said: "What harm would there be if a man, to accomplish better things, and for the sake of the Christian Church, did tell a good thumping lie?" In sanctioning the Landgraf's double marriage, *Luther* undoubtedly took into account the protection that *Philip* could extend to the Reformation movement.²

The liberal ethical teaching of modern times openly acknowledges, that to a great extent, the end justifies the means; not indeed every end, but the end of human life — i.e., the earthly welfare of the individual or of society. By regarding this ideal of prosperity as the result of worldly factors, it naturally makes it dependent upon changeable empirical relations, not upon unchanging spiritual rules. In many cases modern ethics actually concede that the moral laws vary essentially according to nations, times, and individuals; and when once this concession is made, the way is plainly opened to most disastrous interpretations and applications of the proposition which we have been discussing.³

¹ Cf. *infra*, Part II, Chap. I.

² Cf. *N. Paulus*, Literar. Beil. der Köln. Volksztg., 1903, No. 18; 1905, No. 21; *Reichmann*, p. 55, *seq.*

³ A selection of extracts from modern writers, accepting the principle that

FIDES IMPLICITA

Harnack in various places¹ draws attention to a statement quoted by *Döllinger* from the works of *Innocent IV*, to the effect that it is enough for laymen to believe in a God who will reward us according to our actions, and in all other matters of dogma and morality to believe merely *implicite*; i.e., to think and say: "*I believe what the Church believes.*" He states that from the time of Nominalism onwards, this view has received a more general acceptance, and faith has been regarded as an act of blind obedience, the laity having been bound to the Church merely by a convenient and empty *fides implicita*. This system is said to have attained its fullest development in Probabilism, and we are told that the theory, according to which a man in a state of culpable ignorance regarding the mysteries of faith, even such as the Trinity and the Incarnation, could nevertheless receive absolution, was accepted in a general way by all the Popes, although it was formally condemned by *Innocent XI*. *Hoensbroech* quotes from *Laymann*, a Jesuit, the following statement: "Explicit faith in the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity is not essential to salvation." In making this quotation, *Hoensbroech* relies upon *Guimenius* (de Moya, 1657), who sums up *Laymann's* excellent and thorough examination of the subject in this altogether erroneous way.² Whoever studies the history of the matter will, I am convinced, discover in its development a pleasing feature, quite in agreement with modern feeling on Christianity and morals.³

According to Holy Scripture and the uniform conviction of Christendom, faith is the religious adherence to the historical Redeemer and to His truth and grace, and it is in this sense that faith is declared to be necessary to salvation. But ever since the earliest ages of Christianity another line of thought can be traced, apparently not in harmony with the one just mentioned, accord-

the end sanctifies the means, is given by *W. Koppelman*, *Kritik des sittlichen Bewusstseins*, 1904, p. 19, etc.

¹ *Dogmengeschichte*, 4th ed., III, 507, 651, 753.

² *Hoensbroech*, *Die ultramontane Moral*, p. 217; cf. *Pilatus*, *Quos ego*, p. 371.

³ Cf. *Fr. Schmid*, *Die ausserordentlichen Heilswege für die gefallene Menschheit*, Brixen, 1899; also *J. Mausbach*, *Katholik*, 1900, pp. 251, *seq.*, 306, *seq.*

ing to which an ardent desire and love of God, and confidence in Him, can secure the salvation of those who are not followers of Christ. Ever since the twelfth century the question in its more precise form — viz., whether explicit faith in the Trinity and Incarnation was *necessitate medii*, indispensable to salvation — has been frequently discussed by theologians.

What is meant by *necessitate medii*? It means: "Is the knowledge of these dogmas so indispensable that this positive subject of faith, like the interior willingness to have faith, can under no circumstances ever be absent, even in a heathen, if he is to be saved?" Many theologians have taken this strict view and have consequently, in order to reconcile it with the doctrine that God desires the salvation of all men, been forced to believe that God is accustomed to intervene in some extraordinary way in the usual course of salvation. Others — and the majority of recent writers belong to this class — maintain that the kind of faith mentioned in Hebrews xi. 6 is the absolute minimum conceivable for salvation. This view, necessitating belief that God is the Supreme Being and a rewarder to those that seek Him, makes it easier to account for the origin of faith under circumstances of outward abandonment. But these theologians all require, besides faith in God, confidence in Him, contrition for sin, and purpose of amendment. They are *unanimous* in insisting upon a *necessitas praecepti*; i.e., an obligation to accept all the truths of faith made known to men by means of sermons, instructions, and festivals of the Church; they say that the minimum of Christian knowledge comprises the Apostles' Creed, the Paternoster, the Seven Sacraments, and the Ten Commandments.¹ Ignorance of these fundamental truths of Christianity is a sin; but it may be due to external impediments, and excusable for that reason; hence it is not invariably an absolute obstacle to salvation. As we have seen, the first question refers to *exceptional cases*, outside the usual means of salvation; and within the Church it can only affect persons who have never been under religious influence, and are, when finally attended by a priest incapable of instruction, owing to imminent

¹ *St. Thomas Aquinas*, S. Theol. II, II, q. 2, a. 7; *Laymann*, Theol. mor., II, 1, 9; *St. Alphonsus*, Theol. mor., III (al. II), n. 3; *Lehmkühll*, Theol. mor., I, n. 290.

danger of death or to mental deficiency. In this context the theory condemned by *Innocent XI* becomes intelligible, although for several reasons it was too lax.¹

To sum up. According to the more lenient opinion, casuistic morals in exceptional cases limit the knowledge of faith indispensable to salvation to the Alpha and Omega of the scheme of salvation; viz., to faith in God as our Creator and Saviour. But all Christians are required to know something of our Redeemer, His life, doctrines, and commandments, and this knowledge is accessible to all in the Catechism. Moreover, it is necessary to salvation that the *will* should turn to God in hope, love, and the spirit of penance. How can all this appear as "blind obedience" rather than faith, in the eyes of one who on his part has abandoned most of the articles of faith and "absurdly small sacrifices" when his own doctrine of justification really requires nothing but to confide in the God who forgives sin.²

The statement that "God, the Judge, is also our Father and Redeemer" is practically the only dogma that many of our free-thinking theologians deduce from the teaching of Christ. Why, then, should they be indignant at *Innocent IV* and Catholic moralists, who even in the ages of faith realized it as a possibility that some one might be reduced to so miserable a shred of Christianity, and did not exclude him for that reason from all hope of salvation?³

¹ *Viss.*, *Damn. theses.* Francof., 1711, p. 254 *et seqq.* With regard to the words used by *Innocent IV*, in expressing what was only his own private opinion, *Döllinger* and *Harnack* give no reference, but they obviously allude to a passage, In. I decr. 1, tit. 1, c. 1. There is no mention of ignorance of *morality*, in fact the context excludes it. The passage has had no influence upon theologians, and moralists have simply rejected it when they seem to refer to it: *Erronea est sententia Rosellae et quorundam Canonistarum* (*Laymann*, *Theol. mor.*, l. 2, tr. 1, c. 9, n. 2). *Falsa est opinio quorundam Canonistarum . . .* (*Busenbaum*, *Medulla*, l. 2, tr. 1, c. 1, n. 4). This view has by no means been upheld by scholastic or casuistic authors; it is intelligible only from the standpoint of writers on Canon Law, and with them it becomes complicated by the further question of the *culpability* involved in such ignorance.

² *Harnack*, *Dogmengesch.*, 4th ed., III, 888.

³ *Sell*, *op. cit.*, p. 207, says that Protestantism subsequently adopted the theory that, in case of accidental ignorance of the Gospel, "what is indispensable to salvation must consist of a few fundamental points"; but this theory was known at a much earlier period in Catholicism.

IMPERFECT CONTRITION

"Attritionism" is regarded as a similar symptom, in still worse repute, of the evil in casuistic morals. According to *Harnack*, it is the "assumption that under certain circumstances the fear of hell, or some still more worthless disposition, is enough to secure forgiveness of sins in the sacrament of penance; true contrition being therefore unnecessary."¹ "This doctrine of *attritio*, which dominates the whole of Christianity," is "the fundamentally weak spot in the Catholic system."²

One would suppose that much care would be devoted to discussing the weak spot of the Catholic system, but this is by no means the case. In this accusation, as in similar ones elsewhere, there is a distorted account of *attritio*. That Protestant theologians rely upon *Döllinger* and *Reusch*³ only partially excuses them, for the hostility shown to the Jesuits by these so-called Old-Catholic writers should deter any one from expecting them to deal with this difficult scholastic problem in an unbiassed spirit.

The later scholastics distinguish perfect and imperfect contrition by tracing the former back to love and the latter to some other supernatural motive, above all to fear. At first sight, contrition based on fear might really seem not to correspond to the exalted dignity of the Christian ideal. But fear of this kind is nothing immoral. All these theologians describe it as a disposition of mind that cuts a man off from sin, not only outwardly, but also inwardly. They reject as inadequate that slavish kind of fear (*timor serviliter servilis*) in which a secret desire to sin continues. Hence it is not so much the fear, that they regard as sufficient for conversion, as the *contrition* aroused by the fear; and this contrition must be directed against sin as *an act of rebellion against God*. In the sacrament of penance the sinner must practice the virtue of contrition, and this is defined by all theologians in the words of *St. Thomas* as "*Detes-*

¹ *Dogmengesch.*, 4th ed., III, 566. "According to this very widely spread opinion, a man can be saved *who is afraid of hell*, although he may not have any other inward connection with the Christian religion."

² *Ibid.*, p. 594, note. Cf. v. Hoensbroech, p. 539, etc.

³ *Geschichte der Moraltreitigkeiten in der Röm.-Kath. Kirche*, 1889.

tatio ac dolor animi de peccato, quatenus est offensa et injuria Dei, eum intentione eam abolendi et compensandi."¹

This context, in which there is a place for attrition, is almost always overlooked by our opponents. It reveals the penitent sinner to us in another light, not merely as quaking before the prospect of physical pain, but dreading the anger of the God of holiness, who sends souls to hell as the just punishment of sin. In one of his exhortations to confessors, *St. Alphonsus* is careful to point out that "no act of attrition is made if a man says he is sorry for his sins because he has deserved to go to hell; he must say that he is sorry to have offended God" (*non fieri actum attritionis, si quis diceret, se poenitere peccati commissi, quia meruit infernum, sed opus habet, ut dicat se poenitere offendisse Deum*).² Later advocates of the doctrine of attrition have felt no doubt at all on this subject.³

Now let us consider the *further* connection. A sinner does not only fear God as the guardian of the moral order and the revenger of its transgressions, but he must also hope in God's mercy and in the grace of Christ offered him in the sacraments; he must resolve to renounce all grievous sin and henceforth to subject his own sinful will to God's Will. He makes a humiliating confession of his guilt to God's representative, and declares himself ready to do penance in order to make reparation to God's justice. Are all these "neutral acts from the point of view of religion"? Have they no inward connection with the Christian religion? When taken together do they not amount to the performance of a moral and religious action, going far beyond what is necessary for justification according to Protestant doctrines? It must not be forgotten that these same moralists urge confessors to do their utmost to awaken in their penitents perfect contrition, based on an unselfish love of God.⁴ The catechisms and devotional books compiled during the

¹ *Laymann*, l. c., l. 5, tr. 6, c. 1, n. 2. Perfect contrition regards sin as an offence against God, our Father and Friend; imperfect regards it as an offence against our supreme Lord, Ruler, and Judge. Cf. *De Lugo* (Respons. moral., l. 1, dub. 29) who regards an explicit turning of the mind to God as indispensable to attrition.

² *Praxis confess.*, 1, 10.

³ *Palmieri*, *De poenit. Rom.*, 1879, p. 24. *Chr. Pesch*, *Prael. dogm.*, VII, 23.

⁴ *St. Alphonsus*, *Theol. mor.*, VI, 442.

centuries, in which the "immoral" attrition is said to have prevailed, show how this was actually carried into practice.¹

Careful historical research into the early Christian and mediæval teaching on the subject of contrition shows that, in the age of attritionism, theologians in general required of penitents more, rather than less, in the way of contrition, than did many earlier teachers. Here as elsewhere the apparent laxity is due to the fact that later thinkers cleared away certain obscurities and inconsistencies left by their predecessors; they distinguished more sharply between what is of precept and what is of counsel, and assigned more precise meanings to important theological terms, such as *contritio*, *charitas*, etc. The Jesuits were especially concerned in this investigation of complicated ethical questions, as it appealed to their peculiar desire for lucidity in accordance with reason. We need feel no surprise if here and there opinions were expressed which erred on the side of leniency towards the sinner, or which by their subtlety obscured the plain truth.² But on the whole the result was to hit the happy medium; human weakness was taken into account, but the serious purpose of Christian penance was not abandoned.

SINS AGAINST THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT

The necessity of arriving at clear conceptions, that go beyond the sphere of feeling, exists also with regard to *sexual* matters, and it is on this subject that most charges have been brought against casuistry. It might be supposed that the sense of shame, implanted in man by his Creator, would be a sufficient defence against the lower impulses and supply a trustworthy standard of moral behaviour; but this is not the case. The sense of shame is indeed valuable as a protection against unchastity, but sometimes it has as confusing an effect as the lust that it combats, and designates as immoral the means designed by God for the preservation of the human race. The vagueness and mystery attaching to both lust and modesty, and the intensity and excitability of these two

¹ Cf. my article in the "Katholik," 1897, II, 37, etc.: *Katholische Katechismen von 1400-1700 über die zum Buss sakramente erforderliche Reue.*

² See *supra*, p. 91, note 2.

emotions, are apt to lead, on the one hand, to a philosophical or artistic analysis of the sexual instinct that repels us when we encounter it in the morbid erotic writings of both the past and the present; on the other hand, it produces a scrupulosity and delicacy of conscience that is a source of painful and unnecessary anxiety to many people. The right rules can never be reached by the mere conflict of these sensations, but only by reason, that calmly investigates facts and decides in accordance with the purpose in view. Physiology and medicine consider primarily the objects of bodily life, while ethics is chiefly concerned with keeping in view and protecting the social and intellectual aims of man. *Ribbing*, a famous physician and an enthusiastic advocate of moral purity, calls the sexual question "the beginning and end of every moral teaching." We may think this an exaggeration, but it would certainly show reprehensible prudery and plain neglect of duty if moralists refused to deal with this question on the ground that it was unsuited to them, whereas it is one on which the diabolical force of sin and the most ideal Christian virtue approach one another closely. That serious science and ascetical purity do not forbid us to study these things is apparent from *St. Augustine's* example, for he explored even these dark regions. If a moderate form of casuistry is permissible and justifiable in discussing other moral questions, it would be absurd and unscientific to refuse, through affectation, to apply it here in the investigation of particular cases.¹

Owing to the repugnance that they feel to what is vulgar, many writers do not mention sexual sins; but this does not do away with the unhappy fact that thousands, especially of young people, fall victims to the seductive power of vice, many of whom might have offered more resistance if they had more clearly understood wherein its sinfulness lay. In discussing the sixth commandment, moralists are far from wishing any unnecessary reference to this subject in the direction of souls; in fact they desire to avert any dangerous dealing with sexual problems by giving a clear and

¹ *Paulsen* remarks "that a serious director of souls cannot pass over these subjects. If medicine and jurisprudence deal with them, ethics and the confessional must also take them into consideration (*System der Ethik.*, 6th ed., Berlin, 1894, I, 176).

decisive answer as soon as any such question presents itself. It is not misunderstanding, but wicked misinterpretation, to conclude that such matters are discussed in the confessional because some books on morals deal with them in a detailed fashion, that may for other reasons be exaggerated and reprehensible. All books on morals most strictly forbid any unnecessary questions of this kind to be asked, and say that, where there is a doubt as to the necessity of a question, it is better to be guided by consideration for modesty and for the dignity of the sacrament. The confessional exerts great influence in protecting chastity and that virginal purity which is one of the chief ornaments of the Catholic Church. According to *Voltaire*, confession is "the most powerful curb on secret vice," and it gives the priest an opportunity of speaking strongly against forming and continuing dangerous relations, and of emphasizing the sanctity of marriage and of the duties arising from it and connected with the propagation of the race. No proof is needed of the beneficial results of serious instruction, especially on the last-mentioned subject; it can be given without the least suggestion of indecency by simply laying stress upon the reason for the institution of matrimony. It is certainly no mere accident that Catholic countries, in which the reception of the sacrament of penance is frequent and regular, are free from that evil which is sapping the strength of the population, especially in France (where men have almost abandoned the practice of confession), and is increasing terribly in North America, Germany, and England.¹

With reference to the earlier works on casuistry, I may point out one fact that will tend to diminish our surprise at the coarse and blunt language employed in them. On this particular point the moral sense of nations in different periods varies very much. The ancients spoke of sexual matters with far less reserve than our taste requires, and to this day the Latin races discuss these things with less embarrassment than the northern nations, without being

¹ Cf. *Wagner*, *Die Sittlichkeit auf dem Lande*, 1896, pp. 94, 105. Though a Protestant clergyman, *Wagner* acknowledges the beneficial influence of the confessional and the uselessness of purely abstract sermons on morality. *S. Ribbing*, the physician to whom allusion has already been made, gives in his widely circulated book, "*Die sexuelle Hygiene*," a serious and detailed account of sexual matters, taking it as a matter of course that theological writers, too, express an opinion with regard to them.

inferior to them in morality. The Fathers of the Church, *St. Methodius*, *St. Augustine*, and others, in letters addressed to virgins dedicated to God, extol the beauty of virginity, but at the same time speak plainly, and without any apparent embarrassment, of the processes of sexual life. We are often struck by the knowledge of such matters displayed by women saints of the Middle Ages, of whom modern taste would require either a real or at least an assumed ignorance regarding this subject. We can form some idea of the coarseness of feeling and expression prevalent among the lower classes in the Middle Ages from the lists of sins given in some of the *libri poenitentiales*. The connection between these books and the later works on casuistry, and the excessive piety with which casuistic writers preserve that which comes down to them, account for the unreserved outspokenness of many statements at the present day. The most striking instances quoted by *Grassmann* are taken from the *liber poenentialis* of *Burchard of Worms* (circa 1000 A.D.).¹

It is impossible to accuse these authors of immorality in thought, because it was plainly their intention to subject what is sensual to the strict discipline of thought. This intention is revealed in the severity of their language and generally also in explicit warnings against frivolous misuse of their words. It is absolute hypocrisy to accuse the casuists of "obscurity," and at the same time to dissect sensual instincts in their most abnormal aberrations and to make them the subject of literary labour, as is done by the adherents of some modern styles of writing. The casuists studied what was ugly in order to combat it and to nip it in the bud; they condemned inward impurity as a grievous sin, whilst modern art revels in the mysteries of sensuality and rejects, as inartistic, any proposal to limit their representation in accordance with the laws of Christian morality.

Still sterner condemnation is deserved by writers who, like *von Hoensbroeck*, profess righteous indignation in their attack upon the moral teaching of Ultramontaniam, and yet are not ashamed to spread broadcast, in the vernacular, works dealing with the sixth

¹ *Pilatus*, *Quos ego*, p. 389, refers to the writings and spirit of many humanists in the sixteenth century, whose obscenities forced Catholic moralists to treat sexual sins in greater detail than they had done previously.

commandment that were written in Latin for serious and scientific purposes. These works thus get into the hands of the young and of innumerable persons for whom they were never intended.

What a change has taken place in the few years that have elapsed since the first edition of the present work appeared! Whilst *von Hoensbroech* and other adversaries of the Jesuits were expressing their indignation at the initiation of the clergy into sexual matters, the sexual problem was becoming a subject of public interest, not only to men, but also to women; and not exclusively married women, but also unmarried, who spoke, wrote, and gave instruction on a problem that in its effect on education threatens to disturb the peace even of our infant schools. These were the years in which feminism in Germany penetrated to every class of society, and on the one hand drew attention to many melancholy social defects and sins of society, and on the other hand awakened a desire to undertake bold speculations and attempts at reform in sexual matters. With the intention of checking public immorality and its dangers to the young, women now enter spheres of labour from which hitherto female modesty had excluded them, and they now study moral abominations that previously were unknown even to most theologians. Female teachers regard it as a duty to explain to their pupils how human beings come into existence, and claim it to be the right of one's personality to develop all the tendencies of nature, including sexual instincts, without any regard to the limits assigned to these things by law and religion. Some female orators clamour for a new system of ethics, which shall dispense with the restraints of marriage and make it possible for every woman to enjoy "the highest happiness," viz., life-intensifying love, and "the highest good," viz., motherhood.

Modern writers on ethics, such as *Paulsen*, feel constrained to protest against the proposals "of these reckless women," but they do not realize that they themselves have broken down the strongest barrier against such a tide by attacking the natural law and the rigid morals of the Church. Referring to *Luther's* views regarding the dissoluble character of marriage, the most influential representative of the new system of ethics writes: "On the question of marriage, as in all other respects, Lutheranism is a compromise, a

bridge between two logical views of the universe, — the Catholic-Christian and the Individualistic-Monist. And bridges are made to go over, not to stand upon.”¹ The “Individualistic-Monist” view of marriage and its results, especially the enormous increase of divorce, will perhaps open the eyes of society to the wisdom of the Church’s teaching on sexual ethics.²

THE QUESTION OF INTENTION, WITH REFERENCE TO OATHS AND PROMISES

Down to the present time casuists have constantly been accused of moral recklessness in dealing with the question of intention with reference to oaths. The many points of view which oaths, and especially promises confirmed by oath, permitted, appealed to the scholastic desire of making distinctions and admitted of much logical analysis. It was sought to distinguish the interests of truth, religion, loyalty, and justice, which are all interwoven in such an oath, and the question was asked how far they belonged to the essence of the oath or were separable from it. The larger works on casuistry contain investigations into the relation of the *intentio jurandi*, the *intentio se obligandi* (*ex religione*, *ex justitia*, etc.), and the *intentio implendi*, which are marvels of ingenuity and almost bewilder an ordinary reader, yet are specially designed to avert all misunderstanding. The short summaries of them, however, given in compendia of casuistry, are more open to criticism; but as a rule they are unintelligible to theological students until explained by a lecturer, who is to show what they really mean.³

One of the most dangerous of these statements is said to be the assertion that an oath is not valid if the man taking it has an in-

¹ *Ellen Key*, *Love and Marriage*, p. 12.

² In her “*Frauenbewegung und Sexualethik*” (Heilbronn, 1909), p. 53, *Helene Lange* writes as follows: “It would be a good thing at the present time if some censor could prohibit all philosophizing about love, and allow discussions on sexual matters only when carried on in strictly scientific language. There would be some hope, if this were the case, that mankind might escape the present chaotic condition of thought and feeling, into which all this erotic excitement has plunged it, and return eventually to its sober senses.”

³ This remark applies to the statements in *Gury's* work, I, 308, 1, 2, which in their original form might give rise to misunderstanding — later editions contain elucidations.

ward intention not to take an oath before God. In this way, we are told, the trustworthiness of the oath is undermined and public confidence deeply shattered; it is, therefore, a view of the sanctity of an oath as lax as it is dangerous to the state. Let us see what the opinion of the moralists really is. They teach, in the first instance, that such a *fictio* or *simulatio* is a sin of some kind because it involves a misuse of the name of God, and also a lie, because the spoken words "I swear" contradict the inward thought. Now, to commit even a venial sin is under no circumstances allowed, but absolutely forbidden. According to Catholic morals no venial sin may ever be committed, not even for the sake of the greatest advantage. There is a further consideration, however. Some one might say that horror of venial sin is proved by experience not to have nearly so great a deterrent effect as the dread of committing perjury; if, then, the moralists question the validity of an oath, when it has apparently been taken seriously, they are favouring a distortion of the truth and imperilling public confidence. In reply we may say: The same moralists consider *simulatio* a very grievous sin indeed, when the declaration, apparently made under oath, is *false* , whether it concerns an important or an unimportant matter; and they do the same whenever the declaration, even if true, is received in a *court of law* or in any legal matter as made upon oath.

Analogous to this want of truthful declaration in making an oath of affirmation is a defective intention of fulfilling a promissory oath. The question of the venial nature of the sin committed refers, therefore, only to the *simulatio* as such. It affects a statement that is true and a promise that is seriously meant, and it does so under circumstances in which neither the state nor the individual has any right to require an oath at all. As soon as there is any violation of the truth, the invocation of the name of God, made apparently in earnest, becomes, in spite of the reservation, a grievous insult to God's honour, about equivalent to perjury. Moreover, just as soon as public or private rights require a declaration to be made under oath, even a true declaration failing to be under oath is to be regarded as a grievous sin.¹

¹ Cf. especially *Viva* , *Thes. damn. in prop. 25. Innoc., XI, n. 6: Sicut in idololatria . . . non datur parvitas materiae quae a mortali excusat, etiamsi*

This guards against all abuse of the principle. According to this exposition, a man with honest intentions had better take an oath seriously, for thus he is free from sin; whereas *simulatio* is in any case a venial sin, and in cases where an oath can legally be required it is a mortal sin. A man who intends to lie need not hope to escape grievous sin by means of *simulatio*; whether he is guilty of perjury in the strictest sense of the word is, after all, only a matter of words.¹

What would our moral feeling say of the following case? A friend refuses to believe a true story that I have told him, and calls upon me to confirm it by an oath. I object, but cannot resist his importunity, and to satisfy him I repeat the words of the oath mechanically, without inwardly calling upon God as my witness, because an oath is to me something too sacred. My compliance is of course sinful, but can it be described as a grievous sin? This is precisely a case of *simulatio* as such, which the casuists say is a venial sin.

But why did not the moralists simply admit that an oath was really an oath, unless some external circumstances plainly showed

desit animus internus litandi idolo . . . ita nec in periurio, etiamsi desit animus internus iurandi. N. 7: Difficultas tamen est: An graviter etiam semper peccet, qui iurat sine animo iurandi, dum *verum* iurat? Affirmat Caietanus. . . . Communius tamen cum Suarez, Sanchez, Lessio, Palao docent, id esse dumtaxat veniale, dummodo non fiat *in contractu aut in iudicio legitimo*. . . . Neque (hoc) est iniuriosum homini, quia supponimus hoc fieri extra contractum et extra iudicium legitimum et extra *quemcumque* casum, in quo homo damnum aliquod patiat ex hoc ficto iuramento. N. 8: Illuderet vero (Deo), si in *contractibus* aut in *iudicio* iuramentum fieret sine animo iurandi, quia ad jurandum teneretur. . . . Qui vero *falsum* iurat sine animo iurandi, non illudit solum divinum testimonium, sed graviter etiam contemnit. Similar statements occur in *Elbel*, Theol. mor., III, 120, where reference is made to *Babenstuber*, *Michel*, etc.; *St. Alphonsus*, Theol. mor. (ed. Gaudé), l. 3, n. 172, where reference is made to *Roncaglia*, *Tamburini*, *Mazzetta*, and others; *Lehmkuhl*, Theol. mor., I, n. 409; *Aertnys*, Theol. mor., l. 3, n. 72.

¹ *Lugo* describes the sin simply as *perjuriū*. He says: Nec excusaretur a periurio, qui absque intentione iurandi iuraret exterius falsum per verba, quae hic et nunc determinate et omnino significant animum iurandi et invocandi Deum in testem (De iust. et iure disp. 23, n. 12). The non-fulfilment of a promise made *sub ficto iuramento* must also be considered equivalent to perjury. For if contempt of God is shown by apparently calling upon Him to witness a lie, it is certainly a great insult to Him to be false to a pledge placed under His authority. There are some moralists who have not made this latter point sufficiently clear.

it to be fictitious or taken in jest? This view has its supporters. The moralists did not do so, because, according to their ideas of religion and justice, they would have only injured the true character and value of an oath. They recognized the fact that an oath devoid of inward intention must still be *treated* as a real oath, but that an oath, unaccompanied by a serious act of the will, should be *called* a true oath seemed to them as inadmissible as to call a corpse a human being; the soul is wanting in both cases. It was not a lax, but rather a profound, appreciation of the dignity of an oath that caused this view to be adopted. An oath was regarded as an act of the religious life or cultus. Now it was well known that the performance of sacramental rites, though externally perfect, was null and void without the inward intention. Absence of consent in the sacrament of matrimony nullifies the mutual pledge and destroys the validity of a marriage, even though the *externum forum* may maintain its validity until evidence to the contrary is supplied. If in a case like this, where one human being directly confronts another, it is the *interior intention* that decides the question of validity, this appeared to be still more true in the case of an oath, where a human being stands up before God and invokes Him as a witness and surety. The specific character of an oath and its quasi-sacramental dignity could not, it was thought, exist if the will did not consent to this specific moral obligation.¹

The illustration derived from matrimony leads on to judicial procedure, where the same principle of the coöperation of the will is encountered. Every contract has an inward and an outward side, the assent of the will and its outward expression. According to the fundamental principles of Roman law, both must concur if a really legal contract is to be formed. "Primarily, therefore, a real and legal meeting of the minds on both sides is requisite. Hence a *simulated* contract is not a *real* one, or at least it is not the one that apparently is concluded, although if one party alleges a *simulatio* that was not apparent, it could not weaken the force of an evident serious consent."²

¹ Additional importance was attached to the intention, because early authorities laid little stress upon the actual *formula* of an oath, and consequently regarded many asseverations as oaths although we cannot see in them any invocation of God amounting to an oath.

² *Arndts*, Pandekten, 4th ed., 1861, p. 382.

Such was the opinion of the jurists, who, in accordance with the principles of right and the theory *de internis non judicat praetor*, were forced, more than was the case with the moralists, to lay stress upon the outward embodiment of the honest intention. By ascribing to the outward declaration the *effect* of a contract they are actually acknowledging that without interior assent no contract actually exists. By *assuming*, in the case of every apparently serious contract, that the will assents, they show how indispensable the coöperation of the will is in concluding contracts according to the idea of rights. This made it all the easier for moralists, dealing with questions of right chiefly from the standpoint of natural law and conscience, to hold fast to this principle of intention and to apply it to analogous instances.

The result of omitting essential remarks from statements made by *Liguori* and other moralists has been to present their teaching on the subject of oaths and contracts in a completely false and distorted light.¹ When they deny the "validity" of fictitious promises they do so on the strength of the principle that we have been considering and, as a rule, with all the reservations demanded both by a sense of justice and by regard for public security.

De Lugo raises the objection that a fictitious promise must be binding, because it would be unjust to let inward consent be absent without the knowledge of the other party concerned. He replies that it is undoubtedly unjust; but why? "Because consent is not unimportant but essential to the validity of the contract." This injustice certainly involves an obligation to make good any injury that has resulted or may result to the other party, and as a rule this can be accomplished only "by abandoning the deception and giving consent subsequently."²

St. Alphonsus has been much criticised on account of a brief reference to this question,³ but he says in another place, to which he expressly alludes: "In order that human intercourse may remain duly regulated, the natural law requires for the public welfare that there should be no deception with regard to contracts, and

¹ Cf., with reference to *Döllinger* and *Reusch*, *Hillebrand*, *Kath. und protest. Wahrheitsliebe*. Katholik., 1899, p. 127, *seq.*

² *De Lugo*, l. c., disp. 22, n. 48.

³ III, 709.

therefore it binds those who have recourse to *simulatio*, in punishment for their deception, to indemnify the party deceived, *exactly as if no deception had taken place.*"¹

MENTAL RESERVATION AND THE DUTY OF VERACITY

The attitude of the casuists towards truthfulness requires discussion particularly with reference to mental reservation, the so-called *restrictio mentalis*. It cannot be denied that many mistaken, subtle, and ridiculous things have been written on this subject; many things, in fact, that we should have to consider morally doubtful if they had been intended for the general public, who would have understood these things only on their lax and gross side. I need only draw attention to a few points that ought to put us on our guard against unfair and rash judgments.

As to the charge of indifference to truth and to the interests of public confidence, we must not overlook the fact that any real weakening of confidence is disastrous, not only for the secular power, i.e., the state, but also and in a greater degree for the Church, as she is not, like the state, in a position to carry on her work by means of strong measures and vigilance. The moralists in question, when they discuss the duty of giving testimony, etc., do not distinguish spiritual and temporal tribunals; under certain circumstances they allow the kind of *restrictio mentalis* which they consider permissible, even in the sacrament of penance. If we accused them of indifference to truth, we should also have to conclude that they were indifferent to the order and discipline of the Church. It is no want of respect for truth and the moral order, but rather the conflict that can exist between love of truth and other important aims of public and private life, that impelled them to seek this way of escape from the difficulty. Moral philosophers have always been aware of this conflict. *Plato* and other ancient thinkers sanctioned certain falsehoods for the well-being of the

¹ Although generally speaking the consequences of concluding a real and a fictitious contract are the same, it is possible for the ultimate result to be different. For instance, the other contracting party is not bound to release the one who has only simulated assent, if the former chooses to regard the contract as valid; he can however plead that it is invalid, if to be released from it seems advantageous to himself.

community, and most modern writers on ethics (*Schopenhauer, v. Hartmann, Paulsen, Lipps*, and others) take it almost as a matter of course that the desire to secure some important advantage, affecting one's own life or that of another, justifies a "white lie." Even the Fathers of the Church before *St. Augustine* were not clear as to how far truthfulness was a duty. Great doctors of the Church, such as *Origen, St. Hilary, St. John Chrysostom*, and *Cassian*, regarded falsehood as permissible when used as a means of remedying or averting greater evils. *St. Augustine* discussed the matter in two special works; in the earlier one, *de mendacio*, he still was undecided, but in the later, *contra mendacium*, he showed from the words of Holy Scripture, from the Christian conception of God as the God of truth, and from the impossibility of assigning limits if once permission to tell lies were given, that a lie was invariably sinful, although in desperate circumstances it was excusable.¹ The esteem in which *St. Augustine* was held, and a perception of the fact that lying involved individuals and society in a contradiction, made the scholastics, almost without exception, maintain conscious lying to be absolutely forbidden, and this view continues to be that of most Catholic moralists.²

No one can help seeing that frequently there are excellent reasons, and even weighty moral considerations, necessitating a concealment of the truth, which cannot be effected by mere silence. Even a perfect Christian sometimes wishes to deceive his neighbour, although he may not tell a lie in order to do so. In such cases we are allowed to have recourse to *amphibology*, a statement admitting of various interpretations, and to what is called *mental reservation*, which limits the meaning of a statement not in itself equivocal, and has its special justification in the circumstances of the speaker. In many cases such a reservation is made obviously

¹ In *St. Augustine's* time the opinion that it was permissible to lie in cases of necessity was generally accepted (in *hominum opinione praevaluit*, n. 30), and a lively controversy on the subject was carried on by learned men (in *qua solvenda etiam doctissimi fatigantur*, n. 33).

² *Kant* and *Fichte* are of the same opinion, yet the former, in his declaration that "for the future" he would "altogether" refrain from lecturing on religion, said that he made the declaration as "Your Majesty's most loyal subject." Afterwards however he acknowledged that he had used this latter expression in order to be obliged to renounce his freedom of speech only during the lifetime of *Frederick William II.*

necessary through the intention of the person asking the question or the circumstances in which it is asked. The reservation affects the meaning rather than the letter of the question. To ward off improper questions and unseemly inquisitiveness it may be permissible to use expressions which the other will probably misunderstand, even though the surrounding circumstances ought to tell him that their literal interpretation is not applicable.

Against the lax theories of casuistic writers, condemned by *Innocent XI*, later authors agree in saying that the true meaning in the speaker's mind must be capable of recognition, either from the wording of his reply or from the circumstances of person and matter (*restrictio non pure mentalis, restrictio realis*). They do their best to prevent any one from misunderstanding them and from assuming that such reservations may be used arbitrarily, or even for bad ends; in every case there must be a just reason for concealing the truth. Reservation is absolutely prohibited where the questioner has a right to know the whole truth, as in giving evidence before a court of law, in answering parents and superiors, and in making contracts.¹

Modern critics who do not approve of rigorism in the matter argue, in opposition to the theory just stated, that encouraging an artificial distortion of thought has a more injurious effect upon veracity than a frank sanction of a "white lie," or "a lie of necessity," and they are inclined to charge the advocates of such a theory with dishonesty and hypocrisy. These advocates have, however, serious grounds, based on reason and authority, for maintaining the absolute sinfulness of lying, and their view is confirmed by the language of the Bible and also by the modern sense of the value of words. As a practical matter, and as one affecting the care of souls, it is dangerous to tamper with the principle that

¹ Even later moralists are not so consistent in their adherence to these principles as to exclude from their concrete instances all purely mental reservations. *Herrmann* rightly condemns an attempt, discussed by *Gury* and others, to justify a denial of adultery by the argument: *se non fregisse matrimonium, siquidem adhuc persistit*. *Adloff's* remarks (*Kath. Moral und Sittlichkeit*, 1901, p. 29, *seq.*), on the double meaning of the expression *matrimonium frangere* do not affect the matter. The point is not whether the words can, according to the dictionary, bear some particular meaning, but whether they actually do bear it under those definite circumstances. *Laymann* was quite correct in his remarks on the subject (l. 2, tr. 3, c. 13, n. 7, 11).

lying is forbidden. We see how difficult it is for modern students of ethics to define the circumstances under which they consider lying justifiable. They would be still more embarrassed if they had to expound from the pulpit their theory of the relative permissibility of lying.¹

It was therefore not want of frankness and honesty, but respect for the principle that the spoken word must always agree with the thought, that caused the casuists to advise men to accommodate their thoughts to their words, in cases where for weighty reasons it was imperative to give a definite answer. Such accommodations and mental additions are often a theoretical justification of the decision arrived at, rather than a suggestion really to arrive at it. The "No" given in answer to an indiscreet question is generally, from the psychological standpoint, a *simple expression of refusal to give information and a means of averting the question*. Any qualifying clauses that we may mentally add to the "No," such as, "as far as you are concerned," etc., correspond to the reservation of casuists.

We must notice that the liberty granted by the theory of mental reservation is limited in comparison with that afforded by the theory of "lies of necessity." Apart from the fact that, according to the former theory, the true meaning of the words must always be intelligible, in some way or other, it permits almost exclusively such negative statements only by which the truth is concealed, but not positive fictions, the fruit of a deceitful imagination.

¹ *Herrmann* thinks that a lie is permissible when "personal agreement" with some one is not at the time possible; but this rule will not be generally accepted, although it is put forward with much assurance. I should find it easier, in precisely these cases, directly to refuse information; the most unpleasant situation is that in which I *must* remain in "personal agreement" and have reason to fear that plain truth would endanger it. There are many people "morally incapable" of enduring plain speaking in the way in which an ideal Christian disposition would accept it, and yet Christians are forced to remain in personal agreement with them. Between husband and wife there may be a great many harmonious relations and binding duties which form the foundation of permanent agreement, even though the one is not aware of every unhappy and weak incident in the past life of the other. *Herrmann* requires a wife to confess to her husband, should he question her, an instance of infidelity long ago repented of; why does he not make a confession on the part of the husband to the wife indispensable to personal agreement? *Ibsen* has given us, in his "Wild Duck," a striking instance of the consequences that a rigoristic and blind adherence to truth may have in a family.

A principle that in urgent cases it be permissible to lie intentionally and deliberately would give opportunity to both kinds of statements equally, and would actually increase a tendency to prevarication. It is easier to lie freely than carefully to weigh one's words so that they may not in any way offend against truth nor, on the other hand, reveal a truth that would injure another. The same may be said of expressions used in society. To say "the master is not at home" is not nearly so misleading as to assert that he has gone to some particular place, when he is really present. It is also easier to protect oneself with regard to the mental reservation sanctioned by casuists, provided one keeps the actual facts in view, than it would be to guard against arbitrary fictions, such as the principle of "lies of necessity" would allow.

The casuistic principle that all equivocation is forbidden in dealing with superiors and with courts of law admits of one exception. Casuists think that an evasive answer may be given in reply to questions *that are not legally admissible*. A judge who asks questions that he has no right to ask is, according to the casuists, acting as a private individual and not in his official capacity; if he abuses his power I may assert my personal right about expressing my thoughts. The cases discussed by the early moralists on this point generally lose their offensive character if we take into consideration the rules which the Roman procedure prescribed regarding the judge's right to question prisoners.¹

Thus a defendant should be allowed to answer "No" if a judge asked him as to his guilt before the *probatio semiplena*, i.e., in an illegal manner, and also, according to some authorities, if the penalty for the offence with which he was charged was death, or at least very severe. In the former case he would be answering according to the legal meaning of the question, in the second the law asked something contrary to nature, and "No" would be intelligible to every one with any experience of life.

An eminent German lawyer wrote as follows in a newspaper discussion of the Jesuit question.² "This case can be judged only

¹ Hillebrand (l. c., p. 119) says, with reference to *St. Alphonsus*: "If we take into account the ordinary rules of procedure, we find that, both from a juristic and moral point of view, it is impossible to challenge either the general principle that he lays down or the instances adduced."

² *Nachrichten für Stadt und Land*, Oldenburg, 1903.

by one who knows the history of legal procedure. According to the modern system, no defendant is bound to acknowledge his guilt, far less to take an oath, no matter whether the offence with which he is charged involves the penalty of death or a trifling fine. To require a defendant to swear that he is innocent would be regarded nowadays as unnatural brutality and as an unheard-of constraint upon his conscience. But in the ancient system another view was taken, and this point was not clear and free from all obscurity. Students acknowledge that the way in which a judge was accustomed to extort a confession had the effect of leaving the defendant absolutely at the mercy of the court. . . . The early moralists asked themselves whether a defendant, threatened with terrible punishment, were bound to confess his guilt, and they came to the conclusion that he was not, basing their theory on the fact that the legislator had neither the right nor the intention to impose such an obligation upon him, so that he was free to give an equivocal answer. Any one may criticise this decision who wishes to do so; it has long lost all significance."

Similar historical considerations enable us to understand other replies to complicated questions. We ought to bear in mind the incredible verbosity and molestation prevailing in absolutistic government offices and police administration, and also the extremely severe punishments inflicted during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries even upon beggars, poachers, etc.¹

One point only seems to many people dangerous under all circumstances viz., that in the casuistic sanction of mental reservation the sanctity of the oath is involved. It is evident that the early moralists, whose writings are usually quoted on this subject,

¹ Even now, in spite of our having a more perfect legal system, judges are but men, and liable to abuse their right of asking questions and to act in a way contrary to law and liberty. Dr. Sello, in writing on the reform of our criminal procedure, gives the following warning: "If you tear down the barriers which knowledge based on the experience of centuries has set up against the arbitrary action of judges, if you tear them down for the sake of so-called higher, moral, and political considerations, then every one of us will find himself with his neck in the noose once his turn comes" (*Zukunft*, 1904, No. 12). In 1908 the Bavarian minister of justice stated emphatically that it was the judge's duty to avoid asking defendants and witnesses questions that went beyond the limits assigned by law, or were even aimed at forcing the witness to show himself in the wrong.

were thinking, not of public oaths, but of assertions upon oath in ordinary life; and this fact explains much in the casuistic treatment of oaths. The vice of needless swearing, while at all times opposed by the Church, was plainly more prevalent in the past than it is now. In such cases the sanction of some suppression of truth did not at least endanger the public welfare. But how must it be regarded from the point of view of the religious sanctity of the oath, as an appeal to God to witness to its truth? Is it not an offence against the reverence due to God, to state on oath a truth in an obscure or easily misunderstood manner? The theologians with whom we are concerned certainly did not intend to lessen the sacred character of an oath. They stated their view consistently in giving the following answer: "The question turns upon whether the statement is true or false; there is no third alternative. If it is false, the man who solemnly swears to it commits the grievous sin of perjury; and if he does so in casual conversation, it is at least a venial sin." Now all sin, venial as well as mortal, is forbidden; a true Christian lives continuously in the presence of God and speaks and acts so that he may stand righteous in His sight. If, then, in ordinary conversation certain concealments hinted at by the words themselves, or by the circumstances under which they are uttered, cannot be termed lies, and since such mental reservations are used by almost all men without scruple to safeguard important interests, to keep matters secret, etc., when this is considered permissible and under certain circumstances even obligatory by many men of thought, it follows that the assertion upon oath may require stronger justification, but cannot make false that which is true, nor can it make something otherwise permissible sinful, since to a Godfearing man it means an intensification, not a modification, of the duty of veracity.

Even in a court of law, where the oath is required in the interests of justice and of public trust, after these interests are satisfied a mode of speech, inaccurate only in its literal interpretation, cannot be absolutely forbidden, provided that no breach of the law nor injury of any one's private rights is involved. Indeed, in many statements of witnesses and experts, in spite of the fact that they are made under oath, there is often in incidental matters,

that have no direct relation to the subject in view, much that must be taken *cum grano salis*.

Still more obviously is this the case with promissory oaths, in which the intention ought to agree with the words as completely as, in affirmative oaths, the knowledge of the facts with the testimony. An official swears that he will perform all the duties of his office; a soldier swears that he will render military obedience. Do these oaths include every petty formality imposed by a fussy superior, every trifling regulation of the barracks? Deputies in many states swear to represent only the general welfare of their country and not that of any particular rank or class; the oath taken by those admitted to medical degrees at the University of Berlin begins (or used to begin) with the words: "I swear not to practise the art of healing for my own personal advantage, but for the glory of God, the welfare of mankind, and the advancement of science." Can it be denied that in these oaths there is considerable scope for a reasonable use of mental reservation?

Nowadays, when we hear such formulae, or read the panegyrics of a past age we feel that there is something false and hypocritical about them. We are dissatisfied with some of the decisions made by the older moralists regarding the limits of the duty of veracity. Although every such feeling may not be genuine, and although a good deal of the indignation shown is Pharisaical, we must admit that the moral sense of the better part of Christian society on the subject of truthfulness has undergone a certain change, and is now higher and more refined than it was. In former centuries enthusiasm for the eternal truths of faith and philosophy was combined with remarkable indifference to the truth in worldly affairs. The mental attitude of pious writers of legends and forgers of records in the Middle Ages is absolutely incomprehensible to us, who live in a more critical age. The exaggerated praise and condemnation brought into vogue at the Renaissance, especially among the Latin nations, ring false in the ears of sober, honest men of our day. To this must be added the many social malpractices common in those days. Dishonesty in trade and difficulty in communication arouse, as is well known, a tendency to distrust and insincerity; and where such evils are of daily occurrence they excuse, to some extent, untruthfulness in the individual, since he

knows that his words will not be critically examined, but accepted in their "conventional" meaning. Although we may be glad that our judicial and social circumstances are now more favourable to veracity, we must not fail to take into account, when criticising earlier moralists, their actual surroundings, and we must also remember that their hairsplitting dissection of ideas was in practice controlled and modified by consideration for the needs of their flock. Modern writers are in the habit of reproaching the Catholic Church with not doing enough to cultivate the sense of truth, and it behooves us to refute this accusation, both because it shows their disposition to extol and misunderstand their own position, and because these writers, whilst displaying scrupulous literal accuracy in unimportant matters, do not hesitate unscrupulously to repeat old accusations against the Church and to misrepresent Catholic life and institutions.

Haeckel's clumsy attack cast a glaring light upon this kind of zeal for truth. By aiming it at Christianity and faith in God he exasperated even Protestant scholars of high reputation. We as Catholics are bound to confess that many Protestant accusations against Catholic dogmas, scholastic morals, etc., arouse in us a feeling of bewilderment. If a sense of truth is to be awakened and intensified in the people at large, especially with regard to securing the truth in legal procedure, it cannot be denied that sermons on God's omniscience and holiness, and on the judgment to come, as well as the reference to God and the blessing of the Gospel made when an oath is taken, call forth a disposition in the mind of a Christian that is a far better guarantee for his veracity than would be produced by strict principles regarding the taking of an oath in a mind which, according to the empirical morality of the day, distinguishes good and evil only by their temporal results, and which considers duty to be a product of the autonomous *ego* or of custom, and rewards and punishments to be mere functions of spontaneous evolution.

We must also question the right of Protestant theology to criticise the "insincerity" of Catholic morals. In his theoretical and practical attitude towards truthfulness *Luther* himself affords us the most serious points of attack. Apart from the *reservatio mentalis*, which is no stumbling block to him, he sanctions "a good

thumping lie" in order to conceal unpleasant incidents which might injure "the cause of the Gospel."¹

He advised *Philip of Hesse* to deny his double marriage publicly, arguing "that what is a secret 'Yes' cannot become a public 'Yes'; otherwise secret and public would be the same thing and there would be no difference between them, which neither ought to be nor can be. Therefore a secret 'Yes' must be and remain a public 'No,' and *vice versa*."² *Butzer* is still more emphatic in recommending the use of lies and of disgusting deception against the enemies of the Gospel, maintaining that the Bible is full of such things, and appealing to *Schnepf*, *Brenz*, and *Osiander* in support of his view.³

Even on matters of faith *Luther* did not shrink from doubtful "accommodations." He directed that everything in the Canon of the Mass that suggested a sacrifice should be omitted, but at the same time, in order not to enlighten the "plain man" on the subject, to retain the elevation with the ceremonies belonging to it.⁴ The same *Luther* who had so often spoken of Mass and the invocation of saints as diabolical abominations, actually wrote in 1539 to a Pomeranian student, telling him to win over his Catholic father to the Gospel by conforming to his wishes in all religious matters, in fasting, in hearing Mass with apparent devotion, and in invoking the saints.⁵

Luther's vigorous intellect and blunt frankness did not prevent him from making totally contradictory statements regarding his religious intentions in letters written at the same time, nor from making free with quotations and opponents in his writings in a manner that is certainly not that of an honourable antagonist.

¹ *Luther* maintains that in answer to a request for a loan of money any one may say with a clear conscience that he has none, even if he actually is in possession of money, with the meaning: I have none to give you. [(*Tischreden* (*Förstemann*), I, 278.) In his parochial sermons of 1528, hitherto unknown (Weimar ed., XXVII, 12), *Luther* asserts, in opposition to the "monks" who declare all lying to be sinful, that lies told out of love and for some advantage, proceeding from a good heart, are not sins. "How I would glory," he exclaims, "in deception, if thus I deceived men for their own good!"

² *Luther's* Briefe, Sendschreiben. (de Wette-Seidemann), pp. 6, 263, 272.

³ *Janssen*, *Gesch. des d. Volkes* (ed. 9-12), III, 439, *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁵ *Döllinger*, *Die Reformation*, III, 188.

Döllinger remarks that, as a polemical writer and an author of works of controversy, *Luther* united an undeniable talent for dialectics and rhetoric with an unscrupulosity such as has been seldom equalled by other writers.¹

As to the Lutheran writers on moral theology in the seventeenth century, *Staudlin* remarks that with few exceptions they declared veracity in general to be the duty of a Christian; but that they regarded false words spoken with some good and useful aim, and tending to the advantage of one's neighbour, not as lies, but as marks of an accommodating and affable disposition. Only a lie that injured one's neighbour was considered by them immoral and contrary to the natural law. They recognized in lying no inherent immorality, independent of all external consequences and the direction of the intention, and therefore they thought it a duty to tell serviceable or necessary lies.² The theologians of the Reformed Church taught, on the other hand, that no lie was permissible, but that lying was a mortal sin, involving everlasting death;³ but such extreme rigorism was no better adapted to produce a real love of truth than were the lax views just mentioned.

Modern Protestant theologians are not unanimous on the subject; many, such as *Mosheim*, *Ammon*, *Marheineke*, *Rothe*, and *Herrmann*, regard lying as permissible under some circumstances, especially in the interest of one's neighbour.⁴

A particularly sore point in modern Protestantism is the manner

¹ *Kirchenlexikon*, 2d ed., VIII, 342; cf. *N. Paulus*, *Wissensch. Beil. zur Germania*, 1904, No. 33, *seq.*

² *Staudlin*, *op. cit.*, p. 249, *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 433.

⁴ *A. Titius* acknowledges frankly that *reservatio mentalis* must sometimes be regarded as morally permissible, but he thinks *Gury* and *St. Alphonsus* give too wide an interpretation to this principle (*Theol. Jahresbericht für 1906*, p. 1021). *Thomas Carlyle*, in his "Lectures on Heroes," makes an interesting remark on the subject of Cromwell's alleged falsehoods. He says that every eminent man must exercise reticence in some things, and must often adopt the language of his inferiors and even of partisans because his own deeper insight would be unintelligible or harmful to others. "If he walk, wearing his heart upon his sleeve for daws to peck at, his journey will not extend far. . . . There are impertinent questions made; your rule is to leave the inquirer *uninformed* on that matter; not, if you can help it, *misinformed*, but precisely as dark as he was. This, could one hit the right phrase of response, is what the wise and faithful man would aim to answer in such a case."

in which the clergy, who do not stand upon the firm ground of orthodox faith, treat their obligation to accept the creed and to meet the rights of their congregations. We have here an obligation which, while not involving a formal oath, has the sanctity of an oath in another form. Swearing has, as a rule, to do with some statement in a matter of this world which receives religious sanction and strength by the invocation of God. But sermons are statements professing to be the word of God and made during public worship, so that they are in their very nature sacred. The cases discussed by *St. Alphonsus* and *Gury* with reference to the oath are exceptional and relate to a state of affairs either obsolete or so rare as to have practically no effect on modern life. The official oath taken by a minister of religion affects his whole activity, the management of the church, and the significance of Christianity, so that we can easily understand why the unsound relation between theology and the care of souls has been described "as the fundamentally weak spot in the present position of Protestantism."

Liberal theologians and philosophers boldly maintain that a preacher ought to be guided by the degree of education and the credulity of his congregation in speaking of the inspiration of the Bible, the Resurrection of Christ, and other Christian dogmas either as facts or as myths. Dr. *Fr. Strauss* writes: "The minister's duty is unquestionably to lay before the people what *they* themselves believe. If he shares this belief, so much the better; if he does not, he must inflict pain upon himself rather than upon his congregation."¹

Paulsen likewise allows a preacher to adapt his views to the religious circumstances of his congregation, saying that what in a village church is accepted literally is treated as a metaphor by people of more education.² He admits the awkwardness of the situation and connects it with what he describes as "the widespread distrust of the clergy and their honesty."

Steudel, a liberal theologian in Württemberg, said some years ago, in one of his lectures at Stuttgart, that the Church compelled broadminded clergy to preach what was contrary to their own convictions, and that, when speaking of the Son of God, they often

¹ *Ausgewählte Briefe*, Bonn, 1895, p. 409.

² *Ethik*, 6th ed., II, 240, *seq.*

had in mind something quite different from the conception of their "simple congregation." A Protestant theologian, writing on the subject of *Steudel's* movement, said: "We certainly cannot help respecting men who have found unbearable the strained relations between their own personal convictions and the formulæ of the Church to which they were bound to adhere. On a lower moral level stands a man, who, feeling the same difficulty, falls from one religious hypocrisy into another, because he thinks of his family, his office, and his means of livelihood. Mental reservation is utterly inexcusable, utterly contemptible in the case of these Protestant Jesuits."¹

A short time before Pastor *Schrempf*, who had been reprimanded on account of his attitude towards the creed, pointed out that many of the clergy made mental reservations with regard to the symbolism at baptism, adding: "*Reservatio mentalis* becomes the more serious the higher the truth upon which it sets a new interpretation and the more solemn the occasion at which it occurs."² In a subsequent work *Schrempf* drew attention to the fact that one hundred and fifty-three of his colleagues, who had expressed the same views as his in a memorial addressed to the governing body of the Church, nevertheless were allowed to retain their benefices.³

I have referred to these statements and facts without any desire to cast ridicule upon men who are exposed to the powerful influence of the critical movement without having the support of a still more powerful Church attested by historical miracles. Such men are struggling in vain and wavering between negation and faith, between their personal convictions and their official duties, and we can only feel deep sympathy with them. It is, however, necessary to emphasize this sad state of affairs if we are to appreciate the behaviour of those theologians who, because of a few isolated decisions given by casuistic writers, charge the Catholic Church with insincerity and exhort her members to abandon her.

¹ Münch. Allg. Zeitg., 1896, Beil. No. 65.

² *Schrempf*, Akten zu meiner Entlassung aus dem württemb. Kirchendienst, Göttingen, 1892, p. 39.

³ *Ibid.*, Eine Nottaufe, Stuttgart, 1894, p. 32; cf. also the statements given in the Christl. Welt, 1902, p. 891, and 1905, p. 84.

It would be difficult to find a Catholic district with "a widespread distrust of the clergy and their honesty."¹

On most of the topics that we have been discussing *K. Jentsch's* opinion is most interesting, since, having been formerly a Catholic, he knows the training that priests receive and what their work is, although he is now the representative of a perfectly free, subjective kind of Christianity. He writes as follows in his retrospect of the time that he spent at a seminary:

"*Gury, Liguori*, and the famous casuists are not intended to instruct candidates for the priesthood in morals, nor are they guides for imparting moral teaching to ordinary people or to the young. How the Jesuits treat morality in popular instructions can be seen in the third volume of *Deharbe's* explanation of the Catechism. . . . *Gury* and the rest are guides to priests in the exercise of their judicial functions. . . . Just as it is not enough for a judge in a civil court to know 'the great principles of law and equity,' so a priest cannot settle every question by means of 'the great principles of morality.' Both require a code of laws and its elucidation with regard to individual cases; in other words, a system of casuistry. . . . Many people have long ago discarded all idea of sin as savouring of superstition. Probably there are many generous souls, deeply rooted in God, who neither tolerate nor need any mediator between Him and themselves but Christ alone, and are at all times certain that God's will is also their will, or, what is the same thing, *that their will is God's will*, and who for that reason can neither err nor sin. But can all young people be so certain of their position? May not at times some of them have to ask a trustworthy

¹ Such statements, made by Protestants with regard to their own Church, are of much greater weight than the unfavourable opinion expressed by Councillor *Wiese*, a Protestant, regarding the truthfulness of Catholics, upon which *Sell* depends (op. cit., p. 268). The sense of veracity in religion has been undermined by freethinking theologians who discuss great facts of faith and salvation from a scientific standpoint. They assert that the prophets, acting in the interest of morality and monotheism, forged the book of Deuteronomy and pretended that the Pentateuch was the work of *Moses*. They say, moreover, that Roman bishops and theologians declared the Apostles' Creed to be the *regula fidei* and the teaching of the twelve apostles, hoping thus to prevent Christianity from degenerating into extravagance or philosophical speculation. The theologians to whom I am referring do not find fault with this pious deception, but defend it in both cases for historical reasons, and even applaud it as showing much prudence.

older friend whether this or that is right? And is this not casuistry? Can we reconcile it with our conscience to let young people do as they like until they must be taught by a physician or perhaps a magistrate? . . . The argument that casuistry is a temptation to the priest himself is unworthy of consideration. Physicians, judges, artists, and those engaged in many other pursuits are liable to similar temptations; such things belong to their profession. Moreover, any temptation which might arise from the study of a few paragraphs in a textbook of casuistry is hardly worth mentioning. These books are studied at a time when candidates for the priesthood are, on the one hand, in a state of such mental activity, and overwhelmed with so much work, that it is impossible for unseemly thoughts to arrive. . . . If my own experience of life, if scientific and philosophical considerations and familiarity with the classics have led me subsequently to adopt opinions which a Puritan would condemn as lax and reprehensible, I am quite aware that in so doing I have not come into *agreement* with Jesuit morals, but into *contradiction* to them.”¹

¹ Gressbote, 1895, I, 628, *seq.*

PART II

**PROTESTANTISM AND THE CATHOLIC CONCEPTION
OF MORALITY**

CHAPTER I

THE LAW OF GOD AND CONSCIENCE

MANY representatives of modern ethics describe Christian morals in general as a *heteronomous system of compulsion and fear*, since the law underlying it has its source not in man himself, but in God. They maintain that a real conscience only exists there where the inner voice that urges man to do good, and warns him against evil, is the dictate of his own nature and not that of a superior and external will. They charge that Catholic morals maintain that the real standard of morality is to be found in the will of the Church and in her commandments.¹ Protestant theologians go further and distinguish emphatically between Christian and Catholic conceptions of morals, and throw upon the latter the odium of being imposed by an external will.

According to *O. Pfleiderer*, "the idea of duty has in Catholicism again assumed the positivist form, it being conceived as the summary of all temporal and ecclesiastical legislation, which, being without internal unity and having but a limited extent, left wide scope for both subjective caprice and enlargement"; while Protestantism, on the other hand, maintained the inwardness of obligation as dictated by conscience.²

In Roman Catholic morals "the ethical obligation is found in an extraneous law; it is something imposed upon man from without."³ For a Catholic "God's will and law are not written upon his heart and conscience"; they are something external to himself, imposed

¹ *V. Hartmann, Phaenomenologie des sittl. Bewusstseins*, p. 80; *Ziegler, Gesch. der Ethik*, II, 300.

² *O. Pfleiderer, Grundriss der christl. Glaubens und Sittenlehre*, p. 256.

³ *Stange, Einleitung in die Ethik*, 1901, II, 95.

upon him in the commandments and the authority of the Church. The conscience of Roman Catholics is the Pope.¹

Herrmann frankly sympathizes with "people of ethical culture, supposedly without religion," and expresses his contempt for Catholic morals in the words: "In them the thought that the moral law is God's law signifies that precisely for that reason it is not our law. The Church knows no longer the fact that a man acts morally only then when he unreservedly obeys a precept that he himself recognizes as absolutely right. What the Church calls moral obedience is the yielding to a power that can indeed constrain inwardly unstable natures, but cannot intelligently convince men."² It is characteristic of this kind of controversy that it never furnishes evidence in support of its preposterous accusations; it contents itself with drawing rash conclusions from isolated instances of casuistry and shuts its eyes to those principles of Catholic morals which are open to all.

According to Holy Scripture the moral law is God's law, and in this respect there is no difference between the Old Testament and the New. But as God is everywhere, His law is not inscribed in the heavens, nor beyond the confines of the sea, but it is "very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth and in thy heart, that thou mayst do it."³ The Son of God came, not to do His own will, but the will of His heavenly Father.⁴ According to *St. Paul*, God is the law-giver as well as the judge and saviour of mankind; His law is written in the hearts of the Gentiles in so far as their conscience bears witness to it, in so far as they are "a law to themselves."⁵ The Christian consciousness has never experienced any contradiction between this kind of interior autonomy and man's entire dependence upon God. The Fathers of the Church did not hesitate to incorporate into their moral system the Stoic idea of the natural law, of the principles of justice inherent in human reason, because they recognized them as rays of light emanating from the Logos, from divine Reason itself. According to *St. Augustine*, moral

¹ *G. Schulze*, *Der Unterschied zwischen der kath. und evang. Sittlichkeit*, 1888, p. 4, etc.

² *Röm. und evang. Sittlichkeit*, 3d ed., pp. 16, 29.

³ Deut. xxx. 14.

⁴ John vi. 38.

⁵ Rom. ii. 14.

good is both the highest and the most intimate good (*bonum summum et intimum*), and he says that "the soul evolves her own laws out of God's light by means of the process of rational thought."¹

St. Thomas carefully distinguishes between the influence of external rules and the inward voice of conscience. He says: "Although many things are not evil because forbidden by an external law, they are nevertheless evil because forbidden by an interior law. For *the interior law is the light of reason itself*, by means of which we discern what we have to do. Any human action which is in keeping with this light is good; whatever is contrary to it is unnatural to man and evil, and is termed evil inasmuch as it is forbidden by the interior law."²

Continuing the thought in the words just quoted from *St. Paul*, *St. Thomas* teaches that man's dignity consists chiefly in the circumstance that "he is his own lawgiver, since he instructs himself and urges himself on to that which is good."³ But just as in the *theoretical* recognition of truth reason has no creative activity, but has to conform itself to a reality infinitely higher than itself, so in its *practical* activity reason is not a creative and ultimate standard, but rather a means of making known a higher and infinitely perfect will. "The human will is subject to a twofold rule; the first is a proximate, homogeneous rule, viz., *human reason itself*; the other is that elemental rule, that *eternal law*, which is, as it were, *the divine Reason itself*."⁴

This fundamental conception, which meets us in hundreds of places in *St. Thomas's* works, leads to the clear definition that conscience is essentially identical with that practical reason which, by its nature, possesses the disposition to moral thinking (*synteresis*) and, which, when thought has been awakened, forms its real judgments as to what is good and what is evil.⁵ And because conscience is for the individual the application and inward appropriation of the moral law, man may never act contrary to the dictates of his conscience. A heretic, for instance, who believes the taking

¹ *Mausbach*, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, I, 99, 102.

² In I. 2 sent. dist. 42, q. 1, a. 4 ad 3.

³ In ep. ad Rom., c. 2.

⁴ *S. theol.*, I, II, q. 71, a. 6 c.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, q. 79, a. 12, 13; cf. *St. Bonaventure*, In II dist. 39, a. 1, qu. 2: *Conscientia nominat habitum directivum NOSTRI INDICII respectu operabilium*.

of an oath to be sinful would really commit a sin by swearing.¹ *St. Thomas* frequently quotes *St. Paul's* words: "All that is not of faith is sin"; adding, after the fashion of a mediæval gloss, "i.e., all that is contrary to conscience."²

Not only does the *reason* of the natural man tend towards the supernatural, the moral order, but his will, too, naturally strives after what is morally good, and is susceptible to the supra-personal, i.e., to the Divine. This striving differs from the egotistical striving after happiness; it may be weakened through sin, but cannot be destroyed thereby. The response made by the will and mind to the voice of moral reason is inseparable from any complete idea of conscience. It is through it that moral perception becomes effective, agitating or inspiring. According to *St. Bonaventure*, the foundation of conscience lies in the "affective powers, in as far as it is naturally capable of good and strives after the good."³ *St. Thomas* assigns the first place to the reason and the second to the will; the virtues, he says, "preëxist in that natural predisposition to the highest good which resides in reason, recognizing the good, and then in the will, naturally striving to attain it. . . . Thus *Cicero* was right when he said that the germs of virtue are implanted in us by nature."⁴

This theory is the one that has always controlled Catholic moralists. At the time of the Reformation, when the commandments were said to be antagonistic to Christian liberty, particular stress was laid upon this theory in order to demonstrate the interior and divine authority which they possess. The Roman Catechism says explicitly⁵: "Although this law was given to the Jews on the mountain, it was a law which nature had long before planted in and engraved upon the souls of men." *St. Alphonsus* begins his "Moral Theology" with a sentence confirmatory of *St. Thomas*: "There is a twofold rule governing human action, one remote and the other proximate. The remote or material rule is the law of God; the proximate or formal rule is conscience. For although conscience must conform itself in all things to the law of God, the goodness and badness of human actions are known to us only in as far as conscience takes cognizance of them."⁶

Whence, then, does reason derive the contents of its moral perception? As the texts quoted show, it does so not only from the

¹ *St. Thomas*, In II sent. dist. 39, q. 3, a. 2 c.

² S. theol., I, II, q. 19, a. 5 Contra.

³ III, 1, 7.

⁴ In II sent. dist. 39, a. 2, q. 1 ad 5.

⁵ In III sent. dist. 33, q. 1, a. 2 c.

⁶ Theol. moral, I, 1.

revealed law of God, but primarily from *the natural law*, which is a reflection of the Eternal Wisdom. The pith of the Ten Commandments and of all Christian duties belongs to *the sphere of natural law*. What this law enjoins is, "that the good is not good because commanded, but it is commanded because it is good." *St. Thomas*, as we have seen, makes the reason, and not the will, of God the fount and origin of the moral law; it is not arbitrary choice, but inward truth and necessity which decide what is morally good. He introduces into morals that conception of the "eternal law" which the ancient philosophers adopted in order to account for the harmony of the universe, and he does so in order to give vivid expression to the unity of all morality and its connection with the order of nature. In his opinion reason may and must investigate freely the very nature of man, his true needs and his sound inclinations, as well as those duties and achievements which the outer world imposes upon his discerning and practical activity, since just these considerations yield moral imperatives. According to *Plato*, too, law is "the expression of being."

All volition is the aiming at an end, the practical affirmation of what is good and perfect. The law enlightening the will "shows it what action is adapted to the highest aim." Its function is "to order things with reference to that aim, which in the sphere of the practical forms the first principle."¹ The building up of these aims of the will proceeds on the principle of individual human values. "In the various parts of the universe each creature exists for its proper activity and perfection; the less noble for the noble, the brute creatures for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature contributes to the perfection of the universe. Furthermore, the entire universe with all its parts is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it is an image of the Divine Goodness made for the *glory of God*."²

Morality as such, the peculiar dignity and absolute obligation of what is morally good, can be explained only in the relation in which our actions stand to *the ultimate, common object of life and of the world*. The fact, however, whether, and in what way, an action stands in any relation to this aim, is not dependent upon

¹ In II dist. 41, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4; S. theol., I, II, q. 90, a. 1.

² S. theol., I, q. 65, a. 2.

chance or uncontrolled choice; it is determined by the manner in which the action operates upon immediate personal and social good. "The good is present in things in two ways; viz., in the ordering of one thing in its relation to another, and in the ordering of things in their relation to their ultimate end. . . . *And as things are ordered to their ultimate end through the agency of their own particular end*, their relation to their ultimate end varies according to the diversity of their own particular ends. We say, therefore: As the ultimate end of all beings is one, viz., God, so likewise the ultimate end of all volition is one, viz., God. This, however, does not touch the particular ends, and when, in accordance with these ends, the right relation of the will to the ultimate end is secured, the will is morally good; if not, it is morally perverse."¹

Herrmann and others say that according to *St. Thomas* God could make exceptions to the moral law. — The dictates of the natural law having an interior foundation, it cannot admit of any exceptions. God Himself cannot in any case dispense one from the fundamental direction of action or from attempting to attain the highest aim, since in doing so He would be denying Himself, who is absolute Goodness. But how do matters stand with regard to the natural law against murder, adultery, etc.? The exceptional instances recorded in the Old Testament, such as the sacrifice of *Isaac*, led the scholastic writers to discuss these points more fully. The relations of creatures to one another do not constitute the final and essential elements of morality. They were settled once for all by the laws of creation, so far as any human authority is concerned, whether of the Church or of the state. The Creator, however, who has devised them and impressed them on the world, can, according to *St. Thomas*, by a positive manifestation of His will, remove their binding character in cases where some higher purpose of His Goodness and power requires it. In such matters He does not act arbitrarily, but according to a real, though not always recognizable, purpose. Such isolated instances, which always appear as exceptional, do not affect the sanctions of morality any more than miracles, which resemble them in this respect, affect the laws of the physical order.²

The history of morals and civilization suggests another remark. In so far as human nature is elastic and capable of development, and the immediate range of its activity may vary, the natural law also must and does admit of

¹ In II sent. dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1 c.

² *St. Thomas*, In I sent. dist. 47, q. 1, a. 4; S. theol., I, II, q. 94, a. 5 ad 2; q. 100, a. 8. In another passage he lays still greater stress upon the fact that the duties imposed by the natural law admit of no exceptions. Cf. *W. Stockums*, *Die Unveränderlichkeit des natürl. Sittengesetzes in der scholastischen Ethik*, 1911; *F. Wagner*, *Das natürl. Sittengesetz nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas v. Aquin*, 1911.

various applications and interpretations. Its individual requirements are organically connected with life as a whole; they are not like the paragraphs of a written code, but parts of a living idea, essentially uniform and unalterably true. No contradiction is involved by the fact that *Adam's* children were allowed to intermarry, whilst such unions are invalid to-day by reason of the natural law. The very aim of securing the proper and befitting propagation of the race, which then necessitated marriages between brothers and sisters, now forbids them. The Church was not false to her mediæval views on lending at interest when, in subsequent ages, she permitted the payment of interest for moneys loaned. As private exchange in kind gradually developed into a money basis of exchange, money as a means of exchange assumed the nature of capital, a working factor productive of gain; and what had been a loan for consumption became a loan for production. As *St. Thomas* points out, such material changes do not destroy the "formal" uniformity and permanence of the natural law; they are necessary owing to the "changeableness of human nature and the various conditions of men and things."¹

A glance at our Catholic works on ethics and natural law, which have duly aroused the opposition of all positivist students of morals, suffices to show that these opinions are still alive in all Catholic schools, and that more, rather than less, emphasis is now laid upon the natural basis of the law. Most modern students of ethics and law regard moral and judicial aspects as merely the product of history, of national customs and of varying conditions of life, and they therefore subordinate the moral law to the influences of the time and of their arbitrary action; but Catholicism insists upon the inward necessity and sanctity of these principles. It thus incurs the charge of intellectualism in ethics; and, on the other hand, it is accused of having no reasonable insight into morality and of teaching a moral law that constrains, but does not convince, those who lack interior strength.²

¹ De malo, q. 2, a. 4 ad 13.

² In the Catholic schools the only debated point is whether the real *idea* of good and evil involves reference to God, as the highest end of life, or whether it is held to be peculiar to the nature of man as a reasonable being. The latter view is held by *Vasquez* and *Suarez*, although in different ways, and more recently *V. Cathrein* has contributed greatly to its diffusion. The chief difficulty connected with it lies in the fact that it sets up one rule for distinguishing good and evil — that is to say, for the essence of morality — and another for the obligation attached to the moral order (cf. *Cathrein*, *Moralphilosophie*, 5th ed., I, 395, etc.). The Thomistic school, on the other hand, has always connected the essence of morality with the idea of "the eternal law," and many very eminent teachers, belonging to other schools of thought, agree with the Thomists on this point. The objections raised by the opposite side appear weak, if we maintain that the idea of the law itself is included in the *ordinatio*

If we are questioned as to our attitude towards heteronomy, the imposition of law by an external will, we must, as we have said, deny that it exists in the sense in which *Kant* used the word against Christianity. According to him, heteronomy is the antithesis of true rational autonomy; it is a dependence of the will upon natural sense impulses and "pathological laws." The odiousness of this declaration he turns upon the old teaching on morals, by declaring that all efforts to attain felicity were prompted by essentially sensual pathological tendencies, and he foisted upon the legislative will of God the imputation that "it could be a motive power only through our anticipation of the happiness to be won thereby."¹

Both these assumptions are manifestly erroneous. Not with our senses only, but with our minds and our rational wills, must we value and strive to attain happiness as a great, all-embracing good. But God's will deserves our respect and obedience, not only because He can make us happy or punish us, but because, being our Creator and Master, He has a right to command us, and also because, being infinite Truth and Sanctity, He is the absolute law and end of all moral volition. In none of *St. Thomas's* statements above cited, on the foundation and nature of morality, is there any allusion to rewards and punishments. These ideas are of course most important in our ethics, but they are not the basis of the moral justification and binding nature of God's commandments. Christian morality has nothing to do with heteronomy in *Kant's* odious meaning of the word. By circuitous lines of argument *Kant* himself finally arrived at the point of recognizing all duties to be "*also* divine commands"; and he remarks

ad finem ultimum and assumes the existence of an actual order of that which is good culminating in the highest Good. *St. Thomas* explains the nature of morality in this way. The complete essence of the good is, in his opinion, more than things *convenientia cum natura humana*, or in fact any *ordo unius finis creati ad alterum*; it consists in agreement with the highest aims of life and of the universe (cf. *supra*, p. 136). *Cathrein* admits (p. 395, note 1) that reasonable human nature cannot go beyond an *obligatio imperfecta*, and we may say that it cannot go beyond a *moralitas imperfecta*. Cf. on this subject *Mausbach*, *Compte rendu* du 4; congrès international des Catholiques, Fribourg, 1898, III, 360, *seq.*, and *Philos. Jahrbuch*, 1899, 303, *seq.*; 1901, 90, *seq.*

¹ *Kritik der prakt. Vernunft* (ed. K. Kehrbach), p. 50; cf. p. 40, *seq.*

further that those philosophers best expressed the idea of the true end of creation who ascribed it to "the glory of God." But he goes on to take from this thought all its meaning, by adding that we ought to regard the commands of our own reason as those of the Highest Being only because He alone can guarantee our *possession* of the highest good, — a eudæmonistic conclusion, which shows plainly how far *Kant's* apparent rigorism is from the objective grandeur of the Christian thought of God and morality.¹

When the Christian standpoint has once been properly understood, it is easy to see that it is possible to connect it with the idea of legislation from without only then if it were permissible to speak of God as something external to man, since it is in God that we live and move and have our being, and we recognize Him, by faith and reason, as the source of all our intellectual powers, the innermost foundation and support of all our natural and moral actions.

We are made in God's likeness; we see, as it were, with His eyes; we perceive in His light, and we read in His creation which path we must follow in order to attain to moral perfection. We are a law to ourselves in the inwardness of our moral thinking and willing, but we are not, as *Kant* assumes, our own "supreme law"; all our moral thoughts and desires, like our whole being, refer back to God. A creature, that in its bodily and spiritual existence is so completely subject to higher laws, cannot possibly be autonomous in the matter of his duty and volition. *Herrmann* follows *Kant* in saying: "What *ultimately* determines true volition is not something beyond the conscious will, but is the conscious will itself."² The fundamental idea of morality is to him not the idea "that the law is God's commandment, but that the law is *true*."³

Purely formal truth has nothing to do with morality. The laws of grammar, æsthetics, and dietetics are true, and they have a practical, normal effect upon human endeavour. Why do we not ascribe to them the binding force of the moral law? Because they serve only relative, finite purposes, the formal exchange of ideas,

¹ Kritik der prakt. Vernunft (ed. K. Kehrbach), pp. 155-157; cf. also *Kneib*, Die "Heteronomie" der Christl. Moral, Vienna, 1903.

² Ethik, p. 36.

³ Röm. und evang. Sittlichkeit, p. 16.

æsthetic enjoyment, and bodily health. We have to rise above these things and recognize one supreme end, common to all alike, if we are to account for the obligation of the moral law. As soon as this end is presented to us in God, we recognize also a law of unconditional validity and obligation, which bids us to do right and to reject all that is evil. We *recognize* that this law is inwardly true, but *we do not make it*. *Herrmann* exalts what he calls "the unconditional good," "the eternally valid," far above the thinking *ego*; but he ought also to see that what ultimately determines morality cannot reside in man, for matter and form, end and law, are inseparably connected in the principle of morality.¹

Herrmann says emphatically that in the unconditionally good and eternally valid and necessary is seen what is moral. Yet he tries to discover in the moral thoughts of man, "the everlasting foundation of all moral life." He will not allow these thoughts to be dependent upon any other Being; viz., God. No power may intervene between the will and the good, so as to give the latter its binding force (p. 148). According to *Herrmann*, God is summoned only when man, struggling in vain after justice and tortured by sin, seeks help from above; he "experiences" God in Christ as a morally elevating force, inspiring him with confidence and strength; and so he learns to recognize the moral law as being also the law of God. In reply we may assert that our thoughts cannot possibly be the everlasting basis of moral life; this can be only the *contents* of our thoughts, the unconditional good, and this good is nothing *apart* from God, but His very being. God is not a binding force thrusting itself between the will and the good; He *is* the good, that alone can constitute an obligation upon a personal will, aiming at the infinite. Obligation is nothing but the respect and love due on the part of the will to the absolutely Good. *Herrmann* remarks (p. 14) that in my opinion the binding obligation results from the "assumption" of a divine legislator; I answer this statement thus: We are not here concerned with the psychological origin of the moral and religious consciousness, but with the question whether the moral law in our conscience possesses its binding force in itself and independently of God; and that I deny. With regard to the psychological question I had remarked briefly that man's ability to conceive and honour the *absolute Good*, was a preparation for and foreshadowing of an *explicit* recognition of God. As soon as a man, even without Christian education, recognizes the existence of a fixed law, an absolute Good, worthy of his veneration and transcending all that is expe-

¹ As already remarked, Catholic ethical teachers by no means maintain that a positive law of God, an explicit declaration of His will, must be antecedent to morality. That idea is excluded by the expression *lex æterna* as well as by the Thomist definition of law as an *ordinatio rationis* (not *voluntatis*), and by the statement that the basis of morality lies in the *essence* of God, etc. The original law of morality is not properly speaking being given to man, but it exists, and for this reason its origin is to be sought not in man, but in God.

dient and necessary in this world, he occupies a position in the moral order and grasps at least one aspect of the Godhead. In the idea of law and obligation, God appears to him as a Will, as a *Lawgiver*, not only as an end and as a good. This knowledge of God is still incomplete; in the case of Christian children it gains clearness and vividness through their religious instruction. It is the task of Christian philosophers to expound and develop, in the light of the Christian idea of God, this rudimentary perception of the relation between morality and religion; it should not be obscured by false conclusions as to autonomy.

The rejection of the divine life of the spirit, as the Alpha and Omega of the moral spontaneity of man, has had the result of bringing upon morals the evil that it sought to avert, and of subjecting it to the foreign dominion of impersonal laws and impulses. *Kant* desires reason to be autonomous, but he obliges the reason of each individual to ask, before coming to any conclusion, whether its maxim could be regarded as a principle of *universal* legislation; in other words, whether the imitation by people in general of this individual line of action would result in contradictions or not. This is about the opposite of what later advocates of autonomy have understood by personal morality. It leads to an apotheosis of generality, of a "form" which must inevitably be distasteful to modern individualism. But even from a serious, ethical point of view, it seems to limit the moral judgment too much and to regard it only from one aspect, which is more dangerous to the vigorous independence of moral action than the Christian principle of morality can be. There are heroic deeds performed in the cause of freedom and deserving the gratitude of mankind, which cannot conceivably be made the subject of a universal maxim.

What view is taken of the liberty and inwardness of the law by those writers on ethics who pay attention only to the *contents* of volition and not to the form of the "universal"? They separate into two camps; some declare the highest law of life to be the development and satisfaction of one's own existence; others the welfare of the community. The latter, which may be called the social view, makes society everything and the individual nothing in appreciating the moral value of our actions; and here there is obviously a fundamentally external legislation. How can one, who is in no way a moral end to himself, be a lawgiver to himself? The former view admits of an apparently consistent carrying out of the idea of moral independence, but it destroys the moral

law itself; for autonomy becomes anomy and merely egotistical license. As soon as any standard higher than that of the individual disappears, the intellectual ideal is obscured and, as experience shows, the sensual, the natural desire to enjoy life, becomes predominant; and this is precisely what *Kant* first branded as heteronomy.

A man, brought up as a Christian, regards the moral laws as the expression of God's will, revealed to mankind, and so he respects and obeys them for the sake of their divine origin. He finds among them laws which are not interiorly necessary, but enacted as helpful, such as the duty of receiving the sacraments. But on the whole, what we call morality is identically the same both in nature and revelation. *St. Thomas* points out that Christ greatly amplified our knowledge of dogma, but He did not add to the moral law; "our natural reason leads us to practise virtue, since reason is, as it were, the standard for human activity."¹

Even the *positive* rules, added by Christ, are not mere arbitrary requirements; they fit into the natural law, primarily by never contradicting it, and then also (as with the law about receiving the sacraments) by stimulating us in the practice of virtue and by raising the whole tone of our life. It is, in fact, the aim of revelation to raise the inner state of life by disclosing supernatural objects, but to do it in such a way that what is natural may be absorbed into the higher life, not cast aside as worthless. The *natural* moral law was insisted upon by *Moses*, the prophets, and in the Sermon on the Mount, and this was necessary, because human reason had lost sight of its truth, in consequence of intellectual aberration or of immoral habits and customs. Even to the present day, as *Kant* admits, the natural moral law would not be known in its purity and perfection had not Christian revelation come to the aid of reason.

Not only children, but many grown-up people, if they are to be preserved from immorality, require to have their moral obligations deeply impressed upon them from without; they cannot perceive them for themselves. Secular teachers of ethics recognize this necessity; but whilst they speak of a "heterogony of aims" and of class differences as affecting the views taken of morals, so

¹ *S. theol.*, I, II, q. 108, a. 2 ad 1.

that the lower classes do not grasp at all the true basis and aim of morality, Christianity possesses in the *obedience to God* a motive that takes the place, for the masses, of a full comprehension of many of the commandments, because it virtually includes them. For whoever recognizes God as supreme Wisdom and Sanctity, as the Christian does, accepts His law as the outcome of these perfections, and also accepts his own subordination to it, as an act of reverence due to his Creator. As man is essentially a creature, called into existence by God and for God, such obedience is nothing outward and foreign to him, but the natural expression of his own being. Does not the strictest follower of *Kant* perceive that moral autonomy is possible only for such as have reached an advanced stage of education, and that obedience to authority and tradition gradually leads up to this moral maturity? How can *any one* demand such obedience if it is strange and even antagonistic to the true nature of morality? Is not this very advance towards maturity, this inward grasp of what is good, facilitated infinitely more by our placing ourselves in God's presence, when difficulties occur, than by "generalizing" our own maxims and inclinations? Do not passionate emotions, petty sophistries and doubts vanish more readily when considered in the light of God than in that of practical reason? If we are reminded of the inward struggles in which a conscience aiming at freedom is sometimes involved when it feels itself fettered by traditions, are there not equally painful conflicts between the moral sense, as a personal impulse, on the one hand, and the categorical imperative, as a general demand made by reason, on the other?

Enough has been said to make it unnecessary to discuss the statement that morality is for Catholics nothing but a collection of rules *laid down by the Church*. The position of the Church as the preacher of God's word is not discussed here; whoever honours her in this position submits, not to her legislation, but to the objective, divine truth which she received the authority to make known to men. We shall refer later to the necessity of legislation and order in the Church.¹ For the present it is enough to establish the fact that, in issuing her commands, the Church is absolutely guided by the divine law, both natural and positive. All the

¹ See Chap. IX.

doctors of the Church are unanimous in saying that nothing contrary to natural morality can be ordered by human authority. "Every law made by men has the character of law only in as far as it is derived from the natural law. If it is in conflict with the natural law on one single point, it ceases to be a law, and becomes a mere perversion of law."¹

In the life of a Catholic, as in the teaching of morals, a very small space is occupied by the duties imposed by the Church, in comparison with those affecting his general behaviour as a man and a Christian. In *St. Thomas's* "Summa" there is no article at all on the commandments of the Church, and we might read a thousand pages on the subject of ethical instruction without finding more than five on which these commandments are mentioned. In the section devoted to morals in the Roman Catechism only the Ten Commandments are discussed; in later editions reference is made to the commandments of the Church, but only as a short appendix to those of God. The Latin textbooks of morals commonly in use seem to diverge from this tradition, but do so only seemingly. In their second volume they deal with morals, not as far as they affect Christians generally, but in their demands upon the clergy, and naturally go into detail on points connected with the Church, her liturgy, and the pastoral office. In spite of all this, unless a miracle occurs, our learned critics will probably continue to overlook this obvious fact, and, adhering to the "authority" of their tradition, will assert that Catholics put in the place of moral law and conscience the Church and the Pope.²

Luther's hatred of the rules of the Church was not the outcome of a deep and sympathetic appreciation of the abstract character of the moral law. He was a real autonomist whenever there was any question of casting aside inconvenient doctrines and authorities. Into his theory of law and the redemption he intro-

¹ S. theol., I, II, q. 95, a. 2.

² What has been said serves to refute *Herrmann's* retort (*Röm. u. evangel. Sittl.*, 3d ed., p. 157) that, according to *St. Thomas*, the action of the will is plainly different with regard to positive commands from what it is under the natural law. No, *St. Thomas* expressly derives the obligatory character of all laws from the natural law: *Omnes leges, inquantum participant de ratione recta, intantum derivantur a lege aeterna* (I, II, q. 93, a. 3). *Omnis lex humanitus posita intantum habet de ratione legis, inquantum a lege naturae derivatur* (I, II, q. 95, a. 2).

duced a view of the authority of divine rules and decrees which leaves less scope for a man's own insight and free action than the Catholic doctrine. He condemns the law as a "jailer," "a most cruel taskmaster and hangman, the worst of all tyrants"; and he declared its function to be to drive a sinner into fear, anxiety, and despair.¹

How violently did he attack *Moses*, who promulgated the law, and whose admonitions and severe rebukes frighten the conscience! *Moses* was to *Luther* an object of greater suspicion than the worst of heretics, more offensive than the Pope and the devil! In his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans *Luther* says: "The will is always at variance [with the law], and if it were able, would always act in another way, although outwardly it does what the law requires." *W. Braun* acknowledges that, in the natural man, *Luther* expands the absence of free will to do right to the degree of "real hatred of good"; we delight in doing evil, but "no one does right because it pleases him, or because he finds joy in the law, but because he fears present or future punishment, or hopes for some reward." This antagonism to morality is explained by the fact that human nature is radically corrupt in consequence of original sin, and has lost the elements that made it like to God. *Braun* is right in saying that *Luther* laid much stress upon what he asserted to be *St. Paul's* teaching, and maintained that "the whole nature of man is in rebellion, not only his body, but his intellect and will are in constant opposition to God's law, and therefore in his very being, man is sinful; moreover, the still dormant tendencies to do what is forbidden, even though they are not active, are sinful, and the beast, even when asleep, remains a beast."²

This is a true description of *Luther's* doctrine; but how is it possible to speak, in the face of such a view, of subjective morality, or to hope that a creature so essentially alienated from all good can ever be reconciled with the law!

On isolated, theoretical points also *Luther* abandoned the natural idea of what is fundamentally good and the interior autonomy of the human intellect, which scholasticism had taught. In his ear-

¹ *Luther's* works: *Walch* (Halle, 1740), VI, pp. 161, 218, 1160.

² *W. Braun*, *Die Bedeutung der Concupiscenz in Luther's Leben und Lehre*, 1908, p. 105, *seq.*

lier works he still gives a prominent place to synteresis, the inborn foundation of conscience, and believes that there is in the will also a desire for good. Both these good qualities are remnants of man's original kinship with God, and they can be reawakened by grace. In his later writings, however, the idea of synteresis disappeared,¹ and the whole of man, including the highest apex of the soul, is described as carnal, turned away from God. Hence the noblest virtues displayed by pagans are diabolical and sacrilegious.² Reason, not recognizing God, despises Him; "but how can a reason that is blind and ignorant command what is good? . . . and at what shall a will aim, to which reason prescribes nothing except the darkness of its blindness and ignorance?"³

For all that follows, *Köstlin's* statement is to the point: "According to *Luther's* constant assertions, the truth contained in the word of God is always hidden from the reason of natural, sinful, unredeemed man, with its capacity for thinking, understanding, and drawing inferences; such truth remains alien, a subject of contradiction, just as the exertions of a man, sunk in sin and worldliness, are always opposed to it. His reason deals with worldly affairs, it recognizes them and is practically concerned with them, and it establishes outward ordinances adapted to the needs of human social life, but it has nothing to do with higher matters, with the perception of the divine, the raising of mankind to intercourse with God, the way of salvation, or "the things affecting our eternal welfare." "Reason," says *Luther*, "deals with what is beneath us (*inferiora*), and not with what is above us (*superiora*)."⁴

Luther absolutely denies the freedom of the will, at least in the sense of being able to make a moral decision. He always attached great importance to his work "*De servo arbitrio*," and he was

¹ *Köstlin*, *Luther's Theologie*, 2d ed., I, p. 52, *seq.*

² *De servo arbitrio*, Weimar, 18th ed., p. 742, *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 762; cf. 710: *ita fit, ut (impius) PERPETUO ET NECESSARIO peccet et erret, ut iam alieno imperio Satanae pressus.*

⁴ *Köstlin*, II, 48. This contempt of reason was carried so far by *Luther* that he even calls it the beast which must be killed; a "whore of the devil," etc. Even in his last sermon, on January 17, 1546, he speaks of reason as a "beautiful prostitute," "the stateliest whore possessed by the devil" (*Erlangen ed.*, XVI, p. 142).

influenced not only by the consideration that God's omnipotence and infallible foreknowledge precluded all possibility of free choice in man, but he regarded the will as fettered in itself, being under the dominion of stronger motives supplied by the senses or intellect. He thought that we can no more contribute to our moral conversion than to our creation; *liberum arbitrium* exists merely in name.¹ A man is good or bad according as he is dominated by God or the devil; whatever he may do, his will is "purely passive." But in order that our consciousness may be influenced by the moral law, a distinction must be made between freedom to do what is divine and subjectively moral, and freedom to use earthly possessions and to dispose of cattle and horses, money and estates. All receptivity and power in the will with regard to the highest aim in life and fundamental morality is absolutely dead; but a certain ability to do right with regard to what is exterior and lower still remains.²

Apart from his denial of free will, *Luther's* opinions did much to lower and weaken the conception of the moral law and of morality itself. All susceptibility to what is supersensual and absolutely valuable and sacred is denied; in fact the spiritual life of man is deprived of precisely the thing that raises it above the turmoil of sensual and external interests. Man understands and practically values only what is beneath him; there are no ideals left capable of morally uplifting him; his sight is darkened and his heart is corrupt. He still perceives that it is his duty to uphold the domestic, economic, and social order, as it exists for the mutual advantage of men in this world, but it has lost for him the consecration

¹ De servo arbitrio, Weimar ed., pp. 718, 719, 754; cf. also the following note.

² De servo arbitrio, p. 638. Si omnino vocem eam (lib. arbitrium) omittere nolumus, quod esset tutissimum et religiosissimum, bona fide tamen eatenus uti doceamus, ut homini arbitrium liberum non respectu SUPERIORIS sed tantum inferioris se rei concedatur, hoc est, ut sciat sese in suis facultatibus et possessionibus habere ius utendi, faciendi, omittendi. . . . Ceterum erga Deum vel in rebus quae pertinent ad salutem vel damnationem, non habet liberum arbitrium, sed captivus, subjectus et servus est vel voluntatis Dei vel voluntatis Satanae. It appears from the last sentence that *Luther* did not regard the will as fettered because of God's omnipotence and causality, for a dominion of this kind over the will could not be ascribed to the devil. Cf. *Kästlin*, I, 216, 355; II, 124, etc.

that *St. Thomas* gives it by representing God as the final end of all morality.

The moral harm caused by *Luther's* views is not only disastrous but irremediable, since it goes so far as to distort the very essence of humanity. From anthropology he passes on to the doctrine of justification, and teaches that not even grace can really remove the corruption of nature. I will only point out here that the chasm between what is higher and what is lower in life, between the divine and the human, the eternal and the temporal, remains even in the case of those who are pardoned, and the moral law in its practical working and significance is still banished to the lower sphere. Faith has to establish our relation with God by laying hold of the consolation of the Gospel, and thus quieting the conscience with regard to sin. The law is concerned only with the flesh and with matters affecting public peace. The justice of the Gospel must be distinguished from God's justice as carefully and precisely as "God Himself separated heaven from earth, light from darkness, and day from night. . . . Now thou art on earth, therefore let the lazy ass toil and serve, and continue to bear the burden laid upon him. That is to say, let the body with its members be still subject to the law. But when thou risest to heaven, leave the ass with his load and burden down here upon earth. For the conscience can have nothing whatever to do with the law, with works, or with earthly justice. . . . In worldly government, however, we must most strictly insist upon and pay obedience to the law, . . . but when the law and sin enter heaven, i.e., the conscience, they must both be driven out without delay."¹

In his sermons, too, *Luther* frequently insists upon the necessity of distinguishing the moral law from the relation of man to religion, so that the law thus is degraded to the rank of a secondary factor, belonging only to what is temporal. Energy in good works is to be shown only for the good of one's neighbour; it is not "pious," but "useful." Even adultery is not contrary to "a right understanding of the faith" and God's honour; it is only an injury to man.²

According to the fundamental principles of theism, the highest

¹ Walch, VIII, 1789; cf. pp. 1555, 1884.

² Weimar ed., XII, 647, 652, 683, *seq.*

good and its binding force pervade all lower moral undertakings; but according to *Luther*, they stand far beyond all earthly relations and duties, which, being thus stripped of their truly moral quality, are directed by a reason that is worldly, not divine. Kings are not kings before God; their laws "do not bind the conscience," their government is "something external."¹

Practical reason is only an inferior kind of conscience, capable only of judging temporal matters; in all other respects it is darkness and deception; and if it professes "to lead to God," it is no better than if it "leads away from Him."²

¹ Weimar ed., XII, pp. 318, 319, 331, 335, *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, pp. 319, 548, 689.

CHAPTER II

SIN AND JUSTIFICATION

LUTHER "saw in the whole mediæval period but one thing: Service by works, directed by the Anti-Christ in Rome. . . . This historical view of *Luther* has lingered on . . . and continues to live through the reading of his works." *W. Köhler*, who wrote these words, acknowledges at the same time that the view is false, for he says: "The canticle of grace never ceased to sound in the Catholic Church, only it never sounded *alone*."¹

Luther himself derived in his youth from the active powers within the Church "his new living force; he gained it from those very forces of grace, justice, hope, and love which Catholicism makes a ground of reproach against us Protestant historians of the Reformation." If this is true, *Luther* was undoubtedly wrong in imputing to the Middle Ages that bondage to works which he says was inspired by the Anti-Christ. No one can deny that, on important questions affecting his theory of salvation, *Luther* brought charges against the Church and scholasticism which he must have known to be false. He says again and again that works are the idol of Papists, especially of monks and nuns. "They abandon God and fear Him not, and desire not His graces and gifts, viz., *forgiveness of sins*, but they trot on, expecting to be saved by their Orders, cows, and dull works, and so obtain forgiveness of their sins."²

According to *Luther*, chastity had until his time been regarded as the highest virtue and the mark of sanctity, whilst true justice had consisted in the compliance with external regulations. People thought of God as a stern, angry judge, and knew nothing of the

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 45, 47, 50.

² Erlangen ed., XXXVI, 269, seq.

consolation of the Gospel or of faith in God's mercy. The unjustifiable character of these accusations has, since the time of the Reformation and the Council of Trent, often been proved; *Denifle* alone has collected a quantity of fresh material to disprove them, and the reader may be reminded of the liturgy contained in the Missal and Breviary, which *Luther* himself had used daily. Nevertheless the same old assertions recur again and again in Protestant literature.

If modern students intend to deal with mediæval theology, they should give up individual prejudices. But on the other hand it must be admitted that the discursive and minute speculations of the latter scholastics are apt to give rise to fresh doubts, and make it hard for them to survey the essential and common points of faith. At the same time they bring into their discussion, according as they are positively or liberally inclined, modern points of view which have little to do with the dogmatic points of conflict between *Luther* and the Church. One objects to scholasticism because it dissects religious questions in a scientific way and gives them a metaphysical foundation; another finds fault with it for admitting "magical," sacramental influences to bear upon morals; a third, on the contrary, objects to teaching "bare moralism," i.e., a purely human morality; a fourth finds fault for not giving a uniform solution of the problems and mysteries connected with the doctrines of grace!

Let us, therefore, give a short account of the Catholic doctrine of justification, as taught by the great masters of scholasticism, by the Catechism and devotional literature of the Middle Ages, and above all by the Council of Trent. We shall then compare with it *Luther's* doctrine of justifying faith, which Protestants still extol as the most important doctrine of the Reformation, although *Sell* says that "there are few among the Protestant laity who rightly understand it."

According to *Catholic teaching*, the redemption and forgiveness obtained for us by Christ refer, not, as many Protestants believe, only to original sin, but to all the sins of the human race; i.e., to original sin and to all the actual sins committed to the end of the world. It is true, as *St. Paul* says, that there is a *great generic connection* in the sphere of sin, as well as in that of grace and sancti-

fication; these are embodied respectively in *Adam* and Christ. *Sin* was in itself a revolt against God's law, a voluntary abandonment of the highest aim of life. The immediate moral effect of the sinful act was guilt, a permanent state of rejection by God and of deserving punishment. A more remote, psychologically perceptible consequence was the injury done to human nature, the strength given to perverse inclinations, and the preponderance acquired by sensual impulses. In the actual scheme of salvation man was and is also called to a supernatural union with God. This union begins here below in sanctifying grace, which raises and enlightens the mind of man, filling it with mystical life derived from God, and it is completed in the beatific vision in heaven.

Grievous sin destroys this supernatural life of grace; in addition to corrupting nature and to causing moral guilt, sin brings about the mystical "death" of the soul, and thus its full effect is realized. The habit of sin in fallen man cannot be removed by mere contrition or a resolution to sin no more; it can be cured only by God's forgiveness, a miracle of grace, that awakens the sinner to a new, moral life pleasing to God. God laid in *Adam* the foundation of both natural life and supernatural grace and sanctification, for the whole human race; it depended upon his moral decision whether he should pass on to his descendants the grace, as well as the nature, with which he had been equipped. *Adam's* fall into sin involved mankind in destruction. His action was a wilful failure to do right; the sin was personal, but the sinful condition resulting from it became a constituent part of human nature and passed with it on to *Adam's* posterity. Yet original sin is nothing positive, as it is not the guilt following an actual offence; nor is it essentially either corporal or sensual. The loss, sustained by the spirit of man, of its true direction towards God and of the principle of divine grace, and the limiting of his life to the *ego* and to its finite powers, have resulted in a state of spiritual disorder and impoverishment that forms the *essence of original sin*. Want of supernatural justice is a state of sin, because it is contrary to man's real destiny and obligation; it also affects the natural life to some extent, since supernatural justice was no mere external addition, but, like a higher inspiration, pervaded all the faculties of the soul and brought them into harmony.

Hence original sin is connected with a disturbance of the natural faculties of the soul; they are not dead, but weakened and wounded; no intellectual and religious power (such as that of conscience or freedom) has been destroyed, but its action is impeded and obscured, and all this is connected with the removal of restraint from the sensual nature. The disorder thus produced in the natural desires is called *concupiscence*, which displays its power to tempt most plainly in sexual matters, the very means by which fallen nature is propagated. When *St. Paul* speaks of the evil passion as sin, he is using the word "sin" in a broader sense. According to *St. Augustine* and *St. Thomas*, concupiscence is the material side, the embodiment of original sin; it is at once a result of and a stimulus to sin, but it is not the essence of original sin. Still less ought it to be put on a level with continuous, actual sin; its natural impulses become sinful only when the free will of man sanctions them or is answerable for them. *St. Paul* testifies to this truth when, in speaking of baptized persons, he says that there is now no condemnation to them,¹ although their susceptibility to evil remains.

What is the case of those not yet baptized who are in a state of sin? As moral action is essentially free, the involuntary impulses of passion cannot even here be accounted sinful; and in fact the will has strength to resist temptation, to follow what the conscience perceives to be a duty, and to do naturally good works. Nevertheless a twofold limitation exists in this case; viz., a lack of moral freedom and a want of power which we must describe as "bondage" to sin.

No natural morality is able to alter the whole sinful condition of man, to restore his innocence and holiness, or to renew the bond of love uniting him to God as His child. Just as a corpse cannot raise itself to life, so the soul cannot by its own strength renew the divine life within itself. But even to observe the natural moral law as a whole is beyond the power of fallen man. The will may be able to resist isolated temptations, but as long as the whole life of the soul is not renewed and firmly established in God, it cannot stand firm so as to resist all assaults and "fulfil the whole law"; the state of sin causes fresh sinful actions.

¹ Rom. VIII. 1.

Thus mankind in general and each individual man requires *redemption and sanctification through God*; and our only Mediator is Jesus Christ. As man He is the second founder of our race, again epitomizing in Himself the whole human race, and with heroic self-sacrifice taking upon Himself all our suffering, both of expiation and of punishment. As the Son of God He possesses such dignity and sanctity as to accomplish the work of atonement to the full. But just as sin spread through the organic connection of each individual with the founder of the race, so must each individual enter into connection with Christ in order to share in His redemption and grace. It is in harmony with the great mystery of the incarnation, the death and resurrection of Christ, and with the idea of the Church as His mystical body, that this grace should be given, not in a purely spiritual way, but normally through visible signs; viz., the sacraments. Christ Himself requires men to be born again by water and the Holy Ghost, and to receive the forgiveness of sins through the apostles. If, besides this, there is a purely inward conversion through contrition and the desire of salvation, still the very name "Baptism of desire" shows that the Redeemer's grace, and at least a tacit appeal to it, must not be absent. The reception of the sacrament by a man desirous of salvation is in itself a moral act, a token of humility, confidence, and adherence to Christ, the Son of God, who in His priestly capacity administers the sacrament. But the Church lays still further emphasis upon the moral character of justification, without imperiling the freedom and supremacy of God's gracious will and the mystical importance of conversion.

All moral actions, including such as are natural, depend upon the assistance of our Creator, who stimulates and supports our will (*concurſus generalis*); but preparation for receiving salvation requires a specifically higher degree of enlightenment and strength, and this is the supernatural grace of assistance (*gratia actualis*). Its first bestowal is independent of any merit on our part. Natural striving after virtue may have a remote effect in preparing the ground, but the heavenly seed must be planted from above. Often the greatest sinners are called by God by bestowing on them superabundant grace. While He gives grace *gratis* and without restriction, the Church teaches that no man is without suf-

ficient grace to secure his salvation. And with this call of grace he is bound to coöperate freely and becomes capable of preparing for justification. The divine and the human elements are intermingled in the process that now begins. Starting with faith, the root of justification, it advances through fear, hope, contrition, and resolution of amendment, until it reaches its culmination in the love of God. Sometimes this growth takes a long time, sometimes only a moment. In the case of one man it is perfect, in that of another less so; but in all cases, even in the case of attrition, it requires a true conversion of the heart, detestation of grievous sin, and a resolution to set God and His will before everything. Never, even when the contrition based on love is most perfect, is it right to lose sight of Christ and His merits, for this would give rise to human self-justification. "Nothing that precedes justification, whether it be faith or works, merits the grace of justification itself."¹ Love of God, the highest stage in the process, is from one aspect an indispensable disposition for sanctifying grace; but from the other aspect it is itself a result of the new spirit infused into us, it is the most vivid expression of grace and its sanctifying power. "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision, *but faith that worketh by charity*," — "neither circumcision nor uncircumcision, *but a new creature*."²

Biblical expressions, such as "new creature," "the purification and rebirth of man," show most plainly that justification is no purely juridical act, no mere covering up of sin, but a real removal of guilt, *a renewal of the interior man* by the life of grace, so that we are not merely called children of God, but actually become such (*gratia sanctificans*). There is no difference in time or occurrence between the forgiveness of sins and the bestowal of new life; they take place simultaneously. The new vital principle craves for development; being closely connected with the moral impulse of charity, it regards the law of the Lord as obligatory, but yet as a sweet burden, and carries on a humiliating but wholesome and chastening struggle against evil passions, and thus grows up to peaceful assurance and maturity. This growth is a time of fruitfulness, since the labours and struggles of the one who has been pardoned merit a heavenly reward. The *meritorious character* of good works depends

¹ Trid. s. 6, c. 8.

² Gal. v. 6; vi. 15.

upon God's gracious promise and upon our Saviour's grace working in the soul. It is by no means a ground for vain self-justification, but a living testimony to the power and efficacy of the redemption.

We have further reason for humility with regard to our efforts, inasmuch as in this world we cannot be absolutely certain that we are in the state of grace; we can have only a moral certainty, corresponding to the imperfection of our condition as pilgrims, but yet sufficient to give us peace of conscience. Absolute certainty could be given to individuals only by means of a special revelation, and Holy Scripture affords us no guarantee of this; our higher life is still hidden in God, and we find consolation in unreserved *confidence* in Him, the almighty and all merciful God. Our ultimate salvation cannot be absolutely certain because we may lose His grace by our own fault and drive the Holy Spirit from our souls by mortal sin. Not only unbelief, but every serious transgression of the moral law, destroys the higher harmony of life. He who has the faith commits a greater, not a lesser, sin than an unbeliever, if he breaks God's law. He has been raised by grace out of the bondage of sin, and, in the spirit of charity that has been bestowed upon him, he has power to withstand temptations and to keep with true liberty the commandments in all that is essential. Even the just is liable to fall into sin in the same way as a healthy man is liable to small, passing ailments; only venial sin, which is a morally slight transgression, is compatible with the justice derived from faith.

The moral importance of this doctrine of justification appears also in the statement that, after the guilt of sin has been remitted, its *temporal punishment* remains to be expiated by our own exertions. Such expiatory exercises are remedies and not merely penalties; they help the life of grace, now rooted in the centre of the soul, to expand, and they expel all the stains and remnants of sin. Just as Christ's love kindles our love, so His sufferings for our redemption make us eager to suffer in reparation; by having suffered in our place, He rouses us to follow Him with gratitude and love. Moreover, as the Church embraces all who are redeemed, this beneficial interchange of satisfaction continues within her. Although each individual is justified through his own conversion, and can

bring forth fruits of eternal life only by his own exertions, yet the universal merits of the Church can be applied, by means of *indulgences*, to remove the temporal punishment that is still due after a man's conversion. In theory an indulgence is an assistance making for energetic action and not for inactivity. It maintains in Christians the sense of their permanent supernatural unity in Christ, and of the strict conformity to law and advantage of morality, although in practice indulgences have often been misused and made futile.¹

When, after considering the Catholic doctrine of justification, we pass on to *Luther's* teaching, we can understand what a Protestant writer meant by saying that when *Luther's* principles are examined "morality slips through the fingers."² The fact that *Luther* often denies his own principles, and then alludes to moral questions just as any other earnest Christian would do, ought not to deter us from bringing into prominence the fundamental points of his doctrine regarding justification and comparing them with Catholic teaching. We may begin with *Luther's* statements as to the *radical corruption* and moral bondage of man in the state of nature. *Luther* regards the grace and justice of man, in his original condition, not as a supernatural endowment, but as natural to humanity. On this point he is in direct opposition to Catholic doctrine. He does not doubt that original sin involves a strong tendency to evil, a profound injury to man, so that nature is wounded and blinded in all that concerns religion and morals. He says plainly: "The spiritual forces are not only corrupted, but absolutely destroyed by sin." He rejects the principle, laid down by *St. Augustine* and *St. Thomas*, that evil is a negation, not a positive power, and so he arrives at the terrifying doctrine that sin has penetrated into human nature until it has become a part of its very essence; and just as originally justice was *de essentia hominis*, so now is sin *de essentia hominis*.³ Sin in man

¹ This short statement is in close agreement with the teaching of *St. Augustine* and *St. Thomas*, and with that of the Council of Trent (sess. 5 and 6) and of the Roman Catechism (cf. *Mausbach*, *Ausgew. Texte zur allgemeinen Moral* aus Thomas v. Aquin, 1905, §§ 47-49, 55, 57, 60, 61). Books of popular devotions, catechisms, etc., exist showing how seriously people in the Middle Ages regarded the reception of the sacraments.

² *Stäudlin*, op. cit., p. 202. ³ Op. exeg. (ed. Frankfurt-Erlangen), I, 210.

is "a continual incentive, or an entelechy, that produces its results."¹

This leads on to the conclusion that our whole being is sin, and *Luther* does not hesitate to accept it, for he says: "It is true that I stand before you as a sinner, that sin is my nature, the beginning of my existence, my conception, not to mention my words, works, thoughts, and subsequent life. How should I be without sin, when I was made in sin and sin is my *very nature and origin*?"² As the sensible proof of this total corruption of nature he regards *concupiscence*, the unrestrained desire of evil, which incessantly reveals itself in sensuality and the general selfishness of mankind. This is not merely a penalty of and stimulus to sin, but it is original sin itself, as continually active, personal sin; for, in *Luther's* opinion, freedom to commit sin is not indispensable to actual sin. *Braun*, like *Denifle*, considers the result of *Luther's* first development to be his "conviction of the destructive force of concupiscence, that poisons human nature to its very roots."³ "*Luther* adhered, therefore, to the statement that concupiscence is sin, whether it precedes or follows grace; it constitutes original sin." *Braun* remarks that "the struggle with the first movements of passion can be carried on seriously only when they are regarded as *real sins*, not as frailty."⁴ But what is the use of struggling when even the moral efforts and the good works of natural man are "vain, foolish, punishable, damnable sins"?⁵

When man is considered in this light, it is obvious that no moral preparation for justification is possible. With his natural strength he can do *nothing* that tends towards grace; he cannot freely obey its invitation, because his fundamental moral forces are dead⁶; and

¹ Disputat. (ed. Drews), p. 60.

² Weimar ed., XVIII, 501; cf. *Walch*, V, 685: "If thou wilt rightly indicate what sin is, then must thou say that all is sin that is born of a father and mother."

³ Op. cit., p. 66; cf. *supra*, p. 145.

⁴ Op. cit., pp. 307, 112.

⁵ Erlangen ed., XXVII, 191.

⁶ De servo arb. (Weimar ed., XVIII, 643): Si poteritis in tanta serie seculorum . . . ostendere unum opus . . . quo *vel applicuerunt* se ad gratiam vel quo meruerunt spiritum vel quo impetrarunt veniam vel quo aliquid cum Deo egerunt quantumvis modiculum (taceo, quo sanctificati sint), iterum victores vos estote et nos victi. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 754.

when we are told, immediately after, that the sinner attains to salvation by faith alone, the preceding statements compel us to assume that this faith, too, cannot possibly be a moral act of virtue proceeding from the interior of a soul akin to God.

What does *Luther* mean by *faith*, which he, having arbitrarily inserted *sola* in Romans iii. 28, declared to be the one and only means of justification? It is not mere belief in the Revelation, not faith in Christ as the Redeemer of the world — this dogmatic faith is only the presumption on which saving faith rests; the latter is “the lively and undoubting presumption by which a man is *certain beyond all certainty that he is pleasing to God, and that he has a gracious and forgiving God in all that he does and accomplishes*; gracious in goodness, forgiving in evil. For what is faith, unless it be this presumption?”¹

Faith, therefore, does not refer to God and Christ in the sense that They desire all men to be saved, but to the salvation and justification assured, by God’s mercy, to the *individual* through Christ. “God is God to me, He speaks to me, He remits my sins.”

It was in consequence of *Luther’s* own anxiety of conscience, of the moral discord in his own nature, that he arrived at this new doctrine, the whole point of which is that a man must be absolutely certain of his own pardon. The “certainty of salvation,” which is his aim, does not extend only to his present state of grace; we shall find relief from our troubled conscience only if we are perfectly certain also regarding our future felicity. Justifying faith includes a belief in the ultimate happiness in heaven of the believer. A man must not doubt that he is one of those who have attained grace and mercy by their baptism, and “when he believes this, he must freely declare of himself that he is holy, pious, just, a child of God, and *certain of eternal happiness*.”²

Neither *Luther* himself nor modern theologians are clear as to the

¹ Weimar ed., V, 395; cf. a passage in *Köstlin*, II, 180: *Significat fides fiduciam misericordiae propter Christum donatae, qua fiducia statuimus nobis remitti peccata propter filium Dei, victimam et mediatorem.*

² *Walch*, XII, 284; cf. *ibid.*, p. 193. *Luther*, of course, *upholds pure doctrine* and regards it even as more important than *goodness of life*. “There must be no tampering with doctrine; it must remain pure and right, but we are not so strict about life; for we see in the Gospel that Christ is patient with His disciples and winks at their gross failings” (*Walch*, III, 264; cf. II, 3008).

manner in which a man may arrive psychologically at this sort of faith. It is obvious that the reference to the reception of the *sacrament* does not fit in with the theory of certainty regarding salvation, nor with that of *sola fides*. If faith be the acceptance of something as true, as the voluntary recognition of some existing fact, — and innumerable passages support this definition, — the existing fact must necessarily be antecedent to faith; in other words, election to grace and pardon must precede the act of faith, and therefore, in the case of an individual, he must know it by some kind of *revelation*. Many theologians actually regard the process thus, and think that a man is convinced by the evidence of his own mind, by Holy Scripture, or by some inward perception of grace, and that his faith is based on this conviction. On the other hand, it is not easy to prove that *Luther* held this opinion; it is contrary to the idea, frequently expressed in his works, that a Christian must “establish” the fact of his pardon and sonship of God, in opposition to all his feelings; he must be bold and forcibly obtain this faith and make it his own by practice. But on what is *this* to be based? Perhaps on the fact of faith itself, so that, when we are tempted to despond, we need only appeal to the existence of our faith? *Luther* often seems to think thus, but it is unmistakably a *circulus vitiosus*; for what basis could there be for the *first* decisive act of faith? We are probably correct in saying that, according to *Luther*, hopeful faith has no criterion at all; it is established only in the sense that it is a presumption based, not on knowledge, but on great emotion, and it is really a venture on the part of the will, which violently seeks consolation on the subject of salvation. Such certainty as this ignores the very essence of truth and confounds the matter with the act of conviction. Yet this procedure is not incompatible with *Luther's* nominalistic tendency and violent disposition. He delighted in the conclusion: *sicut credit, sic habet*, a man has what he believes himself to have.¹

This opinion might be reconciled with his theology if we may assume that God offers effective grace to all men in the same manner, so that each has only to grasp it. But this contradicts other statements made by *Luther*, and it would remove the characteris-

¹ De servo arb., Weimar ed., XVIII, 769; Erlangen ed., XXVII, 180; cf. *Gass*, II, 29: “What is subjective becomes true and objective.”

tic personal element that is found in his doctrine of faith. Nor can we transfer the whole act from the intellect to the will — in other words, make faith equivalent to hope (*fiducia, spes*), as some theologians attempt to do; for *Luther* has laid too much stress on the assertory element in faith. The confusion and obscurity are, I think, hopeless. In order to remove them, we must first settle these fundamental difficulties: If man is to be justified *by* faith, then faith in itself cannot be justification; or, if faith is the recognition of salvation already bestowed by God, then this salvation cannot possibly be acquired *by* faith.¹

The question of the inclusion of *eternal happiness* in certainty of salvation is equally obscure. *Luther* demands it, for he cannot abandon it without diminishing "the consolation of the Gospel." We shall see that in his opinion even impending sin does not destroy certainty; but what must we say of the possibility of losing faith, the foundation of salvation itself? In a sermon of the year 1522 *Luther* says that a Christian must not waver in his conviction that he is the child of God, but he ought to feel fear whether he *will always continue* "to rely faithfully upon God's grace." Subsequently, as *Köstlin* says, he avoided all discussion of this point, although its importance certainly required it.²

It is generally admitted that the importance of faith to salvation is not, in *Luther's* opinion, connected with the moral freedom and excellence of the act of faith. Faith itself is merely a work of grace, in which man is purely passive. It is not a moral action, but simply a "laying hold" of the merits of Christ in order to make up for one's own defects. There is a further question, of peculiar interest to us, *whether faith does not contain within itself the germ*

¹ Cf. also *Döllinger*, *Die Reformation*, III, 62, 67, 294.

² *Köstlin*, II, 218, etc. According to *Döllinger* (p. 331), it was stated in a colloquy, of the year 1546, that Protestants universally taught certainty of salvation to include eternal happiness. *Loofs* (*Leitf. der Dogmengeschichte*, 4th ed., p. 768, etc.), says that this was *Luther's* doctrine, but acknowledges that it is obscure and indefinite. The Heidelberg Catechism, in answer to the question, What is true faith? replies: "It is not only a kind of perception, by which I accept as true whatever God has revealed to us in His word, but it is also a hearty confidence, produced in me by the Holy Ghost through the Gospel, that not only others, but also I myself, *have received from God forgiveness of sins, eternal justice, and happiness*; God having bestowed these favours from pure grace, for the sake of Christ's merits."

of a new and true morality, and whether it requires a serious moral conversion as a *necessary condition*, and a holy, sinless life as essential to its *preservation*.

We have seen that, according to Catholic doctrine, faith acquires a justifying force only when it is united with a firm purpose of amendment. On this point, "faith active through charity" is opposed to the Lutheran "faith alone." *Luther* often pretends to be combating only the theory that man could earn justification by doing the works of the law; but such a theory was never tolerated in the Church. Justification is *gratis*, but is conditioned by the moral disposition of man; it continues only where there is moral uprightness.

Now it is certain that *Luther* required nothing whatever but faith as a condition for *justification*. No thoughts of the law, of moral duty, of love or good works must intrude when man is concerned with being free from sin and assured of salvation. Even though justification and eternal happiness are closely connected, and in *Luther's* opinion they are almost identical, morality cannot be regarded as a subsequent, necessary proof of faith or as a real condition of eternal happiness. If it were so considered, full salvation would again depend upon something else than fiduciary faith.

The Papists, according to *Luther*, do not simply accept the words: "He that believeth shall be saved," but they "tack on additions and glosses and say that we must understand it to mean: He that believeth and doeth good works, he shall be saved."¹

Writing in 1522, *Luther* tried to prove that good works contributed nothing at all to the piety, sanctification, or ultimate happiness of man; the necessary kind of faith was that through which, "regardless of all my works, be they good or bad, I rely solely upon God's grace and mercy."²

In this "sharp distinction" between faith and morals *Luther* was consistent — in fact he insisted upon it more emphatically as time went on; and to him the law and the Gospel are in contrast,

¹ *Walch*, XIII, 1361. Our ultimate happiness depends, not upon our own actions, but "upon the works of another, Jesus Christ, our Saviour, which we acquire only through faith in Him" (*Walch*, XI, 26, 25).

² *Döllinger*, op. cit., p. 91.

and Christ is our Redeemer and Comforter, not our Lawgiver. The moral law must be rigorously excluded from piety; i.e., from our relation to God.¹

It is true that in several places *Luther* describes in beautiful and impressive language the fertility of faith in good works and the impossibility of separating faith and charity. "Faith," he says, "is a living, busy, active, powerful thing, and it is impossible for it not to do good without intermission; it does not ask whether good works are to be done, but it does them without asking, and is ever in action. He who does no such works is a man without faith."²

Experience of God's love, gratitude for forgiveness, and the cheerful and serene heart impel a man to love in return and to do good works for his neighbour.³ But this necessity is not a duty, nor is it the outcome of reasonable deliberation; it is a matter of course, like the action of some natural force, the burning of a fire, the light of the sun, the blossoming of the tree.⁴

Modern theologians are fond of quoting such passages as a proof of the moral productive power of *Luther's* faith. *Tschackert* even goes so far as to represent the union of faith and charity as the central point of his teaching, but we must have recourse to the methodical consideration to which I have already referred. The remnants of former Catholic theories and the truths of the natural moral consciousness prove little in favour of *Luther* when opinions in direct antithesis to them, stated quite seriously and proclaimed as being in a special sense "his own doctrine,"⁵ also occur in his works.

On this particular point he was painfully aware of the difficulties in which he had involved himself. The want of good works shows, he says, that faith is merely apparent and not real⁶; but if there are both a genuine and a merely apparent kind of faith, what becomes of the certainty of faith and its independence of all

¹ *Loofs* remarks (op. cit., p. 777) that as late as 1519 *Luther* acknowledged the necessity of the law for the moral conduct and direction of the just, but subsequently "his uncertainty with regard to the *necessitas debiti bonorum operum*" made it more difficult for him to recognize this necessity.

² *Walch*, XIV, 114.

³ *Ibid.*, XI, 2594; Erlangen ed., XXVII, 190.

⁴ See *Döllinger*, p. 92, etc.; *Köstlin*, II, 204.

⁵ *Supra*, pp. 22, seq.

⁶ Weimar ed., XII, 270.

justification by works? Sin, such as adultery, we are told elsewhere, does not condemn a man, but only shows that he has fallen away from faith, and this want of faith condemns him¹; but as *Luther's* faith has inwardly nothing to do with good works, and as many Christians, zealous in the faith, commit grievous sins (as *Luther* often complains), it must be possible to lose one's faith without noticing it, — and this is another conclusion fatal to certainty of salvation.

In addition there is the far more impressive doctrine, *that a condition of faith and grace is not affected at all by grievous sins.*

"If the sophists and those who seek sanctification by works do good, they have grace; if they sin, or fall, or are conscious of sin, grace falls too. . . . You must conceive of the kingdom of grace in a childlike way, believing that, by means of the Gospel, God has built up a new great heaven for us who believe. . . . Whoever is under this heaven can neither sin nor be in sin; for it is a heaven of grace, infinite and everlasting. *And even should one sin or fall, he would not for that reason fall outside this heaven, unless he desired no longer to remain there but to go with the devil to hell, as unbelievers do.*"²

"A believer commits *just as great sins* as an unbeliever, but in the case of the believer they are forgiven and not imputed; whilst in that of the unbeliever they are retained and imputed. . . . Therefore, although he [the believer] sins, he still continues to be a Godfearing man."³

"You see, then, how rich a Christian is; *even if he so wishes, he cannot lose his salvation, may he commit ever so many sins*, if only he ceases not to believe. No sins, but only unbelief, can lead to his condemnation. All others are, if faith in the promise made to him at baptism returns or *continues*, consumed by this faith."⁴

It would be easy to collect many other similar passages which contain a clear statement that faith is compatible with sin, even with grievous sin, and that the certainty of salvation is unaffected by it. Without this fundamental principle, *Luther* could never have written his famous sentence: "Sin boldly, but believe yet *more* boldly." He even adds that sin is unable to separate us

¹ *Walch*, XI, 1897.

² *Ibid.*, V, 1682.

³ *Ibid.*, VIII, 2730.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XIX, 69.

from the Lamb of God, although we may commit a thousand murders every day. If *Luther* had been convinced that faith must be living and fruitful, why did he reject the scholastic doctrine of living faith as "drivelling rubbish taught by the Papists"? Why, in spite of his faith in the Bible, did he take the bold and almost incomprehensible step of rejecting the epistle of St. James as non-apostolic?

The account just given of this doctrine is, moreover, the one that agrees best with the fixed principles of his system. To these belong:

1. The doctrine of the *corruption and bondage of human nature*. Sin is assumed to have penetrated into its very essence and to have become its entelechy, so that no inwardly good action is possible. Evil passions "are and continue to be sins, even in the baptized," and they can only produce evil works. Faith does not cure this state of sin, it only conceals it and covers it up, and it is impossible to keep God's law.¹ The faith that resides in man in spite of this evil is the gift of God; even an elevating tendency to do right and resist one's passions does not proceed from man's free will, but is, as it were, something outside him; no true goodness, motivated from within, is possible.

2. It cannot be claimed that the above-mentioned evil impulses mean less serious defects, or venial sins, such as even a Catholic considers unavoidable. *Luther*, in fact, denies the *actual distinction between grievous and venial sins*; the same transgressions are in a believer venial, and in an unbeliever mortal, sins. Hence in the case of both kinds of sin the same answer is returned to the question whether sin and grace are compatible with one another.²

3. As the central point of his doctrine regarding salvation *Luther* sets the exterior *imputation of Christ's justice*; the sinner remains in his moral uncleanness, but by faith the sanctity of Christ is imputed to him. Our own works are "accursed and vain things"; we must look upon Christ's justice "as our own."³ "God can see no sin in us, although we are full of sins; in fact we

¹ Weimar ed., XII, 372, etc., 516; XVIII, 485, 487; *Braun*, pp. 112, 311.

² See *infra*, Chap. V.

³ Weimar ed., XII, 314.

are absolutely sin itself. . . . He sees only the precious Blood of His beloved Son . . . with which we are sprinkled.”¹

Luther always maintained, in opposition to scholasticism, that justification by faith is not any *personal* quality, not a *habitus in corde*, but an acceptance of Christ's justice instead of one's own. In commenting on John xvi. 10, *Luther* says: “Our justice is pure and has its origin absolutely apart from ourselves, and depends solely upon Christ, His work, or His life.” A Christian is *justus et sanctus aliena seu extrinseca sanctitate*.² Hence a sinner says: “If I am not myself pious, *He* [Christ] is pious; if I am not holy, *He* is holy.”³ In some respects grievous sin is preferable to sanctity, since it impels men to cast their sins upon Christ, and thereby to receive His justice in return.⁴

4. *Luther's* idea of the relation between faith and charity is important for the criticism of his *sola fides* doctrine. He abuses the scholastic expression *fides caritate formata* with great violence. It means that faith, although possessing in itself a moral character and value, only attains by means of charity to that higher form of life corresponding to the nature of a child of God.

Luther, on the contrary, regards love of God as subordination to the law; in justification “there is assuredly no reference to law,” *no love*, but quite another kind of justice and a new world over and beyond the law. For Christ and faith are neither the law nor the work of the law.”⁵

“If faith is formed by charity, works become the chief thing in God's sight; and if works, we ourselves.”⁶

Luther evidently tried to separate charity from the interior justice, valid in God's sight. It is strange that he does not ask why faith is not a kind of self-justification, since it can be awakened “by ourselves.” To *St. Paul's* plain statement that charity is the

¹ *Walch*, VIII, 979. Sin remains even in a saint. “Nothing is wanting to its being *genuine* sin, except the fact that it cannot inculpate and condemn us” (*Ibid.*, V, 737, etc.).

² *Könlén*, II, 200; cf. *Walch*, VIII, 2054: “A Christian is *at the same time justified and a sinner*; he loves and calls upon God, and also is angry and murmurs against Him. No sophist would admit that these things can be true at the same time.”

³ *Walch*, XI, 3051.

⁴ *Ibid.*, VI, 548.

⁵ In Gal. (ed. *Irmischer*), I, 192.

⁶ *Erlangen* ed., op. exeg., III, 302.

greater virtue, he appends the gloss: i.e., it extends over a wider sphere.¹

We can see here that, in speaking of *caritas*, he thinks chiefly of charity towards one's neighbour; *caritas* as love of God, in the sense in which it predominates in the works of *St. Augustine*, *St. Thomas*, and the mystics, is with *Luther* quite subordinate. In fact he frequently says that the love of God is impossible in this world, or that God does not require our love. "A Christian lives only in Christ and in his neighbour, otherwise he is no Christian. He lives in Christ by faith, and in his neighbour by charity; by faith he is drawn above to God, and by *charity down to his neighbour*." ²

The question under discussion must probably be decided in accordance with the doctrine of *certainty of salvation*, which certainty, according to *Luther*, must rest on faith alone, not on works or any presumptions of morality. There are other passages in which reference is made to moral life as evidence of faith, and *Döllinger* tries to reconcile them with the main doctrine by supposing sin to cause a *momentary* loss of faith and grace, but to be removed, or rather hidden, immediately by a renewed act of faith.³ Even after we believe, we deserve damnation, but God overlooks our offences. This absolution transports us to a *state* in which there is *without intermission* forgiveness of sins, not only of former, but also of present sins. *Feine* and *Braun* both think that in *Luther's* opinion justification was not anything effected once for all and lasting; but, just as sin necessarily continues, so must justification be renewed daily by repeated acts of faith.⁴ *Harnack* seems to adopt the same view, although he lays greater stress upon the fact that constant falls and recoveries have no effect upon the *state* of grace. He criticises the twelfth article in the Augsburg Confession, be-

¹ Weimar ed., XII, 652, etc.

² Weimar ed., VII, 69; cf. XII, 661, 683. Elsewhere we find the antithesis: "*Within* is faith, *without* is charity or good works." *Denifle*, *Luther und Luthertum*, 2d ed., I, 72; cf. also *infra*, pp. 186, *seq.*

³ III, 115. Cf. especially the words: "The kingdom of Christ is nothing but absolute forgiveness, which is concerned only with sins, *continually wiping them out, covering, and cleansing them*, as long as we live here" (p. 136). Cf. Weimar ed., XII, 516, etc.

⁴ *Braun*, p. 112.

cause it countenances the Catholic doctrine that whenever a Christian falls into sin, he falls from grace. . . . "This consideration, if it plainly and unmistakably formed the basis of the article, would amount to a denial of the chief point of evangelical faith. This faith *does not*, like the Catholic, *discriminate between one sin and another*, but acknowledges that we 'sin much every day.' If it were necessary to think that this always involved a cessation of the state of grace, we should be at once brought back to the heart of Catholicism. . . . In the Evangelical Church we must adhere to the article that God forgives the sins of a justified Christian, who is His child, and that forgiveness of sins and justification consist not only in the *justificatio impii*, but in the fact that a Christian lives on the forgiveness of sins, and is a child of God, in spite of sin and guilt. This chief thought, that a Christian does not fall from grace if he relies upon God's forgiveness of sins, and thus feels hatred of sin, has been at least obscured by the twelfth article in the Augsburg Confession."¹

When we consider that we have here an explicit denial of any difference between venial and mortal sin, and think how this Protestant idea of justice, this constant alternation of grace and guilt, appears from the standpoint of the natural and Christian ideal of morality, we may well feel surprised that any one can regard such a view as superior to the Catholic doctrine. Even from the Protestant standpoint we may ask: "Can any one still call himself a child of God, when, being in a state of grievous sin, he needs to be justified anew? Has he not actually lost the faith which makes him God's child? Outward confession of Christianity is not faith in the *sola fides* sense! Can that be described as a state of grace and justice which is daily destroyed by sin? Is any trace left of certainty regarding salvation if after every sin I must make a fresh act of faith, and since, as I am absolutely incapable of free action, even my faith is purely a gift of God?"

A proper basis for these statements is furnished only if we understand the sin mentioned to be venial sin; but in that case we shall be emphasizing the very difference between one sin and another which *Harnack* denies.

Another question arises as to *sanctification*, which *Luther* regards

¹ Dogmengesch., 4th ed., III, 888.

in many places as the result of justification. After what has been said, it seems hardly possible to believe, as *Braun* does (p. 66), that it is a force effecting an ethical transformation and renewal in man. He has to admit that, according to *Luther*, human nature continues to be sinful, and that every virtue has a parallel vice accompanying it and can at best only diminish its action (p. 210). But *Luther* describes the intimate union of a believer with Christ, the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and he praises the holy fruits of a virtuous life that are its result! He could not altogether give up this mode of expression because the teaching of Holy Scripture is clear, and the doctrine of the supernatural life imparted at baptism firmly established. He succeeded, however, in depriving such statements of all value in two ways: (1) by recognizing no *justitia inhaerens*, no *supernatural advantages peculiar* to the creature. His doctrine concerning the indwelling of Christ is in direct opposition to the Catholic idea of an inward transformation into the likeness of Christ. According to *Luther*, Christ dwells in us only in so far as our faith lays hold upon Him, who sits at the right hand of the Father. The fruits of His spirit do not betoken any inward renewal of life; they only reveal the power of Christ, who is near us in our thoughts through religious feelings.¹ (2) Justification does not restore to man *freedom* to perform strictly moral actions. When *Luther* speaks of the freedom of a Christian, he means a delight in and inclination for doing good, which will — though this is not invariably the case — follow the bestowal of pardon. There is no thought here of free will. The simile of the sun, of the plant and its natural manifestation of vigour, is, according to *Luther*, literally applicable to the action of a just man. There is less a question of what he ought to do than of what he must do. God alone, having given him faith, operates according to His own good pleasure. We may call the man's action coöperation, inasmuch as it is not, like justification, an immediate, uncalled-for act of God; but free will has nothing to do with it: "*per nos praedicat, miseretur pauperibus, consolatur afflictos. Verum quid hinc libero arbitrio tribuitur? Imo quid ei relinquitur nisi nihil? et vere nihil!*"²

¹ Cf. also *Köstlin*, II, 197, etc.

² *Weimar* ed., XVIII, 754; cf. *Köstlin*, II, 205, etc.

The chief points on which *Luther's* doctrine of justification is morally untenable, and inferior to the Catholic theory, are the following:

1. *The denial of free will and the notion of sin as inherent in nature.* Morality, and the contrast between good and evil involved in it, vanish altogether unless the *ego* has control over itself, and unless it determines from within the desires and actions of a man. Ever since the fall of man, when our nobler faculties, that tended towards God, are assumed to have been destroyed, the absence of freedom, the yoke of bondage to sin, has rested upon us. *Braun* does not hesitate to extol the doctrine of the formal sinfulness of concupiscence as "a battering-ram against the rotten bulwark of mediæval piety." He regards it as an upright action to recognize the involuntary stirrings of lust as sin, because otherwise a loophole will be left to casuistry and to playing tricks with conscience (pp. 66, 307). Thus if a Christian, who is sincerely striving to shun sin, feels a temptation to anger or impurity and resists it at once, he has nevertheless sinned. Great saints like *St. Catherine of Siena*, who suffered from involuntary and scandalous thoughts and profoundly abhorred them, nevertheless sinned. Does not such a doctrine take away all our courage and energy, as well as all obligation to resist vice? Must we not absolutely despair of God and morality, if, with the best intentions, we cannot avoid sin? Why should the question whether one consented to temptation tend to looseness of conscience? Surely we have clearer knowledge of our own will than of anything else about ourselves. All the mistakes of "casuistry" put together cannot by far do the amount of harm that such a notion of morality must inevitably cause as it becomes widely spread! And at the present time we see that it is actually *Luther's* repute that is made to give new life to this retrograde view of morality, under the plea that it is serious and conscientious!¹

2. The theory of *aliena justitia, imputed justice*, and the idea connected with it, *that it is possible for a man to be at once just and*

¹ *Sulze* (Christl. Welt, 1907, 933) finds that too little importance is attached to freedom in *Luther's* doctrine of justification. "Morality is action, not a natural product. Religion which does not gain strength in unwearied effort is Quietism. This was a peculiarity of Lutheranism."

a sinner, are equally opposed to morality. According to Catholic doctrine, Christ is the author of our salvation, but in virtue of His merits we too are purified and sanctified in the heart of our being; in this new life we can and ought to persevere, to work, and resist sin. According to *Luther*, however, the same action is both good and bad, the same man worthy of both grace and condemnation. No wonder that he feels it extremely difficult to believe this in such a way as to say: "I have sinned and I have not sinned"; by which means, of course, the supremacy of conscience is happily overthrown!¹

Braun, admiring this kind of justice as an advance over the Catholic idea, says: "We perceive its great advantage over the first grace inasmuch as it cannot be affected by human sin. Standing objectively firm in itself, it overpowers all doubts arising from a subjective consciousness of guilt. . . . Thus we are indeed sinners in fact, but in God's sight we are just. . . . In the objectivity of this conception of justification the certainty of salvation was implied from the beginning" (p. 61). A conception standing in such direct opposition to reality is thus described by *Braun* as objective! Whereas he previously insisted upon veracity and conscientiousness, he now rejoices in a kind of grace that does not remove guilt but only the sense of guilt. True, he is thinking of the objective nature of our redemption, but if that would dispose of everything there would be no need of baptism, nor of any application of Christ's grace. And what is left of the objective redemption as a whole if it cannot actually repair the work of evil? What becomes of God's omnipotence, truth, and sanctity if He can look upon a sinner as if he had no sin? This whole theory is intelligible to some degree only if we either assume the existence in every creature of some dark, sinful remnant, that even God cannot remove, or else regard all reality on earth, good and evil alike, as an unreal apparition in God's sight. As a matter of fact such wavering between dualistic Manichæan ideas and an acosmistic pantheism is noticeable in *Luther* also in other matters.²

3. *The preference given to faith rather than charity* and the impetuosity to obtain to a certainty of salvation through personal

¹ Cf. *Döllinger*, III, 52, seq.

² Cf. *infra*, p. 254.

faith, are both characteristic of *Luther*. He carried his own soul life into his theories. His inward unrest, which he sought forcibly to dominate, never allowed him to come to an objective, pious, and, at the same time, heroic view of life. His powerful imagination and his subjectivity led him to regard the individual perception, inward sense of faith, as of paramount and decisive importance; *sicut credit, sic habet*.¹

A Catholic values achievement more highly than a consciousness that is often deceptive. He is not so much concerned with perceiving his own justice, as with being just, and with practising justice, whilst he keeps his eyes fixed on the objective rules and ideals of morality. He may forget his own self meanwhile, and leave it in God's hands to do as He will with him, being convinced that all tends to the good of those who love God. Having this disposition, he derives help and edification from the truths to faith, devotes himself to moral activity, looks up with joy to heaven, and abandons himself with love to God and Christ. Our Saviour emphatically made *love* the chief commandment: "Who-soever loveth, is born of God." "If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Charity, not faith, is the essence of perfection, the real mark whereby God's children are recognized, and *Ritschl*, *Jakoby*, and other Protestant theologians admit this to be the teaching of the Bible; the Catholic Church has never doubted it. *Luther* held that charity is giving and faith receiving, and as man is incapable of giving his Creator anything, it follows that fallen humanity is incapable even of loving God.²

But is not charity also receptive? Does it not receive the impress of goodness and beauty more distinctively than even knowledge? Our hearts are still stamped with the likeness of God, and long for His light and sanctity, and no sooner are they touched by the rays of grace, than they turn to God and let themselves be warmed and fashioned by His goodness. Although we can give Him nothing that He needs, we can still give Him our hearts and our life, and thus fulfil the aim of our creation and redemption. This most

¹ Weimar ed., XVIII, 769.

² Cf. the passage quoted by *Döllinger*, III, 238; cf. *Denifle*, 2d ed., I, 720, etc.

intimate dedication of self to God, which involves obedience to His commandments, is comprised in that *caritas* which is not a mere feeling, but an intellectual surrender of one's whole being to God.¹

4. *Luther* disregards the indissoluble connection between *religion and morality*, and the preëminence of moral goodness over all other things. We have just seen that he sets a lower value upon charity and its works for the reason that they could give God nothing. Though the world was not created for God's advantage, it was created for His honour and glory, and this aim finds expression in the moral order. Love of God is the highest and most personal way in which we can glorify Him; and the fulfilment of every earthly duty may be interpreted as love of God, in as far as it conduces to the due order of the world, the image of divine goodness. *Luther* compares the faith that relies upon salvation in Christ with *Abraham* upon the mountain, and the law and morality with the ass, left below in the valley. Catholicism teaches us that faith and hope are inferior to charity; hope being so for the reason that it is centred on one's personal happiness, not on God. The grace given us by God, being from Him, is, of course, more perfect than human morality; but it is not more perfect than the *law and end of morality*, which are identical with *God Himself*. The greatest evil in sin is not that it deprives man of grace, but that it is an outrage upon God's sanctity. A doctrine deserving attention, and found in all the ascetical and casuistic books on morals, is that we must never commit a sin, not even a venial sin, even if we could thereby secure the salvation of the whole world; here we have a clear statement of the importance of morality as an absolute value, transcending all relative standards and requirements. True justification recognizes no grace without moral conversion, and no consolation in faith without charity. When *Luther* distinguishes morality from faith, he sums it up in a characteristic fashion as charity towards one's neighbour, not

¹ In another place *Luther* extols faith as giving honour to God, ascribing to Him "truth and all goodness," just as we honour a man whose sincerity we recognize. But I would show greater honour to one by loving him for his entire character than by merely esteeming him for his sincerity. Thus adoring love gives God the greatest honour, because it not only ascribes to Him "all goodness," but feels in the depths of its being that this is true.

as love of God, and assigns the earth and the civil order to it as its sphere of action. He does not regard morality as forming an organic part of the friendship and service of God, but at best as being a spontaneous reaction due to gratitude.

The account that I have given of *Luther's* teaching is borne out by its immediate effects, as viewed in history. The theological circles and learned associations that boasted of preserving with the utmost fidelity *Luther's* inheritance watched with distrust the tendency to lay greater stress upon the necessity of a moral life. *Georg Calixt*, who cautiously suggested that adultery and similar vices were impediments to salvation, incurred almost universal condemnation on the part of orthodox Protestant theologians. According to *Lagarde*, *Luther's* doctrine of justification had in the first half of the seventeenth century brought ethics into such disrepute that "any study of the subject at once aroused suspicion of heresy."¹

Harnack, whilst wishing to acquit *Luther*, nevertheless accuses the German Protestant Church in that period of moral laxity and of want of serious efforts at sanctity.² Many writers in the "*Christliche Welt*" express similar views, although few are so outspoken as *W. Köhler* in acknowledging the wrong done to the Catholic Church by *Luther* and by disciples of *Luther*.³

The powerful influence of Holy Scripture, as also of men's natural conscience and of the effects of the Church's teaching and practice, did much to diminish the harm that such principles might otherwise have caused. Pietism, and other tendencies in Protestantism, gave a positive stimulus to active works of piety. But even now *Ritschl* feels that, in speaking of Christian perfec-

¹ *Deutsche Schriften*, p. 46; cf. *Döllinger's* statement, *supra*, p. 25.

² *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 180.

³ The remarks made by secular authors on the effects of *Luther's* doctrine of justification are not without interest. *Henry Drummond*, for instance, says in "*The Greatest Thing in the World*," 1890, p. 55: "I was not told when I was a boy that God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should have everlasting life. What I was told, I remember, was that God so loved the world that, if I trusted in Him, I was to have a thing called peace, or I was to have rest, or I was to have joy, or I was to have safety. . . . Many of the current gospels are addressed only to a part of man's nature. They offer peace, not life; faith, not love; justification, not regeneration. And men slip back again from such religion, because it has never really held them; their nature was not all in it."

tion, he is touching a note that will sound strange to the ears of Evangelicals. From *Tersteegen* down to *Stöcker*, all complain that the Reformation dealt a blow at courageous striving after sanctity, and at the heroic spirit of sacrifice that was the outcome of a consciousness of the abiding power of God in the heart. The best and clearest evidence of the truth of the Catholic doctrine regarding justification and sanctification is to be found in the saints of the Church, in that glorious band of men and women who, from the depths of sin, or at least from human frailty and imperfection, have risen to marvellous purity and perfection. They reveal to us the power of a grace that is not forgiveness only, but also moral conversion, and supernatural life and glory.¹

¹ *Luther* makes a strange but characteristic remark about the saints when he says: "I am glad that the saints stick in the mud like ourselves" (Weimar ed., XXIV, 518).

CHAPTER III

LAW AND FREEDOM. PROBABILISM

ACCORDING to *Herrmann*, the law of the Church is to a Catholic "*a burden and a restraint*," whilst freedom means to him *unrestricted license*. A Catholic, he thinks, must strive to perform certain definitely prescribed acts, and "if his actions conform to what is required, he may incidentally do what he can to advance his individual interests. When a man has satisfied the requirements of the commandments, he can in other matters do as he likes."¹

In this way the moral law seems brought down to the level of the civil law. "A Catholic Christian, who allows himself to be kept by his Church at such a point of moral immaturity, always lives in a state of inward rebellion against God. For what he desires to be for his own sake is always *something different from what is right*, since he feels the moral law to be a barrier to his freedom. We, too, know this feeling, but we call it sin. . . . Morality such as this can hardly understand how *Probabilism* can be regarded in any other light than an invaluable aid in the moral conflict. For if we are justified in regarding the moral law as a bond and barrier to our freedom, we are also justified in defending our 'freedom' against this restraint" (p. 39). The reformers, however, have, according to *Herrmann*, recurred to the doctrine taught by Jesus, in which there are no rules, but only confidence in God and personal conscience, that imposes duties upon itself. They distinguished civil justice from spiritual justice, which is really moral goodness. It must be admitted that many Protestant Christians lose sight of this doctrine, when they assume that God has in particular revelations promulgated both written and spoken laws (pp. 35, etc., 44, etc.).

¹ Röm. u. evang. Sittlichkeit, 2d ed., p. 26.

The system of *Probabilism*, described by *Herrmann* as unconscientious, has, in the opinion of *Harnack*, also tended to turn mortal into venial sins, and to weaken the force of moral convictions.¹ *Dreydorff* regards the probabilistic system as "the last stage on the way to moral degeneration," referring to *Pascal* in justification of his opinion.² *Von Hoensbroech*, of course, tries to prove that the Church as a whole is to blame for this "tendency" which destroys the moral and religious sense of responsibility.³

I

The subject has been so fully discussed in the two preceding chapters that there is no need for me to say much in order to elucidate the principles of the Church regarding law and liberty, nor to accept *Herrmann's* challenge, and draw an accurate comparison between "Roman and Protestant morality." In itself the question of Probabilism does *not* belong to these fundamental matters, since, apart from the fact that the name includes various tendencies in the Catholic teaching on morals, the whole discussion regarding the "moral systems" affects differences in moral science, rather than the real doctrines of the Church. As, however, the controversy is connected with ideas that are matters of principle, and as the practical application of Probabilism concerns the Church in her office of watching over and guarding morality, it behooves us to show how the system arose, and how its existence can be tolerated and justified by Christian moralists.

The moral law, according to the Catholic conception, is, as we have seen, the ordering of all our acts to the highest good, —

¹ *Supra*, p. 5.

² *Pascal*, p. 176.

³ Die ultram. Moral, p. 68. *Kauffmann* and *Berndt.*, in their "Hilfsbuch für den Geschichtsunterricht" for seminaries, 3d ed., 1911, p. 407, say with regard to the morals of the Society of Jesus: "A Jesuit has no absolute spiritual principle by which to regulate his own life and that of others, except the authority of the Pope and of the General of his own Order. In all other matters he can attain to nothing but an uncertain probability (Probabilism)." "Any opinion is probable, i.e., fit to follow, for which reasons of some weight are to be found. Whoever acts upon such opinions, does not burden his conscience, even if he is convinced of the immorality of his behaviour." What a number of slanders are contained in these sentences, and to what prejudices must they give rise!

such ordering being based upon God and reflected in human nature. With her innate faculty of thought, reason accepts the justification and necessity of this ordering. Hence there arises an obligation that presents itself to the will as a binding law, and which the will in its inmost depths acknowledges to be just.¹ As its physical energy necessarily is directed to an ultimate end, viz., happiness, which dominates all our earthly efforts and desires, so the enlightened will also recognizes a moral end as unconditionally worthy of reverence, free from all "arbitrariness," and with its sacred necessity controlling all the lower spheres of activity. This moral end, the glory of God, materially coincides with the full development and discernment of the natural aim of the will.² Thus obligation and will are fundamentally in full agreement, and duty is not a barrier but the backbone and support of true freedom. Man's free will enables him to fall away from the moral order, and to prefer his own lower interests to the higher ones of God; but never yet has any Catholic writer on morals regarded a liberty to sin as a natural right belonging to the will, or even as a mark of freedom. It is, indeed, Scholasticism that regards sin as an interior contradiction of reason, as a culpable obscuring of the will³; and power to sin as indicating a defect in free will. Christ and the saints possess free will in greater perfection than we do, because in virtue of the contemplation of God they are raised above any obscurity in the moral judgment, above any wavering of the will between good and evil.⁴

Herrmann remarks, in opposition to my statements, that *St. Thomas* does not sum up the commandments into the uniform idea of the good; that "he even asserts that the commandments, which are impressed upon the nature of man, refer only to his outward and not to his inward acts."⁵ The passage in *St. Thomas*, to which *Herrmann* is alluding, runs as follows: "Man is able to make laws on matters where he has power to judge. His judicial power, however, does not extend to inward acts, which are hidden, but

¹ Cf. Chap. I.

² Cf. Chap. IV.

³ *De malo*, q. 1, q. 6.

⁴ *St. Thomas*, S. theol., I, q. 94, a. 1; cf. *St. Augustine's* beautiful thoughts regarding the *beatæ necessitas* of the saints (*Op. in p. c. Jul. I, 102, seq.; VI, 11, 19*).

⁵ S. theol., I, II, q. 94, a. 4.

only to outward behaviour, which becomes apparent. Yet for virtue to be perfect, a man must be morally just in both respects. Hence *human* law could not adequately prohibit and enjoin inward acts, and consequently it was necessary for the (positive) *divine* law to supplement it." *St. Thomas* is clearly speaking of human legislation and legal procedure, *not* of the natural law! His arguments cannot be overthrown by such superficial criticism! If *Herrmann* had only read the subsequent chapters in *St. Thomas*, he would have found that the various commandments are explicitly summed up in the uniform idea of the good. In answer to the question "whether the natural law contains several commandments or only one," *St. Thomas* says: "For every agent acts for the sake of an end that has a character of goodness." Hence the first principle in practical reason is one *that is based on the nature of good*; viz., that is good which all are striving to attain. The first commandment of the law, accordingly, is: You must do good and avoid evil; *all the other commandments of the natural law are based upon this*.¹

It must be granted that, from the natural standpoint, the force of evil desires and the weakness and partiality of the empirical will are antagonistic to the moral commandment which the fundamental will recognizes. This causes the natural man often "to feel" the law to be a burden and barrier. The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and even in the spirit the lower inclinations of the creature oppose the impulse to rise to a higher life. But has Catholic teaching on morals ever sanctioned this opposition or ever described the unruly impulses of passion as freedom? The threats and promises of the divine law, which sustain the imperfect in the struggle, the emotions of fear and hope, which urge sinners to conversion, — these may help to overcome the inward desire to sin; and if they do this, they represent the beginning of morality but not by any means perfect moral freedom, the true liberty "of the children of God." Fear, that only outwardly deters from sin, but allows the inward "opposition" to good to continue, is denounced by all Catholic teachers as servile and immoral.

The result of Christ's teaching, example, and grace has been to mightily increase and deepen our understanding of the law, and

¹ S. theol., I, II, q. 94, a. 2; cf. also *supra*, pp. 134, *seq.*

this has by no means been overlooked or obscured by Catholic moralists, but the question is whether our Lord meant that man "imposes the law upon himself," that His commandments "can only be obeyed by one whose own will is expressed by them."¹ We have already stated emphatically that we can obey a commandment only if our own will assents to it, and the fact that we are bound "by our own moral perception" is recognized in our definition of conscience. *Herrmann* ought to avoid ambiguous expressions of this kind when he is trying to find fault with the Catholic and Christian interpretation of the law. He appears to impute to Christ the opinion that the moral law is binding just because it is the outcome of a man's own perception and will, — an idea that is contradicted by the plainest facts in the Gospel and by the unanimous opinion of all who have most deeply penetrated into its spirit. If *Herrmann's* view were correct, Christ would have said, not that He had come to fulfil the law of the old dispensation, but to repeal it. The law of Israel was the law of God — "I am the Lord, thy God," and how loyally did Christ observe it, in order to set an example to all men! He sharply distinguished His own human will, wholly united as it was with God, from what presented itself to His human will as His lifework and law. "I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of Him that sent me."² When Jesus rejected ordinances of men it was because they had taken the place of "God's commandment"³; a law, however, imposed as supreme arbiter by man upon himself would have seemed to Him a still worse "precept of man." He allowed human laws to participate in the authority of the divine: "He that heareth you, heareth me, and he that heareth me, heareth Him that sent me." *St. Paul*, when speaking of true liberty, says precisely that he has to make known a commandment of the Lord on the subject of the marriage of Christians, and he lays down a commandment of his own with reference to marriages between Christians and heathens.⁴ The commandment of the Lord was by no means so self-evident that the Christians of that period might have imposed it upon themselves. In the Sermon on the Mount, to which *Herrmann* alludes, there is the

¹ *Herrmann*, pp. 44, 46.

² John vi. 38; cf. Mark xiv. 36.

³ Mark vii. 7.

⁴ 1 Cor. vii.

command to love one's enemies, and to resist all revengeful and impure thoughts — a command which most men even to-day do not recognize as the expression of their own will, but which they have to accept and respect as the will of One higher than themselves. We can see at the present time to what lengths the thoughts of honourable men can go with regard to the laws of marriage and chastity, if they follow only the voice of their own being! The freedom and independence in which *Herrmann* sees his ideals can only be attained when the will, by means of obedience to God's voice, has been gradually trained to a higher insight and morality.

That the Church takes pains to keep her members in a state of ignorance, incapable of understanding the inner meaning of the law, is a charge in support of which *Herrmann* can adduce no evidence. Christian habits and training, which the Church has done so much to promote, bring home to reason the important obligations of a Christian life, and these same obligations are adapted to the needs of the time and are impressed upon the hearts of the people by means of sermons and in the confessional. But what is still more important, the Church succeeds in keeping alive *the thought of God*, and in maintaining the right atmosphere for the solution of moral questions, by surrounding all earthly things with a religious consecration. Moreover, she has always made the *love of God* the centre of all virtue, and always recommended, as the chief method of awakening good will, the resolution to do everything for Him. This instruction and direction of the will affects the Catholic outlook on life so deeply, that the average man goes on his way with assurance and independence, as long as no extraordinary difficulties beset him.

Protestants misunderstand so completely the theology of the time preceding *Luther*, that it must be pointed out that Scholasticism, in speaking of the *law of Christ*, was not referring to anything like the Mosaic Law, nor even to the written words of the Gospel, but to something *purely* subjective, viz., to the *feeling of faith and love awakened by the Holy Ghost in believers*. *St. Thomas* devotes three long articles¹ to the *lex evangelica* or *nova*. They are quite in harmony with *St. Paul's* teaching about the "law of

¹ S. theol., I, II, q. 106-108.

the spirit" and with that of *St. James* and *St. John* about the "perfect law of liberty" and the "unction that teacheth all things," and they are a direct continuation of *St. Augustine's* thoughts regarding love as the predominant law of the Christian life. "The essence of the new law is the grace of the Holy Ghost, revealed in faith efficacious through charity."¹ "The new law, the centre of which is the grace of the Spirit infused into the heart, is called the law of love," and whoever obeys it "inclines to the objects of virtue and especially of charity, as to something that is his own, not to anything foreign to him."²

According to *St. Thomas*, therefore, the law of Christ cannot be compared with "that of the state," or with any external regulation; in its depth, freedom, and life it resembles the law of nature, but is superior to it, because it affects not only our duty but also our will. Grace and love are powerful forces counteracting our evil inclinations, which, based upon nature, as *St. Paul* says, so often weaken the demands of morality.³ Thus the Christian is a law to himself in a higher sense than the natural man; he is subject to God's law, but does not feel it as a crushing, external force; by grace he has become a participant in the divine life, has received the spirit of the law in faith, and has fulfilled it in love. "Those who possess charity are a law unto themselves, since charity guides them instead of law, and leaves them free to act according to their own impulse."⁴ This does not diminish the binding force of the law, *the duty to obey God*. *St. Augustine's* words: "Love, and do what thou wilt," mean the same as *St. John's*: "Whoever is born of God, committeth not sin," — a statement with which the apostle begins a sharp rejection of lax autonomy.⁵ In as far as, and so long as, we love God and are born of God, we cannot sin. Love is "*finis legis*," not in the sense of being its termination, but in that of being its aim, "an aim in which the commandments are collected and fulfilled, not destroyed and cast aside."⁶

¹ q. 108, a. 1.

² q. 107, a. 1 ad 2.

³ q. 106, a. 1 ad 2.

⁴ S. c. Gentil., III, 128. *St. Thomas* here refers to a misunderstanding then already existing, and afterwards propagated by *Luther*: *quasi justi non TENENTUR ad legem implendam*.

⁵ 1 John iii. 9.

⁶ *Aug.* in Ps. xxxi. 5.

A Christian's attitude towards the Law is one of "true freedom, owing to the delight that he takes in doing good, but also one of pious subjection, owing to the obedience due to God's commandment."¹ The positive law of God continues to be a restraint and barrier to the unruly and proud, but for the good it is a support and help "in order to attain that which they themselves have in mind."²

Christian liberty does not consist in denying the obligation of God's law, but love works the miracle of rendering the law not burdensome but comforting and sustaining. "Birds carry the burden of their wings — and what do we say? They carry and are carried. They carry the wings on earth and are carried by them in the air. If you were sorry for a bird, especially in summer, and said: 'Its wings are a burden to the poor little creature,' and if you were to remove this burden, it would have to remain down on the ground, though you intended to benefit it. Therefore you, too, should bear the pinions of peace and put on the wings of love."³

It is by means of recognizing the laws of natural beauty, of lines, sounds, etc., as something outside and above himself, that an artist becomes great and free, that he steepes himself in them with all the power of his soul, and makes them part of his own being. The same is true of morals; we do not create the rules and ideals, but assimilate them by our efforts and obedience. The obligation of these laws is so great and at the same time so compelling, that we cannot wait to understand every single motive for obeying them, but must rise gladly to the most general of all, which is also the highest and most permanent—"All for God and for His sake." It would be contrary to God's majesty and to the inner significance and dignity of morality, if faith and love made moral action "free" in the sense of no longer being strictly obligatory.

Herrmann is of opinion that no one can truly hear God's voice in the demands of morality, unless *previously*, from the meaning of moral ideas, he had recognized them to be unconditionally valid (p. 159). I maintain, on the contrary, that no one can recognize the unconditional validity of a moral law who has not previously grasped, or who does not simultaneously perceive, the fact that

¹ *Aug.*, *Enchir.*, n. 9.

² *Thom.*, *S. theol.*, I, II, q. 98, a. 6 c.

³ *Aug.*, *Sermo* 164, 7.

there is an absolute law higher than that of men. The absolute necessity of that which we call duty cannot be explained without the reference of all things to an end. The most certain individual duty, such as respect for human life, becomes relative and dependent on conditions just as soon as we consider its meaning only from the point of view of the nature and dignity of creatures. *Nietzsche* was perfectly logical in saying: "I deny any absolute morality, because I do not know of any absolute end of man."

But even the central position occupied by charity in Catholic morals is not enough to convince *Herrmann* of the *uniformity* of our conception of law. On the contrary, he thinks that "the moral obscurity" of *St. Thomas* can be detected in his manner of expounding the great commandment of love. *St. Thomas* did not, he considers, perceive that in this commandment "the command to love God as well as the one requiring us to love our neighbour expresses the *whole* law in a *special* manner, and that therefore each of them should fill the whole disposition of man." Consequently, that *St. Thomas* regarded it as "more meritorious to fulfil the commandment requiring us to love God directly, than to fulfil it in the commandment requiring us to love our neighbour" (p. 158, etc.). *St. Thomas* everywhere maintains most emphatically that the two commandments are but one, so inseparably are they connected. Even the "virtue" of love, i.e., the supernatural force and affection, is *the same* in the case both of God and one's neighbour; it is the cardinal virtue of charity. This is a very pregnant expression when it occurs in so strict a classification of virtues in accordance with their immediate objects. *St. Thomas* gives two reasons for this unity: 1. That love of God and love of one's neighbour have the same object, viz., divine goodness; 2. Love in each case is based upon everlasting happiness, and this is common to both.¹

Supernatural charity "loves God in one's neighbour; it loves the latter *because* God is in him, or *in order* that God may be in him."² This does not mean that love of God and one's neighbour are absolutely the same. Christ requires us to love God with all our heart and all our strength, but, with regard to our neighbour, He only bids us love him as ourselves. Is there not a

¹ S. theol., II, II, q. 23, a. 5.

² Qu. disp. de car., a. 4.

significant difference here? How is it possible from any point of view to think of God and man in the same way, without having a pantheistic idea of God? Can a love, founded on truth, endure and permit goodness that is finite to be regarded as equal to goodness that is infinite? Even if we say that we love God in helping our neighbour, the distinction still remains between what is primary and fundamental and what is secondary proceeding from it; this is a distinction of infinite importance to being and to loving.

St. Thomas requires us to love God more than ourselves, and quotes *St. Augustine's* words: "If thou must love thyself not for thine own sake, but for His who is the truest end of all thy love; then thy neighbour may not take offence if thou lovest him for God's sake." By way of elucidation, *St. Thomas* adds: "That, by which and for which another exists, possesses this being in a higher degree." *Sed propter quod unumquodque et illud magis.*¹

It is only through direct love of God that the spiritual life of man receives a completeness that harmonizes all its nobler tendencies; it is only through this love that we learn the real meaning of love of self and of our neighbour.

St. Thomas goes on to say that every member is naturally more concerned about the welfare of the whole than about its own, in the same way as a man involuntarily raises his hand to protect his head. This is doubly true of supernatural association in love. "A man must love God more than himself, as God is the common good of all (*bonum commune omnium*); in Him is bliss, as the common principle and source of all who can participate in bliss." *St. Thomas* often uses the expression that the *bonum commune divinum* is the object of love²; it bears an unmistakable stamp of the uniformity of his view. In the passage quoted by *Herrmann*,³ *St. Thomas* does not, strictly speaking, say that it is more meritorious to fulfil the commandment of loving God directly than to fulfil it in loving one's neighbour; love to God must include love to one's neighbour as an intention.⁴

¹ S. theol., II, II, q. 26, a. 3.

² S. theol., I, q. 60, a. 5; I, II, q. 19, a. 10; Ep. ad Rom. ad 1, 20.

³ S. theol., II, II, q. 182, a. 2.

⁴ In the sentence, "*Deum diligere secundum se est magis meritorium quam diligere proximum*," it is not accurate to translate *secundum se* by one or alone.

He says, indeed, that in this unity the love of God as such is better and more meritorious; but is it fair to charge him with declaring "the service of God to be, in his opinion, higher than moral earnestness and fidelity"? According to *St. Thomas*, morality embraces the service both of God and man; in both there is need of moral earnestness and fidelity. The root of morality, the good whence it derives its obligatory character, is found in God, not in man, and therefore the direct love of God is placed on a higher level. Let us use a *simile*: If the activity of the body derives its human and moral value from that of the mind, the latter is itself higher; if all sciences go back in their principles to philosophy, this is the highest science of all.

Herrmann and many other Protestant theologians regard the love of one's neighbour, i.e., social conscientiousness, as the sole form of moral fidelity, and as the perfect equivalence and independent counterpart of love of God. *Herrmann* even defines the final aim of morality as the "spiritual community of mankind and the personal self control of the individual." Others prefer the theological view and speak of "the kingdom of God," but they are careful to eliminate any idea that God is in Himself the highest good, and the object of a special activity in the human soul.¹ I cannot here do more than indicate briefly how completely these writers depart in this respect from the spirit of the Gospel and of Christianity, which has always regarded the religious uplifting of the soul as its highest form of activity.

Modern ethical writers absolutely disregard God, but they are painfully aware of the discord between the individual and the social principle, between "personal independence" and "spiritual brotherhood of all mankind." The fact that they fail to assign any real meaning to either the one or the other indicates their helplessness, and it should make Christian students appreciate still more highly the wisdom and profundity of the commandment that represents love of God to be a real love proceeding from a man's

Moreover, the punctuation should be: *Deum diligere, secundum se est magis meritorium, etc.*, as appears from the words that follow: *potest tamen contingere, quod aliquis in operibus vitae activae plus mereatur.*

¹ Cf. *infra*, Chap. VI; also *Mausbach*, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, I, 190.

whole heart, and his chief aim in life, and which derives from it real love of self and of his neighbour.

The absence of this close union of the human and the divine, and also of the complete moral unity of life, may be traced to *Luther* and his conception of law. In the Epistle to the Romans, *St. Paul* condemns the theory that sinful man can be justified by fulfilment of the law, whether it be the Jewish ceremonial law or the moral law. *Luther*, without any justification in the New Testament, extends this condemnation to the obligation of law in general, to the possibility of augmenting one's justice by fulfilment of the moral law and thus becoming worthy of eternal happiness. In his opinion the freedom of the children of God does not consist merely in the fact that the law does not condemn them, but in there being no law at all binding upon them. The commandments of God belong to the Old Testament; they prescribe moral purity only "in order that man may see and learn his inability to do good, and may despair of himself." According to *Luther* the New Testament contains no law but only promises; faith, which lays hold of the words of promise, is the "first great commandment," in which all the commandments are certainly and easily fulfilled. A Christian needs no works to make him pious and happy, i.e., to secure his justification and assurance of salvation; he is "undoubtedly released from all commandments and laws." This opinion is expressed again and again in as early a work as the "*Freiheit eines Christenmenschen*,"¹ but it is softened down here by allusions to the active charity that gratitude calls forth and that follows upon faith. Why did not *Luther* in this connection acknowledge the *duty* of moral activity? The objection that the idea of obligation brings with it a danger of self-righteousness or desire of reward, is merely a pretext, for nothing can be more foreign to the idea of duty than these considerations.

Luther seems always to have felt a binding law to be something terrible and unbearable. He could not understand how vigorous, moral liberty is compatible with an inward recognition of duty and responsibility. But a deeper reason was that, with his opinions regarding the corruption and bondage of mankind, it seemed to him impossible to fulfil the law. If the law were to

¹ Erlangen ed., XXVII, 180, etc., 192, etc.

be binding upon Christians as well as others, it would condemn them also and plunge them into despair. *Luther* did not deduce the other conclusion, more obvious from the philosophical point of view, that the law can neither bind nor terrify a will that is not free, simply because for it law has no meaning at all. "Papists," says *Luther*, "suppose that Christ said 'thou shalt,' and therefore I can. By no means, my friend; there is a great difference between being bound and being able to do a thing."¹

As to the metaphysical aspect of free will, *Luther* could not see that God's omnipotence and human independence were compatible. As to the moral aspect of it, the living, organic connection between obligation and liberty was equally incomprehensible to him. In one place he denies human liberty, because he wishes to assert God's supremacy; in another, he denies God's law, in order not to limit the liberty of a Christian.²

When this opinion is further developed, so as to represent the law in contrast to the Gospel, *Luther* is thinking not merely of ritual, but also of moral laws, including the commandment of love. In his Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, he argues that Christ was not a legislator like *Moses*, but the Lamb of God, bearing our sins. He did not teach what we ought to do, but did everything *for us*. Therefore, as soon as any question arises concerning our relation to God, we ought to forget the law, and be towards it not only blind and dumb, but altogether dead. A true Christian is "completely free from all laws, and subject to no law at all, either inwardly or outwardly."³ The Papists are blind and foolish, not only because they require exterior works, but because they have made out of the Gospel a law of love that it is impossible to fulfil.⁴

"The old teaching of *Moses* is: Thou shalt fear, trust, and love God, and love thy neighbour as thyself. But the teaching of Christ is much higher and more glorious, for it does not tell us what we

¹ Erlangen ed., XLV, 180.

² *Köstlin* acknowledges that, according to *Luther*, it is impossible to speak of free will in the case of a just man; the freedom ascribed to him — i.e., his vigorous and joyous behaviour — must be regarded purely as an effect of divine grace (I, 218).

³ *Walch*, VIII, 1827, 1883, 1885, 1890; cf. *supra*, p. 148.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1693.

must do, such as is the peculiar office of a law."¹ "This preacher does not say that thou canst *love God*, nor how thou shouldst act and live, but he tells thee how thou must still become pious and happy even if thou canst not do it. . . . The law says: Thou shalt not sin; go and be pious, do this and that; but Christ says: Thou art not pious; *but I have done all for thee, remissa sunt tibi peccata.*"²

In this way *Luther* changed the one thing needful, piety and happiness, into a faith that is not moral activity but the assumption of a sanctity not one's own. Active morality on earth is not a moral law at all in the sense of being absolutely obligatory, it belongs to a lower and ultimately indifferent province. *Herrmann* agrees with *Luther* in regarding active morality of this kind as on a level with social obligations and charity towards one's neighbour, but they differ essentially in their valuation of it. *Luther* obscures the divine and eternally significant element in this moral activity concerning one's neighbour and puts it on a level with the civil order, but *Herrmann* exalts it to full equality and identity with what is divine, regarding it as primary morality. Both *Herrmann* and *Luther* fail to understand Christ's great commandment, according to which love of God is made known as the most lively expression of fundamental morality, and is, consequently, on the one hand our highest absolute duty, and, on the other, the chief stimulus to energetic action on our part for the welfare of mankind.³

II

Let us now see how the theory of Probabilism can be explained, when we take into account the distinction of Catholic morals in matters of principle, and their ideal conception of law as a rule of

¹ *Walch*, V, 187.

² 7, 2322; *ibid.*, 10, 1461: The law makes us desperate; the Gospel shows that "the law having been fulfilled by Jesus Christ, it is now not necessary to fulfil it by our own obedience." *Luther* describes as obscure and difficult the words of Christ: If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. He assumes that they express what ought to be, but not what can be. Cf. p. 188, note 1.

³ *Herrmann* reproaches Catholic ethics with setting the moral law on a level with state regulations, made for the maintenance of public order. This is what *Luther* actually does.

duty intensified by love. In its historical significance the word is connected with the various opinions expressed in casuistic works written on moral questions since the latter part of the Middle Ages; and more especially with the point how certainty in matters of conscience can be obtained where there is doubt as to the moral obligation of an act. As the word *conscience* itself indicates, consciousness, a conviction of the clearest possible kind, ought to precede our resolutions and actions, and when this is present naturally, or has been obtained by instruction and reflection, there is no need of any further theories. But what is to be done where there is uncertainty, and where on the one hand there are serious reasons for regarding an act as morally obligatory, and on the other hand equally good reasons for thinking that there is no obligation at all? May probability (*probabilitas*) here take the place of a knowledge of truth? Can it at least indirectly afford the conscience a certainty that is free from laxism no less than from rigorism and scrupulous adherence to the letter of the law? I must once more protest against the customary misrepresentations of Probabilism, and emphasize the fact that it by no means permits men to act in a way contrary to "their own convictions" and to their own judgment." All Catholic theologians are agreed in saying "*that wherever moral certainty exists, wherever there is a true recognition of duty, there is but one kind of freedom, that of obedience.*" Nor do they require any scientific evidence or cogent proofs for their opinion, but simply that "moral certainty" which in practical questions is generally the only one obtainable, a certainty that does not exclude every possible, but every reasonable doubt. One need only open any textbook on morals in order to see that *conscientia dubia* has been the object of all disputes carried on by moralists in the last few centuries.¹

Even where a direct perception of the moral truth is not possible, Catholic moralists unanimously require us to settle the theoretically insoluble difficulty somehow or other, so that we may not

¹ All scientific discussion becomes impossible if, after the clear statement on this subject in the first edition of this work, *Herrmann*, in his answer to it, continues to maintain that Probabilism encourages men "not to follow their own moral perceptions" or "to neglect what they themselves know to be right" (pp. 33, 143, 146, etc.).

leave everything blindly and arbitrarily to chance, but have some clear, practical views before we proceed to action. This is the meaning of the rule that one must never act *in dubio pratico*. But how can we obtain such clear views and calm judgments? The system called *Tutorism* taught that in such cases, even though there may be weighty reasons against it, the mere conjecture that something is a duty has the same binding force upon the conscience that clear knowledge would have. *Probabiliorism*, however, denied that a conjecture has a binding force when there are weightier reasons for adopting an opinion less severe and in favour of freedom. *Probabilism* taught that as soon as any serious doubt arises regarding the existence of a duty, a *doubt, which remains after conscientious reflection, corresponding to the education and circumstances of the person concerned*, there is no obligation; *lex dubia non obligat*.

Since the sixteenth century this theory has been represented by theologians of very various schools and orders. Many included also cases where the *greater* probability is on the side of the law, provided that this probability does not weaken the arguments in favour of the freer opinion. A Dominican, *Bartholomeus Medina*, in 1457, was the first to state the formula: *si est opinio probabilis, licet eam sequi, licet opposita probabilior sit*, thereby recognizing that the less probable opinion could justify the denial of obligation.¹

The conflicts between the various systems brought to light much that was unedifying. The attacks of the Jansenists, and above all *Pascal's* "Provincial Letters," with their strong bias, spread misunderstanding and excitement far and wide in ecclesiastical circles. It is impossible not to blame some moralists of that period for a certain superficiality and want of decision in rejecting offensive opinions, when dealing with individual questions and when stating reasons on which they based their answers. Several Popes condemned certain lax, individual views of probabilistic authors. In a decree issued in 1680, *Innocent XI* commends and encourages *Gonzalez*, subsequently General of the Society of Jesus, for his energetic opposition to the definition of Probabilism given

¹ Com. on St. Thomas, I, II, q. 19, a. 6, concl. 3.

above.¹ Yet it was precisely among the Jesuits that this theory continued to prevail, although the meaning and the natural limitations of the formula were more clearly established. *St. Alphonsus Liguori* was not satisfied with Probabiliorism, nor with the simple form of Probabilism. He restricted the application of the rule *lex dubia non obligat* to cases of genuine doubt, where the arguments for and against were approximately of equal weight, but he maintained that the law continued to be binding if its applicability were more probable than not. This is *Equiprobabilism*, to which the Redemptorists still adhere, and also many other theologians who are decidedly opposed to the other line of thought already mentioned. Our antagonists, therefore, who speak of Probabilism as tolerated and sanctioned by the Church, ought not to overlook the existence of this latter theory, which has many adherents. Taken as a whole, and as including both theories, Probabilism has certainly almost completely displaced Tutorism and Probabiliorism, which, whilst ostensibly rigorous, contain many defects both from the scientific and the practical points of view.

But does the existence of Probabilism not acknowledge the fact that Catholic morals contain or suggest a view according to which law and liberty are placed in opposition to one another?

An important distinction already drawn supplies us with the answer to this question. The basis common to all morality is the relation of free action to an absolute end, viz., the highest good. It follows from the very essence of the absolute good, or, in other words, from the attitude of His creatures towards God, that this relation embraces all our actions. In the moral life there are no gaps or breaks, there is no sphere where natural liberty is exempt from the dominion of the law. Just as our reason cannot think correctly unless guided by logical principles, so there can be no practical judgment and action unless subjected to ethical principles. In reply to the question whether all our actions ought to have relation to God, all theologians, including Probabilists, answer in the affirmative, and thus proclaim the principle of a morality controlling all free action.² The great majority, following *St.*

¹ *Ter Haar*, Das Dekret des P. Innocenz XI, 1904, p. 29, seq.; cf. also *supra*, p. 91, note 2.

² Cf., e.g., *St. Alphonsus*, Theol. mor., I, V, n. XLIV; *Gury*, I, § 31.

Thomas, go further and declare that this supremacy of the moral law must not be merely negative, excluding all irregularity in deliberate actions, but must be positive, since it ought to regulate all the aims of creatures with reference to the highest aim. In other words, this means that nothing is morally indifferent if it belongs to our conscious actions; he who does not do right, does wrong. As charity in the life of Christians is nothing but the intensified, living, and vigorous form of this fundamental striving after morality, the full surrender of self to the highest Good for its own sake, we can see that, in the case of those in a state of grace, love is an all-embracing law, knowing no limitations or exceptions. This is a central point in *St. Thomas's* doctrine of morals to which all subsequent spiritual teachers have adhered, though they have held various opinions regarding the kind of influence possessed by love. "It is contained in the *commandment* regarding love, that we must love God with our whole heart; this involves *referring all things to God*; hence man cannot fulfil the commandment of love, unless a relation to God is given to everything."¹

Subordinated to charity, which is *the* great commandment of Christianity, is a system of laws regulating the various departments of our moral life. Property, honour, sexual life, and the state, all acquire moral significance when viewed in the light of the highest Good, but their binding power is limited, not absolute. The human intellect is complete and without condition; it is subject only to the Infinite; with regard to particular points of morality it is *bound* only in as far as they must be observed, to reach the highest and ultimate aim of our existence. Hence there exists actually a right to freedom of action with regard to the individual laws of morality; the duties of prayer, almsgiving, obedience, etc., have their limitations, and can themselves become limitations to the higher use of liberty. This does not mean that, after establishing my "liberty" with regard to some particular duty, "I may do what I like"; for in *all* that I do I am subject to the obligation of morality as such, and as a Christian I must observe the law of charity. It is almost incomprehensible how any one can so misunderstand the Probabilists, when they discuss duty and liberty, as to represent freedom from some particular law as equivalent to a re-

¹ *S. theol.*, I, II, q. 100, a. 10 ad 2.

moval of every moral obligation, and the letting loose of immoral tendencies and interests. We may even say that most casuistic questions turn on duties arising out of *human* laws and on obligations to the Church or state. Even *Herrmann* admits (p. 37) that, with regard to such laws, moral liberty does not completely surrender its independence or its rights.

Herrmann particularly objects to the arguments advanced by *Cathrein* in support of the probabilistic rule: *lex dubia non obligat*. In the latter's book on moral philosophy (p. 368) we read: "For a law to have a binding force upon us, it must be sufficiently promulgated. It is a universally recognized principle in law that *lex non promulgata non obligat*. Now a really doubtful law, against the existence of which weighty reasons can be alleged, may be regarded as insufficiently promulgated, and therefore it is not binding. We can develop the same idea in another way — Man is in himself master of his actions, freedom of action has been given him by God. Every limitation to this liberty, or, what is the same thing, every law imposed upon a man, must be positively proved; and until this proof is forthcoming, man is free to act in the matter as he pleases. If, however, the existence of a law is really doubtful, and if there are serious reasons against it, the proof is null and void, and the man retains his right to determine his own actions."¹

Is there anything in this passage that justifies *Herrmann* in regarding the liberty, to which *Cathrein* alludes, as liberty from the moral law in general, and his "freedom of action" as license to do what one likes? Has *Herrmann* any right thus to impute to Catholics a desire to be absolutely free from God, or, in other words, to be godless? The whole of the first part of *Cathrein's* Moral Philosophy was written to show that man's true greatness and happiness must be sought only in turning to God, and that the moral law, though based on God, is still the expression of our innermost nature, and therefore sets its mark on all the free actions of man. He says: "The natural law is, so to say, the necessary endowment or equipment of human nature, and is made known to men by the natural light of reason. Therefore the sphere of its legality is as universal as that of human nature itself. . . . Reason commands me, as a man, to observe the order proper to myself, and to do so

¹ *Cathrein, Moralphilosophie*, 2d ed., I, 368, seq.

unconditionally, i.e., not merely to-day or to-morrow, here or in some other place, but *always and everywhere*. *There is therefore no position conceivable, in which the natural law is not binding upon man*" (p. 336). The principle derived from jurisprudence concerning the *melior conditio possidentis* is, in its application to morality, certainly likely to be misunderstood, and has therefore been abandoned (as a fundamental part of the system) by many recent Probabilists; according to the fundamental theory of Catholic morals its actual meaning may be as follows: Although it belongs to the essence of reason to order everything with reference to God and His glory, yet according to the nature of our reason and will this is only a general law, affecting our principles; it does not preclude, but actually demands our independent examination of the means to this end. This moral freedom of the individual to choose his way to God according to his own independent judgment, is actually limited by particular laws in which certain interests of morality occur as objective demands. A true and certain knowledge of the latter, causes freedom to be rediscovered in the law — what is necessary for the honour of God is best also for man. But just on the border line disputes are apt to arise between the advantages and interests of various particular laws; and thus the personal liberty to order one's own life, which in itself is a good, may be imperilled by demands for which there are no proofs. In this sense the probabilistic principle, *lex dubia non obligat*, in cases where there is reasonable doubt, maintains the right of freedom to assert itself."¹

Herrmann is of opinion that the preceding statements are likely to be injurious to the Church. He thinks that when I say the moral

¹ The principle that freedom is "in possession," as opposed to the law, is often based upon the argument that logically physical liberty, the *liberum arbitrium* of the creature, is antecedent to all moral law. But here is a serious confusion of thought. For this kind of liberty is *never* dispossessed; even a certain duty addresses itself to the free will. If we are speaking of moral freedom, of the *libertas a lege*, this is not antecedent to law, not even logically. In the idea of the creature, determination for God is given before moral free will, as, in theory, the aim is antecedent to the means. In physical volition also, the *voluntas ut natura*, i.e., the turning of the will to the highest Good, is antecedent to the *voluntas ut ratio*, i.e., free will. *St. Alphonsus* wisely guards against all misunderstanding by explicitly limiting the *principium possessionis* to the *praecepta particularia* (I, 78) as we have done above.

law continues in force as such, even though *one* duty may be released, I am revealing the unmoral mode of thought of the Church. As the moral law is the carrying out of what each perceives to be right, to release any one from it, as is permitted by Probabilism, is to destroy every moral obligation. I certainly, he considers, had no right to reproach him with having failed, in a ridiculous way, to understand me. If *Herrmann* requires us to look at things from his point of view, he must be prepared to look at them from ours; but he represents things to his readers as if a Catholic, feeling himself free from some one obligation, "has satisfied *all* the demands of morality, and for the rest can do as he likes" (p. 27), so that he has escaped from "the restrictions" of morality and can give free rein to his desires (p. 40). I was bound to refute this utterly false and unfair statement. The Catholic Church, as a matter of fact, upholds an idea of morality that lays hold of life more uniformly, and regulates it more strictly, than the Protestant Church does. By assuming that *Herrmann* had misunderstood this, I wished to make him a polite rejoinder; I was not then concerned with the fact that he has quite a different fundamental idea of morals.

The nearer *Herrmann* approaches to the problem, the more does he limit his universal condemnation of Probabilism as a theory destructive of conscience (which was the point that I primarily had to notice), to the fundamental principle of simple Probabilism, according to which one may, when in doubt, follow the less probable opinion. When he singled out this form of Probabilism as the type, as the "bone of contention," he ought to have acknowledged that the strong, perhaps at the present time preponderating tendency of *St. Alphonsus* is in direct opposition to this probabilistic principle. He would in that case have been obliged to represent the Popes' recommendation of *St. Alphonsus* not as a *confirmation* by the Church of the opinion that he considers unmoral, but rather as a warning against it. In 1762 *St. Alphonsus* abandoned simple Probabilism, and thenceforth adhered steadily to the following principle: "If the opinion in favour of the law seems to us more solidly probable, *we must follow it unconditionally*, and may not adopt the opposite opinion in favour of freedom. The reason is that we, in order to act permissibly, *must ascertain and follow the*

truth in doubtful matters, and where the truth cannot be clearly ascertained, we must at least adopt that opinion *which comes nearer to the truth*; and this is the more probable opinion."¹ *Ter Haar* points out to *Herrmann* that *St. Alphonsus*' teaching coincides in many respects with his own.² This discovery should have caused to vanish into smoke a great deal of the fiery indignation in *Herrmann's* reply.³

Herrmann desires me to state "more explicitly" how I stand with reference to this controversy. The voluminous literature on the subject seems to me to show two things: viz., that untenable arguments are occasionally adduced in support of both views, and these can easily be refuted; and that, on the other hand, there are difficult problems, connected not only with ethics, but with the theory of cognition, underlying the whole matter.

As to the theory of cognition, some agreement has been reached since the *Æquiprobabilists* admit higher probability as such not to be identical with moral certainty. Consequently they give up some grounds upon which *St. Alphonsus* relied, and base their system upon the theory that the *sententia probabilior pro lege*, being "nearer to truth" and affording "greater" guarantee that it is in objective agreement with the law of God, is the opinion binding upon the conscience.

Not much deliberation is needed to enable one to see that a preponderance of reasons, and a subjective probability flowing therefrom, is noetically possible without destroying the proba-

¹ *St. Alphonsus*, Theol. mor. (ed. Gaudé), I, n. 54.

² In confirmation of this statement I may refer to a characteristic passage in the seventh edition of the "Theologia moralis" (Gaudé, l. c.): Quoties enim intellectui diserte apparet veritatem multo magis stare pro lege quam pro libertate, tunc voluntas nequit prudenter et sine culpa parti minus tutae adherere; siquidem eo casu homo non proprio iudicio seu propriae credulitati innixus operaretur sed potius per quamdam conatum, quam sua voluntate in intellectum inferret.

³ I do not, however, agree with *Ter Haar* in considering *Herrmann* an *Æquiprobabilist*. As he requires certainty or a higher degree of probability in order to justify any moral decision, he seems to be rather a Probabiliorist. His opposition to both forms of Probabilism is seen in the fact that they acknowledge no obligation in cases of real doubt, where the probability is equal. *Herrmann* seldom notices this possibility, although, as a matter of fact, it is of frequent occurrence; otherwise he would most likely have seen that his general condemnation of Probabilism is untenable. (Cf. also Koch, *Moraltheologie*, 2d ed., p. 104, and the quotations given there.)

bility of the opposite opinion. The Bible, history, law, and politics supply us with hundreds of instances of this. The same thing must occur in questions of morals, both natural and positive. Many of these doubtful questions have been discussed in ethical works of every kind, and new ones constantly present themselves with the advance of civilization. The more such questions are separated from the life of individuals, and treated in an abstract and scientific manner, the easier will it be to show the relation between arguments and counter arguments, and to designate one opinion as theoretically *probabilior* and the other as *probabilis*. For instance, *St. Alphonsus* describes as *probabilis* the opinion that any price may be asked for curios, but as *probabilior* the opposite view, according to which the price is to be fixed by an expert's valuation.¹ *Lugo* calls *probabilissima* the opinion that in making restitution no attention need be paid to the order in which the debts were contracted, but he adds at once: *Sed fateor mihi contrariam videri magis naturali aequitati consonam . . . quam tenent quamplures et gravissimi*. The contrary opinion appears to be more in consonance with equity and is adopted by learned authors.² The more we venture upon new ground, and deal with questions of a personal nature, the more does greater probability appear to be simply a stronger intellectual tendency without any clearly recognized reasons, weighed one against another.

I think that noetic obscurity continues because modern Æqu-probabilism desires to regard every "more likely probable opinion" as a certainty, viz., the certainty that "it is more probable that an objective obligation exists than that it does not," and that this opinion "is more in accordance with the truth."³

This view is emphatically wrong, unless it means simply the mere security of self-consciousness. The inadequate relation between subjective mental process and objective facts is sufficiently indicated by the word *probable*; we do not arrive at what is objective by increasing the "appearance" of truth. In asking whether an obligation exists or not, we do not want an objective "more or less," but only "yes" or "no." As long as there are reasons in favour of both views which I cannot disprove, I must not say

¹ III, 808.

² De iust. dist. 20, n. 146.

³ *Ter Haar*, pp. 5, 25.

that the more probable opinion certainly comes *nearer* to the objective truth.¹ How frequently does it happen that what seems to be more probable proves eventually to have no reality at all! On the other hand, many probabilists raise an ill-considered objection and maintain that to weigh reasons for and against, and to establish the greater probability, as *Æquiprobabilism* requires, is a task beyond the powers of most Christians, since it needs great acumen and much intellectual exertion. The followers of *St. Alphonsus* declare a man to be free of all obligation where there is real doubt, which cannot be removed by a reasonable amount of reflection. Liberty ceases only where there seems to be better ground for believing the obligation to exist, i.e., when it is *certe probabilior*.

But does not this distinction between the probable and the true ultimately destroy all certain knowledge? Is it ever possible for a man really to arrive at the objective truth? A warning not to regard probability and truth as equivalent is a matter of common sense. The philosophical theory of cognition cautiously examines the criteria of our conception of truth, and makes certainty its decisive characteristic. We cannot here discuss why and to what extent it possesses a guarantee of approaching objective truth as closely as it is possible for man to do, but the emphasis with which philosophy distinguishes the state of certainty and assurance from other states of cognition has undoubtedly an important bearing on our question; conscience and certainty are closely connected with one another.

Is it a matter of course that a man's practical behaviour must invariably follow the various stages of cognition, even where they only show a preponderance on one side? Very little observation of life is needed to show us that this is not the case. The inheritor of property may retain it, even though his right of inheritance may be seriously questioned. The same is true of family rights. A judge may not give sentence against a man because there are

¹ *Herrmann* arrives at a false conclusion: "It is taken for granted that a Catholic Christian possesses an important piece of knowledge on this point; viz., that he himself regards one opinion as the more correct" (p. 123). I might, of course, with equal right maintain absolute doubt to be certainty, since a man in doubt knows *with certainty* that he doubts.

strong grounds of suspicion, nor may a friend always abandon a friend for such reasons. The Church permits the veneration of relics until they have been proved not authentic, although doubts may have arisen. These instances do not, of course, settle the matter, but they show how sharp the distinction is in practical life between certainty and probability.

We are, however, concerned with the recognition and the performance of a moral act as such. As this is essentially interior in its accomplishment, it may occur to some one to say: "Whoever recognizes anything with greater probability as God's will, must in action carry out this line of thought. Any other course is contrary to the unity of the intellectual life and to the dignity of morality. A man must strive, as far as he can, to bring his will into agreement with the objective moral law; and one who acts contrary to the more probable opinion, favourable to the law, is not honestly striving to attain to this agreement or to moral truth."¹ Is this conclusion correct? A man's striving after truth may be quite honest, and yet lead him, because the reasons in favour of the duty do not convince him, to the probabilistic conclusion: "Just because of motives of honesty I must not declare anything to be a duty for myself and others, i.e., an obligation binding the will through the moral law, as long as my reason, the light of my will, perceives no compulsion, no intellectual *determinatio ad unum*." To act in accordance with what I assume to be my duty, is not in itself a means of solving the question of truth, whether God is really laying upon me an obligation.

Ter Haar, referring to *Herrmann*, discovers a further argument in the fact that a preponderance of reasons contains in itself an "initial enlightenment" of the mind; and he says it is wrong to disturb such a process by means of resolutions of a contrary nature. I shall come back to this argument, which is certainly not borne out by facts. It is hardly necessary to point out that in cases, such as we have been discussing, zealous Christians are apt to decide in favour of the stricter interpretation of duty, and that as a rule an obligation really arises, because a moral man must be true to himself, resist indolence, avoid setting a bad example to others, etc. With regard, however, to the debated point, I maintain: (1) that

¹ *Ter Haar*, p. 11.

the obligation of acting in accordance with an opinion remains when the preponderance of reasons in support of it is so great as to amount to "conviction," in *Herrmann's* sense, and to *proprium iudicium* in that of *St. Alphonsus*, since in this way the serious personal uncertainty is overcome. Probabilists will call this moral certainty, and from their point of view they will concur in my conclusion. But I must point out that in this case the abstract probability of the contrary opinion can still continue; only the individual judgment has risen superior to it to such a degree that we personally can no longer assent to that opinion. (2) Oftentimes in our minds reasons and counter reasons are apt to stand in such antagonism that, though we *clearly perceive* those on one side to be stronger, we dare not give a "decision," and though we are personally inclined to admit the obligation, we cannot abandon our attitude of reserved investigation. In this case we are not justified in representing the more probable opinion as binding. A case of this kind is more likely to occur when the law is of a positive nature, and its obligation depends upon historical or legal presumptions (as in questions of ecclesiastical law, the liturgy, civil duty, etc.), and also in particularly difficult questions affecting morality in general, or in such as have been confused by the way in which scholars have dealt with them.

The diverging opinions regarding the solution of such problems, and the debated point itself, have not the importance in the actual life of a Christian that our opponents ascribe to them. *Herrmann* fancies all morality to be undermined by Probabilism, for "*all cases* subject to a moral decision are obviously *doubtful*, until the moral deliberation has reached its end. . . . Every moral decision, which leads us on, is reached through a number of uncertainties, out of which we have to work our way. Sometimes our decision is still hampered by a doubt whether we have not made too little of motives tending in another direction. But only our own disposition, and the moral insight that we have won by the struggle, can lead us to a definite opinion" (p. 33). On this point *Herrmann's* views and my own do not coincide. The doctrines and practice of Catholicism have succeeded in making most duties so plain to the faithful, that their conscience does not need to waver, or to recall previous hard-won cognizance in order to come to a

clear and definite opinion. The Ten Commandments and the fundamental virtues of Christianity are so well taught by the Church, that the most ignorant man recognizes, without any deliberation, that a temptation to theft, immorality, etc., is a temptation to sin. A Catholic is in the happy position of not being obliged to evolve all moral truths out of himself, nor of seeking a clue to moral progress in the struggles of his past life. He accepts the great simple truths of Christian morality first on faith, but then also with the honest assent of his reason; he hears in God's word the innermost voice of his own nature, and in accordance with its decisions he judges his own past and future, his failures and progress. Whoever observes the duties proclaimed as binding by Catholic morals, and whoever takes to heart the counsels given us as our *via tutior* in doubtful cases, and inculcated in sermons on morality, need feel no anxiety regarding his moral progress.

Others hold quite a contrary opinion and maintain that conscience is *never* in doubt, and that the "categorical imperative," or the "voice of God," always allows any one, who honestly seeks light, to know what is required of him at any given moment. This theory is contradicted by general experience, and also by the natural organization of our reason, which, starting with a few clear principles, has to think over and arrange the many difficult problems affecting the life of the individual. It is contradicted also by the laws of Revelation, which, being given to mankind in general and not to the individual, supplies it with the treasure of general truths contained in the Gospel, in the light of which men are to think, work, and struggle for themselves. On one point the two extreme views mentioned above agree with one another in opposition to the Catholic theory; this is in ignoring the objective character of the moral ideas and laws to which the individual has to rise by his investigations and to which he must intellectually and morally conform. This contrast appears most plainly in the harshness with which modern subjectivists reject as immoral any reference to other opinions or to theological authorities in the solution of problems of conscience. *Herrmann* goes so far as to call the recognition of such authorities, as weighty arguments against an individual opinion, "a disgraceful fact." In other branches of knowledge, as for instance history, it is regarded as a matter

of course that we should examine the views and arguments of others, and no one hesitates to declare that any doubts on the subject of some particular question render an immediate decision impossible. In such cases it is perfectly obvious that the truth is something objective, which remains unaffected by our subjective judgments; but in philosophy, and especially in ethics, there is an idea that it is possible "to evolve truth for oneself." Because people do not really trust in the reality of a metaphysical result, they accept the view of some individual thinker as true. But since morality is assumed to be nothing but the expression of the individual disposition, varying according to nationality, periods, and persons, they do not trouble to seek moral truth, or to avail themselves of the help of others, but say: "The moral insight that we have won for ourselves decides the matter." Although I may be convinced that another man is my superior in intellectual powers and learning, I pay no attention to the opinion that he has expressed on some moral question, or on the application of some law. It does not occur to me that truth is something distinct from him and me, floating as an intellectual power over the minds of all, and that some other student may have come nearer to it than I have. No, truth is expected to conform itself to the varying modes of thought; "what is true for one is false for another."

What is personal and accidental undoubtedly affects moral decisions more than it affects theoretical investigations; for the question is what some particular person ought to do at some particular time. It is also true that feelings can often take the place of deliberate examination; sometimes an innate happy instinct, sometimes a deposit left in the mind by previous experience, can do this, but still the individual and accidental must be guided by what is general and permanent, and sentiment must justify itself before the tribunal of reason.¹ It is not enough to recognize the fundamental law of morality, "that an absolute Good, the highest aim of life," exists as the sole truth in that objective sense; for the question arises what is good, and what proximate aims correspond to the ultimate highest aim of life. Thus no reasonable man doubts that the words "beneficence," "gratitude," and "obedience" convey ideas that are always and everywhere morally binding. But why

¹ See *supra*, pp. 86, *seq.*

should we stop at these laws, universal though they be? Why should we not be permitted to seek objective truth also on questions for which all cannot at once give the same answer? Is it because the exceptions become more numerous, the more we come down to what is concrete? But even the ideas of beneficence, gratitude, and obedience have reference to methods of action that admit of exceptions. "Objective" is not equivalent to "absolute" legality; the secondary aims of morality, which often interfere with one another, and always have the primary, highest aim as their standard, make it impossible for these terms to be equivalent. But truth and the moral law nevertheless continue to exist, just as in nature the essential difference between animals and plants continues to exist, in spite of the uncertain border line between the two forms of life. Is it possible to think of obedience and disobedience as on a level, because one must occasionally disobey? Is beneficence not a virtue for the reason that one must sometimes refuse to confer a benefit?

In opposition to the above statements *Herrmann* insists again and again upon the points that uncertainty *attaches to every movement in moral growth and progress*, that we have to *win* the necessary insight for ourselves *by means of a struggle*, and this offers consequently to Probabilism the widest and most pernicious application (126, 131, 147). In answer to these assertions I wish to remark that moral growth is essentially a growth of the *will and character*, not of knowledge. (1) There are duties great and small, perfectly plain to every Christian, which make the greatest demands upon his desires and feelings; is not their performance a means of moral growth? Did not the apostles advance morally when preaching the Gospel, martyrs when resisting idolatry, virgins when remaining true to their vows? A heroic struggle is possible, in fact it is more auspicious, when the consciousness of duty has not first to be won. The common life, on the other hand, requires self-conquest in little things, but in it, too, there is no need for us to gain the necessary insight by a struggle. It is plain to every Christian that we are bound to avoid proud and uncharitable thoughts and to refrain from injurious, contemptuous, and false words. (2) The practice of virtues that are of counsel, not of precept, has nothing to do with the conscientious doubts of which we are now

speaking. Do we not see that precisely people with a strong sense of morality make sacrifices, of self and to others, and undertake spiritual and social work, being tormented by no doubts as to the limits of duty, but urged on only by *unfettered enthusiasm*?

With regard to my last illustration *Herrmann* might argue that he did not recognize such a course, as going beyond the limits of duty; that every moral decision is the "recognition of what is *unconditionally necessary*" (pp. 127, 133). But here again the artificial and false character of his ethical teaching is revealed. On such a foundation as this is also based his claim that freedom from some doubtful duty amounts to immoral liberty of action. Is this true in actual life? Let us suppose it to be the duty of each individual to select a definite calling; are we to regard it as something unconditionally necessary that he should decide upon a certain sphere of action within that particular calling, in the same way as a professor or author might arrange a scheme for his literary labours? Of course no human eye can discover any law to this effect; and also with reference to God there is no such moral obligation in detail. The whole moral order, from the general down to the particular, in all its manifold forms, is intelligible only when we think of its *aim*, not of *law*. The Protestant theologian, *Rolfs*, acknowledges this when, in answer to *Herrmann*, he remarks that there are as a rule several possible ways of achieving a moral end. "*Herrmann* narrows down the idea of good in an ominous manner by considering an action to be moral only when a man independently follows what is unconditionally necessary. . . . Must we exclude from the sphere of moral actions all manifestations of love towards parents or children, of friendship and of patriotism, because they do not proceed from a clear consciousness of their being unconditionally binding?"¹

According to *Herrmann*, in cases where decision is difficult this inner obligation reveals itself, inasmuch as the better course appears the more probable, but that the Church, by sanctioning Probabilism, gives a man the right "to ignore *this enlightenment dawning within him* or, in other words, to deny his own opinion" (pp. 40, 118). The Church, as we have seen, does not encourage this form of Probabilism any more than that of *St. Alphonsus*, to

¹ Theol. Rundschau, 1901, p. 491, etc.

which this charge is quite inapplicable. But can the opposite opinion be justified at all in such a way? Whenever a probability is in process of formation, and investigation is not yet complete, all serious moralists require further deliberation, and, if possible, full enlightenment. The *regulae reflexae* of Probabilism find application only when it is impossible to arrive at direct certainty.¹

Is *Herrmann* right in thinking that the dawning of greater probability always suggests the direction of one's own opinion, as it gradually becomes clear and definite? I doubt it. Whoever looks back at the various stages in his own personal development, will find that the transition to a more profound conception of duty, or to one more in accordance with circumstances, often begins with conjectures, and is uncertain and daring, whilst what was old and traditional continued to be the more probable. If, therefore, greater probability were to be regarded as equivalent to moral obligation, this would check the origin of many significant developments and destroy all courage to aim at ends that are new, hazardous, and still unproved.²

Our moral systems are scarcely concerned with such deep and lasting discussions. The different kinds of probability, with which they deal, are not identical with the various stages of personal development and enlightenment. They mostly affect external actions or positive duties that fall just on the border line and have very little influence on the formation of character. In many cases centuries of discussion have not settled the questions. Just as phil-

¹ *Lehmkuhl*, 10 ed., I, n. 50: Ratio autem, cur sufficiens diligentia, eaque diversa, pro rei gravitate et personae agentis condicione, praemitti debeat, ea est, quod aliter temere periculo laedendae legis sese exponat, atque eo ipso debitam legi obedientiam et reverentiam, utpote quae primo obliget ad cognoscendam legem, violet. *Aertnys*, theol. mor. 2d ed., I, n. 56: Dubium de actionis honestate . . . per principia reflexa deponi nequit nisi praemissa debita diligentia in inquirenda veritate rei. Ratio est, quia homo semper in actibus suis deliberatis prudenter se gerere tenetur; prudentia autem dictat, ut pro dubio deponendo imprimis diligentia in veritatis inventionem adhibeatur.

² *Linsenmann* emphasizes this argument in his article on Law and Liberty (reprinted by *A. Miller*, "F. X. v. Linsenmann's Ges. Schriften," 1912, I, 104). He regards Probabilism as being in some sense conducive to progress. The rest of his criticism is not altogether sound; he is wrong in speaking of doubtful obligation and the conflict of duties as essentially the same (p. 75); and also in connecting Probabilism with Nominalistic theology (p. 86). Cf. *supra*, p. 202, and *infra*, p. 208.

osophical points of controversy are handed down from one generation to another, and just as legal and political problems remain unsolved, so there are questions in ethics to which decisive, uniform answers can seldom be given.

Herrmann attaches but little value to the consolation that a Catholic derives from knowing that the Church made clearly known our fundamental moral duties, and that the strife of opinions does, therefore, *not* extend to the foundations of character building. He admits that our thought is not allowed to undervalue universal truth, but, with regard to the "*great truths of Christian morality*" "there is not much trace of individual thought in these notions. *They served their purpose centuries ago, when they were worked out, but now they reveal no trace of work done at the present time, and do not in fact call for it; they are therefore insipid and worthless*" (p. 128). He advises me to consider "whether any action can be called morally good, unless it is a man's own individual expression of what is good, and whether the personal coming into existence of a single human being is not something so great that the fulfilment of all imaginable regulations is in no way comparable with it" (p. 138). The fundamental principle underlying *Herrmann's* opinions on ethics is most clearly expressed here, and it can no longer be denied that it is opposed to Christianity and to the general idea of morality. The alternative that he suggests was considered by me long ago, with reference to morals as well as to philosophy and faith.¹

The mental activity of an individual, and the coming into existence of a single human being, are no doubt a great good, but not the highest good. Far more important is the universal, superhuman, and eternal, for which each individual works and whence he derives life. There are destructive errors and phantoms of happiness, for which talented men labour intensively — to their own destruction and that of society. *Herrmann's* view closely approaches the most extreme cultus of personality, so-called Solipsism. The life of an individual in its fluctuations and contrasts shows that its real standards, and the inmost sources of its value, are not in himself, but in things universally good and true. This fact appears

¹ Cf. my article in the "*Hochland*," fourth year of publication, No. 8, *Die Persönlichkeit und ihre Stellung zur Ideenwelt*.

especially in the Christian conception of God, whilst such idolatry of human life savours of pantheism. Right action is the individual expression of good, but not the expression of an individual good. The more we forget ourselves in the service of supreme, common ideals, the more will our personality develop; the better we familiarize ourselves with the "old truths of Christianity," the more light and courage shall we have in doing the right kind of work at the present time. A re-surrender to what is universal, the sacrifice of the *ego* for faith and the common weal, — these have at all times been regarded as acts of the highest morality. The idea of making the promotion of the "intellectual work of an individual" the moral duty of man is a modern Utopia of sophistry.

From such a standpoint it is easy to see why the *objectivity* of moral laws, upon which I have laid so much stress, is denied. According to *Herrmann* there is only *one* moral law to which objectivity can be ascribed. And how does he define it? "We call objective that which we ourselves recognize as really existing" (p. 132). False, because in both ordinary and scientific language, a thing that exists is objective, and our cognition has to adapt itself to it. "That the thought of this law is a true thought, we perceive only because our volition receives through it its uniform direction, or obeys it" (p. 133). False again, because as we perceive the thought of the moral law to be a true thought, our will must obey it, and in obeying receives its uniform direction. *Herrmann* goes beyond *Kant* on this point and approaches psychological pragmatism.

The doctrine of ideas everywhere appears as the fundamental question in philosophical and ethical speculations. Modern philosophy has refused to admit that ideas are the support of intellectual life, because it regards the particular alone as true and important, and looks upon universal concepts and laws as mere additions made by the thinking mind, as symbols and generalizations, not as the thoughts of God, as models and laws of actual reality.

Nowhere are the results of this view so disastrous as in ethics. The forms and laws in nature remain unintelligible, if only the particular has any effect upon the mind and unity of thought is absent. But in the case of ethics, as soon as the law ceases to be intelligible, it ceases to have any force, for the moral laws affect

not what is, but what ought to be. Neither an empirical study of reality, nor individual reason or sentiment, can evolve an obligation; it is produced only by a law laid down by the intellect and governing thought and volition.

In this way alone is a *science* of ethics possible. According to the purely human view of morality, ethics can only show in particular cases what experience teaches with regard to the effect of certain actions upon human welfare, or tell us what theories on the subject of life and its aims have been devised by particular nations or men eminent for their morality. In his "Ethik" Herrmann says, in reference to "many attractive accounts of ethical questions" given by modern philosophers (*Paulsen*), that they do not belong to ethics at all, but are the "work of artists, whose imagination is able to grasp and describe the experiences of others in most minute detail." He thinks that such concrete problems belong to the stage and novels, but are injurious in ethics, because they gloss over the truth that "each man must find out for himself what his moral obligations are" (p. 161).

This remark may be correct from the standpoint of the subjective conception of conscience; but when, nevertheless, intelligent moral philosophers attempt not merely to find reasons and definitions, but to give advice and lay down rules, they show sound reason, which tries to bring what they acknowledge to be true to recognition and practical accomplishment. A work on ethics that deals, as Herrmann's does, exclusively with questions of principle, fails to fulfil its whole task, and is generally obliged arbitrarily to disregard these limitations at certain points. As a matter of fact, Herrmann deals with such questions as marriage, participation in political life, social culture, etc., which, according to his theory, no more admit of a universal answer than many of *Paulsen's* minute discussions or those of Catholic moralists. According to the testimony of history and life, there are no points on which individual feeling has more influence than in judging of marriage, culture, etc.

It is only when moral truths are considered objectively that ethics receives a *historical* character in the true sense of the word. When the whole moral ideal stands before us in living truth, — not as a mere generalization, but as a conception of God, dominating every particular, — then, and not until then, can thinkers

of every age work in common at giving a more complete account of the treasures of truth contained in morality, and at transmitting them to posterity as an ever-increasing inheritance. As long as the present theory is accepted, such investigation and teaching is impossible; every nation has its own way of thought, and every individual evolves out of his own inner consciousness his idea of moral truth. History stimulates men to self-action; the old truths are condemned as "insipid and worthless," when nothing new is produced from them; and people overlook the fact that there is in these truths something which must remain forever, and be a law controlling all new developments. Thus the organic growth of moral ideas is hindered, since it is possible only where respect is shown to tradition. We can trace such a growth within the Church; by the work of centuries and the activity of science, always sifting and criticising, many one-sided views of moral truths have been set aside, and we may look in the future for progress *in eodem dogmate, eadem sententia*.

Nothing but an objective view of morality gives it a *social* character. As *Willmann* rightly points out, ideas are forces binding men together. Only a person with no knowledge of the human soul could impose upon men, as a condition of moral independence, the duty of discovering in himself all the rules to govern his actions. To impose such a duty upon people in general would lead to a terrible fiasco. It would be equally impossible, and also contradictory, to impose upon any one as a moral law what is only the experience and individual opinion of some scholar or spiritual director. Moral truth must be recognized as something general and higher, at which each man must aim in proportion to his mental ability to grasp it. Those who instruct the masses will then impress upon them the obvious truths of morality with all the emphasis due to their origin and importance; when doubts occur, they will ask the opinion of others, and be careful not to represent as binding duties what are only personal opinions, not shared by other serious and morally minded men. Spiritual directors will not try to compel their penitents, who think more liberally, though not carelessly, of certain matters, to adopt their own more severe views. This is the point of view of Probabilism. To understand it, we must take into account its bearing upon the direction of

souls, which is no less important than its bearing upon the individual conscience. In the latter case, where an individual feels doubtful how to act, Probabilism is, rightly understood, *modesty*, respect for the judgment of others; and in the direction of souls it is *tolerance*, respect for the liberty of others. Probabilism is accused of making the conscience dependent upon the confessor; but the truth is that it does just the opposite. Probabilism renders it impossible for a confessor to impose his own opinions upon others as rules to govern their conduct, but at the same time he does not dismiss a penitent in a state of bewilderment, bidding him go and form a conscience for himself. Whoever knows the actual mental condition of the great majority of mankind, must be aware that no beneficial results could follow from this method of direction. To take into account what experienced directors and teachers of theology have thought on some point, affords a better guarantee for a correct determination of duty, than to refer some immature or doubtful penitent to his own personal deliberations.

Probabilism affects society also by maintaining amongst the people a level below which morality and Christianity must not descend. Those who charge Probabilism with rendering all morality doubtful and with undermining the common customs of Christianity, do not show much penetration. Discordant opinions are formed as soon as each man judges *subjectively* for himself; if every preacher and confessor were to inculcate his own views, the moral sense of the people would soon become uncertain. Probabilism aims at averting this danger; it demands that every priest without exception require whatever is plainly a law of God and the Church to be fulfilled; with regard to doubtful obligations, which some fulfil, considering them binding, a priest may express his own opinion, when consulted, but he may not declare them to be absolute duties, in opposition to other confessors. Both alike will warmly *recommend* the better course, and by sermons, admonitions, and example do their best to encourage their people to follow it. By eliminating personal divergencies of opinion from sermons and instructions, the Catholic Church protects uniformity in the practice of Christian morals and the authority of the ecclesiastical state. This self-restraint is not insincerity, but respect for the higher truth, at which we all aim, each according to his ability.

It is an acknowledgment that the spirit of God, not that of man, is the standard of truth.¹

Herrmann found much fault with us for allowing the decisions of "eminent authorities in the Church" to take the place of our own independent judgment. He still regards it as contemptible to accept a theological decision against one's own perception of greater probability (p. 129, etc.). Yet further on he writes: "In particular decisions a Christian, of course, allows himself to be guided by the authority of persons whom he believes to possess *higher moral enlightenment* than he has himself. In this course he follows his own mind, if it is really an inward submission to *moral force*. Withal the consciousness of his own responsibility remains" (p. 131). *Herrmann* is here trying to set up a line of demarcation against Probabilism.

In accordance with his theory of the awakening of moral consciousness through the impression produced by persons regarded as exemplary, *Herrmann* speaks of submission to moral force. Here he is shifting the point under discussion; hitherto he had been speaking of moral enlightenment. We can believe also men to possess such enlightenment who make no personal impression upon us at all, such as the scholars and thinkers approved by the Church. "But the man who submits to moral force, yet follows his own opinion, which the Catholic does not do in such case." *Herrmann* attempts to produce this impression when he describes the probabilistic maxim as a denial of one's own perception of what is right; but we have already seen that this is an unfair statement, since the whole aim of Probabilism undeniably is to supply what is wanting to our perception, and so to secure certainty.

Does *Herrmann* regard it as contemptible if a man acts in accordance with authority, rather than follow what he recognizes as better, i.e., more probable? Is not this just what a Chris-

¹ As we have seen (*supra*, p. 74), *H. Grotius* praises the scholastic writers for their scientific modesty. The air of infallibility with which many modern students of ethics decide principles and individual questions, is only apparently expedient to safeguard morality from "vacillations." Others display the same certainty in stating a contrary opinion, and the result is uncertainty of a much worse kind than is ever produced where thought is governed by greater self-restraint.

tian does, who, in *Herrmann's* sense, is guided by the authority of others? If he really believes them to possess "*higher moral enlightenment*," if he does not merely consult them, but allows himself "to be guided" by them, he is plainly acting quite consistently in subjecting his opinion, which is by no means certainty, to their judgment. In so doing he would, of course, be acting as much against *Herrmann's* principle of self-recognized morality as any Catholic who proceeds according to probabilistic principles. As a matter of fact, our books on morals are useful only to theologians and priests. A Christian in need of direction acts just as *Herrmann* suggests, and has recourse to living persons in whom he feels confidence, and who, in his opinion, possess more light and strength than he does.¹

In conclusion I may draw attention to a fact of history. As soon as Protestant ethics abandoned *Luther's* impossible principles regarding law and liberty, a casuistic and probabilistic treatment of morals became automatically necessary. One of the noblest Protestant theologians, *Georg Calixtus*, lays down, word for word, the "Jesuitical" principle; "If of two opinions one is more probable, it is not necessary to choose the more probable; *it is lawful also to choose the less probable, provided that a solid foundation or authority for it is not lacking.*"²

Let us also take to heart a saying of *Goethe's* on the harmful results of rigorism, although we cannot endorse all he says. He stated that: "Thousands are enemies of religion who would have loved Christ as a friend, had He been represented to them as a friend and not as an angry tyrant, ever ready to launch His thunderbolts wherever highest perfection is not attained. Let us give expression to what has long been our conviction, namely, that

¹ *Rolfs* (op. cit., p. 496) regards "autonomy," such as *Herrmann* would have, as impossible. "In the extent to which *Herrmann* desires it, it could not be endured even by *strong characters*, as it would render the burden of personal responsibility intolerable." *Schell* remarks in his "Christus" (16th-17th thousand, p. 127): "Would it be possible to extol Jesus as the founder of a religion of . . . unique importance, if He had not recognized and carefully kept in view the real disposition of the average man? Could One who was to be regarded as the chief benefactor of mankind overlook the fact that men as a rule *do not live with own thoughts and perceptions, nor with duties and aims discovered for themselves?*"

² Epit. Theol. mor. Helmstad., 1632, p. 27; cf. *Gross*, p. 282.

Voltaire, Hume, La Mettrie, Helvetius, Rousseau, and their whole school, did not injure morality and religion nearly as much as the rigorous, morbid *Pascal* and his followers.”¹

¹ *Goethe's Werke* (*Hempel*, 1st ed.), XXIX, 43. *F. Maurer* remarks, in the *Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie*, 1910, p. 404, that the Roman law, which undeniably bears the impress of profound knowledge of human life, repeatedly professes the maxim: *In re dubia benigniorem interpretationem sequi, non minus justius est, quam tutius*. *Maurer* does not overlook the difference between law and morality.

CHAPTER IV

MORALITY AND HAPPINESS

OUR statements in Chapter I, about the true nature of morality and the inner value it derives from the highest order of being, will not produce their full and lasting impression unless we demolish that caricature of the old Christian and Catholic morality which, since the time of *Shaftesbury* and *Kant*, is met with wherever there is the desire to displace the old ideal of a Christian life by another, a so-called higher ideal. We are told that Christianity has fostered in man a one-sided desire of happiness, injuring his morality, and that, by directing his gaze incessantly to a beyond of either bliss or misery, it has made of virtue an external matter and reduced it to a trade, with sometimes coarse, at other times refined, methods. To make one's own happiness the motive for the will is, according to *Kant*,¹ "the direct contrary to the principle of morality." To do right because of rewards or punishments is said to reverse the correct order of things. The sensual heaven described in the Bible, and the gross ideas of hell depicted by mediæval artists, are said to show how little the inward nobility of virtue was understood by both primitive and mediæval Christianity. Modern writers on ethics, especially since the time of *E. von Hartmann*, have constantly been repeating these and similar charges, generally spiced with contemptuous ridicule, and it cannot be denied that they have made a deep impression upon unsophisticated minds.

Yet this moral idealism and the indignation with which it attacks Christian ethics are not quite so pure and genuine as it would appear. For most of our critics the abandonment of all thoughts of reward and consummation in another life follows from the fact

¹ Kr. d. pr. Vernunft (*Kirchm.*, p. 41).

that they have ceased to believe in such a future life of the individual. Where, however, the idea of immortality remains, it is impossible to banish from heart and mind all thought of eternity. Another equally prosaic reason, for what looks like noble resignation and absence of selfishness, is the feeling of impotence in man after he has become "autonomous" in volition and efforts, and deprived of the aid of an Almighty and Holy God. From this standpoint a just perception of morality, such as it presents itself to the conscience of a Christian, is out of the question. Lastly, we must emphatically protest against the supercilious air in judging the Church assumed by many who know nothing of her real teaching, nothing of the depth of her point of view, and who are far from able to appreciate her wealth of sanctity that has been confirmed by the centuries. Since the rejection of the idea of happiness in ethics reveals an ignorance of the human heart that must inevitably vitiate every system of morals, there is so much less excuse for charging with the promotion of vulgar selfishness a religion that has, in combating sensuality, in purifying the soul, and in practising unselfish charity, at all times pursued and attained the highest ideals.

Protestant theology is in so far to blame for these attacks as it reproaches the Catholic Church with effecting a false connection between morality and reward in the doctrine of *merit*. It is asserted that the mere thought of obligatory good works is dangerous to a pure and unselfish practice of virtue. The prospect of a reward in heaven is supposed, moreover, to produce a kind of speculation, in which the selfish will reckons up debits and credits and measures merits and sins.¹

Any attempt to separate the idea of duty from every trace of eudæmonism, to eliminate the craving for happiness completely from morality, fails as soon as it is applied to *the most elementary facts of the spiritual life*; it destroys morality itself through removing it from its natural soil. All ethical teachers of antiquity start with the incontestable axiom that all men desire happiness.

¹ *W. James*, for instance, follows Protestant theologians in thus presenting the matter (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 461). *Sell* similarly remarks (p. 200) that the Reformation aimed at putting down "that unworthy bargaining for heaven which men gain or forfeit by individual actions."

The better ones reject coarse, impure forms of happiness; the most rigorous, such as the Stoics, by making virtue itself the moral ideal, say at the same time that this ideal contains the true happiness.

When, in the Sermon on the Mount, Christ assigned to poverty, meekness, and patience a value far beyond that set upon them by ordinary, worldly people, and thus exhorted His followers to avoid all self-seeking, did He not speak of happiness in order to attract the eyes and hearts of men to the narrow way leading to salvation? "Blessed are the poor," "Blessed are the meek," "Blessed are those that sorrow." Nothing is so general, and at the same time so varied in its expression, as the desire for a full and happy life. In his passionate and disorderly career a sinner pursues happiness; in his love and hatred, his revelling and reviling is expressed the longing of his heart for peace and joy. And so does the hope of victory sustain the moral man in his conflict with evil, and the vision of heavenly glory consoles the saint amidst his sacrifices, prayers, and works of charity. A religion that thus makes use of the most powerful impulse of the human heart is open to the danger that passionate, undisciplined men may carry their sensual and imperfect ideas into the very highest subjects. Who can deny that the Christian conception of heaven and hell has suffered such coarse exaggeration, or that in many cases men have dwelt upon their personal destiny in the future life until they have given it an undue predominance over the deepest and noblest tendencies of morality?

But the possibility of abuse is inherent in everything that is intimately connected with the interests of humanity. The highest and noblest, if it is to raise mankind, must first descend into the depths of human nature and assume, as it were, the very flesh and blood of man, in order to spiritualize and ennoble him. A morality which cannot thus condescend remains a thing apart, abstract and ineffectual, and is, moreover, untrue and contradictory, since there is no obligation that is not based upon the will, no law completely alien to human nature. Indeed, where such a moral system is set up as alone justified in existing, and where it is antagonistic to a "more human" system, which aims at harmonizing morality and happiness, it has a positively injurious effect, since it leads

actually to the other extreme, the unbridled and reckless pursuit of pleasure. It was thus that the Stoics, with their impossible rigorism, not only made themselves ridiculous, but promoted the growth of Epicureanism; it was thus that English and Italian Humanism, whilst opposing the Christian ideas of happiness, actually encouraged the crass utilitarianism of *Macchiavelli* and *Hobbes*. Thus we see that in France, together with Jansenism, that insisted upon the absence of all self-interest in morality, there grew up a system of economics that regarded naked selfishness as the natural law; and upon *Kant's* isolation of good will and the subsequent hostility to the Christian doctrine of immortality, there is now following a modern Eudæmonism, which more and more intoxicates itself in the naturalistic dreams of evolution, and to which the norm of right and wrong is pleasure and pain.

It is well known that *Kant* contradicts himself in consequence of his criticism of men's striving after happiness. He holds that in action the will must not allow itself to be determined by any hope of happiness and success, nor by the thought of eternal bliss to be obtained from God; it ought to set aside every suggestion of an aim or of real value and only keep in view the formal law of reason, the universality of the maxims. Subsequently, however, *Kant* has recourse to the conception of the highest good as belonging to all mankind, so that to each individual is assigned proportionately the happiness due to him. *Kant* says that the realization of this good must be demanded for the sake of morality itself, because virtue is worthy of such happiness. But how unnatural, then, is the suggestion to the will that, in striving for this good, the demand itself must be denied, and invariably to desire the good (that in accordance with an interior law inevitably *must* cause happiness) simply from the point of view of duty and never from that of felicity.

Kant is too logical to be able to rid himself altogether of the impression produced by such thoughts, and confirmed by elementary manifestations of the soul life, and consequently he involuntarily substitutes the inferior and narrower idea of sensual satisfaction for the loftier conception of aiming at happiness, and represents all inclinations and needs of the mind as "pathological" affections. According to *Kant*, there is no universal criterion of happiness;

we have only the judgments resulting from experience and determined by the sensation of pleasure; perfect happiness is "not an ideal of reason, but of the imagination, resting merely upon an empirical basis."¹ If this hypothesis were correct, *Kant's* line of argument would have a meaning, but, as a matter of fact, he completely ignores the existence of any spiritual tendency to happiness, belonging both to the reason and the will, and shuts his eyes to the intimate connection between the good as an absolute law and the good as enriching the life of the individual, although this connection is recognized not only by Christians, but by all deep thinkers.

If we look at the teaching of the general Christian life, as contained in the Bible and the doctrines and practice of the Church, we find *both* thoughts. In the first place we hear of law, the will of God, and the moral order, and then of happiness, salvation in God, and the moral sanction; both are connected in a most close and active way, but still so as to distinguish that the first ranks higher than the second. God is the beginning and the end; His unchanging holy perfection is the primary law and the ultimate end of all life. Just as creation proclaims the glory of God, so human action has no higher object than to magnify His Name and to accomplish His Will, that in itself is holy and good. Good is good because it conforms to the divine order and subordinates the individual to the whole; evil is evil because it is at variance with God and His order, and seeks personal gratification apart from truth and sanctity. The way to moral perfection must, on the whole, be one of self-denial and resistance to the desire for pleasure and the pursuit of individual aims, because human nature, limited and finite as it has become through sin, is still further injured in its moral order. But the steep path of self-renunciation, pointed out by the commandments, leads to a goal that affords the highest happiness to the individual; obedience to the absolute Good breaks through the limitations of the creature and bestows upon the soul a stream of divine light and life which not only raises and ennobles it, but increases its energy and happiness.

Man submits with reverence to the voice of conscience because it is the voice of the highest perfection and wisdom; he listens

¹ Grundl. z. Metaph. d. Sitten. (*Kirchmann*, 2d ed.), p. 41.

with awe, half fearing, half hoping, to God's promises announcing the requital for good and evil deeds. As God's judgments are *just*, it is clear that virtue must in itself be worthy of happiness, and vice must in itself deserve punishment; and so what is moral is evidently prior to what brings with it happiness or pain. The heavenly reward is overwhelming, uniting man with God, and the punishment is irrevocable separating him from God forever. Hence a value must be attached to morality that surpasses all other good, and in comparison with which man himself and his natural importance vanish altogether. If our critics had only taken into consideration that, to a Christian, heaven and hell do not stand simply for happiness and misery, for gain and loss, but for reward and punishment, — i.e., for *the expression of moral value*, — they would not have raised the untenable objection that our ideas of heaven and hell detract from the importance of morality. Holy Scripture teaches that an infinitely holy God accomplishes the sanction of the moral law in the way in which He must accomplish it, according to His divine justice, and that man in his moral life on earth sows the seed from which springs his eternal destiny. How, then, could it be possible for the "coarse pictures" of the future life to blind our eyes to the inner beauty and dignity of morality?

People are apt to overlook the symbolism in Holy Scripture and to give a literal interpretation to what is figurative and spiritual. They assign a literal meaning to the wedding feast and other things in the Apocalypse, and so justify themselves in reproaching us for having of heaven a sensual idea worthy of Mahometanism. Even in the Old Testament the idea of the sanctuary in the tabernacle, and especially of the Most Holy Place, as well as expressions in the Psalms and prophetic books, all show that happiness consists essentially in the presence of God and in beholding His countenance. In the New Testament the reward promised to the pure of heart is that they shall see God, see Him as He is, face to face; that they shall be transformed by His glory and be made like unto Christ, and that they shall glorify God in the kingdom of the blessed.¹ This spiritual glory will, it is true, be reflected upon the body after the resurrection, and upon all outward creation, and it will produce a sense of delight of the most exquisite sort. This

¹ Matt. v. 3, xxv. 34; 1 John iii. 2; 1 Cor. xiii. 9; 2 Cor. iii. 18.

is required by the inner unity and relation to God of all that has been created; but this bodily delight is so mysterious that it tends to encourage and edify and not to give rise to sensual and selfish imaginations.

The active blending in Holy Scripture of what is enjoined as law with the personal element, also characterizes *Christian piety*. There is little trace of any conscious effort to separate them, or to put apart what God has joined together. A child prays that God will make him good so that he may go to heaven, and a grown-up person, amidst the temptations and trials of life, looks forward hopefully to the life everlasting. The Church prays that we may be made worthy of the promises of Christ, that we may deserve to enter His glory, and that in His spirit we may see what is right and ever rejoice in His consolation. Although the moral thought of being worthy of admission to the joys of heaven is here constantly mentioned, elsewhere the *overpowering* idea of God and the unselfish element in our service of God shines forth in all its fulness. Into the ordinary Christian life the lofty and all-embracing aim is introduced by the doxology, "Glory be to the Father, etc.," and by dedications of ordinary actions to God. In the "Our Father" we pray, first of all, that God's name may be hallowed, that His kingdom may come, and that His will be done, before we refer to our daily bread or to the forgiveness of our sins. Every Catholic learns in his prayers and from biblical allegories that, of the three *theological* virtues, charity is greater than either faith or hope. While in the most personal act of religion, the reception of the sacraments, all moral considerations play their part, and even fear of punishment is included amongst the permissible motives for contrition, the Church aims nevertheless at perfect contrition, proceeding from the love of God¹; and where in confession this love is still incomplete and cold, it is naturally increased in Holy Communion, the banquet of love, where our glorified Redeemer gives Himself to the soul freed from sin. We can see in *St. Augustine*, the greatest philosopher of Christian antiquity, how the thought of God and His absolute goodness alternates with that of man's own happiness. Some modern writers on ethics fancy that "his chief aim in every department of his work is to promote the

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 101.

well-being of man's own entire nature." This is, however, a mistake, even if we do not take well-being in any narrow or selfish sense, but as meaning "the complete gratification of every part of one's nature, the restoration of all one's powers, and rapture penetrating one's whole being."¹

In all his statements regarding morality *St. Augustine* undoubtedly starts with a desire for happiness; he indeed describes ideal happiness, the development of all man's faculties to their highest perfection, as the most complete *bonum proprium*, the best that man in his essence and subjectivity can receive. But above this gratification of the *ego* is the *summa et incommutabilis bonitas*, God, in His fulness of life and truth. To *St. Augustine* this alone is the centre of the moral order, this alone is the objective good at which we aim, and from which the powers of our mind receive their intensification, fulness, and satisfaction. God is so absolutely the foundation, source, and substance of the happiness of heaven, that all selfish considerations are eliminated from the will and nothing is left but pure love of what is good. "Man can attain happiness only by the means whereby he becomes good," and he becomes good by loving the highest good and by valuing God above everything "for His own sake" and "with no thought of reward." Not every kind of happiness is welcome to me, "nothing," says *St. Augustine*, "is sweet to me that does not lead me to God. May the Lord take everything from me and give me Himself!"² "This is happiness, to rejoice in anticipation of Thee and in Thee and for Thy sake"; "to adhere to God, to live for Him, and through Him to become wise and happy." A good man "lives, beholds, and loves; he lives in God's eternity, he beholds His truth, he rejoices in His goodness."³

Rest in God is at the same time activity, eager contemplation, and loving appropriation of His inexhaustible truth and beauty, and also sympathy with all His creation, love of one's neighbour, and zeal for the *civitas Dei*, the great kingdom of peace. God's infinity alone can supply refreshment and happiness to millions

¹ *Eucken*, Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker, 211; cf. a detailed argument in *Mausbach*, Ethik des hl. Augustinus, I, 51, etc., 84, etc.

² *Enarr.* 2. in ps. xxvi. 16.

³ *Conf.* 10, 32; *de civit.*, 12, c. 1, 3; 11, c. 24.

of His creatures without suffering diminution in the case of the individual or giving rise to feelings of fear and envy.¹

In the very conception of justice and the moral order, and in "those unchanging rules and guiding stars of virtue which reside incorruptibly in universal truth and wisdom," God's everlasting goodness gives light to our understanding. Even reverence for these things is a kind of *caritas*, love of God in the widest sense; and in the same way every offence against the moral order implies a turning of the soul away from God, the absolute Good, and hence there follows, by an inherent necessity, punishment, loss of the happiness possible to a creature.²

The central position assigned by *St. Augustine* to *charity* had a great influence upon the piety and mysticism of later ages. *Fear of God*, as slavish fear of punishment, appears in his writings and those of his disciples almost exclusively in its educational aspect, and it was only later that scholastic writers distinguished the different kinds of fear. Childlike fear of offending God was highly esteemed as a fruit of love, and servile fear, which in the dread of punishment renounces sin, is approved as a first step on the way to love. Slavish fear which dreads punishment but still loves sin is condemned as an immoral imperfection.

Any one who acquires an intimate knowledge of this literature must be impressed by the anxiety displayed by the ascetical and mystical writers to bring Christians not only beyond the imperfect, initial stage of fear, but also beyond the too personal desire for heaven, and to reveal to them something much higher and greater. To prove this it is enough for me to quote a few passages from the "Following of Christ" by *Thomas à Kempis*, the best-known work of the kind. "Without charity, the outward work profiteth nothing. . . . He doth well, who regardeth the common good rather than his own will."³ "Let me love Thee more than myself, and myself only for Thee, and all others in Thee."⁴ "By seeking Thee alone and purely loving Thee, I found both myself and Thee; and by this love have more profoundly annihilated myself."⁵ Perfection consists "in offering thyself with thy whole heart to the Divine

¹ Cf. *Mausbach*, *Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, p. 70, etc., 79, etc.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 92, etc., 115, etc.; *de lib. arb.*, II, 52.

³ I, 15.

⁴ III, 5.

⁵ III, 8.

will; not seeking the things that are thine, either in little or great, either in time or *eternity*.”¹ “Grant that I may learn above all things to seek Thee and find Thee; above all things to relish Thee and love Thee, and to understand all other things as they are, according to the order of Thy wisdom.”² “I had rather be poor for Thy sake, than rich without Thee. I prefer rather to sojourn upon earth with Thee, than to possess heaven without Thee. Where Thou art, there is heaven; and there is death and hell where Thou art not. . . . Bless and sanctify my soul with Thy heavenly blessing, that it may be made Thy holy habitation, and the seat of Thy eternal glory; and let nothing be found in the Temple of Thy dignity that may offend the eyes of Thy majesty.”³ The same spirit of most perfect morality makes itself felt in the writings of *St. Francis of Sales*, who is scarcely less read than *Thomas à Kempis*. It is particularly noticeable in the book called “*Theotimus*,” a treatise on the love of God.

Scholasticism displayed a spirit in no way opposed to biblical and mystical piety, and the efforts of the scholastic writers to attain to clearness of thought have been of great assistance to those attempting to establish the true relation between morality and happiness. But it may be asked, did not the study of *Aristotle*, whom *St. Thomas Aquinas* followed so closely, cause ethical writers to adopt a utilitarian point of view, which is not Christian? Has not the idea of *beatitudo*, resembling the Aristotelian idea of eudæmonism, assumed such prominence as to obscure the proper theory of morality? What has already been said regarding the principle of the moral order shows at once that such a reproach could be justified only if *St. Thomas*, the greatest of the Scholastics, had at the same time been the greatest bungler who did not mind a few manifest contradictions in the foundations of his system. But in his ethics all essential points are in harmony, and the unity of morality and happiness, as recognized by *St. Augustine*, is brought out clearly and thoughtfully by *St. Thomas*. A misinterpretation of the word *beatitudo*, as well as inadequate knowledge of scholasticism in general, no doubt led to the misunderstanding to which I have referred. It is unjust to *Aristotle* to number him with the representatives of eudæmonism in the ordinary sense;

¹ III, 25.² III, 27.³ III, 59.

with him eudæmonism is not subjective comfort, the gratification of desire through pleasure and enjoyment, but the development of human nature to its fullest activity, the intellectual and also the moral perfection of man. Striving after happiness is one of the moments, in the movement to an aim, which proceed from the nature of things and revolve in orderly fashion around a spiritual and divine centre.

St. Thomas adopts *Aristotle's* views, but fills up the gaps in the system and develops tentative suggestions in the spirit of Christianity. The highest Good, whence the sanction of moral obligation emanates, is the all-embracing and perfect essence of God. Being Himself perfect, God could not seek in the creation His own advantage, but only His own honour; i.e., the production of a worthy representation of His perfection. The accomplishment of this end is beneficial only to those creatures who were called forth from nothing to participate in God's goodness. In the case of irrational creatures, the full development of their powers fulfils the aim of their creation, yet not in such a way that these creatures are to be considered an end to themselves. Man, on the contrary, is in some degree an end to himself; his perfection is intimately connected with the highest aim; his nature is capable of a thinking and loving reception of God, as is shown by his innate interest in *all* that is good and true; his life is destined for permanent union with God, as is revealed by the immortality of the soul.¹

The sense of void and disappointment experienced by the human will in all earthly aims and pleasures, and the continual increase in mental vigour and desires, of which a man becomes aware when he seriously investigates truth, are the plainest evidence that he is destined for God. His actual perfection and happiness are found in the recognition and immediate contemplation of God as the infinite fulness of being. The gratification of the will and affections, the feeling of happiness, is not the essence of *beatitudo*, but its consequence and completion. The substance of the highest intellectual life must first be given, and then peace and happiness flow from it. This great substance is so exalted, so far beyond the soul of man, that it fills with love rather than pleasure, with devoted admiration rather than selfish gratification. "We aim at

¹ S. c. Gentil., III, c. 112.

the absolute end in order to possess it, *but it is loved far beyond the measure of its possession.*"¹ "The happiness which includes love and joy is, as it were, an end *subordinate to a higher end*, and uniting us with the highest end of all."²

In speaking of earthly morality also, *St. Thomas* clearly distinguishes between *amor concupiscentiae* and *amor benevolentiae*, the love of desire and the love of benevolence. He says of himself and of all morally-minded Christians: "We love God with the love of friendship rather than with that of desire, because the goodness of God in itself is greater than any advantage which we can receive in its enjoyment. Hence man in *caritas* loves God more than himself."³

Both kinds of love are most closely connected in Christianity, but the absolute never fails to take precedence of the created, the universal of the particular, in all moral relations. According to *St. Thomas*, it is neither desire of happiness nor hope but love of God that constitutes the essence of every moral action, and is the vital principle, the *forma*, of all virtues.⁴ Speaking with profound knowledge of the universal tendency of human nature to exalt the *ego* unduly to the rank of the absolute, *St. Thomas* remarks: "Human nature would never love anything that was not in some sense or other *its own* good, either in reality or in appearance. But human nature loves it, not because *it is its own*, but because it is *good*; for what is good in itself is the object of the will."⁵

If, bearing these fundamental principles in mind, we pass on to some objections and obscurities in the modern treatment of our problem, we shall first of all have to reject as unnatural *Kant's* distinction between the good and goodness, obligation and volition, and the form and matter of our endeavours, which he subsequently tried to bridge over in an artificial manner.

¹ In II, sent. dist. 3, q. 3 ad 3.

² *Ibid.*, dist. 38, q. 1, a. 2; cf. *Mausbach*, *Ausgew. Texte*, § 4.

³ S. Theol., II, II, q. 26, a. 3 ad 3; cf. *supra*, p. 182.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 181.

⁵ In II, sent. dist. 3, q. 3 ad 2. He speaks still more plainly in III, sent. dist. 29, q. 1, a. 3 ad 2: *Quamvis unicuique sit amabile, quod sibi est bonum, non tamen oportet, quod propter hoc sicut propter finem ametur*, quia est sibi bonum, cum etiam amicitia non retorqueat ad seipsum bonum, quod ad alterum optat. Cf. S. Theol., II, II, q. 26, a. 3 ad 2.

The rigorism of some teachers of religion, who violently separate love and hope, is inwardly false, both psychologically and ethically. There is only one God, who is at once the rule of sanctity and the source of happiness; and there is only one soul, which necessarily finds happiness in the love of what is good and divine, never in selfish enjoyment, but only in unreserved love of that which is perfect in itself. We are not merely permitted but we *are bound* to desire true, heavenly happiness, as, in so doing, we are developing the talents given us by God and bringing them from their rudimentary condition to ripeness and strength; and we are making clear and beautiful the likeness of God which He has impressed upon the depths of our souls. *It is God's will* that we should be happy; He desires it for His own glory, as we can see and adore His majesty only in the light of heavenly glorification; we can love Him with all our heart and strength only when we are near Him, and we can be removed from every possibility of falling into sin only when we thus behold and love Him.

The glory of God, regarded as the aim of the universe, compels us to make happiness our own personal aim. On the other hand, a true desire for happiness necessarily rises above itself to pure, adoring love. One who would think, "I am seeking my own safety and happiness in heaven; I could easily dispense with God," would not really be thinking of heaven as represented to us by Christianity, for that consists essentially in the adoration of God, it is His kingdom. A simple Christian who longs for heaven glorifies God by acknowledging his own poverty and dependence as well as God's riches and mercy, and by turning his thoughts to God as a flower turns to the sun. Progress in true morality, and still more its perfection in heaven, precludes all self-concentration and self-idolization. *St. John* saw the ancients and angels in heaven, singing "Holy, Holy, Holy" in love and adoration to the Most High; and in the same way the eyes of the blessed do not rest upon the gifts but on the Giver; and they are consumed by ardent love for God, for it is His boundless love that descends upon man, revealing the Godhead to him.

The good is intrinsically significant, wholesome, and perfect, but it also affords happiness and joy, for the latter are but *the outward manifestation of abundant, healthy life*. In organic nature the reali-

zation of important designs is secured by the sense of pleasure accompanying certain actions. In our intellectual and social life there are possessions and tasks that impress our will by their objective importance, and at the same time afford us sympathetic interest and enjoyment in their realization. In neither case is pleasure the purpose designed by nature, but the stimulus and encouragement of the effort to attain the end valuable in itself. The same is true of things connected with morality. Obedience to the moral law, the higher aim of life, brings with it a pleasant reaction, and the will, being consecrated to what is good, gains in goodness, power, and joy. Even one who, accepting the doctrines of *Kant* and the Stoics, tried to stifle natural inclinations, to flee from pleasure and to aim at the universal and intellectually imperative simply for the sake of its moral worth, could not help feeling that what at first was hard and painful became sweet and easy by practice and with increased knowledge, so intimately are goodness and happiness connected. It is absolutely contrary to nature to attempt to break off this connection and to insist upon representing the inevitable sensation of happiness always as a consequence and never as an aim.

As long as we stop short at particular instances, and do not regard the resulting happiness as a prelude to the ultimate harmony of virtue and joy, our experiences are too fragmentary and weak to strengthen and maintain our moral courage, or even to satisfy our idea of morality. Moral growth is too secret and too much assailed, to hold as universally true that here on earth virtue is its own reward. And where this is claimed to be the case, virtue is shown to be of a superficial character, since it is satisfied and rendered happy by what is imperfect and perishable, and so diminishes the serious conception of duty, the tenderness of conscience, and the dignity of the moral ideal.

There is nothing in the world comparable with the silent heroism of virtue, but just for this reason the virtuous sentiment, or consciousness of its possession, *cannot be its adequate reward*. For (1) it often happens that, owing to the close connection between mind and body, virtue is accompanied by so much pain, anxiety, and uneasiness, or by so many external troubles and persecution, as to lose almost completely its power to comfort and uplift the soul.

In answer to the Stoics, the ancients used to point to the fear of death which during a storm at sea completely overwhelmed a self-sufficient philosopher. An attack of seasickness or a violent toothache are more than enough to put to rout any self-satisfaction arising from a sense of virtue. (2) Moral perfection must be humble and self-forgetful in this world; it is not a conscious but an unaffected greatness. A saint who realized himself to be the most perfect of all living men is — apart from Christ, the God-man — utterly inconceivable. And yet consciousness as such is not a fault, but an advantage; it is in knowledge of self that true inward self-possession consists. But only in heaven, before the face of God, can virtue endure its own full splendour without being tempted to self-exaltation. (3) If a good will is the most perfect thing on earth, it is proper that it should receive the recognition of others. A moral greatness that is never recognized as such, and never makes itself felt, either in the consciousness of the individual or in the world about him, is in this world practically destroyed and annihilated. Here below this sanction, however, is lacking; neither success nor permanent results, neither gratitude nor fame, so regularly follow virtue that we can regard them as a worthy crown and completion of the moral idea. (4) *Kant*, who refused to consider happiness as a stimulus to goodness, admits it only as counterbalancing the troubles and trials incidentally connected with goodness. Even with a Christian the thought of heaven is often taken into account much in the latter way. He rejects attractive temptations, overcomes indolence and difficulties, in order to give free scope to that sense of duty and love of God which bring the moral principle to expression in all its purity.

When compared with hedonism and utilitarianism, Christian ethical teaching is seen to differ (1) in insisting upon *more than external compliance* with the rules of morality. Where the scales of moral justice are held by the force of nature or by the favour and authority of man, all stimulus to and support for inward morality is absent; but God examines the heart also, and the thought of Him purifies and animates the soul in its very depths. (2) Our happiness is, in its essence, not *sensual pleasure*, but *spiritual joy*; hence it is not an obscure, passive sensation, but it is a clear surrender of the will able to appreciate its substance; it is, in short,

mental activity. Such happiness cannot degenerate into egotistical self-seeking. Even the delight at making some scientific discovery or progress cannot be so completely separated from its object, or so selfishly regarded, as a sensual pleasure. But the good things of heaven, being high and abstract, make even greater demands upon the energy of our thought and desires. "Only a heavenly heart can grasp the happiness of heaven." (3) Happiness *proceeds organically from morality* and continues to be *inwardly united with it*, since the moral aim, the deepest ground of obligation, coincides with the substance of happiness. Although this parallelism does not properly apply to every stage and detail of morality, it is obviously true of its development as a whole. It may be argued that the idea of reward is opposed to this view; that reward implies compensation for some action that is of an uncongenial character and felt to be unpleasant. This makes the idea of reward mean payment for mechanical labour. But is not knowledge the reward for scientific research, and family happiness the reward for good training? Christian pedagogy should endeavour, of course, to put more emphasis upon the inner power of good to bring its own reward, and of evil to produce its penalty, but it will never be able to dispense with all reference to the ultimate justice in the next life. (4) The aim of Christian hope is not *individualistic*, as our opponents assert, but, as *St. Augustine* declared, it is the *vita socialis sanctorum*, the *Civitas Dei*. The statements in Holy Scripture, the intervention of angels for the good of men, the doctrines of the communion and intercession of the saints, the teaching of the Church regarding indulgences, etc., all show how actual is the connection, which faith reveals, not only between the members of the Church Triumphant, but also between them and those of the Church Militant and Suffering. The dogma of the resurrection of the body shows that we must not think of the future life as purely spiritual and hostile to the world, but we must believe that everything natural, including our own bodies, is destined to share in God's glory.

Viewed in this context, the thought of a reward in heaven, especially as contained in the teaching of the Church on the subject of *merit*, appears to be a natural consequence of most fundamental ethical principles, provided, of course, that its meaning is not dis-

torted and obscured. People talk a great deal nowadays of the eternal value of morality, but nowhere is this made so clear as in the Catholic theory of merit as conducing to salvation. When even *W. Köhler* regrets that *St. Thomas*, who had no rival in singing the canticle of grace, allowed his theology "to end in merit," we see that the prejudices of the Reformers are still strong and active. Does not the Church's dogma contain the same pure idea of "retribution" and "reward" that pervades the philosophy and religion of all nations that believe in immortality? Did not even *Kant* say that virtue meant "worthiness to be happy," and did he not ultimately postulate the existence of God, precisely in order that, by His omnipotence, happiness might be assigned "exactly in proportion to morality"?¹

These very expressions suggest at once the scholastic doctrine of merit, but with the difference that in *Kant* God's position towards the "autonomous" subject of morality is not dignified, and His omnipotence and mercy are pressed into the service of a self-glorifying virtue, whereas with us God is the *prima causa* and moral legislator, dominating morality from beginning to end, as it is made up of good actions that He will bless and reward, and that He has physically and ethically prompted us to perform. No Catholic theologian has ever represented "merit" as if God and man were standing face to face as independent litigants; none of them has ever spoken of any moral or cosmic excellence that was not due to God's action; all that is good, like all that is, proceeds from the Source of life, and scholasticism inherited this firmly established principle from *St. Augustine*. In saying that God is the cause of all things, we do not exclude the productive activity of the creature, but hold these two things as inseparably interwoven, and this principle of genuine theism has also been upheld by scholasticism, with reference both to morality and to nature. *Luther's* inability to see how these things could be interlaced is analogous to his denial of merit, and is connected ultimately with his tendency to a pantheistic and superficial view of creation.²

¹ Kr. d. pr. V, 133, 149, etc.; cf. *Kneib*, *Die Lohnsucht d. Christl. Moral.*, 1904.

² The pantheistic views of the Arabs led *St. Thomas* also to discuss this important theistic principle (*S. c. Gentil.*, III, c. 69 and 70).

But is it not a defect in Catholic teaching that it considers a reward beyond all proportion as *due* to human effort? Does it not ignore the gratuitous element, the part played by grace in supernatural happiness? If this were really involved in the idea of reward, the blame would have to be laid upon Holy Scripture. Our Saviour bade His disciples "Be glad and rejoice, for your reward is very great in heaven,"¹ and He told them: "With the same measure that you shall mete withal, it shall be measured to you again."² In the same way *St. Paul* says that God "will render to every man according to his works; to them who, according to patience in good work, seek honour and incorruption, eternal life."³ He frequently speaks of the bliss of heaven as a reward or a crown of justice.⁴ We are prevented from giving an external interpretation to these words by other passages where a Christian's life is described as the seed whence the heavenly harvest will spring, as the branch invigorated by the sap flowing from Christ, the vine, or as a development of the spirit of Christ, dwelling in such as are forgiven. The close connection and equality between morality and its reward are expressed in each case with equal clearness, but the latter kind of texts shows that a divine element is imparted to the human will, explaining the proportion existing between moral actions and eternal life.

The dogma regarding the working out of our salvation has been further developed by the doctors and councils of the Church, but these biblical ideas are retained in undiminished force. *St. Augustine*, the *doctor gratiae*, and *St. Thomas Aquinas* do not merely let the doctrine of grace "end with merit," but they introduce merit as a constituent part in the doctrine of grace. The former asks: "To whom will God give the crown that is due? O Paul, thou who art little and great, to whom will He give it? Certainly to thy merits. Thou hast fought the good fight, thou hast finished thy course, thou hast kept the faith; to these merits of thine He will assign the crown that is their due. But, in order that it might be assigned to thee, thy merits were (in the first place) the gift of God."⁵ "To whom could He, as a just judge, give the

¹ Matt. v. 12.

² Luke vi. 38.

³ Rom. ii. 6, 7.

⁴ Col. iii. 24; 2 Tim. iv. 8.

⁵ *St. Augustine*, Sermo 297, n. 6.

crown, if He had not, as a merciful Father, bestowed the grace upon him. . . . The Pelagians would not have expressed any opinion worthy of condemnation, had they understood our merits in such a way as to recognize in them gifts of God.”¹

In the same way *St. Thomas* teaches that there is no proportion, but “the greatest inequality” between human actions and supernatural happiness; “but if we speak of a meritorious action as proceeding from the power of the Holy Ghost, it merits everlasting life *ex condigno*. For we value the merit according to the power of the Holy Ghost, which urges us on to eternal life, as it is written in John iv. 14, ‘It shall become in him a fountain of water, springing up into life everlasting.’ We value it also according to the *dignity of the grace* through which man participates in the divine nature, and, being adopted as a child of God, in virtue of his adoption receives the inheritance, as it is written in Romans viii. 17, ‘If sons, heirs also.’”² The specific moral effect of the Holy Ghost and of grace is *love (caritas)*; in this interior disposition, that regulates the whole being of man with a view to God, lies the fundamental condition and the very soul of human merit.³

Luther abandoned these principles of the Church and Christianity, but the reason for his doing so was not that there were abuses and excrescences in Catholic doctrine, nor that he desired a more serious and stricter carrying out of the absolute, unselfish principle of morality. I cannot deny that *Luther* was able to refer actually to unfortunate misrepresentations of the idea of merit, nor that in many passages he tries to minimize the fear and hope regarding one’s own destiny, in order to lay stress on the higher intention of being good in God’s sight and of living so as to thank and please Him. On the whole, however, his doctrine of justification is more eudæmonistic in character than the Catholic. With him conversion begins with agitating fear and alarm at the prospect of the judgment, having as yet no moral character at all.

¹ De grat. et lib. arb., n. 15.

² S. theol., I, II, q. 114, a. 3, c. Gratia Spiritus Sancti, quam in praesenti habemus, etsi non sit aequalis gloriae in actu, est tamen aequalis in virtute, sicut semen arboris, in quo est virtus ad totam arborem. Et similiter per gratiam inhabitat hominem Spiritus Sanctus, qui est sufficiens causa vitae aeternae, unde et dicitur pignus hereditatis nostrae (*ibid.*, ad 3).

³ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

The desire for forgiveness and its satisfaction in faith in the Gospel have in Lutheranism a more personal and quietistic tendency than perhaps in any other religion. Faith is *fides specialis*, and its living interest turns away from the great world-embracing doctrines of salvation to the troubles and cares of the *ego*. Its task is to supply the *ego* with complete and irrevocable assurance of salvation. Whatever lies beyond this consolation, this certainty of grace and happiness, particularly the energy and duty of moral action, *Luther* carefully excluded from his idea of justification. He has been praised for transferring the happiness, at which he aims, to this world, and for uniting it more closely with morality than Catholic doctrine does. Those who praise him for this fail to see that this sort of happiness, the comfort produced by fiduciary faith, has nothing to do with morality, and that it is far from being that inner development and completion of it which *Plato*, *St. Augustine*, and others had in view. *Luther's* believer is comforted and happy, not because he is pure and good, but in spite of being impure and sinful. *Luther* inevitably rejected the Catholic doctrine of growth in goodness and merit because, in his opinion, grace does not make the bad tree really good, and Christ's sanctity does not penetrate so far into man as to communicate to him any ability to do right. He is therefore eager to hurl arguments against Catholic doctrine which even at first sight are seen to be worthless. For instance, he asserts that Christ would have died in vain if there were any merits, that under those circumstances even pagans and unbelievers could be saved, etc.

With deliberate assurance and perfect appreciation of biblical and patristic tradition, the Council of Trent established the really Catholic idea of merit as a fruit of justification, in answer to *Luther's* distorted views. It emphasized especially the fact that Christ constantly supplies, to those who are justified, that supernatural force which promotes, accompanies, and completes their good works, without which force these works can in no way be pleasing to God and meritorious. In supplying this force Christ shows Himself to be the head of us who are His members, the vine, of which we are the branches.¹ On the subject of meriting heaven, the Council commends those Christians only who "in

¹ Sess. 6, c. 16.

order to overcome their indolence, and to encourage themselves to run their course, *in harmony with the intention of glorifying God above all things*, look forward also to a heavenly reward.”¹

As merit depends upon grace, the duty of humbly thanking God is increased, not diminished, if God by means of grace not only preserves us from guilt, but makes us fruitful in good works and capable of independently attaining our end. The Church has never taught that we have any merit in the sense of being able to confer some benefit or favour upon God, for which He subsequently shows His gratitude to us. *Luther*, on the contrary, represents God as egotistical when he assumes that without this mistaken conception the idea of merit has no meaning. The whole order of the universe and of grace is not the outcome of any need felt by the Creator; however, it is governed by laws which God, in His justice and wisdom, upholds, not for His own benefit, but for His glory. Modern objections to reckoning up merits still echo *Luther's* argument: “In that case we should have to do good and salutary works incessantly, and that is not possible.” Those who think thus fail to see that moral life is a living unity, in which it is quite possible to do right incessantly, provided that the fundamental intention of doing everything for love of God is strongly developed. Where this is the case the individual actions are not isolated and distinct values, capable of being added together like a sum; nothing truly good is lost, the same as in a living organism there is never a moment of growth or a living force that is not effective. Of reckoning up and balancing debits and credits, or, in other words, of wiping out sin by means of good works, there is no suggestion in the teaching of the Church, at least with regard to mortal sin; as to venial sin, theologians ascribe to love the power to remove it, inasmuch as love is the life of the moral organism, and this life, as it becomes more abundant, overcomes small obstacles and disturbances.

It is hard to account for a very widespread idea among Protestants that Catholicism ascribes merit exclusively, or in a predominant degree, to works of *supererogation*, the fulfilment of the Evangelical Counsels. This is quite a mistake. The life of grace manifests itself primarily in the fulfilment of ordinary

¹ Séss. 6, c. 11.

duties, and as long ago as at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, the Church declared in opposition to some heretical views: *Non solum virgines et continentes verum etiam coniugati per rectam fidem et operationem bonam placentes Deo ad aeternam merentur beatitudinem pervenire.*¹ According to *St. Thomas*² and his school, every action of a justified man that is not sinful is good, expedient, and beneficial, because motivated by the spirit of love and meritorious for heaven.³

¹ Denzinger ed., X, 430.

² Qu. disp. de malo, q. 2, a. 5 ad 7.

³ How just the Protestant people are possessed of a very unedifying "reward idea" is revealed by an article contributed by *Pfarrer Grethen* to the "Protestantenblatt" (1912, No. 46). The author discusses the effect upon rustic piety of the wet summer in 1912, and says: "We hear on all sides that the country people were most embittered against God as the Lord of sunshine and rain, and that they did not hesitate to give expression to their indignation. . . . Their firmly rooted idea of reward made them question the divine justice, and the denial of God's existence was of daily occurrence." Had the doctrine of merit and of the *heavenly harvest* awaiting a Christian not been so thoroughly uprooted, the faith of these people would probably not have suffered such disastrous shocks!

CHAPTER V

INTENTION AND ACTION. MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN

EVEN a superficial acquaintance with Catholic morals, scholastic as well as mystical, ought to prevent any one from reproaching the Church with looking at things only from the outside and with teaching external justification. The precise form and emphatic assertion of the principle of *sola fides* shows every thoughtful critic that the original difference between the Catholic and Protestant religions was not the alternative "faith or works," but "faith *alone*" or "faith *and* works." In order to conceal the interior contradictions of his system, *Luther* charged Catholicism with teaching a *purely external morality*, and this charge has been made the main point of Protestant controversy, and it recurs with an astounding persistency. There are few points on which one feels so strongly tempted to agree with *Newman*, in saying that Protestants have always looked at everything Catholic through a telescope and have associated with Catholics as with the deaf and dumb, instead of asking a few questions or consulting a simple Catholic book.

It is hardly credible that a professor in a school oration should assert that the Catholic Church demanded of Christians nothing but good works, "and was indifferent as to the disposition or sentiments in which they were performed"; and that, until the time of *Luther*, the Church looked only at externals, "but cared nothing as to a man's heart." It is difficult to believe that a German Protestant paper could print such a sentence as this: "In the life of a Catholic, works are everything; and the intention, that we Protestants regard as the chief thing, is nothing to them."¹ Even

¹ Der Reichsbote, Berl., 1890, No. 293; Deutsches Protestantenblatt, Bremen, 1892, No. 28 (see *Reichmann*, op. cit., p. 5).

a historian such as *Treitschke* undertakes to say that *Luther* accomplished an imperishable task "by reëstablishing the doctrine that good works without a good intention are worthless."¹

Theologians are more cautious, but though they generally avoid bringing such obviously false charges against Catholicism, they still overlook *the true unity and depth of its teaching* and maintain that Catholics do not regard the work of securing salvation as one uniform, absolute process, but break it up into a succession of many single acts. They discover the reason for this in the fact that the Church takes a wrong view of the inwardness of the religious and moral life, and looks at deeds rather than intentions and at things rather than at persons. In this way the moral law is split up into a number of separate requirements, estimated according to their magnitude; *quantitative distinctions* between good and evil and between *mortal and venial sin* take a prominent place and determine the moral worth or unworthiness of the individual. Protestantism, on the other hand, compresses the process of salvation into the one point of faith, and values all that is external simply as evidence of what is internal, and all action simply as the result of the intention; it stands, therefore, in their opinion, on a higher level with reference to its conception of morality.²

If morality is considered only with regard to its highest and ultimate aim, and man only in his spiritual aspect, there is certainly a temptation to adopt a false "uniformity" and concentrate all moral action and being on one point. For the resolution to do everything for God must embrace all the relations of life, and the will, whose business it is to form this resolution, actually possesses, as the spiritual and universal principle, the power to accomplish this complete surrender to God. If, on the other hand, in considering the object of morality one fixes his eyes chiefly upon its more immediate, relative aims and, with regard to its subject, looks only at exterior actions and efforts, he will naturally consider moral development as progressive and the moral state as a sum of qualities and powers. Pagan and Jewish morals erred through

¹ *Treitschke*, *Politik*, 1897, I, 99.

² *Herrmann*, p. 12; *Luthardt*, *Kompendium der christl. Ethik*, 1896, pp. 89, 212; *Ziegler*, p. 576; *H. Schwarz*, *Das sittliche Leben*, 1901, p. 343; *H. Cass*, II, 184; *Weiss*, *Einl. in die chr. Ethik*, 1889, p. 163.

adopting the latter one-sided opinion. In the history of the Christian Church false mysticism occasionally encouraged an exaggerated monism, in its desire to deliver the elect at once from all the pains and uncertainty involved in progress and to bring them at once to rest in God. This was prompted partly by the prominence assigned to the final aim of religion, which is peculiar to Christian ethics, and also to tracing the new life of justice back to an immediate act of grace on the part of God, as contained in the Christian doctrine of justification.¹

If we look, in the first place, at the *historical evolution* of the Christian life, the contrast between the Catholic and the Protestant theory is clearly marked by a decision of the Council of Trent: "If any one says that justice once received cannot be preserved before God and *increased* by good works, but that works are only fruits and tokens of the justification obtained, . . . let him be anathema."² With regard to this canon *Gass* remarks that it contradicts *Luther's* doctrine, "according to which the justice perceived in Christ, and appropriated by the sinner to cover up (*tegere*) his sins, *always remains the same*, needs no active works to preserve it, and is capable of no growth."³

This Protestant theory is, he thinks, untenable "in this form; it is based upon an obsolete psychology, for, even if justice cannot increase in its religious and historical signification, still the moral personality of the man appropriating it grows indirectly, and the man himself becomes stronger through acquiring fresh powers of will and self-determination." The "psychology" of *Luther's* age cannot be blamed for his untenable opinion of the moral process. The growth of the moral personality by the reception and appropriation of higher powers, which, as *Gass* emphasizes, is a fact recognized by modern psychology, was declared by scholasticism to be the essence of that progress which a Christian living in grace

¹ In the Middle Ages the Church condemned the theory of the Beghards, according to which a Christian in this life can attain to such perfection as to relieve him from any further practice of virtue. *Eckhart*, too, was condemned for stating that God did not really enjoin any outward actions, because He cared only for souls and not for works (Denzinger ed., X, 471, 476, 516, etc.); similar statements by later Quietists were likewise condemned (*ibid.*, pp. 1253, 1260).

² Sess. VI, can. 24.

³ *Gass*, op. cit., II, 1, 184.

should display. *St. Thomas Aquinas*, too, says that the objective basis of grace, viz., God's goodness, is unchanging; therefore grace and charity can grow only in the way that "one man is more perfectly enlightened by the light of grace than another." He says that "the subject shares in charity to a greater extent the more he prepares for and submits to it," and that charity "takes deeper root" and "the likeness of the Holy Ghost is more perfectly reproduced in the soul."¹ No particularly profound psychology is needed to enable any one to see that, in speaking of moral purity and sanctity, we are referring only to "man himself," "to his moral personality," and that growth can only be expected from it and not from the religious and historical foundation of justice, i.e., the work of redemption.

Luther, however, did not grasp this simple fact, and this was due to his new and mistaken "theology," to his doctrine of the imputed justice of Christ, that merely conceals but does not remove sins, and has no effect upon "man himself." Such a forensic act of forgiveness is certainly incapable of development or growth; it cannot produce any truly moral disposition, but a certainty of salvation which finds comfort in the Redeemer in spite of a bad conscience. Only from such a standpoint as this could *Luther* have asserted that the act of faith made all men "just as holy as Mary and the other saints."²

Whoever adopts the interpretation given on page 159 and believes that, according to *Luther's* teaching, grace is lost by grievous sins, to be immediately restored by fresh acts of faith, so that a Christian is always falling and rising again, "living on the forgiveness of sins," altogether abandons the idea of a "uniform" and complete state of morality and acceptability to God, and thus every trace of the superiority claimed for the Protestant standpoint disappears. In order to uphold this claim, others refer to the evidence of justification and the sanctity resulting from it; others again to the moral struggle between the spirit of Christ and evil inclinations, in which struggle the former gradually prevails and the good disposition becomes firmly established and brings forth fruit. But they cannot deny that *Luther* regarded this

¹ S. theol., I, II, q. 112, a. 4, c; II, II, q. 24, a. 4 ad 3; a. 5 c. ad 3.

² *Walch*, XI, 3144.

sanctification as of less importance than faith, and that he derived the true consecration and life of the soul from faith alone, and did not even admit that moral actions could increase the inner worth of an individual.¹ In this way a dividing line is drawn between religion and morals, between faith and its outward manifestation, and thus the boasted unity in *Luther's* conception of the Christian life is seen to have no foundation.

In discussing how the life of a Christian develops in time, Catholicism adopts a point of view which, whilst recognizing the relative, changing, and progressive aspect of all created things, does not overlook the absolute, permanent, and essential side of morality. The process of conversion and sanctification is by no means split up "into a number of atomistic acts"; the essential sanctification of an individual, his transition from sin to a child of God, appears as *one, momentary act*. The Catholic theory is misunderstood, partly because the preliminary steps taken by the sinner, which dispose him for the reception of grace, are confused with justification. The former require as a rule a certain amount of time, but the latter is accomplished suddenly, both in the sacrament of penance and in awakening perfect contrition.

St. Thomas, like all Catholic theologians, teaches that "the infusion of grace takes place in a moment, not gradually." The act of the will, by which a man turns to God in love, occupies no length of time; the transition from darkness to light, from death to life, from purely created existence to the higher divine mode of being, is accomplished in one indivisible act of becoming.² There is no intermediate condition between the state of sin and that of grace; between the union with God that we call justice and friendship with God, and the separation from Him that characterizes the fall from grace. In opposition to *Luther*, the Church understands the biblical words referring to our rebirth in a mystical and positive sense, thus showing plainly how "absolute and uniform" the new life of the Christian is in her sight, in contrast with a mere enhancement of the natural life.

The same biblical words guarantee also the other truth, that a definite exclusion of what lies in the past does not preclude a

¹ Von der Freiheit e. Christenmenschen (Erlangen ed., XXVII, 183, 191).

² S. theol., I, II, q. 113, a. 7.

development in the future, and that the point where the old existence ends is not a terminus, but the beginning of an upward trend of life. A judicial act of amnesty and the imputation of another's merit may have unity and limitation in the first sense, but the procreation and birth of a human being have unity and completeness in the second. A development of life, ever producing something new, follows upon the moment of origin; and this one, permanent life unfolds its powers, sometimes with joyful growth, sometimes in conflict with troubles and sickness. The same union of a fixed and a movable element occurs in our love of God, which we have seen to be the moral expression of the life of grace. It must be a love "above everything" and "from the whole heart," a complete surrender of all that is personal to the highest Good. It requires us to abandon all that is displeasing to God and to resolve to be loyal to Him in all circumstances of life. Even the lowest degree of *caritas*, according to *St. Thomas*, excludes mortal sin. But this exaltation and perfection of soul are not quietistic and unfruitful, certain of salvation, like *Luther's* faith; for love involves entering into the mind of the beloved, partaking in his interests and aims. God is infinite, and the tasks that He has set us cannot be measured and so our love must necessarily proceed from rest to action, and by means of holy activity it must develop its own being in likeness to and conformity with God. This development of the soul in the state of grace is not something belonging to a lower, secondary stage of life, as *Luther* taught—it is the development of the life of faith and grace itself, and is filled with its divine dignity and everlasting importance.

There can be no doubt that this Catholic theory is found in the New Testament. By baptism we become "new creatures" and "saints," and it marks an absolute beginning, the implanting of a new and higher being in man. At first this new life is delicate and rudimentary; Christians are called "little ones" and "children," who can digest only milk, not solid food; but gradually they grow to the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ and become "perfect."¹ The life of the inward man is "renewed day by day"; the zealous Christian advances in the light of faith "from glory to glory," and "he that is just, let him be justified still, and he

¹ 1 Cor. iii. 1, xiv, 20; Ephes. iv. 13, etc.; Heb. v. 14, etc.

that is holy, let him be sanctified still.”¹ Although love is a complete and unconditional surrender of the heart, it can still vary in degree, it can advance and stumble; it can bring forth fruit in greater or less abundance, and consequently there are differences in sanctity and in the heavenly harvest resulting from it.²

With reference to *St. Paul*, there have been lively discussions among Protestant theologians, leading to what can only be described as a confirmation of the Catholic theory. *A. Ritschl* pointed out that, in considering his relation to God, the apostle does not by any means manifest that constant discontent which *Luther* desires to awaken in man as a motive for faith in Christ. *Wernle* went further and denied that *St. Paul*, apart from occasional moods, felt himself to be a sinner at all. “*Paul* arrived at that total deliverance from sin which a Protestant is accustomed to hope for only in the world to come”; he expected of his readers, not further moral development, but completed righteousness.³

In answer to these statements, *Gottschick*, *Jacoby*, *Braun*, and others have shown that the truth lies midway between the extremes; that a Christian is indeed raised above sin and, leaving his evil past behind him, advances joyfully in the consciousness that he is the child of God. But the life of salvation is not a thing completed, it is a “beginning,” subject “to development”; and this development is not always in a straight line, but it meets with many obstacles, swervings from the path, and trials, which show the need of vigilance and humility, and mingle the triumph of victory with the pain and sorrow of conflict. *St. Paul* knows that it is possible for a man to fall back into his former state and to sin in the fullest sense of the word, but he recognizes also unavoidable minor faults and imperfections. “Transgressions that are to be regarded as sins due to want of thought may occur even in the life of a normal Christian, and in this sense *Paul* also probably adopted the prayer of the publican and the fifth petition of the *Paternoster*.”⁴

Here we touch upon another aspect of the problem; viz., the

¹ 2 Cor. iv. 16, iii. 18; Apoc. xxii. 11.

² Matt. xiii. 8; 2 Cor. ix. 6.

³ *Wernle*, *Der Christ und die Sünde*, 1897, p. 24.

⁴ *Jacoby*, *Neutestam. Ethik*, p. 325, etc.

question how unity and multiplicity are interwoven in the *object* of morality. The description of the smaller faults, that *St. Paul* ascribes even to a normal Christian life, tallies perfectly with the Catholic idea of venial sin, which Protestant controversialists are in the habit of regarding as evidence of our superficial conception of morality.

Catholic morals preserve the right mean between two extremes with reference also to the *substance* and *matter* of moral activity. In the development of a moral code, it is not enough to have a high standard, it must be comprehensive in order to bring unity and multiplicity, the absolute and the relative, into their due relations. Our opponents say that Catholicism allows the intention, the interior personality, to be obscured by works and external aims that are promoted or retarded, attained or rejected; they maintain that the Church judges of good works, the same as of sins, by their magnitude, and not according to the purity or malice of the personal intention. If we take the word "intention" in its widest sense, the question resolves itself into this: Is it in accordance with Catholic teaching or practice to describe as moral an exterior work or result unaccompanied *by any mental understanding or volition*? It is an elementary principle in Catholic morals that understanding and freedom are essential to the morality of an act. A sin committed without consciousness and freedom, is no sin at all; an act of heroism, performed by a man who is asleep or intoxicated, is not meritorious. "A thing enters into the sphere of morality inasmuch as it is voluntary."¹ "He who has a will is said to be good so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have."² "An ignorance, which with our best efforts we cannot overcome, is called *ignorantia invincibilis*. Such ignorance is not a sin, because it is not voluntary, and because it is not in our power to remove it."³ "Sin resides essentially in the act of the free will, which is the faculty of desire and reason."⁴ "Sin is possible by means of the senses in as

¹ *Thom.*, S. c. Gentil., III, c. 9.

² S. theol., I, q. 5, a. 4 ad 3.

³ *Ibid.*, I, II, q. 76, a. 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, cf. 77, a. 6; cf. S. c. Gentil., III, c. 10: *Morale vitium in solo actu voluntatis primo et principaliter invenitur; et rationabiliter, cum ex hoc actus moralis dicatur, quia voluntarius est. In actu igitur voluntatis quaerenda est radix et origo peccati.*

far as the senses are subject to the reason."¹ "Virtues exist in the appetitive faculties only in a derivative sense. In their original and primary meaning they reside in the reason and will, because the essential act of moral virtue is choice, and this belongs to the reasonable will. In its subsequent effects, however, choice has a bearing upon the emotions of the *vis irascibilis* and *concupiscibilis*."²

There is no need to make further quotations from Catholic authors in support of this principle; it is stated as the most obvious and elementary truth in every work on morals. So much stress is laid upon the inner direction of the will that moralists are almost unanimous in saying that the outward carrying out of a good or bad resolution does not affect its morality, it only causes it to overflow upon the outward act, except in the case where the outward action reacts in a stimulating and strengthening manner upon the will.³

The great importance attached to the inner necessity and to freedom is shown by the fine distinctions between different degrees of consent on the part of the will, especially in the case of sin. There are sins of ignorance, passion, and malice. In all some amount of perception of the evil of sin, and some freedom in consenting to it, are taken for granted; but the wickedness and responsibility of the act are diminished if the insight and freedom of the mind have been clouded by erroneous representations or passionate emotions. A sin of malice, however, being an act of a perverted will, is altogether wicked and its guilt is unmitigated. This sin is "in a higher degree peculiar to the will," having originated in it; it affects matters of principle, is more permanent and harder to cure than sins committed through passion.⁴

In estimating the freedom of and responsibility for a man's moral

¹ De malo, q. 7, a. 6 ad 8.

² De virt. card., a. 4 ad 13.

³ Thomas, S. theol., I, II, q. 20, a. 4; *Alphons.*, I, n. 40; *Lehmkuhl*, 10th ed., I, n. 36; cf. *St. Anselm's* beautiful exhortation to religious (Epist., III, 133): "Every praiseworthy or blameworthy act derives its praise or blame from the will. From the will proceeds the root or beginning of all actions over which we have control; and if we cannot do what we would, we are yet judged before God in accordance with our will. Therefore keep your eyes fixed not only on what you do, but also on what you will; look not so much at your works as at your intention."

⁴ S. theol., I, II, q. 78, a. 4.

actions, account must be taken of his habitual dispositions and the good and evil tendencies inherent in his soul. In opposition to the false principle that an unbeliever commits sins even in his involuntary evil impulses, *St. Thomas*¹ remarks that those who presume this to be the case must assume these impulses to be much *more sinful in the case of believers*, since, *ceteris paribus*, a believer, by committing the same sin as an unbeliever, sins *more grievously* than the latter.²

This true remark can be used against *Luther's* opinion that the stirring of concupiscence is an actual sin, imputed as such to an unbeliever, but covered over and forgiven in the case of a believer. It is one of the glories of Catholic morals to have always upheld free, intellectual origin of morality against every deterministic attack; and scholasticism did much to remove certain obscurities on this subject in the teaching of *St. Augustine* and of theologians in the early mediæval period. In *Luther's* teaching, and that of sects akin to him (Jansenism), we at once meet with a confusion of physical and moral ideas and an undervaluing of the free, personal element in man's actions. Even at the present time Protestants regard purely natural and indifferent things as moral faults and real sins; they feel obliged to deny the sanctity of men like *St. Jerome* and *St. Augustine*, because they had to struggle against an irritable temperament and temptations to sensuality. Such a view obscures the inward character and personal determination of morality, and *Kant's* saying, that in the whole world nothing was valuable except a good will, is denied its true signification. How definite and clear in contrast is the formula of the Catholic principle as given by our teachers of morals: "An act is called moral which has to do with the morals of a man, or in which a man, *by his personal self-determination, imposes on himself an inward code which makes him worthy of praise or blame. This is done by free and deliberate acts, and only in this way.*"³

¹ De malo, q. 7, a. 3 ad 17; cf. my Thomas-Texte, §§ 6, 42, 45, 53, 54, and *supra*, p. 154.

² Heb. x. 29; 2 Peter ii. 21.

³ *Lehmkuhl*, Theol. mor., I, n. 27. Catholic ethical teaching does not, of course, overlook the fact that free acts may give rise to circumstances to which a moral importance must be assigned, but which are no longer wholly subject to free will.

Great emphasis is therefore laid, in Catholic morality, upon inward character, upon the fact that a deed is the free expression of the will; and surely this is what is meant by "intention." In comparison with the deed and its immediate result, there is a reference to a *higher* intention, to which the immediate reality is subordinated. In almsgiving we must look not only at the willingness to part with one's property, but at the deeper motives for giving it away. An injury to one's neighbour must be judged in one way if it is done to avenge a crime or to defend one's honour, and in another if it is the outcome of a base desire for gain. Does Catholic moral teaching overlook the importance of motives and aims? Does it regard only the amount given in alms, the length of time spent in prayer, the actual value of a thing stolen, without seriously taking into account the inward motives for such actions? If so it may well be charged with encouraging pagan and pharisaical opinions. But we have already seen that, according to the unanimous teaching of our moralists, for a deed to be morally good, the *end in view*, the *means taken*, and the *circumstances* accompanying the deed must be good. We must desire what is good, *and desire it for the sake of what is good* (*propter bonum, sub ratione boni*). In judging of the morality of an action, we have to distinguish the external act itself and the internal will that prompts it.

"Each of these acts has its own peculiar object. The final end in view is, in the proper sense, the object of the inward act of the will, and the matter of the outward activity is the object of the latter. Just as the outward activity is specifically determined by its object, so the inward act of the will receives its specific character from the end in view, as its own peculiar object. What proceeds from the will is the formal element in relation to the exterior activity, for the will makes use of the organs as its instruments, and outward actions are moral only in as far as they are voluntary. Hence the specific character of human action is considered formally in accordance with the end in view, and materially in accordance with the object of its external activity. Thus *Aristotle* says that a man who steals in order to commit adultery is an adulterer rather than a thief."¹

"A will cannot be called good if an evil intention underlies it.

¹ S. theol., I, II, q. 18, a 6.

A man who gives alms in order to win vain reputation, wills to do what is in itself good from the point of view of evil. In the way in which he wills it, it is evil; therefore his will also is evil."¹

Since there are certain aims which generally confuse and bewilder a man's moral sense, because they urge themselves as objects of his daily actions and lower his "intention," the Catholic teaching has, since the time of the Fathers of the Church, recognized and resisted the passions corresponding to them as the seven chief sins. Many learned treatises on morals, and many popular books on confession, as well as allegorical representations in art, direct attention to their disastrous influence. On the other hand, the virtues are represented not only as a series of good actions, but as a *habitus*; i.e., as inward moral conditions which through constant practice take root in the soul, overcome its natural indifference and selfishness, and give it a firm and joyous inclination to what is good. Thus morals do not merely aim at intention in general, in the way *Kant* describes it, but at an intention which more and more overcomes psychological obstacles in doing what is good, and by loyal fulfilment of duty and endurance of labour arrives at a morality that is natural in the higher sense of the word — i.e., spontaneous — and full of vigour and zeal.

"The goodness or badness of the will depends chiefly upon its aim — i.e., upon that on which the will is set; and quiet concentration of the will and of every effort on what is good is joy; hence from the joy of the human will it is possible to recognize a good or a bad man. He is good and virtuous who rejoices in works of virtue; he is bad who delights in evil deeds."²

These principles are accepted by Catholic theologians without any exception, and even their opponents bear witness to the fact of their doing so by reproaching them with allowing the "direction of the intention," the interior "reference to the end in view," and the "good disposition" to influence unduly the morality of actions. These very charges show that our moralists properly lay great stress upon the moral aim. If their opponents were not accustomed simply to repeat, without examining them, all the old objections to Catholic morals, they could not adopt such phrases

¹ S. theol., I, II, q. 19, a. 7 ad 13; cf. also Thomas-Texte, §§ 39, 40.

² *Ibid.*, I, II, q. 34, a. 4.

as "justification by works" and "the end sanctifies the means." They would have to consider the "subtle scholastics" and "shrewd Jesuits" to be so dull and stupid as to teach that the objective wickedness of an action disappears when it is performed with a good intention, whereas its goodness and merit remain no matter what the intention and disposition may be with which it is done.

A deeper and more general meaning may be assigned to the word "intention." Above the aims and virtues rises one highest aim and ideal of morality. Catholic moral teaching requires our direction of all actions and desires to *this* highest aim and *final end of morality*; and this direction in its highest and most efficacious form is the love of God, the *central* virtue of a Christian life, the "soul" of all other virtues.

Many modern writers speak of moral disposition thoughtlessly without asking in what it consists and what it really tends to. Intention is the direction of the will, of affections and endeavours; a purely subjective intention, without aim and object, is plainly a contradiction. *St. Augustine* says, "Virtue is to love, but to love that which is worthy of love." "Love, but take care what you love!"¹

Christianity teaches the love and fear of God as the fundamental intention in morality; this is its most intelligible form, and one that satisfies all philosophical thought. The Catechism teaches the child that the aim of his life is to love and serve God, and he is advised to consecrate all his daily occupations by doing them for the glory of God. Theology demands a *relatio operum in Deum*, a thorough and habitual relation of all actions to God, so that "the force of this first direction to the final end remains in all subsequent actions, as also the force of the highest aim remains in all subordinate aims."² In any case it recognizes no merit unless the disposition to love God resides in the heart, together with sanctifying grace. "By love the soul is united with God, who is the life of the soul, just as the soul is the life of the body"; works not brought into connection with this vital principle are "dead."³

¹ *August.*, Epist., 155, 13; in ps. XXXI, II, 5.

² *Thomas*, In II sent. dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5 ad 7.

³ *De malo*, q. 7, a. 1; *Thomas-Texte*, §§ 55, 49, 50.

St. Thomas states emphatically that the absolute value of morality and the essential happiness of heaven depends upon "the intensity of the love, not the greatness of the works"; for God regards the motive more than the magnitude of the action (*Deus magis pensat, ex quanto, quam quantum fiat*).¹ This sentence seems to have been written with a view to refuting beforehand the Protestant accusation that Catholicism has a "quantitative" method of judging moral actions.

Here, too, as with all ideals and profound obligations, the realization is often far behind the theory. In barbarous times, and when men are rough and uneducated, their thoughts and aims are often fixed upon the external, realistic aspect of good and evil, since this only is within their comprehension. The Church in her instructions and penitential discipline was forced to lay stress upon an earnest obedience of the moral law, and ignorant or short-sighted critics might misunderstand her so far as to suppose that she attached equal importance to this outward compliance with the law as to the inward disposition; but such a mistake is possible only where there is inadequate knowledge or a culpable ignorance of the principles laid down by the Church. A more general difficulty is found in the supernatural dignity of the Christian aim in life. It is not so easy to lift the ordinary occupations of daily life naturally and spontaneously to the height of a religious ideal, as it is to value them according to their human results and to work them up into a business system. Where the thought of God is not a lively one and does not permeate a man's whole existence, and where there is a failure to grasp the moral duties in their connection with one another, we often find unhappily that piety and the faithful discharge of duty in things of this earth diverge, and that love of God has not yet become the element in life which glorifies and dominates everything else, even the smallest temporal details, social courtesy, and attention to one's calling.²

¹ In III sent. dist. 29, q. 1, q. 8 ad 2; Thomas-Texte, § 51. The expression can be traced to *St. Cyprian*, de opere et eleemos., 15.

² Secular teachers are careful to show a child that he is connected with the civilization of mankind and with distant races and remote ages through the most trivial things about him. In the same way teachers of religion ought to make it plainer that a "good intention" does not merely superficially accompany our little daily duties, but that in the conscientious fulfilment of them

Secular writers on speculative ethics criticise Protestant piety in the same way, and perhaps more sharply; and the human element, which always attaches to what is sacred, is by no means enough to account for the obstinacy and violence with which Protestant controversialists accuse the Catholic Church of undervaluing the inward disposition to morality.

There is, as a matter of fact, a real conflict of principles underlying this charge. At the outset Protestant ethics emphasized the inner disposition so pointedly that activity had to suffer harm; the eye of the mind was directed to God in so spiritual a fashion that the moral value of created things was overlooked. Catholic moral teaching insists upon the moral disposition and the religious unity of all morality, but within this disposition and unity it strictly maintains the importance of individual duties. If the works, with regard to their value, depend upon the intention, to some extent the intention depends upon the works. There are actions so positively good or bad that they cannot be performed with a contrary intention, and their occurrence *eo ipso* reveals a good or bad disposition, although ineffectual nobler tendencies may run parallel to it. A man cannot truly love and honour his parents if he disobeys their earnest and reasonable commands; nor can he possess the purest patriotism if he evades payment of the taxes due to the state. In the same way a moral disposition is not a mere good-natured, ideal enthusiasm for the welfare of humanity, nor is it a quietistic absorption in God, but an inner adherence to a real order, branching off in many directions, upon which depend the welfare of mankind and the glory of God. *Luther* says explicitly: "In this faith all works are equal and one is the same as another; *all difference vanishes between works*, whether they be great, small, short, long, many, or few. For the works are not pleasing for their own sake, but for the sake of the faith, which alone and without distinction is present, works, and lives in each and every deed, no matter how many and how various they may be, just as all the members receive life from the head, and move and have their name; and without the head no limb can live, move, or have a name."¹

there is really at least an indirect promotion of God's glory, of the salvation of our souls, and of the edification of Christendom. ¹ *Walch*, X, 1570.

This principle still affects Protestantism. *Harnack* remarks that, in applying it to the Catholic doctrine of justification by works, *Luther* was opposing the fundamental error of the view adopted by the moralists and Pelagians, "*as if anything but God Himself had any value before God*"; also that in this way he destroyed the "refined dualism" that runs through the whole Catholic theory of Christianity.¹

Thus many utterances of modern ethics are based, consciously or unconsciously, upon the principle that, in comparison with the ideal aim of our thoughts, "all differences in works disappear" and that all individual rules are consumed by the glow of faith. There is occasionally a touch of historical irony when, for instance, the "*Deutsche Evangelische Frauenbund*," in its declaration of principles against the modern views of life and marriage, said in 1910: "Modern ethical teaching is dangerous on matters of principle, and is consciously hostile to Christianity, although, when occasion serves, it quotes passages from the Bible, torn out of their proper context. In its exaggerated individualism it values *only the motive, and never the act*, and obliterates the differences between our judgment of an action and our judgment of the man performing it."²

It was *Luther* who introduced and spread this "exaggerated individualism." With the intention of representing faith and inward confidence in God as the essence of Christian piety, he fell into the fatal error of describing the relations of creatures to one another, and the works resulting from these relations, as purely external, placing all on an absolute equality. "Thou hast no duty to God but to believe in Him and confess Him; in all other things He leaveth thee free and unfettered, so that thou mayst do as thou wilt, without any danger of conscience."³

This liberty is restricted only by consideration for one's neighbour, not by any thought of *the interior opposition offered by certain actions* to the very essence and wisdom of God. "In God's

¹ Dogmengesch., 4th ed., III, 850.

² *Sell*, too, remarks (op. cit., p. 203) that Protestantism "cannot recognize any real difference in value between one duty and another, since every duty comprises one of God's commandments.

³ Weimar ed., XII, 131.

sight it does not matter whether a man leaves his wife or not, for the body is not united to God, but given freely for all outward purposes, and it is God's only internally by faith; but in the sight of men the marriage bond must be preserved." ¹ *Luther* had recourse to the same argument in attacking the doctrine of *opera supererogatoria*, the higher dignity of the religious life, etc., and many theologians of the present day do the same; but the fact should not be overlooked from whence the argument is derived, and that its disastrous results are far-reaching.

The first and most inevitable of these results is that not only all good works, but also all *sins*, not immediately referring to God, are *perfectly equal*. For if the value of the action and the inner perfection of things are not taken into account when a man turns in faith to God, they are equally unimportant when he turns away from Him. We can understand, therefore, why *Luther* considered it a "harmful error" on the part of the Sophists "to distinguish sins *secundum substantiam facti*; i.e., according to the works in themselves and not according to the faith or want of faith in the agent. *A believer commits just as grievous sins as an unbeliever, but in the case of the believer they are forgiven and not imputed to him, whilst in that of the unbeliever they are retained and imputed, and so to a believer that sin is pardonable which is mortal to an unbeliever.*" ²

Harnack, too, declares it to be one of the chief points in the Evangelical faith that it does not distinguish between one sin and another, as Catholicism does." ³ Some moralists, *Melanchthon* amongst others, disagree with *Luther* on this point and discriminate between grievous and slighter transgressions "according to their substance"; but how can they then endorse *Luther's* fundamental statements regarding good works and even commend them?

When *Luther* says that sin is not imputed to the believer, we see another result of his principle. What he calls "pardonable" sin is not the same as "venial" sin in the Catholic sense, but has ceased to be sin at all, since no guilt is attached to it. If, with reference

¹ *Walch*, VIII, 1128.

² *Walch*, VIII, 2730; cf. the quotation from *St. Thomas*, *supra*, p. 246.

³ *Dogmengesch.*, 4th ed., III, §87.

to the final aim of religion, all relative values are *alike*, then they have no real *significance* for it at all; and if all acts of earthly morality are "equal" before God, they become perfectly indifferent. If murder and adultery are not in themselves worse than the unavoidable daily faults, then transgression of the moral law loses its absolute character, and the only sin capable of separating man from God is unbelief. This line of argument brings us back again to the conclusion that, in *Luther's* opinion, faith is compatible with sin. *Harnack* makes the same deduction, for immediately after the passage quoted above, in which he declares the equality of all sins to be a Protestant doctrine, he goes on to say that "a Christian lives on the forgiveness of sin, and in spite of sin and guilt is a child of God."

If we wish to discover the fundamental error in *Luther's* views, we shall find the clue to it in *Harnack's* statement that *Luther* was opposing the theory "that anything had any value in God's sight except Himself." This is undeniably a thorough uprooting of the "refined dualism" of Catholic morals, but in itself it is nothing but *refined pantheism*. History supplies us with many instances of it; the equality of all good works and sins was taught by the pantheistic Stoics and Hindoos, by the Gnostics in the early ages of Christianity, and by some mystics with pantheistic tendencies in the Middle Ages. If God is everything and things created exist only in appearance, then no significance can be attached to any action aimed at anything created, and this is avowed Pantheism.¹

The false deduction of refined, practical Pantheism is this: "If morality in the highest sense is derived from faith or love, and if without this reference to God no work is truly moral, then the value of the work in God's sight is determined, not by its character, but by the fact of faith or love; and consequently to one in good faith all works are alike." We might just as truly argue thus: "If in the night everything looks black, and if it is the sunlight that imparts to bodies their colour and brilliancy, then in this *one* light all things must assume the *same* colour and lustre." Or, to use a metaphor employed by *Luther* himself: "If all the members

¹ Pantheism in its cosmic form can, of course, lead to quite the contrary ethical conclusion and to purity of morals in this life.

derive their life from the head, and without the head no member can live or move or have a name," then it follows that eye and ear, heart and brain are not distinguishable at all in their action or in their objects. The latter conclusions are obviously false, and it is equally false to say that "as works are not pleasing to God for their own sake, but on account of faith, they are all alike and there is no difference between them."

God is the *Sun* in Christianity, but not a sun that by its brilliancy destroys all created beauty; but He is a sun which, as the efficient cause, calls all created things into being and makes them reveal the splendour of their various colours, and also, as the final end of morality, raises all created ideals and aims to the clear light of morality, though their moral beauty and dignity vary greatly.

Love is the *soul* of all Christian actions, not a soul which, as in the lowest organisms, animates the body without reference to particular functions, but one that controls a very highly developed organism, assigning to every organ a particular task and to every sense a specific energy. In God's sight not He alone is of value, but His regard includes the universe, created by Him with such infinite wisdom, and, above all, the human race, to each individual of which He has appointed his place and his round of moral duties.¹

St. Thomas solves the sophism, that has confused so many intellects, in the following way: "The *equality* of all virtuous acts seems to be supported by the fact that a work receives the quality of being virtuous from the *aim of all good*; hence, as all good actions are directed to *one* moral end, they might all appear to be good in the same degree. But although there is only one highest aim of the good, the actions, deriving their goodness from it, receive goodness in *various* degrees. There are differences of degree among the good acts directed to the final end, according as they are *more perfect and closer to the final end*. Therefore, *in the will and its acts also, there are gradations of goodness*, according to the diversity of the good things to which the will and its actions are directed, although the final end is the same."²

¹ Cf. *Mausbach*, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, I, 213, etc.

² *S. c. Gent.*, III, 139; cf. also *supra*, p. 136.

In the Catholic theory of morals the recognition of an absolute Good, whence the peculiar consecration, obligation, and merit of good deeds are derived, is connected with the recognition of a relative good, on which the diversity and the specific gradation of moral acts are based.

The goods connected with family life, property, honour, civil government, culture, etc., receive in the light of the highest aim, a moral and in so far an absolute significance; but the peculiar character of each is retained and the duties of continence, justice, patriotism, and piety are specifically different, although they all possess the common character of duty.

The same is true of the differences and degrees within the province of the same duty. If the acts of creatures and their significance in personal and social life are to be recognized as having a moral value, their diversity must have definite effects upon morality; and here we reach the dreaded "quantitative valuation" of good works and sins. If an injury to the rights of property is not only a breach of the law, but a moral offence, a sin, then the theft of a costly object cannot, in either ethics or law, be precisely the same as the theft of a less valuable thing. Where the circumstances are the same, a theft of one hundred dollars cannot involve the same degree of sinfulness as a theft of fifty dollars. If, from the moral point of view, the difference of fifty dollars is nothing, then the first fifty dollars stolen must also be nothing. To poison a whole community must be a more serious sin than to kill one person; if the loss of life of the greater number does not affect the moral valuation of the act, then the loss of one life cannot deserve notice.

Hence the "actual" valuation of a moral act, though not its essential and most important aspect, is inseparably connected with the foundations of all morals. If in the light of faith all works are equal, morality ceases to be anything but a general, vague "disposition" to wish to do right. Such a disposition does not of itself induce men to be moral. For if all things are *equal* in God's sight, if one aim set before creatures is not more moral than another, why should "faith" or a "moral disposition" make a man choose to do one thing rather than another, prefer chastity to impurity, honesty to theft? Just as soon as we ignore the inner nature of

things and their inherent determination to some end, and declare them to be morally indifferent, the *moral impulse* is confronted with a chaotic mass of indifferent possibilities, and moral freedom of choice degenerates into blind license, and finally in complete lawlessness. If I resolve to found a refuge for the sick or for orphans, for the glory of God, I must necessarily recognize the work as good in itself before I can perform it as an act of homage to God.

Hence *St. Thomas* and the Catholic moralists teach that what is indifferent may be sanctified by a good aim, but not *directly* by the *highest* aim; I cannot say: "I will stand on my head for the glory of God!" What is earthly and temporal must first be brought by its inner teleology into order with the reasonable *life of mankind* before it can be consecrated to God and share in *eternal* life. Morality is an organism of which the whole resides in its parts, but in which also the parts live each in its own way and condition the whole. Thus God's goodness, the source of all being, is at the head of all good things, and as all being emanates from God not naturally, but according to spiritual ideas, and therefore in an infinite variety of ways, so these same ideas form laws of action, characteristic links between the one highest good and the multiplicity of life.

In deciding individual questions of morals, we have to take into account the personal element, circumstances, calling, etc., as well as the objective idea. But what is there to guide any one in his deliberations if there are no individual ideas of morality to connect the concrete instance with the absolute? How can I reasonably determine my profession if all careers with their duties and dangers are morally alike and indifferent? Can *circumstances* alone guide me if, in thought, I cannot *start* with some objectively valid ideas of morality? If there are no species of good or bad, there can be no specific circumstances; if we have no degrees of goodness and badness, we cannot weigh and compare things from a moral point of view. If there is no objective standard to assist the conscience in the development of moral ideas, we shall be driven either to the subjectivity of a false mysticism, that expects a divine inspiration at every moment, or to a purely empirical utilitarianism, that regards only the temporal result of the action,

or finally to anomistic quietism, which, relying on the sensation of inner union with God, dispenses with all outward morality.¹

What has been said will lead to an understanding of the difference between *mortal and venial sin*. I say it will lead, for the question still remains whether the distinction between various kinds of sin is really so essential and far-reaching as, according to Catholic doctrine, is that between mortal and venial sin. But here again we perceive the correct union of the absolute and relative factors in morality, such as a consideration of human nature and of the objective foundations of morality demands. In virtue of his intellectual faculties man is able to bring together the whole of his life into one moment; by means of a total surrender of himself to God and His grace he can rise above time, above the "endless succession" of earthly existence, to a definite end of his development, that is also the beginning of a new and everlasting life. He can also sum up into one grand point of view the various objects and interests of his life, and perceive the absolute Good in human existence, the *unum necessarium* in the midst of distracting multiplicity. But at the same time, owing to his possession of a body and senses, he is a child of the moment, of his time and its changes, he is still subject to development, to its progress and vicissitudes. He is influenced by what is individual, subject to the impression of the senses and to advantages of this world, and in such a way that what is universal and eternal is not in every case either furthered or abandoned.

This explains, on the one hand, the possibility of mortal sin, which in its inner nature and in its punishment is absolute and eternal in character, and, on the other hand, the possibility of venial sin, the nature and punishment of which bear the mark of something relative, pertaining to the senses and temporal.²

St. Thomas makes the significant remark that an angel is incapable of venial sin. With the higher intellectual energy that is peculiar to him he concentrates his whole moral development, or

¹ *Thom.*, de carit., a. 5 ad 7: Sicut caritas imperat aliarum virtutum actus, ita per modum imperii excludit peccata eis contraria; et secundum hunc modum caritas resistit tentationibus; sed tamen necesse est esse alias virtutes, quae directe et elicitive peccata excludant.

² *Thom.* in II sent. dist. 42, q. 1, a. 3, 4, 5; S. theol., I, II, q. 74, 88, 89; qu. disp. de malo, q. 7.

rather decision, into one moment; with the same energy and consistency he beholds each object of his volition, even the derivative, in the light of the absolute, and in each individual decision he definitely takes up a position for or against God.¹

It is otherwise with the pilgrim of this world. His conscience, too, refers him to God, the absolute Good; to him, too, the everlasting truths of morality are revealed in the *rationes aeternae* of his reason; and he, too, is able by a free decision of his will to concentrate his whole being and bring it into harmony with or opposition to the Most High and Eternal. But his actions are not always deliberate and decisive. Imperfections are possible in the *accomplishment* of the will; there may be acts that are not a complete expression of his personality. The sphere of sense, or "the lower reason," concerned only with temporal standards and rules, may outstrip the decision of the conscience, judging according to eternal principles. Such acts cannot amount to more than a venial sin, since full knowledge and freedom of decision are inseparable from sin in the full meaning of the word. There are differences also in the *object* of the will and action, which may remove the mortal character of sin; and faults involving a disorder in the "means," in concrete temporal goods, without affecting the "final aim," the divine end of the world and of life. Not only Holy Scripture, but mankind in general, recognize the fact that there are sins which in their nature do not betray a real lapse from morality, and that there are bad actions which do not render the agent bad and worthless, but may be performed even by the just and noble. According to *St. Thomas*, it is characteristic of both forms of venial sin that the will *does not swerve from its direction to the final aim of morality; viz., the love of God above all things*, although it does so in the case of mortal sin.²

But what sins are mortal sins? First of all, of course, any explicit *aversio a Deo*, contempt of morality as such, and deliberately living according to sensuality or caprice. But not only this subversion

¹ S. theol., I, II, q. 89, a. 4.

² *Thom.* in I sent. dist. 1, q. 3, ad 4: *Quamvis ille, qui peccat venialiter, non referat actu in Deum suam operationem, nihilominus tamen Deum habitualiter pro fine habet; unde non ponit creaturam finem ultimum, cum diligit eam contra Deum; sed ex hoc peccat, quia excedit in dilectione, sicut ille, qui nimis immoratur viae, non tamen exit a via.*

of the moral principle, nor only hatred and blasphemy against God, diabolical pride and unbelief in *Luther's* sense, unrestrained worldliness, etc., are mortal sins. It is God's desire to realize and represent *in the order of the universe*, and especially in *mankind*, His own glory as the highest aim. This highest aim is the conclusion of a series or organization of aims, and whatever imperils the order of the world may destroy the moral order. Everything *tending to annihilate man, made in God's likeness and the vehicle of morality*, everything endangering the continued existence of the *human race, God's kingdom on earth*, is a blow aimed at God Himself.¹

In examining the various departments of moral action, we must not only take its empirical effect into account, but also ask whether a mode of action, if regarded as a "general maxim," would render human order and prosperity impossible. From these points of view there is an essential difference between an offence against courtesy and an assault for purposes of robbery; between a falsehood told in jest and a slander affecting a man's honour; every reasonable person must see that this is true. It is more difficult to decide cases that lie, as it were, on the border line; here the verdict of Holy Scripture and of the teaching authority of the Church, as also the development of Christian thought, have thrown much light; and the more the underlying conditions of duty vary with time and place, the more weight must be attached to the reasonable formation of the individual conscience. After what has been said above, however, it is plain that everywhere the distinction between mortal and venial sin and a "real valuation" of offences is unavoidable.²

¹ *Thom.* in II sent. dist. 42, q. 1, a. 4: Quando aliquis peccat in his, sine quibus recte servatis non remanet *subjectis hominis ad Deum et foedus humanæ societatis*, tunc est peccatum mortale ex genere.

² *Julius Müller* has dealt with the question of sin more thoroughly than any other Protestant theologian in "Die christliche Lehre von der Sünde" (Breslau, 1844). Since writing the above, I have found in his book an acknowledgment that *Luther*, *Schleiermacher*, and others take a partial and inadequate view of sin when they regard it only according to the general condition of the sinner. *Müller* says that, in spite of the danger of a trivial and superficial interpretation, the objective distinction between mortal and venial sin must be maintained. "Guilt is the subjective determination of sin, but it is the *one* which has the *objective nature of sin* as its essential basis. Guilt is the immediate reflection of sin upon its author, but the force with which it is reflected upon him

Linsenmann, a Catholic theologian, has discussed the scholastic distinction between mortal and venial sin, but although his opinions have met with applause in some quarters, they cannot be accepted as justifiable on some essential points. With reference to *St. Thomas's* definition of mortal sin as an *aversio a fine*, and of venial as a *deordinatio*, he remarks that *St. Thomas* was aiming at a *notional* expression and succeeded only in giving a figurative one.¹

This may be true if we assign to the word *finis* the meaning, let us say, of the end of a journey, but not if, like *St. Thomas*, we understand it to be the final aim of morality, Good in its highest and absolutely binding form. It is unfair to bring this charge against *St. Thomas* as, immediately after giving the formal definition, he goes on to determine the notions thus: "As it is charity which orders men to their highest aim, all that is contrary to charity is mortal sin; it may be *against the love of God*, as blasphemy, perjury, etc., or *against the love of our neighbour*, as murder, adultery, etc."²

Does not this cover what *Linsenmann* terms "malice" of the will? Although, as we have seen, *St. Thomas* and the other moralists refer particularly to the *greater* or *less* amount of disturbance caused in the moral order, as was pointed out above, this is actually of more importance in distinguishing mortal and venial sins than is the "psychological" distinction, that *Linsenmann* prefers, between sins of malice and sins of frailty. Not every venial sin is "due to frailty"—i.e., to a sharp moral temptation—nor is it "regretted as soon as it is committed." There are also "small sins of malice," the consequence of which may be momentary annoyance, but not real destruction of friendship. There are even habitual faults, defects of temperament, which one cannot call depravity, but blots on a character, such as vanity, a love of gossip, discourtesy, etc. On the other hand, some sins of frailty are not venial. Would any theologian regard *St. Peter's* denial as a venial sin, or the surrender of innocence, because of a "sharp moral temptation"?³

depends not merely upon the *effort of the will* that produced the sin, but also upon the *objective difference in the magnitude of sins*" (I, 232; cf. also II, 563, etc.).

¹ *Moraltheologie*, p. 159.

² *S. theol.*, I, II, qu. 88, a. 2 c.

³ *Linsenmann* is forced to admit in many instances that refer to the objec-

Linsennann's remarks are not unreasonable where they are aimed at a superficial application of casuistic distinctions to practical life. What the theoretician and casuist cannot accomplish, must be done by the teacher or confessor; that is to say, he must take into account the connection of the individual act with the whole character, the circumstances and the probable results, and let these things guide his judgment and counsels. A habit of lying or stealing may have worse consequences in the development of a child's character than an objectively greater offence; a student who is addicted to habitual though moderate tippling may, by wasting precious time and money, do himself more harm than one who on an isolated occasion becomes completely drunk. But the accuracy of the objective determination of the sin is not affected thereby; only practice is more varied than theory, and there may be complications and compensations, that occasionally add gravity to what in itself is light, and make light what in itself is grievous.

Since the first appearance of this work the problem of mortal and venial sin has been much discussed by Catholic theologians, and therefore I may here make a few supplementary remarks that will help to elucidate the fundamental idea of scholasticism on the subject, as well as to solve some of the commonest practical difficulties. The more we study *St. Thomas's* teaching (and in all essentials *St. Bonaventure* is in complete agreement with him), and the more we consider his incidental remarks, the better do we appreciate his logical consistency, refinement, and depth, and these are the best criteria of truth. Unfortunately it is impossible here to do more than just outline the most important points in his doctrine. I will give first a consecutive and literal specimen of his line of argument.

"In order to establish the distinction between venial and mortal sin, we must notice that they differ in *guilt (reatus)*, for mortal

tive "standard" and "final end," the justification of the ordinary distinction. He quotes from *St. Augustine* (Enchir. n. 21): *Quae sint autem levia, quae gravia peccata, non humano sed divino sunt pensanda iudicio*. But these words bear a totally different meaning from that usually assigned to them. The author is not thinking of the secrecy of a man's personal motive for sinning, but, as the context shows, he says that the objective gravity of sin must be judged according to Holy Scripture and not according to the human wisdom. Cf. *F. Stephinsky's* criticism of *Linsennann's* views in the "Katholik," 1910.

sin deserves eternal, and venial sin temporal punishment. But this difference *follows* from the nature of venial and mortal sin, and does not constitute their nature. For sin is not sin because punishment follows it, but, on the contrary, punishment follows it because it is sin. Mortal and venial sin are distinguished also by their *effects*, since the one deprives the soul of grace, and the other does not. But this again is not the distinction that we are seeking, since this difference in their effects follows the sin; it is because the sin is of such a kind that it has such an effect, not vice versa. . . . To make matters clear we must also take into account that sin consists in a disorder of the soul, just as sickness is a disorder of the body; sin is, as it were, a malady of the soul, and its remission is a cure of that malady. Just as there are curable and incurable maladies, so certain sins are curable or venial, and others are in themselves incurable or mortal, although they can be cured by God. But we call a malady incurable or mortal, when it affects a vital principle of life; for when such a principle is destroyed, there are no means of restoring it, and the sickness must end in death. Other ailments affect not vital principles, but conditions which flow out of these principles, and hence can be restored by them. For instance, the 'tertian ague' is due to an excess of gall, and may be overcome by the force of nature. The principle in action is the *final aim*.¹ The principle of the spiritual life that consists in the integrity of the action, is therefore the aim of all human action, viz., *love of God and one's neighbour*. 'The end of the commandment is charity.'² For by love the soul is united with God, who is the life of the soul, as the soul is the life of the body. When love is excluded, mortal sin enters, and no principle of life is left that can cure the defect, although it can be cured by the Holy Ghost: "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us."³ If the lack of integrity, however, is such as not to exclude charity, it gives rise to venial sin, for such deficiencies can be made good by the charity that still remains, acting as a principle of life. 'Charity covereth all sins.'⁴

"There are two reasons why a sin may or may not exclude

¹ *Arist.*, *Eth. Nic.*, vi. 5.

² *Tim.* i. 5.

³ *Rom.* v. 5.

⁴ *Prov.* x. 12.

charity; one *on the part of the sinner* and the other *depends on the character of the action*. On the part of the sinner in two ways: in one case the sinful act involves a power of the soul that is incapable of directing itself towards the final end, and therefore incapable also of turning away from it. For this reason a mere movement of sensuality may be not a grievous, but only a venial sin, because aiming at the end belongs to the intellect alone. Conversely also, when the power of the soul, that can aspire to or reject the final end, places in opposition to this end some action not in itself contradicting it; thus for instance an idle word uttered in contempt of God, i.e., against charity, would be a mortal sin, not on account of the form of the action, but on account of the perverse will of the agent. In the second case the disagreement or compatibility with charity results from the *character of the action*, i.e., from its object or matter, according as this is opposed to charity or not. Just as there are certain kinds of food which destroy life, e.g., poisons, and others that do not endanger life but interfere with its orderly course, e.g., coarse and indigestible kinds of food, and also digestible kinds if consumed to excess, so amongst human actions there are some that in themselves are antagonistic to the love of God and one's neighbour, those, namely, that destroy man's obedience to and reverence for God, such as blasphemy and idolatry, and those which prevent men from living together, such as robbery and murder, — for where such crimes are committed often and with impunity social life ceases to be possible. These actions are grievous sins in themselves, no matter with what intention or purpose they are committed. But some actions involve some amount of disorder, without directly excluding the things previously mentioned as good. For instance, if a man tells a lie, not in matters of faith nor for the injury of his neighbour, but in order to please him or further his interests; or if any one exceeds the bounds of moderation in eating or drinking. For this reason such actions are venial sins."¹

A few further observations may be made, if we take into account the other teaching of *St. Augustine*, *St. Thomas* and the chief scholastics. In the first place there is a clear ethical meaning underlying their figurative expressions, ethical also in the sense

¹ De malo, q. 7, a. 1 c.

that the distinction between mortal and venial sin is not derived from the punishment threatened, nor is it transferred into some mystical and unknown region, but the great difference in the penalty and the different effect upon the life of grace are deduced as results of the moral difference between venial and mortal sin. Nor is this difference "quantitative," produced by mere intensification and accumulation, but it is qualitative and specific, arising from contrary mental dispositions; in the one case removal of the moral basis, in the other only a digression; in the one case love of God is abandoned, in the other it is preserved; there the effect is deadly, here it is only a malady capable of cure. Mortal sin can be committed only when the final aim of life can be recognized or despised in spirit; such sin is utterly opposed to charity, which unites the inmost spirit with God the highest Good. Mortal sin is *contra caritatem*, venial is *praeter caritatem*; the former is antagonistic to the *habitus* or disposition of charity, the latter only to the act, the momentary activity of charity. In the case of venial sin, too, the *act* is disorderly and sinful, but the disposition, and therefore also the *agent*, remains good and pleasing to God, since the will, the centre of the personality, holds fast to the *subjection of all the goods of life to God*, as it betrays false pleasure and love only in the *valuation of these good things*. For this reason, mortal sin severs the union between God and the soul, and destroys the supernatural life; whilst venial sin interrupts the movement of the soul towards God, and checks the growth of grace. It is a gap, a break, a standing still; and in as far as we owe our whole life to God, it is a step backwards, and moreover, as confusion in the lower reacts upon the highest, it becomes a disposition to and danger of mortal sin. The consequence of sin in the future life confirms this distinction. Whoever persists in turning away from God, and passes into eternity in that disposition, remains forever aloof and cut off from Him; hell is essentially the loss of God, the failure to attain the final end of morality and happiness. But he who passes away in a state of venial sin, as he loves God, is judged worthy of happiness; his punishment corresponds to his guilt, and is not a diminution of his heavenly reward, but temporal postponement of it, and a painful hindrance to a love that is now eager to reach its aim.

In this way the speculative theory of scholasticism is not a superficial and mechanical mode of thought, but reveals a lively comprehension of the inner and outer factors of our actions, and particularly of what lifts the moral personality above what is external and finite.¹

In the case of a non-Christian conscience, unenlightened by faith in God, the statement that there is in mortal sin an *aversio a Deo* is true in the sense that it must involve an abandonment of the real aim in life and absolute good, and a betrayal of the one thing needful, moral worth as such. In this sense every developed conscience, even that of a pagan, possesses the knowledge of an absolute, sacred, and divine Good. Mankind in general distinguishes dispositions and actions in accordance with the attitude adopted towards this highest Good, and allow that some make a man "bad," and ruin him morally, whilst others are indeed bad, but may be described as the faults of a "good" man. In the case of every mortal sin the prospective enmity with the absolute Good must be really recognized and desired; a merely "interpretative" abandonment of it is not enough to turn even a serious offence of an outward kind into a mortal sin. The desire need not, however, be direct, or based on principle. It is based on principle always in so far as the fully conscious will recognizes its responsibility for the decision and perceives the contemplated sin to be an evil in the absolute, supernatural sense. As a rule, man does not seek evil directly, for its own sake, but for the physical good connected with it. If we were to declare nothing grievously sinful except a diabolical antagonism to and rejection of the highest Good, we should have to describe all ordinary sins and vices as venial. In a magnificent passage *St. Augustine* shows how in every sin there is an impulse towards happiness and greatness, in fact even a distorted longing for God. He says: "The soul plays the wanton, when it turns away from Thee, seeking, apart from Thee, what it can find purely and wholly by returning to Thee. In a perverted way all are following Thee who leave Thee and rebel against Thee."² In the case of actions rendered insulting to God by their

¹ Cf. Thomas-Texte, § 55; de malo, q. 9, a. 2, q. 12, a. 3; S. theol., I, II, q. 88, a. 1, a. 2.

² Conf., II, 13, 14.

objective disorder, the subjective will would often gladly cast away the evil and make peace with God; but this desire and wish is ineffectual; in fact the actual volition, tending in a contrary direction, gives it the lie.

But is there not in venial sin also an offence *against* charity and the moral law, a revolt *against* reason and conscience, as *St. Thomas* and *St. Bonaventure* speak of it as an action *praeter caritatem, praeter legem, sine ratione*? Does not this fact overthrow the very fine distinction according to which this kind of sin is only a gap or break, a deviation on the periphery of the development of morality? In reply it may be observed in the first place that *praeter legem* and *praeter caritatem* mean the same thing; venial sin is a transgression of a secondary law of morality, "the order in the means," the due measure and relation of our aims and affections, but it does not transgress the fundamental law of morality, the command that requires us to love God above all things. A man who sins venially would never renounce God to secure earthly pleasure. The following elucidations will show with how much deliberation *St. Thomas* used the other expressions. To the first class of venial sins belong the so-called *subiti motus, actus imperfecti*, i.e., efforts, prompted as a rule by the senses, and not in themselves free, to obtain what is forbidden (even what is forbidden under pain of serious punishment), such efforts not being sanctioned by the will, but also not hindered, in cases where the will has control over them. With regard to these faults, due to inadvertence and indifference, man, as a reasonable being, does not consider the object of the desire, but gives undue liberty to his imagination and temperament, as belonging to a lower sphere for which he would not wish to be responsible; and he does not bring it within the subjection of his intellect. Such a proceeding is literally an "interruption" of his moral life, a "break" in his full mental action and progress. It is not *contra rationem*, but *sine ratione, sine ordine*; but because we ought always to use our reason and conscience, it is nevertheless a sin. There seems to be more difficulty with regard to small, deliberate transgressions of the law. How is it possible in such cases as trifling thefts, intentional lies, etc., to uphold *St. Thomas's* definition of venial sin? He remains faithful to his fundamental idea, and remarks often that in such cases the object of

the venial sin is "practically nothing, without any value or significance," as, for instance, plucking a flower, in questions of property. He says of venial sin that it is "idle and vain, and *therefore* forbidden." That is to say, in comparison with the full force of morality and the absolute obligation of justice, charity towards one's neighbour, etc., these objects are insignificant, and therefore they do not affect the highest good of morality. The temporal good, however, the rule of moral action, is despised and injured by them, and as everything ought to have a moral consecration, what is comparatively nothing becomes really sinful and worthy of punishment.¹

When we attempt to define the boundary in a concrete instance, at first sight there is a serious difficulty involved in passing from the increasing material value of an object — as in the case of compensation for damage done to property — to the moral, supernatural contrast between mortal and venial sin. Some one may argue that if it is a venial sin to appropriate a "small" sum of money, and a mortal sin to steal a "great" sum, there is a point where the addition of a single penny to the theft alters the whole character of the offence. Yet in God's sight a sovereign is of no greater importance than a shilling. In a question of this kind, between God, the highest Good, and the material, concrete action, we must insert as middle term the *particular virtue* which is outraged and its special aim, and then the change becomes intelligible. In cases of injury to property, we have to consider whether the person affected really suffers from the loss, or whether he does not view the matter so much as a loss, but rather is aggrieved because he is the victim of a joke or of carelessness. In the case of a child's disobedience, we must see whether the parents feel their authority impugned, and no longer regard the disobedient child as a good son, or whether, in spite of his unruly behaviour, they are still on the whole satisfied with him. Similar considerations arise between friends and between married people.²

¹ Cf. de malo, q. 7, a. 1, 2, 4, 6; q. 9, a. 2; q. 10, a. 2; q. 12, a. 1, 3. S. theol., I, II, q. 109, a. 8; II, q. 59, a. 4 ad 2. q. 66, a. 6 ad 3. q. 76, a. 2 c. In 2 sent. dist. 24 q. 3.

² In case of dishonesty, the fact that the person robbed possesses immense wealth does not affect the border line at which sin ceases to be venial. As subject to the law and as a fair-minded man, even a wealthy man does not re-

That ultimately in all these cases one drop more would be enough to make the cup overflow does not affect the actual state of affairs. It is not the trifling addition that makes an offence grievous, but the qualitative change in its character; what was jest becomes earnest, and the *habitus* of friendship, or of conjugal and parental contentment, cannot endure the increased strain, but is broken and destroyed. These things are *undoubtedly* important when regarded from the point of view of the moral aim, and thus the moral gravity of the offence becomes self-evident. Therefore it is only in an indirect way that material differences affect the sphere or morals and religion, and the point under discussion. In every case, as has been said, we have to consider over and above the "object," a number of intrinsic psychological factors and all the circumstances attending an action before we can judge of it as a whole.

gard the theft of a sovereign as a trifle, although he might do so as a millionaire, as a philosopher, or an easy-going man. From the standpoint of law we ought also to take into account the effect of the ill-gotten gain *upon the thief*, and the injurious influence upon his domestic, social, and moral life, that money obtained so easily by dishonest means must inevitably call forth.

CHAPTER VI

COMMANDMENTS AND COUNSELS

ALMOST all Protestant theologians agree in saying that "a view of Christianity in which works are taken into account causes morality to be divided into two 'stories,' one of the Commandments and the other of the Counsels."¹

The Catholic Church, it is said, mistakes "the A B C of a Christian life," which recognizes the perfection of a Christian to consist in faith and in the love of God and His will, and which demands this offering of faith and love from all Christians, since it includes within itself the highest moral achievements.² The Church is said to regard the moral law as a routine which is not thorough enough for the elect³; and consequently "perfection, real Christianity," is possible only to a small circle of chosen souls, after the fashion of ancient aristocracy.

The spirit of asceticism which Catholicism possesses, in common with pagan religions, and which is hostile to the world and to civilization, determines in what this false perfection consists.⁴ It believes in the possibility of "a spiritual life, having God as its sole aim, and being free from all worldly pursuits and moral duties."⁵ "As the Catholic Church chiefly emphasizes the future life she has no proper appreciation for the present, for a man's work and calling."⁶ Only in the religious state does she see "Christian perfection."⁷

¹ *Luthardt*, p. 212; *Gass*, II, 35.

² *Frank*, *System der Christl. Sittlichkeit*, Erlangen, 1884, I, 439.

³ *Frank*, p. 436.

⁴ *Luthardt*, pp. 211, 213; *Ziegler*, p. 300; *H. Weiss*, p. 183; *Herrmann*, *Röm. u. evang. Sittlichkeit*, p. 12.

⁵ *Sell*, p. 230.

⁶ *Tschackert*, p. 20.

⁷ *Ritschl*, *Gesch. des Pietismus*, I, 38; cf. *Harnack*, *Das Mönchtum*, 7th ed., p. 6.

In order to throw some light on these charges, let us begin with the actual and public instructions issued by our Church. In the Catechism used in the ecclesiastical province of Cologne, the question is asked: "Wherein does Christian perfection *consist*?" The answer is: "Christian perfection consists in our keeping ourselves free from all inordinate love of the world and of self, and in loving God above all things, and all things in God." Further on we are told that "*the way to perfection lies in following Jesus Christ, and in practising the virtues taught us in the eight beatitudes.*" Prayer, the hearing of God's word, the reception of the sacraments, self-denial, and the performance of *our daily work* in a way pleasing to God, are recommended to every Christian as the *means* of attaining perfection. Finally we find the Evangelical Counsels, of voluntary poverty, perpetual chastity, and perfect obedience to a spiritual superior, designated as *particular means* of perfection. I may remind my readers that, in the same Catechism, love of God, which is here described as the essence of perfection, is not enjoined as a counsel, but made the *fundamental duty* of every Christian, and set down as the chief *Commandment* standing in the forefront of all moral teaching.

These quotations from the Catechism are only the crystallization of all theological teaching on the subject, the popular expression of what has been said by men like *St. Basil* and *St. Augustine*, *St. Thomas* and *St. Bonaventure*, *Eckhart* and *St. Francis of Sales*, *Suarez* and *Bellarmino*. Love is the very essence of Christian perfection, and this love is not a Counsel, but the first and greatest Commandment. This is the unanimous teaching of all Catholic authorities, and we may actually call it a Catholic dogma.¹

Denifle refers to a great many ascetic writers, both well known and obscure, who taught the same doctrine in the Middle Ages.² This love can unfold and manifest itself in many different forms and under various circumstances of life. All external works and achievements, as well as the abstinence and sacrifice of the ascetic life, are only the material which is inspired and glorified by love, the means which love uses for its advancement. On account of its greater capacity to further this love, the religious life is sometimes

¹ *Thom.*, S. theol., II, II, q. 184, a. 3.

² *Denifle*, Luther, 2d ed., I, 133, etc.

called the "life of perfection"; but those who give it this name do not intend thereby to deny the possibility and duty of perfection to people in other ranks of life, any more than those who speak of the "religious life" mean to imply thereby that people in the world are not called upon to be religious.

It is not outward severity, not the magnitude of gifts or works, but the degree of love of God and one's neighbour, the purity and force of the inner disposition to virtue, that determine the degree of perfection; hence many in the world attain to even higher sanctity than those in religious houses.¹

In his "*Practica di amar Gesù Cristo*," *St. Alphonsus* insists upon the duty of loving our crucified Saviour, and says that not austerities, not prayer, not the frequent reception of the sacraments, and not almsgiving constitute the essence of Christian perfection, but charity.²

When Protestant moralists light upon Catholic expressions of this kind, they admire them as utterances of a liberal spirit, and have no idea how obvious and commonplace these ideas are to any instructed Catholic. Not long ago an author collected and published some interesting Italian folk-lore, and amongst it was a tale that attracted particular notice. It was the story of a monk, to whom, in order to make him more humble, God revealed that there were despised vagrants and other such worldly people equal or superior to him in perfection. It was argued that this story arose from some reaction on part of the people against the prestige of the religious life; but, as a matter of fact, it was merely a very ancient monastic legend!³

Charity, the essential perfection, is the law of the Christian life in the sense that it is final; there is nothing beyond it. As *St. Thomas* says: "Love of God and one's neighbour does not fall under the Law in but a limited measure, so that what lies beyond it belongs to Counsels."⁴ "The commandment of the love of God, that constitutes the highest aim of a Christian life, is not restricted

¹ *Thom.*, de carit., a. 11 ad 5; Quodlib., III, a. 17; *St. Augustine* says: "When I praise the perfect chastity of a virgin dedicated to God, I praise this particular virtue; there are other virtues that are still more important."

² *Meffert*, p. 258.

³ *Rufin.* Hist. monach. Migne., XXI, 435 ss.

⁴ *S. theol.*, II, II, q. 184, a. 3. c.

by any limitations, so that one could assert a love of a certain intensity to fall under the commandment, whilst a greater love would go beyond the limits of the Commandments and fall under the Counsels.”¹

God being infinitely good and infinitely worthy of our love, and our obligation to Him being absolute, we ought to dedicate unreservedly to His glory and service all that we are and all that we do, the simplest as well as the highest actions. But within this general fundamental obligation there are distinctions between what is good and what is better, between what is permitted, required, and counselled. In the light of charity all means and ways leading to God are not alike, nor are all actions realizing His designs of an equal value. We saw in the preceding section that the moral value of an action is not added to it arbitrarily and from the outside, but is inherent in its nature and is the outcome of its ideal connection, when this connection is traced back to the absolute. Hence it is plain that gradations of goodness occur in the sphere of morals, and that there are degrees and an objective diversity in what is good, as well as in what is sinful.² Thus the care to preserve one's honour and good name is in itself better than the care to preserve one's property; the development of one's intellect is better than to increase bodily strength; keeping the marriage bond holy is better than to maintain friendly relations; and to defend life or country when in danger is better than to defend one's possessions. It is, however, true that these things are *morally* better only in the light of the highest Good.

The *virtues* also are not all of the same dignity and beauty, and among *duties* there is diversity of obligation and importance, and in matters where there is no moral obligation we can distinguish what is simply permitted from what is advisable. At the risk of again incurring the charge of taking a material view, we may even say that to give abundant alms and to found a splendid social institution are things objectively “better” than to offer scanty gifts, and a fatiguing and pious pilgrimage is better than a simple “Our Father.” And in doing so we are not unmindful of what our Lord said about the widow's mite, nor of *St. Paul's* panegyric

¹ Opusc. 17 (Contra retrah. ab ingr. relig.), c. 6.

² See page 251, *seq.*

of charity; for in these comparisons we are not thinking of the absolute dignity and significance of the act, which we also make dependent upon the greatness of the love prompting it, but rather of the relative, material side of morality, of which we assert that while it is subordinate to the absolute, it is not altogether merged in it. God looks *primarily* at the love, the disposition of the heart; but where the inward disposition is the same, the more abundant gift is more pleasing to Him than the scanty one; a generous disposition naturally impels a man to do great deeds, and his heroic action reacts upon his disposition and increases its generosity.¹

Circumstances affecting the occasion and the individual often alter and even reverse this "objective" valuation, so as to give what is of counsel the character sometimes of sin and sometimes of duty. But is not this equally true of the requirements that every one recognizes as moral commandments? All that is morally good, the highest Good alone excepted, is, as we have seen, relative, and these things limit and condition one another. Hence the claims that they make upon us may be in conflict or even destroy one another. Obedience to parents ceases to be an obligation if the parents demand what is wrong. The duty of regarding one's neighbour's life as sacred is not binding in case of self-defence or war. The prohibition to injure the property of others admits of exceptions when higher interests are at stake. In spite of this relativity or elasticity of the moral rule, are not obedience to parents and respect for the life and property of others objectively virtues and duties, and is not failure to observe them a sin? If this is so, we cannot deny that the moral truths called Counsels have also an objective value, although they are not judged by any absolute standard, and may be affected by clashing with other moral duties, and possess an absolute value only when referred to their highest end, which is charity.

It may, however, be maintained that when a serious and tender conscience recognizes one thing as *better* than another, it is *bound*

¹ Commandments and Counsels are not two provinces distinct from one another. The fulfilment of the Counsels includes that of the Commandments, as love feels bound to sacrifice everything, great and small, necessary and unnecessary, to God.

to choose it. Our opponents tell us "that to despise the better course, when it is recognized, is a moral defect," and "that everything is contrary to duty that is not *required* by duty." A Christian has but one thing to seek — viz., doing God's will; but this will is always authoritative. The utmost that can be conceded is that our inability to see clearly the authoritative will of God may give to a duty the appearance of a Counsel.¹

It is not correct to say to one honestly striving after morality that the recognition of a better course invariably makes it his duty to adopt it. We can see here that it is precisely Catholic morals which grasp in their deepest meaning the true unity and absolute character of morality and the superiority of the moral ideal to all mere forms of it. We may sum up the Catholic theory thus: As charity is subordinate only to the highest Good, "the Best," it is *free* in its attitude towards what is only "the Better." It stands under *the Law*, but above *the laws*.²

Charity is bound only by the highest Good; no virtuous aims, no external good works, are equal to real charity, directed towards the Absolute; and therefore it is obligatory only in as far as the maintenance of order to the highest end requires. No one can say that greater love *necessarily* impels us to do a greater deed, since love knows that in God's sight the *ex quanto*, and not the *quantum*, decides the moral value of an action. A Christian, says *St. Thomas*, is not bound to aim at the perfection which resides in the *objects* of his actions, nor to possess it; but he is bound not to *despise* it and not to be *callous* or *indifferent* to it.³ This respect for what is better, and its greater suitability to attain the purposes of love, make it preponderate over what is less good when they are weighed in the moral balance; and in this way we arrive at what is of counsel, in addition to what is permitted and what is of obligation.⁴

¹ *Frank*, p. 440; *Luthardt*, p. 209; *Sell*, p. 200; *Herrmann*, p. 191.

² *Möhl*, *Neue Untersuchungen*, p. 308.

³ *Thom.*, in III sent. dist. 29, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2, quaestione.

⁴ A fourteenth century mystic writes: "Man should accustom himself always to have God present in his mind and intention and love. Keep the same disposition that thou hast in church or in thy chamber, and carry it with thee amongst other men, and amidst the troubles and trials of the world. But this is not to be understood as if all works, places, and people were to be esteemed alike. That would be most unjust, for it is better to pray than to spin, and a

This Catholic theory is not weakened by pointing out that we are never free from the obligation to do God's will. We have already seen that the conscience does not receive, in every case, special enlightenment, upon which a moral decision can be based. However much attention may be paid to individual considerations, personal experiences and impulses, this individual and accidental factor must be appreciated in the light of the necessary and general idea.¹

It is contrary to all experience to assume that we enjoy a particular revelation in every moral decision. The important thing to notice is that the adoption of this principle excludes not only what is counselled, but also what is *permitted*. For if I invariably have to fulfil duties, there is no place left for freedom, and therefore no place for what is permitted. The short-sighted opposition of Protestant theology to the Catholic view of the Counsels has had disastrous results, and to the present day there are, in Protestant ethics, strange contradictions and obscurities on so simple and fundamental an ethical truth as the existence of the permitted.²

A superficial thinker may be tempted to accept the statement that, by assigning preëminence to the ascetic life, the Catholic Church regards the ordinary life as evil,³ and science, art, and literature as pagan abominations.⁴ The argument is: The recognition of one thing as better pronounces the other to be bad. In what other sphere of thought would logic such as this be tolerated? But when employed against the Church it always has its effect. If a man ascribes a higher value to gold, does that necessarily mean that he despises silver? Or does a preference for the

church is a better place than a street. Whoever did not think this, would be a heretic. But in all our *works* and in every *place* we ought to preserve the same *disposition* and the same loyalty and love and confidence in God" (*Denifle, Das geistliche Leben*, 5th ed., p. 585).

¹ It is characteristic, but very natural, that as Protestantism denies *in abstracto* to chastity and poverty all superiority, there are very few Protestant clergy who *in concreto* feel called to a life of celibacy, although many Protestant commentators acknowledge that, according to Matt. xix. 12 and 1 Cor. vii. 35, there is an ideal connection between celibacy and active labour for God's kingdom.

² G. Mayer, *Die Lehre vom Erlaubten . . . seit Schleiermacher*, Leipzig, 1899.

³ Ziegler, II, 300.

⁴ Jul. Beloch, *Histor. Zeitschr.*, 1900, p. 30.

rose imply a dislike of other flowers? And these comparisons are used by the Fathers of the Church. How many admire *Beethoven* as the greatest musician, without wishing to disparage *Haydn* and *Mozart*! Many honour *Goethe* as greater than *Schiller*, without any desire to undervalue the latter! Many a lover of nature returns again and again to the Alps, though he regrets that on his way he cannot stop to explore the charming heights of the Vosges or the Black Forest. Why should the praise given by the Church to virginity be regarded as a disparagement of marriage, or the recommendation of heroic self-denial be considered a condemnation of riches?

Another important consideration presents itself here. What is better *in abstracto* is not better for every one, and a man's special calling must be kept in view as well as the general "counsel."¹ The kingdom of God is intended to include persons of various ranks and spheres, and by means of outward circumstances and inward suggestions God takes care that there shall always be some who are ready to devote themselves to the clerical state.²

The thought of Christian society as an *organism* had great influence on opinions in the early ages of Christianity. It is not always clearly expressed with regard to the antithesis between work in the world and retirement from the world, but it can be traced from very early times, and has gone on developing itself more clearly. The Church is a body having various members; the eye may be nobler than the foot, but still it is best for the body that both should be healthy.³ The Church is a garden, the beauty of which consists in the *variety* of its flowers and plants.⁴ Christ praised *Mary* for choosing the better part, but He did not tell *Martha* to

¹ *Suarez* points out (de relig., tom. 3, l. 1, c. 9, n. 25) that the Evangelical Counsels are not, strictly speaking, a stimulus to the will, but a judgment resulting from moral thought.

² *Thom.*, S. theol., suppl., q. 41, a. 2; S. c. Gent., III, 134; Quodlib., VII, a. 17: Haec autem diversificatio hominum in diversis officiis contingit primo ex divina providentia, quae ita hominum status distribuit, ut nihil unquam deesse inveniatur de necessariis ad vitam; secundo etiam ex causis naturalibus, ex quibus contingit, quod in diversis hominibus sunt diversae inclinationes ad diversa officia.

³ 1 Cor. vii. 7, xii. 21; *Aug.*, de bono fid., n. 4, 5, 9; *Thom.*, S. c. Gent., III, 134, 136; S. theol., II, II, q. 183, a. 2; *Bonar.*, de perf. evang., q. 2, a. 2 ad 16.

⁴ *Method.*, Conviv., II, 7; *Ambros.* De Viduit, n. 83.

leave her work and come to sit at His feet. *Non ergo Dominus opus reprehendit, sed munus distinxit*¹; and accordingly *Martha's* office as well as *Mary's* was to continue in the Church.

Modern ascetical writers express the same opinion. *St. Francis of Sales* says that it is love of God which impels one man to poverty and withdraws another from it, which makes one enter the married state and another practise celibacy.² "The state that is holiest in itself is not the best for all; it is only when each man occupies the position assigned to him by God, and labours in it zealously, that unity, harmony, and beauty can prevail in society or in the Church. . . . Only a few are called to dedicate themselves to serve God as priests at the altar, or as religious in a monastery; most are destined to be laymen, living the ordinary life of Christians in the world, fighting the good fight there, and earning for themselves the eternal crown."³

But it may be asked whether the social idea does not preclude the distinction between what is good and what is better. If all the members are *indispensable* to the organism, must they not all be *equal*?⁴

In reply I may quote *Lagarde*, who says (p. 164): "Equality amongst the members exists only in a corpse; in a living body the eye, the brain, or the heart is worth more than the little toe." All that *St. Paul* says in 1 Cor. vii. would have no meaning if the head were not nobler and of greater importance than the foot. In comparison with zealous *Martha*, *Mary* is praised for having chosen "the better part"; and within the number of our duties, as we have seen, some are of greater importance and dignity than others, although the essence of every duty consists in its being necessary, not merely in a collective or social, but also in a particular and personal sense.

¹ *Aug.*, Sermo, 104, n. 3.

² *Theotimus*, Bk. VIII, ch. 6.

³ *Krier*, der Beruf., 3d ed., Freiburg, 1899, pp. 6, 278; cf. v. *Nostiz-Rieneck*, Stimmen aus Maria Laach, supplement 43, p. 160, etc.

⁴ This argument is adopted by v. *Schultheß-Rechberg* (Theol. Rundschau, 1899, p. 388) in his criticism "Christentum und Weltmoral" (Münster, 1897), in which the following sentence occurs: "The religious life forms, as it were, the quiet, golden background, and life in the world, with its many changing aspects, stands in contrast to it, but at the same time forms its necessary complement" (p. 60).

But in this case would not the divine vocation to this or that state include the call to a greater or lesser degree of morality? If this were so, and God distributed the moral talents also in such a manner that the varying glory of the blessed in heaven could be connected with a vocation for some particular state, would this contradict the Christian doctrine of grace, especially as taught by *St. Paul*? Human liberty and the recognition of its moral striving can be reconciled even with such a theory.¹

Under all circumstances we must hold as follows: After what has been said, it is clear that the lower degree of moral worth ascribed to any work or state determines its morality only relatively; the absolute worth of a man depends upon the purity and depth of his love, and this love *may* attain a higher development in the lower than in the more perfect state. Artistic genius can, with inferior materials, produce better results than a lesser capacity can produce with better materials at his disposal. If a man carefully examines his vocation, and from motives of love of God, of his family, and of humanity believes that he ought to marry, he is choosing what is *for him* the better state, and he should find peace of mind in this thought. The average man has, of course, no right to judge the inner morality of his neighbour, but we may recall what *St. Augustine* says with reference to the words, "the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord, that she may be holy."² He asks: "Are there not married people who deserve this praise? Certainly there are; but how many of them have married *solely* for the purpose of advancing in godliness?"³

In the same way we may ask: How many people seek *riches for the express purpose* of coming by means of them into closer union with God, and of obtaining thereby the power to benefit their neighbours? Those who *renounce* the world cannot be influenced by any motives of worldly pleasure and passions, and under normal circumstances love of God is the pure motive that leads them to do so.

¹ *Thom.*, I, II, q. 112, a. 4: Unus perfectius illustratur a lumine gratiae quam alius. . . . Prima causa hujus diversitatis accipienda est ex parte ipsius Dei, qui diversimode suae gratiae dona dispensat ad hoc, quod ex diversis gradibus pulchritudo et perfectio ecclesiae consurgat.

² 1 Cor. vii. 34.

³ De bon. coniug., n. 14.

F. Thalhofer makes the following remark on the foregoing passage: "*Mausbach* does not fail to refer to the vocation necessary in following the Counsels. When, however, in order to prove the superiority of the religious life, he compares it with the nobler members of the body, he should remember that purely animal functions cannot be compared with moral activity." He thinks also that I have not succeeded in solving the many difficulties involved in the Catholic doctrine of the Counsels.¹ In making the comparison to which *Thalhofer* alludes, I had no intention of *proving* the superiority of the religious state; had I wished to do so, I might have referred to the Canon of the Council of Trent: *Si quis dixerit, statum conjugalem anteponendum esse statui virginitatis vel coelibatus, et non esse melius ac beatius manere in virginitate aut coelibatu, quam jungi matrimonio, anathema sit.*² But because *Luther* and modern Protestants deduce from the unity of life in a living organism the conclusion that, owing to the unity of the fundamental disposition, there can be no difference in the values of moral acts, such as Catholic teaching maintains, I wished to show that this conclusion was based upon a superficial presumption and that it actually *favoured* the Catholic theory. Moreover, animal activity can very well be *compared* with moral; I need only mention *Plato*, *Menenius Agrippa*, and *St. Paul*, who applies the metaphor of the body to the Church. In order, however, to find analogies for my argument in the higher activity of man, let me ask whether, in spite of the unity and importance of the artistic conception, there is not a difference between the drama and epos, on the one hand, and a novel on the other; between a sonata, as a work of art, and a two-step? Do not the former belong to a higher form of art than the latter? Even in a drama there are important and subordinate parts, and in distributing them the manager takes into account the amount of talent possessed by the actors, although an actor with real genius can shine even in the smallest and most insignificant part. Of the various institutions for training the young, *Kümmel* remarks — and most Catholics will agree with him: "A full classical training will always be the *highest and best*,

¹ Korrespondenzblatt f. d. kath. Geistl., 1902, p. 34.

² s. 24, can. 10, Denz. ed., X, 981.

and it must not be allowed to disappear from our national life, but *not all can or ought to receive it.*"¹

Is there no meaning in describing philosophy as the specifically higher branch of knowledge? The idea of a social and political organism approaches that of the kingdom of God still more closely. However high a value we may set upon the duty and honour of each calling in the sphere of labour or in official life, however much we may appreciate the loyalty and devotion of an individual in discharging the duties of his calling, still we cannot deny that some callings rank *higher* than others, and that it may be morally reprehensible to content oneself with lower manual labour when it is possible to do something better. "Those callings which are *immediately* concerned with the aims of civilization hold a *higher rank* than others in the social organism. . . . Callings that serve directly intellectual ends stand higher, or ought to stand higher, in public estimation than those concerned with the life of the body or the gratification of the senses. But this by no means implies that persons following a profession of the former class are better than those engaged in industrial life."²

I never proposed to solve all the difficulties connected with the doctrine of the Counsels, nor could I undertake to do so. In the first place, both in Catholic and in Protestant literature there is still no thorough theological explanation of what constitutes a calling or vocation. The only merit that I can claim is this: (1) In answer to the alleged "difficulties," or rather misrepresentations, on the part of Protestant controversialists, I laid great stress upon the principle that "charity is the essence of perfection." (2) In spite of some obscurities in Catholic works, I showed that throughout the whole of natural and Christian ethics we can trace the distinction between an absolute and a relative factor in morality, and between the final end and the immediate aims; also that this distinction gives rise to objective differences in value, although all of these are not unconditional and absolute. The infinitely greater importance of the final end, the *summum bonum*, makes the ardour and force of charity, the innermost disposition, of greater importance to the judgment of morality than all other distinctions.

¹ *Grenzboten*, 1901, I, 161.

² *H. Schwarz*, *Das sittl. Leben*, p. 375.

Hence it is misleading to assert, as is sometimes done, that virginity or the religious life constitute "the Catholic ideal."

The difficulty lies in this question: If the religious state is in itself *better* calculated to lead to perfection, by encouraging an undisturbed development of love of God, must not this love recommend this means to the individual, with an urgency proportionate to its strength and depth? If this is so, does it not follow that, in *selecting* the religious or secular state, the man who chooses the former shows greater obedience to the prompting of this love than a man who chooses the latter? No, not unconditionally; for entrance into the religious state may be impossible owing to some bodily defect, to the rejection on part of the orders, or to the removal of religious orders from the country. But even where the choice is outwardly free the conclusion is not a necessary one. The objective considerations of morality involve fitness, not compulsion; what is firmly established is rendered uncertain as soon as the higher postulate of charity is added. The various forms of religious "life" stand on the basis of "good works" and are great systems for performing works of charity and piety. In the case of single actions it often happens that the most enlightened charity chooses the lesser rather than the greater; a social gathering rather than study; some mechanical occupation rather than prayer; even the vegetating condition of sleep rather than intellectual activity. The reason is that, in the connection of life, what is in itself better and higher may become the lesser good; and precisely because it is so good and noble it can claim but a comparatively small place in the limitations of our earthly existence. May not something similar be the case with regard to choosing a profession or vocation? There can be no doubt that a natural capacity for the higher secular professions (science, art, politics) is much rarer than one for the lower forms of labour.

Does not the superiority of what is morally good to what is good in the purely worldly sense, lie in the fact that it, like the highest Good of all, is also the most universal and accessible and comprehensible to all men alike? Must not, therefore, a mode of life, "in itself better" than another, be recognized by all as better for them individually, if they are *able* to adopt it? If, in the case of isolated good works, the reverse takes place, it is be-

cause what is in itself inferior seems likely to do more to further life *as a whole*; but with regard to the choice of a career, the whole of life is concerned, and here, it may be said, genuine charity and prudence could have no reason for choosing the lower course! Many moralists and ascetics have come to this conclusion and maintain that, the greater the purity of intention with which a Christian aims at union with God, the more will he feel himself drawn to the religious state. To this extent God gives every one both the counsel *and* the vocation to the religious life. The multiplicity of ranks and positions in the Church is the outcome, then, of an actual moral inferiority on the part of the majority of Christians; the "bestowal" of callings by God is placed in the same mysterious obscurity as the bestowal of grace.

This theory admits of exceptions, cases where no physical impediment, but free, moral, and social considerations advise against entering a religious life; and this fact in itself suggests that the theory is open to question. Moreover, in course of time it has become a regular practice to submit those anxious to embrace the religious life to a very careful and special test of their vocation. The religious life, based on the Evangelical Counsels, is something impersonal and objective. It stands in closer and fuller relation to the Christian ideal than life in the world, and from this point of view is no doubt "better and higher." This truth is made known to all Christians and affects them in so far as they recognize, esteem, and admire the dignity of this state; but for the Counsel to amount to a "vocation," the *fitness of the individual* for that state must be taken into account, as well as the objective and abstract features of it. In many cases this fitness depends upon the use made of liberty; the beauty of this life is apparent only to the morally pure, and courage and joy in adopting it exist only in a high-strung disposition. But, as *St. Thomas* points out, there are unmistakable tendencies and inclinations of the soul and arrangements of divine Providence which show many Christians, honestly striving after perfection, that in selecting *another* calling they will be choosing what is for them the "better part."¹

¹ In the same way *Lehmkuhl* (Theol. mor., 11th ed., I, 364) distinguishes the vocation to the religious life, in an extended sense, from the call to the religious life in a special, direct, and practical sense.

Lastly, some one may argue: "Although they may choose what is better for them, they must in the long run remain behind those who have chosen what is intrinsically better. This is particularly the case with those numerous Christians who have chosen without great conscientiousness and eagerness to follow the higher course, who have rather as a matter of course grown into their calling or profession." I grant the truth of this in the latter case; if people will permit themselves to be influenced by external things and circumstances, and simply yield to the force of "circumstances" and follow the example of those about them, etc., they are not likely to rise above the level of their surroundings. I grant the force of the argument also with regard to those who remain in the world from motives of love of God, and will admit that they run the risk of lagging behind others who enter the religious state; it is implied in the abstract superiority of the religious life that the conditions of moral progress are better fulfilled and perfection is more attainable in it. But the superiority is here again not absolute. The ideal of the spiritual life is often only imperfectly realized, and a lax monastery of course cannot guarantee moral advancement; on the contrary, *Corruptio optimi pessima*.

Apart from this, however, lapse of time gives opportunity to human freedom to raise or lower its initial degree of moral and religious devotion. In dealing with so important a matter as the choice of one's life work, the disposition of the moment is of small importance; and the mystery of a man's personality and of the grace working within it, is here certainly not subject to a rule derived from usual circumstances. There is also a diversity in moral capacity and maturity to be considered. Many a great sinner enters the religious state to secure his salvation, but of course he cannot at once get rid of the moral defects of which he had more than a saintly Christian living in the world. Those theologians, too, who represent the choice of the ascetic life as personally better for all, recognize the weight of these latter considerations and acknowledge that, in spite of the better start, the beginning, continuance, and completion of the great work remain doubtful and depend ultimately upon the free will of the individual. In this way, therefore, we can adhere to the rule that, given equal conscientiousness, the religious life leads to

greater sanctity than a secular profession; but this ought not to lead to personal judgments, proud and overbearing on the one hand, or timid and despondent on the other.

In what has been said above, we have referred to those Counsels which are of chief importance in religion and history — viz., poverty, chastity, and obedience; but they are by no means *the only ones*; in fact, as we have seen, Commandments and Counsels are interwoven in the life of every Christian. Why does the Catholic Church attach a higher degree of perfection to *renunciation of the advantages of this life* than to reasonable use and enjoyment of them? When a man from religious motives refrains from marriage, money making, and power, is he not really undervaluing the natural aims of the human race and displaying a dualistic aversion to the visible world of sense?

Christianity in every age has had to wage war upon the open and hidden idolatry of this world, and this explains why, from the New Testament onward, throughout all Christian literature, there is more reference to avoidance of the world than to its joys. It cannot be denied that in the writings of the Fathers and in mediæval works, the Evangelical Counsels are so highly extolled and recommended, as to reveal, on the part of the authors, an inability to appreciate duly the importance of work in the world. The same exaggeration of the ascetical principle is displayed in many facts of history and culture. It should not, however, be forgotten that the great number of religious writings of the Middle Ages to which these remarks chiefly apply were compiled by religious and for religious. This accounts for the enthusiasm shown for the ascetical life. Protestant scholars have been quick to lay hold of these unfamiliar expressions, and have overlooked those with a contrary tendency. Even in the writings of the Fathers, a more careful search reveals a surprising number of statements expressing sympathy with the secular life.¹

Finally, in considering the whole question, we must not lose sight of the practical aims of the Church and her great historical labours in the cause of civilization. At the time of her greatest power, the Church *actually* sanctioned most fully the free develop-

¹ Cf. *Mausbach*, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, I, 264–350, 396–442; *Schilling*, *Die Staats- und Soziallehre des hl. Augustinus*, 1910.

ment of secular knowledge, art, and commerce; she did not merely tolerate secular pursuits, but encouraged and blessed them. "It was from no mere necessity, nor with uneasy consciences, that priests and monks studied the classics, wrote poems and chronicles, planted gardens and vineyards, and carried on arts and handicrafts; all that they produced by their labours shows their creative impulse and absorption in the beauties of God's universe. It was not only in order to accumulate riches, or to compete with the State, that the Church took the guilds under protection, bestowed her blessing upon the knight's sword and the king's crown, granted indulgences for making roads or building bridges, and granted privileges to schools of secular and religious learning, but she did all these things because she seriously desired the welfare of society and the advancement of education."¹

Explicit decrees of the Church, containing actual recognition of these facts, were issued whenever heretics or mistaken enthusiasts attacked the natural order of life. Both the dualism of the Gnostics and the rigorism of the Montanists were condemned by the Church. The Council of Gangra in the fourth century defended marriage, property, and secular occupations against the extravagances of ascetics, and *Innocent III* did the same very emphatically against the errors of the Albigenses and Waldensians.²

The Council of Trent, though it declared religious virginity to be superior to marriage, nevertheless defended the natural liberty and morality of mankind and the sacramental character of marriage. The Vatican Council laid stress upon the advantages and religious significance of the fine arts and sciences³; and *Leo XIII* praised them enthusiastically in his Encyclical on the Christian State.

The very *principles* of Catholicism require the Church to adopt this attitude. The dogma of the creation of the world by God,

¹ *Mausbach*, *Christentum und Weltmoral*, 2d ed., p. 39.

² Denzinger ed., X, 424: *Hominem quoque cum sua conjuge salvare credimus et fatemur, nec etiam secunda et ulteriora matrimonia condemnamus.* P. 425: *De potestate saeculari asserimus, quod sine peccato mortali potest iudicium sanguinis exercere.* P. 427: *Remanentes in seculo et sua possidentes, eleemosynas et cetera beneficia ex rebus suis agentes, praecepta Domini servantes, salvare fatemur et credimus.*

³ Cap. 4, de fide et ratione.

His pronouncing everything to be "good," and His command to devote six days to labour and the seventh to rest in God,—all these exclude all pessimism and any antagonism to matter and earthly industry. According to the Catholic opinion, even sin has not had so disastrous an effect upon human nature as to destroy its essential constituents and its innate determination to its end. Hence grace can be connected with nature; the old axiom *Gratia non destruit, sed supponit et perficit naturam* brings nature and grace, creation and redemption, reason and faith, humanity and sanctity into close relation with one another. Even irrational nature shares in this glorification, and the things of sense serve as the symbols and instruments of grace. With regard to morals, it is enough to remind my readers of the principle of *ideal realism*, that may be traced through all our investigations. A system that so emphatically recognizes the value of moral goods as to incur on that account a charge of exaggerating their importance, cannot at the same time deserve the reproach of caring nothing for the valuable work to be done in this world. A system that, in discriminating mortal and venial sin, so seriously and successfully transfers the economic value, in a case of damage to property, to the sphere of morality, shows irrefutably that it has grasped the moral significance both of property and of economic life.

The praise lavished by the Church upon voluntary poverty and renunciation of the world is not opposed to this principle. *St. John Chrysostom* makes a very shrewd and apt remark when he says that, if marriage and domestic life and labour were slight or contemptible in the sight of a Christian, the *sacrifice* of these things could not be considered heroic; for only he who sacrifices something great deserves to be called a hero.¹

Cardinal *Newman* rightly says that true asceticism consists in admiring what is earthly whilst we renounce it. *Pionius*, a priest put to death in Smyrna under *Decius*, was urged by the people to obey the emperor. "Is it not a good thing," they asked, "to live, breathe, and see the light?" *Pionius* replied: "Yes, it is good to live in the light, but in that light which we desire. We are not abandoning God's gifts through ingratitude, but because we hope to receive yet greater ones."

¹ *Chrysost.*, de virgin., n. 8.

When *St. Elizabeth* was kneeling beside her husband's coffin, she said: "Lord, Thou knowest that, if it might be in accordance with Thy holy and divine will, my husband's life and his cheerful, loving presence and appearance would be dearer to me than all the joy, happiness, honour, and luxury of this world. But now, dearest Lord, I will not struggle against Thy divine will. . . . I would not, even if I could, purchase his restoration to life at the cost of a single hair against Thy holy will."

It is no *want of natural affection*, no Stoical apathy or Buddhist "weltschmerz," but the *preponderating force of a higher love*, that robs earthly delights of their charm for Christian ascetics. Not the renunciation as such, but the greater liberty derived from it to undertake a nobler life work, directly devoted to the service of God and humanity, imparts its higher moral value to the action of a Christian who abandons the world.¹ It is the figure standing before the ciphers that gives them their significance. The Evangelical Counsels are particularly well-adapted instruments for living a perfect life of charity, and they are also spontaneous *effects* and manifestations of perfect charity.²

Ardent enthusiasm for an ideal is not satisfied with words, it longs to make acts of sacrifice. What is true of every "disposition" is peculiarly true of the disposition to make sacrifices and to rise above the world; the serious mind reveals itself in works of renunciation.³ That such a life of sacrifice not only honours God, but also benefits mankind in general, is a necessary consequence of the natural connection between love of God and love of one's neighbour; and history records the magnificent achievements of the Catholic religious orders.⁴

To a modern student of ethics, who regards worldly culture as

¹ *Origen*, c. Cels., I, 26, 27; *August.*, de s. virgin., n. 11: Nec nos hoc in virginibus praedicamus, quod virgines sunt; sed quod *Deo dicatae pia* continentia virgines. *Thom.*, S. theol., II, II, q. 24, a. 8.

² S. theol., II, II, q. 186, a. 2.

³ *Schopenhauer* (Ges. W. W. Reclam., II, 180) ridicules the merely "mental" mortification of the Stoics, "who fancied that they could compromise their principles, and, when seated at a luxurious Roman banquet, might leave no dishes untasted, provided that they ate, drank with a disdainful expression, protesting that they really cared nothing for this whole feasting."

⁴ *St. Thomas*, too, points out the connection of the religious and social elements in the religious life (*Opusc.*, 17, 6; 18, 14).

the absolute standard of morality, the ascetic principle is utterly incomprehensible. A Christian, however, who believes in God, and in his own call to the happiness of heaven in the next life, cannot consistently see that they who esteem highly a state of life aiming exclusively at God and eternity are false to Christianity. He is deterred from doing this, even if he would, by Christ's words regarding celibacy and poverty¹ and *St. Paul's* teaching on virginity.² The essence of the Evangelical Counsels is expressed so plainly in these passages that nowadays many eminent Protestants interpret them in the Catholic sense³; and the same fundamental ideas of asceticism can be traced throughout the whole literature of Christianity from the earliest times.

The chief reason for the moral excellence of real detachment from the world is that *God* becomes the centre of the moral life. *St. Paul* emphasizes the fact that a virgin dedicates herself "wholly to God"; and he suggests thereby that freedom from *earthly* joys and sorrows encourages a fuller development of charity, which is the essence of perfection. *St. Augustine* says: "He loveth Thee too little, who loveth besides Thee anything that he loveth not for Thy sake." These words show that there is a natural love for things temporal, but that the *ideal love* is that of God alone, which uses earthly things only in as far as they serve God's interests. Absorption in worldly aims and possessions almost inevitably entangles the spirit not only in reasonable "cares," but also in selfish "lusts."⁴ The river of charity, if it spreads its waters over the lowlands of worldly occupations, cannot bring them to the ocean in such force, purity, and abundance as it would do if it were confined within the narrow bed of religious renunciation of the world.⁵

¹ Matt. xix.

² 1 Cor. vii.

³ E.g., *Strauss*, *Schopenhauer*, *Ueberweg*, *Hilgenfeld*, *Paulsen*, *Pfleiderer*, *Holtzmann*, *Gottschick*, etc. Some weaken down their meaning, others exaggerate it. A token of the inward connection between Christianity and withdrawal from worldly life may be discovered in the fact that the worldly inclined Protestantism of the present time is constantly asking the question "whether we are still Christians," and that men such as *Ibsen* and *Kierkegaard*, in opposition to this worldliness, describe as Christian a spirit of sacrifice that lacks all moderation, all practical clearness and possibility of attainment.

⁴ Mark iv. 19.

⁵ *Gregor. Nyss.*, de virgin., c. 7.

We can undoubtedly serve God in the world, but it is in accordance with the Creator's final aim and the creature's highest, because eternal, destiny, to pay Him peculiar honour and glorify Him, and this is the work of those who adopt the religious life. Our religious duties, though they do not constitute all morality, are its most dignified part. They cover the commandments regarding our duty towards God; they make the moral principle more intelligible, active, and fruitful, and they were recognized even by the great pagan philosophers as the chief obligations of man. The denial of this truth by Protestantism leads to the doctrines of *Kant* and of modern thinkers who deny all moral value to prayer or to any action of which God is the immediate aim.

Why should Sunday be more sacred than other days if the worship of God is no better than any other occupation, when to do one's daily work is, in fact, "the only justifiable way of serving God"? Why should a church be a more sacred place than a factory, a museum, or an inn, if work connected with the economic and æsthetic sides of life were on a level with its religious aspect, or rather if it actually constituted Christianity?

The religious Orders in the kingdom of God are precisely what a church, with its spire pointing to heaven, is in the midst of a wilderness of houses, or what Sunday is to the rest of the week — neither more nor less. The life of prayer in a religious house is not "free of all moral obligations," but is itself the highest moral act. *Sell* contradicts himself when he says that Protestantism disparages all "purely religious activity" and recognizes "no other direct spiritual relation with God than that which consists in performing all the duties of one's earthly, human, and moral calling from the depths of a heart devoted to God, i.e., with prayer." All practical moral action is, in his opinion, "direct worship of God" (p. 230).

But *Sell* shows plainly that earthly activity is not *direct* worship of God, because he is compelled to add prayer to it, in order to be able to represent it as such. Prayer, however, is a "purely religious activity," the direct submission of the spirit to God; and the most important, though not the sole, aim of the contemplative Orders is to practise prayer in as great and perfect a degree as is possible. If man had "no particular duties to discharge towards

God," we ought to adopt *D. Fr. Strauss's* suggestion and invite people rather to visit museums and listen to *Beethoven's* symphonies on Sunday; if work were our best direct means of honouring God and fulfilling our highest aim, we ought to leave off observing Sunday as a holy day. If the "sanctity" of earthly labour is due, however, to the prayerful disposition of the heart, the superiority of the latter must logically be admitted, because what is original and absolute always takes precedence of what is derived and relative.

W. H. Riehl, the talented apologist of labour, sharply criticises "the rhetorical exaggeration" of describing all honest work as "sacred." He says that such a description involves a false principle: "Sacred labour is assumed to be the one true form of worship; we are no longer to *pray and* work, like the old-fashioned people, but we are to work *instead of* praying"—a "new edition of the old rationalistic doctrine that advocated morality in place of religion."¹

Modern Pantheism is consistent in pronouncing all true service of the world to be service of God; it is taught consciously or unconsciously by many modern theologians as a consequence of the neutralization, peculiar to Protestantism, of all distinctions and degrees of being. It is a significant fact that *Luther* on one occasion remarked that churches ought not to be built differently from dance halls.² Such language cannot be reconciled with a loving conception of God and a steady Christian piety; it is the outcome of the hostile disposition shown to all that is Catholic.

Furthermore, exclusive devotion to religious interests brings *the dignity and supernatural destiny of man* into prominence. "A religious," so says a Protestant writer, "is deficient in what we now regard as of the highest importance, viz., *personality*, which is *inconceivable apart from property, family, and freedom*."³ In these words there is not so much an exaltation of personality as a descent to the standpoint of paganism, which valued a man according to his physical strength, social position, and wealth. If this theory were adopted, the poor, the lame, and the enslaved would possess no human personality. It is a great merit of Christianity

¹ *Riehl*, *Die deutsche Arbeit*, 3d ed., p. 30, etc.

² Weimar ed., XII, 696.

³ *Grenzboten*, 1899, p. 623.

to have asserted the dignity of the individual, but this is to a great extent connected with the fact that in the religious life the unimportance of all exterior accidental advantages, such as property, birth, and social position, is not only taught, but demonstrated *ad oculos* by means of living examples, often of a very remarkable nature.¹

The good things of the world cannot be compared with the dignity of the human soul; nor may the need of sexual consummation be deemed absolute for man as a personality. Although man has a dual nature, the two spheres of his life are not of equal importance; the senses supply matter for the intellect, but the intellect is destined to possess God. The modern opinion that an unmarried man is only "half a man"² involves a degradation of the human personality, and, *a priori*, a moral condemnation of a large proportion of the human race; above all, the dignity of woman is incompatible with such a principle. Personality is strengthened, not by giving the passions and the demands of nature free play, not by living a life of nature, but by self-discipline and freedom of the spirit. The history of art and science introduces us to many great men who were so fully occupied with their intellectual interests and ideals as to renounce marriage. In answer to the question why he had never married, *Michaelangelo* replied: "I have too much of a wife already in my art, which keeps me always busy, and my children may be seen in the works that I shall leave behind me." *K. Fischer* remarks of *Kant* that there was in his life no void that marriage could have filled. If art and science can accomplish this, is it beyond the power of religion to do the same? Cannot the highest beauty and truth acquire such influence over the heart of man that serving them is enough to fill his whole intellectual existence? "Exalted above human values is the thing the contemplation of which enables a man to live without other

¹ *Uhlhorn* says (*Gesch. der christl. Liebestät. in d. alten Kirche*, 2d ed., pp. 344, 369) that the monasteries were the birthplace of free labour, and that, whilst apparently destroying personal liberty, had in fact restored it to life. *Gregory the Great*, having shown at the tomb of the martyrs *Nereus* and *Achilleus* how Christian contempt for the world had destroyed the spurious attractions of paganism and restored the nature and dignity of man in himself, admonished his hearers thus: *Nolite ergo in vobismetipsis pensare quod habetis, sed quid estis* (*Hom.*, 28, 3).

² *A. Philippi*, *Die Frauenfrage*, Bielefeld, 1894, p. 18.

men.”¹ If in the former case, in which accident plays so great a part, the world calls idealists those who renounce marriage, why will it deny in the latter case this term to those to whom the ideal disposition is the primary and pronounced motive?²

A third reason for asceticism exists *in the power of sin*, which has to be resisted by individuals and by mankind in general. Human nature, as it is constituted, is incapable of simple, unreserved intercourse with the world and its attractions. The thorns and thistles of riches and worldly pleasures are only too apt to choke the good seed, and this life becomes the foe of the life to come. Every Christian is bound to resist lust of the eyes, lust of the flesh, and the pride of life, and if in this struggle he renounces even that which is permitted, in order to be more surely true to duty in time of temptation, and if such renunciation in individual cases is better than the enjoyment of what is permitted, it follows that an Order, which in many forms of the Church’s organism embodies precisely this spirit of resistance to sin, the lifting up of the spirit above the things of this world, penance and sacrifice, must be recognized as higher, more ideal, than any other. The three Evangelical Counsels are a strong force in counteracting the degrading power of desire for base gains, of sexual passion, and of unrestrained license, which are always assuming new forms and threatening to disturb the peace of the individual and of society at large. Heroic renunciation of the enjoyments and the happiness of life, when actually seen in glorious exemplifications, makes a deeper impression upon the minds of the people than any number of sermons, and confirms their faith in the future world, and quickens that sense for higher things that is the characteristic feature of Christian morality.

All that has been said can be summed up in the words: *Following of Christ*. It is a vain attempt to represent Christ as a “cheerful, life-enjoying rabbi.” From His birth in the stable to His death on the cross, Jesus lived in poverty, privation, and contempt. In a manner all His own He united the spiritual with the temporal,

¹ *August.*, de mor. eccl., 65.

² If we regard the “supernatural” destiny of man in the strict sense (see *infra*, Chap. VII) as an elevation to a higher state of resemblance to God, the appropriateness of the Evangelical Counsels becomes still more apparent. The ascetic life finds in mysticism a source of strength, and, conversely, asceticism considers the character of Christianity as of a supernatural order.

the contemplative with the active life, thus setting an unattainable example to men in all phases of life. There can, however, be no doubt that His whole life was not favourable to the "intimate interweaving of worldliness and culture that is presented to us in modern Protestant Christianity." It is very significant that His life culminated on the cross of shame and suffering. Even *St. Paul* preached Christ as the Crucified, and all who have penetrated most deeply and earnestly into the spirit of Christ have understood it to be a spirit of sacrifice and mortification, and have valued the religious life as most perfectly embodying this spirit.¹

Finally, it is an incontestable fact that the observance of the Evangelical Counsels has been *a great blessing to the social order and to the cause of civilization*. Society is based upon a modification of the natural man with his selfish, self-assertive, and seclusive disposition so that he voluntarily accepts an assigned place in the organization of the social order, and willingly submits to authority. This modification is effected most perfectly within the narrow limits of community life in religious Orders, which brings together high and low, learned and ignorant, in the spirit of charity and mutual service. True culture is attained when the body and all the natural talents are brought under the dominion of the spirit, and such a dominion requires the spirit, first, to have control over itself and the things of sense. Such a deliverance from the bonds of nature and sense, such a concentration of all the intellectual faculties upon great thoughts and aims, is greatly promoted by the strictness and silence of monastic solitude.

In the Gospels the commandment requiring perfection includes both love of God and love of one's neighbour; and love of our neighbour, of humanity as a whole, is the spirit of all genuine social culture. As love of God grows more intense, it increases our comprehension and zeal in our love towards others; in fact, charity impels men to action, as Christ and the apostles expressly admonish us not to love only in word, but in deed and in truth. Consequently, the energy and buoyancy of a Christian's love of God, being incapable of benefiting Him, overflow upon our fellowmen and succour the needy and afflicted. In renouncing material goods this transference of energy is displayed outwardly: "If thou wilt

¹ Cf. also *Linsenmann*, Tüb. Quartalschr., 1872, p. 32, etc.

be perfect, sell what thou hast and *give it to the poor.*" Also the renunciation of marriage for God's sake is not unfruitful in good results to society. The heart, too, possesses treasures, stores of power to do good and confer happiness, and it has a desire and necessity to bestow them on others. In the light of a religious vocation they lose none of their beneficent force, and when released from the confines of family life they find wider scope. The greatest demands made by society upon the charity and spirit of self-sacrifice of its members have ever met with ready response on the part of those vowed to virginity.

There is a profound saying of *Goethe* that whoever wishes to do anything for the world must hold aloof from it, and *Carlyle* wrote: "Two men I honour, and no third. First, the toilworn craftsman that with earth-made implements laboriously conquers the earth and makes her man's. . . . A second man I honour, and still more highly; him who is seen toiling for the spiritually indispensable; not daily bread, but the bread of life."¹

The world, with its hurry and struggle for worldly things, with its passions, errors, and disappointments, knows that it is often unable to see clearly what is truly necessary, or what tends to its happiness; and so it places peculiar confidence in men who, by a renunciation of the world and a firm and heroic will, have raised themselves above earthly interests. It is not merely accidental that in masterpieces of literature, faithfully representing human life, a religious often appears as the counsellor of people in the world, and even of lovers. I need refer only to Friar *Laurence* in "Romeo and Juliet," the friar in "Much Ado About Nothing" and in *Goethe's* "Natürliche Tochter," and *Pater Christoforo* in *Manzoni's* "Promessi Sposi."

The force of example, too, is edifying, and Christians collectively are the better for the high standard of moral purity attained by those who have dedicated their lives thus to God's service. The idea of Christian sanctity, the belief in God, in His grace, and in the world to come, and the capacity of human nature to attain the highest perfection, are all displayed objectively in the glorious lives of the heroes of self-sacrifice. Countless unhappy mortals, weighed down by the cruelty of men and by suffering of all kinds, and

¹ Sartor Resartus, Bk. III, Chap. IV.

without hope, have derived fresh courage through seeing the favourites of fortune, whom they were inclined to envy, voluntarily abandon all pleasures of life and gladly descend to their own poverty. That such things actually take place not only supports morality generally, but particularly demands attention from the social thought of our day. But it cannot be the principal aim of asceticism to exert an influence upon society, it must be included in its religious aim; for any one who practised virtue with a view to edifying others by its force and beauty would certainly run a risk of falling into the folly and sin of self-justification.¹

In discussing the twofold character of Christianity, world-renunciation and world-enjoyment, we must bear in mind that the guiding principle of a Christian life is an unreserved, all-embracing love of God and our neighbour, which involves renunciation of all sinful pleasures and selfishness. Moreover, this life discloses a great many different forms, and there are various vocations, some devoting themselves to research, others to manual labour, others again to training the young, all according to God's will; whilst a few dedicate their lives to the exclusive service of God and to promoting the supernatural and spiritual welfare of mankind.

The sense of duty must urge every Christian to discharge the obligations of his own calling, whatever it may be, with all the loyalty, industry, and sacrifice required, in conformity with God's holy will and the general aim of His kingdom. History bears witness to the fact that men who have renounced the world are the ones who have done most for its restoration and for the promotion of intellectual and social culture. This is not one of the paradoxes of historical evolution, but a fulfilment of the words of our Saviour in the Sermon on the Mount: "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you."

Some people maintain that the discharge of worldly obligations is the *only* calling that a Christian can have; and I have no hesitation in stating that since the Reformation this idea has predomi-

¹ *Hilty*, *Schlaflose Nächte*, p. 233: "Constant and not merely occasional intercourse with God, and complete renunciation of all pleasure and of every kind of selfishness, are now as much as ever the secrets of God's power amongst us. The clergy must attain to this, otherwise their whole activity is of no avail; the prince of this world would laugh at them, and that with good reason."

nated to a great extent. Whether it originated in a deeper moral appreciation of civilized life, or whether it has had a beneficial effect in giving this life the impress of Christianity, is another question. We are told that *Luther* shattered the mediæval ideal of life and set up another in its place; that he restored the natural life to its proper position and united the worldly and the religious calling¹; that he restored the performance of one's worldly duties, like every other pure and profitable enjoyment, again to the holy service of God²; that by delivering the world from the curse of asceticism, he restored its natural simplicity and allowed all earthly labour to be performed with a good conscience.³ According to *Ritschl*, the new ideal of life, by means of which a Christian who trusts in God raises himself above the world and subdues the world, while following his earthly vocation, was actually *Luther's* fundamental thought.⁴

This view, however, has been rejected as untenable, even by Protestants. The few passages that can be quoted in support of it are as nothing in comparison with the mass of testimony which proves the starting and central point of the Reformation to have been the *sola fides* doctrine, "that consoling grace to a man troubled about his sins." But even as one idea out of many, *Luther*, by his alleged removal of the stain of profanity attaching to secular life, does not deserve the praise that he has received, and this for two reasons.⁵

In the first place, during the Middle Ages, the word "profane" had no bad sense when it was applied to worldly pursuits, and it would be easy to quote from mediæval preachers and mystics words exactly parallel to *Luther's* well-known remarks on the subject of the sweeping maid and the ploughing man, who were pleasing in God's sight. *Mark von Weida*, a Saxon Dominican, preached in 1501 a sermon on prayer, and said in it: "A man ought always to do what beseems his position and employment, and what is good and right. If he does this, he is always praying.

¹ *Uhlhorn*, *Katholizismus und Protestantismus gegenüber der Sozialen Frage*, 2d ed., Göttingen, 1887, pp. 28, 30.

² *Schmidt*, *Christentum und Weltverneinung*, p. 36.

³ *Harnack*, *Wesen des Christ.*, p. 175.

⁴ *A. Ritschl*, *Die christl. Vollkommenheit*, 2d ed., Göttingen, 1889.

⁵ Cf. *Ziegler*, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

Hence it follows that we find many poor peasants, labourers, or artisans, and others who, on beginning their work, do so with the intention that it shall tend to God's glory, and, by means of this work that they do day by day, they are more pleasing to God in heaven, and earn more merit in His sight, than many Carthusians, or black, gray, and white friars, who stand daily in their choir, singing and praying."¹

In the second place, *Luther* extolled life in the world not because he appreciated the natural sphere of life as more moral, but, as is apparent in all his writings, because he hated the monastic system, and this hatred had much to do with *Luther's* own personal development, and with his contempt of all good works. Whoever despises "the clerical life" as the work of Satan, and tries to banish it altogether, is naturally forced to recommend the secular life.²

In proof of this last statement I may remind my readers of the dark and pessimistic view held by *Luther* regarding man in his natural condition. If human nature were utterly corrupt and incapable of any living union with God, it would follow that the activity of this nature, and the creations of the intellect and will, must also be alien to God, and therefore "profane."

According to *Luther*, this inward disorder is not really remedied by justification, but only covered up. At the best any attempt on the part of man to renew himself and the world is only a constituent of "earthly and human justice," which *Luther* says is as distinct from God's justice as heaven is from earth and light from darkness. A Christian "conscience" has, strictly speaking, very little to do with the reason and the will. *Agricola's* theory that

¹ *N. Paulus*, *Katholik*, 1902, I, 333. Statements of this kind occur very frequently in mediæval sermons and devotional works. Cf. *N. Paulus*, *Ztschr. f. Kath. Theol.*, 1902, p. 438, etc.; *Denifle*, *D. geistl. Leben*, p. 332. "Know that many a man is in the midst of the world, and has wife and child; and many a man sits and makes shoes, and his intention is to serve God and support himself and his children; and some poor men go out of a village to manure the fields and earn their bread with hard work; but it may happen that they fare a hundred times better, because they faithfully follow their calling."

² *Sell*, p. 200, involuntarily acknowledges this when he writes: "The secular and regular clergy, hitherto highly esteemed, fell suddenly into the deepest contempt. Positions and employments of laymen were all that was left, and these rose in popular estimation."

the Gospel belonged to the Church and the law to the law courts, bears a great resemblance to *Luther's*. We should be justified in saying that religion and the natural life are here so far separated as to seem to be on *two quite different planes*.¹

The most decisive feature in asceticism is the renunciation of marriage, as by marrying a man incurs the obligation of acquiring worldly possessions, social position, etc. In order to give a convincing account of *Luther's* views on this subject, and also indirectly to throw light on his attitude to secular life in general, I will refer to one of his most sober and instructive works, the explanation of 1 Cor. vii. From verses 1 and 2, regardless of *St. Paul's* opinion, subsequently very plainly expressed, *Luther* infers that woman was created only for marriage, that in her very nature she exists *for the sake of man*, otherwise nothing remains to her but *vice*, or else "we should have to strangle them all." He² holds that for every human being marriage is necessary on account of the violence of sexual passion; "therefore inevitably a man must cling to his wife and a wife to her husband, unless God *works a miracle* by a special gift" (p. 113). This theory, that only a miracle of God can raise any one above the power of passion, and that chastity apart from marriage is very rarely possible, recurs several times in this treatise (pp. 105, 141). It follows from this, as a logical conclusion, that if, after a separation, one party refuses to be reconciled, the other is free to contract a new marriage (pp. 119, 121). Of the various causes, that give importance to marriage, the best and strongest is said to be "necessity" (p. 114). Even in marriage, however, sexual pleasure is not "without sin,"

¹ *Gass*, op. cit., p. 54: "*Luther* nowhere proves that moral conduct, as the general sum total of good works, requires a subjectivity of its own; he stops short at the *distinction* that good works belong only to the outer world. . . . Moreover, *Luther* declares that though the believer, *who is on the higher level*, must be free from all law, yet the one *on the lower level*, who is still influenced by sin, must continue to be under the dominion of law. But *these two stand-points are kept too far apart*, and it is not clear how they can both affect the development of the personality." *Paulsen*, 6th ed., I, 129: "*Luther* did not think the doctrine of the Church too unreasonable, nor the life of the Church too worldly; we may even assert the contrary. He rejected reason in matters of faith, and had very slight appreciation for the value of this earthly life and its significance."

² Weimar ed., XII, 93.

and God only tolerates it because of the benefits of marriage (pp. 101, 114).

What does *Luther* make of the words in which *St. Paul* so plainly states the superiority of virginity? He interprets them as referring to "matters of this world," to "temporal advantage," to "temporal peace and comfort," and for these reasons he, too, recommends celibacy.¹

If this explanation derived some sort of support (though only apparently) from verse 26 (*propter instantem necessitatem*), it would be proved unsatisfactory by verse 34, where it is plainly out of place. Hence, in commenting on this verse, *Luther* admits that chastity has the further advantage of "*facilitating the service of God.*" Although in marriage care and labour are good, "yet it is *much better* to be free to pray and to spread God's word, for in this way a man benefits and consoles many people, even the whole of Christendom" (pp. 138, 139). Nevertheless the difference between marriage and virginity should not be connected with morality, but only with earthly advantages and disadvantages!²

A further contradiction makes *Luther's* theory still more complicated. He speaks of marriage as a spiritual state, because it always necessitates confidence in God's assistance to supply the needs of the family; whereas a religious lives free from anxiety. Hence the married state is "in its nature" gold, and the religious state "filth," because the former promotes faith and the latter unbelief (p. 107). How, then, can *Luther* sum up his chapter with the words: "It is good not to marry, unless there be need" (p. 141)?

This wavering between two contrary opinions is due to *Luther's* Nominalism, which ascribes no value to morality in comparison with faith. He remarks here: "Before God all things are *alike*, although they are *different* from one another. . . . Before Him

¹ P. 137: "He who has grace to remain chaste, let him restrain his eagerness and beware of the married state, and not entangle himself in such trouble. This is the right way to extol virginity, not to emphasize its merits and dignity before God, but to praise the peace and comfort that it affords in this life."

² The contradiction is very evident in the comment: "The words 'well and better' (v. 38) are sufficiently explained above, that we must understand them as referring to what is good 'on earth,' that the married state is good, i.e., without sin and *pleasing to God* and *free* to everybody, but the state of chastity is calmer and *freer*." Note how the meaning of the words is confused here!

marriage and virginity are alike, for both are His divine gifts, although, to compare them, one is *better* than the other" (p. 164).

But enough of these contradictions; the clear fundamental ideas, which elsewhere appear much more bluntly, show what "*Luther's* wholesome ethical teaching" is in comparison with "the lower Catholic conception" on the subject of marriage.¹ *Luther* regarded it as a duty for every Christian to marry — "miracles" need not be taken into account; marriage, however, was advocated not because of its moral beauty and excellence, but chiefly because it supplies the only means of curbing the impulses of our corrupt nature. In itself *Luther* thought chastity to be "a rare and noble gift," but no one possesses it; and consequently those who do not marry have only the sorrowful necessity left to them to be overcome by their passions. The Catholic Church has always taught that the advantages of marriage were threefold: *bonum prolis, fidei, sacramenti* — the good of posterity, of fidelity, and of the sacrament — and that it was not merely "a matter of necessity." She has not set before woman the alternative between marriage and vice, but by exalting virginity has opened to her an ideal career, and has given her the opportunity of attaining to religious perfection, and at the same time of engaging in works of charity, art, and science, independently of man's caprice. Thus in Catholicism the spirit, that ostensibly avoids the world, actually supplies all the needs of civilization — and is capable of dealing even with the modern woman's question — whilst *Luther's* principles display the peculiarity of all extreme views; they turn into the direct opposite of what is intended.²

In the further development of Protestant thought, the principle that *extremes meet* has acquired peculiar significance. The stress laid upon "faith alone" inevitably led to a reaction and gave rise to philosophical moralism, to an exaggeration of the evil effects of sin, and to naturalism. Two other circumstances favoured the spread of Protestantism, both being historically, though not theoretically, connected with the Reformation. When

¹ Ziegler, p. 450.

² This fact has not escaped the notice of thoughtful women who are taking part in the present movement; e.g., *L. Eckenstein*, *Woman under Monasticism*, Cambridge, 1895, and *E. Gnauck-Kuhne*. The latter, by joining the Church, has shown her appreciation of Catholic principles.

dogmatic faith was deprived of the support of ecclesiastical authority, it gradually decayed and gave place to ideas of "enlightenment," and when the religious institutions and forms of life, that had in the Middle Ages been regarded as holy and sanctifying, were to a great extent destroyed, civilized life was "secularized," and left to its own resources.¹

It is not, therefore, in accordance with history to regard modern progress in civilization as especially due to the Reformation. The centuries of orthodoxy have been by no means conspicuous for achievements in art and science. When a livelier perception of the necessity of moral action made itself felt, it did not aim at social progress. On the contrary, the history of Pietism shows that, with the idea of perfection, a tendency to adopt the ascetic view of life again asserted itself; and, owing to the absence of a church organization and guidance, Pietism, in renouncing the world, degenerated naturally into exaggerated or trivial affectation.²

Discussions regarding the intermediate or indifferent things already mentioned, such as dancing, smoking, playing cards, shooting, visiting theatres, and wearing wigs, abound in the Protestant literature of the seventeenth century; many Lutheran and Calvinistic theologians declared all these things to be actually sinful, and not merely less good; and they acted on this principle in their care of souls. Some considered it even morally wrong to *love any creature whatsoever*. Catholic asceticism has always been free from these extremes, for such renunciation of the world destroys the true ideal and brings ridicule upon it.

According to *Möhler's* famous saying, the periods when faith and public spirit are strongest in the Catholic Church are those of the most splendid productions of art and science. "Protestant-

¹ *Paulsen*, op. cit., 131: "The further historical result was that the Church, having thus lost her essential importance, gradually disappeared, like a superfluous organ. . . . There can be no doubt that, like their external manifestation, thought and feeling also were secularized. . . . As the outward life of the Church vanished, the minds of the majority lost all thought of eternity, and men attached themselves more firmly and more exclusively to this world. *Luther* certainly had no intention of bringing about this result."

² *R. Rocholl*, *Einsame Wege*, Leipzig, 1898: "Pietism is able to arouse, but not to guide men. . . . It has a strange, morbid, arbitrary appearance, for it lacks a Church which tones down offensive peculiarities and restrains, moulds, and directs the individual."

ism has another effect. As long as the teaching of *Luther* and *Calvin* was faithfully believed, there was no poetry, no history, and no philosophy in the Protestant Church. It is certain that as long as the Protestant part of the population was Lutheran, it had no philosophy, and when it gained a system of philosophy, it had ceased to be Lutheran. Thus its faith fled from philosophy, and its philosophy from faith." In speaking of classical German literature, so great from the human point of view, and so remote from Christianity, *Möhler* remarks: "The more thoroughly the principle of isolation is carried out in Protestantism, the more brilliant are the results produced in its own peculiar manner; and conversely, the more lively the sense of unity in Catholicism, the more do the arts and sciences flourish within its bosom."¹

Lagarde, writing independently of *Möhler*, expresses almost the same ideas. According to him, the apparent influence of Protestantism on progress is due not to its excellence, but to its inner *indefensibility*, and the ease with which it may thereby be destroyed "I absolutely deny that *Lessing*, *Goethe*, *Herder*, *Kant*, and *Winkelmann* were in any essential way influenced by the Protestant system and the Protestant Church."²

It is not within the scope of this work to compare Protestantism, so completely divested of all supernatural thought and direction, with Catholicism. But one thought suggests itself: The setting free of all the intellectual faculties without restriction to contend for an earthly reward, and the struggle for a meaning of life, in which the highest aim, the absolute Good, has first to be sought, must on the one hand impart great buoyancy to men's efforts, but on the other must produce sharp contrasts, doubts, and disappointments. A Catholic, on the contrary, whose thought is at rest on the most vital questions, and whose efforts as far as they are absolute, are aimed at the world to come, is apt to lag behind a man of the present day with his energy of thought and action, unless he is urged on by far-sighted conscientiousness or apologetic rivalry. As a compensation, however, he has a firm grip upon his fundamental principles, and so is able to maintain the just mean between the fluctuations of opinion, and to sift out the

¹ *Möhler*, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Regensb., 1839, I, 260.

² *Lagarde*, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-47.

truth from ideas indiscriminately heaped together. His idealism takes the form, less of a struggle to discover a meaning to life, than of moral action for the sanctification of the world and of his own life, and of the peaceful representation of what is beautiful in art; in fact, he aims at the *realization* of his ideal. The very thought of the multitude of human beings, and of the social consequences of a daring heresy, — this profoundly Christian consideration for the poor in spirit, — forbids to him that reckless individualism of which modern thinkers and poets boast.¹

The Church will never win the applause of those who regard worldly possessions and human dignity as the highest Good; she will always keep alive in her children the consciousness *ad maiora natus sum!* Precisely by this means she renders man inwardly free and happy, for he is raised above the blind forces of passion and fate; precisely by this means she offers mankind an ideal of perfection and happiness, accessible to millions, without being exhausted or broken up. In order to preserve this supernatural spirit in Christendom, she will always uphold the ascetic life and take care that the salt of the earth does not lose its savour. But while resisting all deification of progress, the Church shows her respect for all that is truly great and beautiful. The consciousness *ad maiora natus sum* does not forbid her from saying, with *St. Augustine*, of worldly education, *magna haec et omnino humana*. A man who turns his back on the problems of civilization, not because he possesses higher knowledge and purer love, but on account of narrow prejudices, *Weltschmerz*, or misanthropy, or through despondency or a desire for ease, cannot boast of the approval of the Church any more than he can rely upon God's blessing. In periods when intellectual progress was scarcely thought of as an ideal, and when it offered no dangers or difficulties to Christianity, men with enlightened minds strove to reconcile faith and science, and the Church sought to bring the spirit of Christianity into

¹ In a very affecting sketch by *J. Jörgensen*, a man in a state of desperation says to the poet, whose works have led him astray: "Remember that *we live* the life that you poets only *describe*. . . . We heard you say that the good man is the strong and reckless man, — the man with great pretensions, wild desires, and intense delight in life! . . . We followed your seductive words to the very brink of the abyss, where you stopped short, whereas we others plunged into its depths" (*Parabeln*, Mainz, 1899, p. 41).

every relation of life. Nowadays, when the idea of progress is clearly recognized as a divine law, and when modern thought with its empiric certainty stands threateningly opposed to the Church, it is more than ever the duty of Catholics not to shrink from the conflict and the labour of the world, but to bring the supernatural forces of Christianity to bear upon it, so as to cast upon its labour and enjoyment the light of higher thoughts and aims.

My remark that the strenuous exertions of the highly strung people of the present day may be accounted for partly by the fact that they seek the absolute meaning of life in the things of earth, has led *Herrmann* to reply (p. 167): "It is quite impossible for all a man's forces to be employed in a contest for earthly rewards, if at the same time he has to struggle to discover a meaning for his existence in something absolutely good; for the absolute Good as such belongs to the next life." This formalistic interpretation neither coincides with nor refutes my idea. In *Kant's* terminology every conception of the absolute may be regarded as transcendental, belonging to the other world, but in the metaphysical and ethical consideration of things, this language is not permissible. Pantheism teaches that there is an absolute cause, but asserts that it is of this world, that it is essentially identical with the world. Many modern students of ethics believe in the existence of an absolute Good as the aim of human action, but explicitly reject the religious aim as belonging to "another world," setting in its place universal prosperity and progress *in this world*. It is therefore a fact that quest of the absolute has not invariably an "other-worldly" character.

Herrmann probably knows how far theoretical and practical Monism has spread amongst educated Protestants, and to what extent it has concentrated all efforts upon this life, either by overvaluing knowledge or by the pursuit of riches and power. He asserts, it is true, on the other hand, that genuine Christianity is essentially no less active and equally concerned about human progress. "True religion is in every man the highest energy of thought in its reckless advance" (p. 171). He thinks that a religion which authoritatively checks thought and makes men indifferent to worldly matters is a perversion of religion. I need scarcely say that I have never stated with regard to the Catholic

religion that it "made" men indifferent and easy-going; but only that in the case of individuals the danger of such a misunderstanding of religion might arise. To say that in every man "true religion is the highest energy of thought in its reckless advance" is manifestly an exaggeration, disproved by the history of Protestantism, beginning with *Luther*, as well as by that of every other religion. According to *Herrmann*, the origin of religion is to be found in an "experience of God," but this must be passive rather than active. If philosophical thought regarding God leads to no trustworthy result, a "man's own production" of the substance of religion, and "his struggle for religious conviction," cannot really be the energy of thought pressing forward to truth, but only the introduction to the individualistic breaking up of Christianity and faith in God.

The following remark of *Herrmann's* can only be regarded as the utterance of blind fanaticism: "*The Roman Church has therefore at the present day its place only among the ruins of civilization.* Where, however, a nation is preparing a future for itself, the presence of the decaying mass of Roman Christianity, being excluded from participation in active life, can only have a deadly effect. The consciousness of this is apparent wherever life is in vigorous growth, in Germany, Austria, France, Italy" (p. 172).

I do not intend to discuss here the question of culture in Protestant and Catholic nations,¹ but regarding *Herrmann's* gross misconstruction of the situation a few words in elucidation are not out of place. The attempt to answer such profound questions offhand reminds one of the self-satisfied *famulus* in "*Faust*," and it shows that some theologians adopt a very ephemeral standpoint. It is a comparatively very short time that Protestantism has been in a position to fancy itself superior to Catholicism in matters of culture. Far up into the eighteenth century it was still overshadowed by the abundance of Catholic achievements, although it had done its best to destroy them. With regard especially to what constitutes joy in life and in the future, no one can deny that all the *foundations* and *productions* of Christian culture have so far been the work of the Catholic Church. It is impos-

¹ Cf. *Mausbach*, *Die Kirche und die moderne Kultur*, 1912, Kap. 2, in *Religion, Christentum, Kirche*, III, 191 ff.

sible to name *a single nation* that has been converted from paganism either by Protestantism or by the separated Greek Church, and trained in Christian civilization in the way in which our own nations, now Christian, were converted and trained by the primitive or mediæval Church! The immense difficulty involved in such an achievement, the vast amount of wisdom, heroism, and patience that it required, are not clear to those who now rest upon a height that it has cost them nothing to attain, there to give free play to their own talents and subjective ideas of religion. As *Herrmann* refers to nations and masses of people, I may ask further: What elements of Christian culture, penetrating deeply into the nation in general, can be traced to the influence of Protestantism? I venture boldly to assert that every detail marking the life of nations as Christian — religious customs and forms of art, the ecclesiastical year and popular customs, the development of language and symbolism, even the Passion music, German chorals, and the Christmas tree, so long claimed as a Protestant institution — all date from an old Catholic past; in teaching the people Christianity and civilization Protestantism has produced nothing new; it has only developed or destroyed that which it found already in existence.

If, after the Reformation, the intellectual productiveness of the Church was less obvious, this was not a sign of decadence nor a token that her faith was a thing of the past, but to a great extent it was the result of the unhappy conflict in religion, and of the increasing alienation of secular life from Christianity and religion and of the hostility to the Church that was its outcome. Protestantism, as well as infidelity, never ceases to attack the positive doctrines and institutions of the Church, and hence the representatives of Catholicism have been forced to adopt a *defensive* attitude, and this, considering the extent and long history of the Church, has necessarily absorbed a vast amount of energy and labour that otherwise might have been devoted to the cause of progress. And yet, in the interests of truth and social morality, this defensive attitude is indispensable; it actually has a beneficial effect upon Protestantism, which, without it, would succumb more readily to the disintegrating forces that are now undermining its strength. I need only mention the revival of Christian philosophy,

and of theology, after the so-called period of enlightenment; also the resistance offered in our day to infidel socialism. The conflicts with philosophical and moral errors have brought many modern thinkers into prominence, but they imposed upon Catholic scholars the renowned task of ever again defending a truth that had long been established. It is true that the Catholic Church has thereby also made progress, but the growth of an old tree is more easily overlooked than that of a young plant or the blossoming of some strange new flower. In addition to the interior and intellectual antagonism, we must take into account the outward hostility and adverse state regulations which for centuries have been destroying Catholic civilization and its resources. Many of the "ruins" of which *Herrmann* speaks are the result of brutal regulations made by "enlightened" governments; secularization has destroyed innumerable places of Catholic education, and made their means of support available for Protestant purposes. The recent persecution going on in France showed why the modern spirit regards "the presence of Roman Christianity as something deadly." This hostility arises to a great extent from hatred for the divine and supernatural. When the Pope abandoned vast material possessions in France for the sake of maintaining ideal religious principles, he displayed a magnanimity and hopeful courage, and an assurance of the future and the permanence of the Church, that inspired every unprejudiced opponent with admiration, and by which Protestantism also benefited.¹

What has *Herrmann* to say about the Catholic parts of Germany near the Rhine and the Danube? These are regions most ready to submit to the influence of Catholic principles, and the life of the Church is able to expand and flourish there; is it possible to assert that they seem to be "under a narcotic," or reduced to ruins?

K. Sell as a theologian is opposed to all dogmatic restraints, but as a writer of history and a student of civilization he shows great appreciation of the work done by Catholicism in the cause of prog-

¹ A Protestant minister, writing in the "Deutsche Volkszeitung" (Hanover, July, 1910), shows how in Prussia the Catholic Church had repeatedly played the part of catpaw for Protestants by resisting the power of the state. "The Protestant Churches have shared in what the Catholic Church stoutly preserved."

ress. A comparison of the various nations of to-day seems to him to reveal a superiority, on the part of the Germans, English, and Dutch, in economic and perhaps also in educational matters. "But," he asks, "is not this probably much more an affair of *race*? And can it be maintained that the French are behind the English in culture at the present day" (p. 271)? To the Protestants belongs the largest percentage of those who attend the secondary schools in Germany, but this "is due to the Protestants being better off, owing to the fact that the parts of Germany that are exclusively Catholic are chiefly agricultural." The Jews, however, are even better off than the Protestants. He thinks it very questionable whether in criminal statistics any account ought to be taken of creeds, if temperaments and race conditions are ignored. Against the absence of Catholics among the German classical poets, he sets the creative genius of Catholic musicians and artists (p. 271). He concludes with the true remark, which I also have emphasized, that the value of a religion does not lie in what it has effected in the cause of progress, but that the higher efficacy of religion depends upon its capability of being adapted to the needs of progress (p. 275).

When we come to the historical appreciation of the achievements of the two creeds, *W. Köhler* admits that the Catholic Church also has extolled civic life, marriage, and civil government. "Ever since the time of *Paul the Apostle*, the supramundane Church, being unable to dispense with the world, has dovetailed into it, by means of the natural law, which controls all social life, a man's calling, marriage, etc. All these things are rendered legitimate in God's sight by the equation *jus naturae = lex divina*" (p. 48). Close investigation has shown that *Luther* was not the pioneer of modern culture as Protestantism would like to assume. Our modern culture, according to *Sell*, "finds its roots, not in the Reformation, but in humanism and enlightenment." Where *Luther* lays stress upon efficacious action as well as upon faith, "he refers hardly at all to its relation to the world and to civilization" (pp. 52, 56).

E. Tröltzsch discusses the subject fully and expresses similar views with regard to the genesis of modern life; on both the positive and the negative side he traces it back beyond the Refor-

mation to the Renaissance. "The pioneers of modern science, *Galileo, Pascal, Macchiavelli, Bodin, and Descartes*, were Catholics and not Protestants. This is of course no proof that their ideas were of Catholic origin, but it precludes the possibility of their being Protestant." The spread of their ideas, especially in the direction of individualism, was of course facilitated by the Protestant principle; the breaking up of mediæval supernaturalism was accomplished more quickly owing to the small resistance offered by Protestantism.¹

F. M. Schiele, who is much influenced by *Tröltzsch*, discusses the relation between civilization and the Catholic and Protestant ideas of religion. By "the union of nature and grace, of faith and thought, of sanctity and the natural law of morality, Catholic Christianity is brought into direct relation with civilization, whilst the individual Catholic participates in it only *indirectly*, in virtue of belonging to this form of Christianity. With us the reverse is the case. In consequence of our religious individualism and the reckless severance of our civilization from the Church, an individual Protestant stands in direct relation to civilization, whilst Protestantism participates in and influences it only indirectly, as it represents the common sentiments of individual Protestants."² This contrast has, of course, been challenged by other Protestants, nor can we as Catholics altogether agree with it; but it contains, nevertheless, some truth and gives matter for thought.

With reference to asceticism, *Harnack* says that "at the present time Protestantism has acquired more appreciation for the ideal side of monasticism than was possible in the Reformation period. It must admit that there is a great moral truth in the Evangelical Counsels, and that it is desirable to have within the Church a class who, in order to serve their neighbours, are willing to renounce the goods of this world."³ Asceticism has found in *F. W. Förster* an intelligent champion of the religious life, who describes its social and ethical importance with much appreciation and from many different points of view.⁴

¹ *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, Part. I, Section 4 (1906), p. 378.

² *Christl. Welt*, 1908, p. 906.

³ *Protest. und Katholizismus*, p. 28.

⁴ Cf. the statements in my "Kernfragen," pp. 84, etc., and *F. W. Förster*, *Sexualethik und Sexualpädagogik*, 2d ed., pp. 137, etc.

Even *W. James*, the American writer, though far more remote from us in thought, and though objecting to many forms of Catholic asceticism, admits that strict "temperance . . . and non-pampering of the body generally . . . may be fruits of love; they may appeal to the subject in the light of sacrifices which he is happy in making to the Deity whom he acknowledges."¹ In another passage he says: "The saints, with their extravagance of human tenderness, are the great torch-bearers of this belief (i.e., in the sacred character of every soul). . . . like the single drops which sparkle in the sun, as they are flung far ahead of the advancing edge of a wave-crest or of a flood; they show the way and are forerunners. The world is not yet with them, so they often seem preposterous in the midst of the world's affairs. Yet they are impregnators of the world, vivifiers and animaters of potentialities of goodness, which, but for them, would lie forever dormant. It is not possible to be quite as mean as we naturally are, when they have passed before us."²

¹ *W. James, Varieties of Religious Experience*, 1902, p. 297.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 357, 8.

CHAPTER VII

THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL

WE are told that the Church, in contrasting the natural and the supernatural life, has introduced a false distinction into morals; that she requires us to accept truths that we have not "evolved from our own hearts," but found presented to us as God's revelation in the Bible or in the doctrines of the Church. Such *faith based on authority* is pronounced "a deep corruption of the soul."¹

It is the same with regard to the will. Morality is said to be explained as due not solely to activity of the will, but partly to *grace* and the *Redemption*; i.e., "to a process standing entirely outside the religious and moral consciousness of the individual."² This double reproach can, of course, be advanced only by modern free thought. It is applicable to orthodox Protestantism even more than to Catholicism. On the other hand, opponents in both camps condemn the Catholic theory of *grace* as being a "physical, *supernatural* elevation of life"; the *sacraments* are condemned as being "conjuring tricks," infusing grace, a supernatural substantial force, "like medicine."³

I may say, by way of introduction, that in theological language the word "nature" denotes, in its most general sense, the essence of a thing, and especially its essence in so far as it is connected with some definite activity. Hence we call *natural* the properties and effects which belong to a thing, the advantages that it acquires by its growth and activity, and the possessions, aids, and aims to

¹ *Herrmann*, p. 10.

² *Wundt*, op. cit., p. 262; *Jodl*, *Gesch. der Ethik*, I, 55, 74; v. *Hartmann*, op. cit., p. 810.

³ *Harnack*, *Dogmengesch.*, 4th ed., III, 561, 566; *Hase*, op. cit., p. 340; *Ziegler*, op. cit., p. 291; *Braun*, op. cit., p. 108. A number of similar remarks emanating from Protestant theologians are cited by *Seitz* in *Die Heilsnotwendigkeit der Kirche nach der altchristl. Literatur*, 1903, p. 268.

which it is directed by its inner life and to which it has a right. Above all we apply the word "nature" to creation as a whole and to its order in conformity to law. In ordinary language man, the ruler of the irrational world is often excluded from nature in this sense; but in ethical and theological language the words "nature" and "natural" are used primarily of man and his disposition. This explanation will suffice to show that, in discussions of the latter kind, *supernatural* is not to be understood as equivalent to immaterial or supersensual, since the immaterial, spiritual soul belongs to man's natural substance, and spiritual and moral perfection to his natural destiny and obligation. Even religion, the turning of his mind to God, is not in itself anything supernatural, but the necessary completion of the spiritual life of man. As the life of the spirit is immortal, its natural, final end is conceivable as being in the world to come; and man, if he were limited to his own inner development and to the natural providence of God, would have to strive for this end and seek to attain it. It would be a happiness realized in the knowledge and love of God acquired through His creatures and imperishable.

On the other hand, we ascribe the quality of *supernatural* to what belongs neither to the essence of man, nor¹ to the properties and attainments of this essence, nor to its claims and inward possibilities of development. We apply the word to those advantages which man cannot acquire by himself, but which the Creator must bestow upon him by virtue of His wisdom and justice, and not because of His act of creation. What is supernatural participates in the divine perfections in a way surpassing the disposition of man; it has its origin in God's favour freely bestowed, and its formal character is that it is gratuitous.

These supernatural works of God are also parts of one whole; i.e., "a realm of the supernatural,"¹ with its varieties and gradations. In some cases a fact exceeds the natural order only in the manner of its accomplishment (miracles and prophecies). In others an advantage surpasses earthly human nature in the permanence of its effect, although it would not be considered supernatural for other creatures of a higher order (certain gifts of Paradise). In other

¹ Cf. *Scheeben*, *Dogmatik*, II, 393; *A. Weiss*, *Apologie*, III, *Natur und Uebernatur*; *Pohle*, *Natur und Uebernatur*, 1913.

cases, again, the gift includes an approximation to God, going far beyond anything to which a creature could lay claim. Such a gift is grace, the inward quickening of life, the equipment of a man with actual and habitual graces, and the grace of justification and adoption by God. In the realm of the supernatural the final end forms the completion that throws light and glory on the whole, and this end is the happiness of heaven, far exceeding every anticipation and need of the human heart. The supernatural character of this happiness lies in seeing God "face to face," in knowing Him as He is, and in the love and joy proceeding from this knowledge and contemplation.

Even in its original purity the natural, spiritual, and moral activity of man was not enough to establish or merit the life of grace, and it was far less possible for man to acquire such a life when in a state of sin and weakness.¹ Yet there is no antagonism or incompatibility, but an inward relationship and connection, between nature and grace; the spiritual nature of man, created in the likeness of God, presupposes grace and possesses an interior susceptibility to follow the call of grace and to grasp its constraining force.²

According to this conception of the supernatural, it is taken for granted that the presence of grace raises the soul and imparts to it strength, beauty, and fertility. Grace presupposes nature, just as the idea of perfection presupposes the existence of something capable of perfection. Perfection is the development of a potentiality into action, of a capacity into a reality, and hence, in speaking of the faculties of the soul, it means an increased ability to convert capacity into reality.³

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 151, *seq.*

² *St. Augustine*, de praed., ss. 5, 10; *St. Thomas*, S. theol., I, q. 2, a. 2 ad 1: *Fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem sicut gratia naturam et ut perfectio perfectibile*; I, II, q. 113, a. 10: *Justificatio impii non est miraculosa, quia naturaliter anima est gratiae capax; eo enim ipso, quod facta est ad imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam*. *Pius X*, ap. Denz., p. 2103: *capacitas et convenientia*. *Scheeben*, p. 400; *Pohle*, p. 333, etc.

³ Cf. preceding note; *Thom.*, S. theol., I, q. 1, a. 8 ad 2: *Cum gratia non tollat naturam sed perficiat*. . . . De malo, q. 2, a. 11: *In natura animae vel cujuscumque creaturae rationalis est aptitudo quaedam ad gratiae susceptionem, et per gratiam susceptam fortificatur in debitis actibus*. . . . *Gratia naturam perficit et quantum ad intellectum et quantum ad voluntatem et quantum ad inferiores animae partes obedibiles rationi*.

Grace, as we have just seen, presupposes nature, just as faith presupposes natural knowledge.¹ The supernatural, final end of man, and the order of salvation tending to it, can only be recognized as graces, freely bestowed by God upon man by means of a supernatural communication; viz., by revelation and faith. Most of the doctrines of Christianity and its institutions of grace are, in relation to our cognition, supernatural both in their substance and intellectually; their truth and reality are grasped only by faith, and they remain in many cases to the believing mind a secret shrouded in impenetrable darkness. Modern rationalism and autonomism rebel against these *supernatural truths*. Herrmann remarks: "We should regard it as sinful to treat a statement as true, unless its ideas coincide with our own."² His true meaning is revealed more plainly when he says that all our thoughts must *evolve from our own hearts and be based upon our own experience*.³

But with the statement thus worded more explicitly, its falsehood becomes at once apparent. We have acquired many ideas and much knowledge regarding history, geography, and physics, and we act in accordance with them, without having witnessed the historical events or visited the places or understood — much less discovered — the physical laws. If, then, the only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, reveals to us certain things regarding God and eternity, are we to refuse to believe them because we have not evolved them out of our own hearts? Our whole spiritual knowledge of truth depends ultimately not upon any evolution of truth from within, but upon the acceptance of truth, objectively presented to us, and upon action in conformity with it. The clearest difference between faith and knowledge is generally admitted to be that, in the case of faith, the testimony of others takes the place of interior reasoning. "*Quod scimus, debemus rationi, quod credimus, auctoritati.*" Have all who, following *St. Augustine*, accepted this distinction said what was contrary to common sense and morality? Herrmann will not deny that the Gospels, unless they are critically "expurgated," demand faith in the supernatural, and that *St. Paul* makes acceptance of the resurrection the fundamental article of faith and regards submission to God's

¹ See p. 314, note 2.

² Herrmann, p. 5.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 9, 57.

revelation as essential.¹ *Harnack* says that the Apostolic Fathers regard faith as "*reliance on the truth of a number of sacred traditions.*"²

The apologetic writers of the second century look upon faith as the "recognition of the mission of Christ, the Son of God, and the conviction of the truth of His doctrines"³; and all subsequent doctors of the Catholic Church hold the same opinion; and the reformers and their disciples, although they altered the idea of faith, retained its dogmatic character. Even *Plato* and *Aristotle* admit that "a philosopher by no means derives his knowledge of divine things solely from his divinely inspired inner consciousness, but he has at the same time to refer to tradition, to which religious sanction is attached."⁴ In the face of so much evidence taken from history and religion, *Herrmann*, not satisfied to express modestly his own contrary opinion in the way of criticism, dares to speak of the want of common sense and morality as being involved in the old idea of faith, just as if it were something perfectly obvious to every rational human being!

For thousands of years men had been striving to attain to a knowledge of God and inward peace by their own spiritual and moral efforts. History before the Christian era had taught that on these lines no pure, trustworthy, and consoling religion was attainable, even for the individual, much less for mankind as a whole. The Revelation given in Christ offered a wealth of heavenly truth to man in his desire for light and sanctity; he did not evolve it from his own mind, but in faith accepted it, relying upon Christ's wonderful testimony. The Church, being commissioned by our Lord Himself to *teach* all nations, has passed on these good tidings to every race, and thus she has constructed Christendom as we know it historically.

If *Herrmann's* idea of faith were correct, there would be at the present time no Christianity, no Bible, no knowledge of Christ as "the manifestation of the Almighty's good will." If our own feelings and experiences were the sole infallible criteria of truth,

¹ Cf. Rom. xv. 1, etc.

² *Harnack*, *Dogmengesch.*, 3d ed., I, 163, note 2.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 501, note 2.

⁴ *Willmann*, *Gesch. des Idealismus*, I, 411, etc., 453, etc.

every vagary of visionary mysticism would be justified, and religious truth, stripped of its objective dignity, would be at the mercy of every fantastic opinion.¹

God's thoughts are *not* always "our thoughts." In *Isaias* we read: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are my ways exalted above your ways, and my thoughts above your thoughts."² *St. Paul* applies the word "mystery" not only to isolated doctrines of the Gospel, such as the resurrection,³ but to Christianity as a whole, and speaks of the mystery hidden from all eternity, but revealed through him as "minister of the Church."⁴ If God and not man is the measure of truth, the fact that it is difficult for us to comprehend a religious revelation is no evidence of its being untrue. "The reason of man," says *Goethe*, "and the reason of God are two quite different things." According to *Lessing's* well-known remark about Revelation, "to a reasonable man it ought to be a proof of its truth rather than an argument against it if he finds in Revelation things that surpass his understanding."

Such mysterious doctrines are not without a bearing on our spiritual and moral life. The history of art and science, as well as that of religious thought, shows that when the human intellect adopts new and lofty ideas, which it has not evolved from itself, accepting them as true, it is by no means "mentally crippled." Can we describe as intellectual cripples men like *St. Athanasius*, *St. Augustine*, *St. Thomas*, *Bossuet*, and *Leibniz*, all of whom accepted and respected the supernatural element in Christianity and tried to press forward "through faith to knowledge"? Have not the very dogmas that are most offensive to modern minds exercised the most profound and beneficial influence upon the development of art, such as the Virgin Birth of Christ, His death upon the cross, and His presence in the Blessed Sacrament? The same thing that awakened the inspiration of the artist was the chief cause of piety which in its turn gave rise to moral heroism and devoted charity.

¹ With reference to the Gnostics, *K. Jentsch* writes in the "Grenzbote," 1904, 1, 251: "The Gnostic organization would not have been able to take the place of the Church, because its leaders regarded themselves as Pneumatics, possessing knowledge not to be acquired by ordinary instruction. A body of men capable of such imaginations will inevitably in course of time become an association of fools, if they are not such from the very beginning."

² lv. 9.

³ 1 Cor. xv. 51.

⁴ Col. i. 25.

Whence could the martyrs have derived their hope and courage, whence could the teachers of the faith have drawn their zeal for souls, how could the virgins sanctified to God have renounced the world, had they not believed in our Lord's resurrection and divinity and in His mystical life in the Church? Can subjective faith, based on reason or the emotions, produce anything great enough to compare with the flood of light bursting forth from the obscurity of these mysteries? Has it ever for even a short time exerted a similar influence upon the thoughts, life, and actions of men, rendering them fruitful in good works, holy and contented?

With regard to the fact of Revelation, on which our faith is based, we certainly ought to be able, by examining its proofs, to arrive at a reasonable conviction of its truth. *Herrmann* speaks of a "naïve reflection," of a "deadening" of all thought, when we Catholics refer to the miracles wrought by Christ and the apostles as evidence in support of Revelation. He thinks that the historical accounts of these occurrences can never produce absolute certainty.¹

This is not the place to discuss the abundant reasons (over and above the miracles wrought by Christ and the apostles) which satisfy a Catholic that his faith rests on a moral and rational basis; such a discussion belongs to apologetics. It is, however, interesting to see upon what foundation *Herrmann* builds up his own faith. Faith is supposed to be produced in the soul by a revelation made by God to the individual, in which God makes Himself known as the good will dominating over all real existence. This revelation is effected through Christ; His moral excellence, as presented to us in the Gospel, awakens confidence in a moral force controlling all reality.²

Now *Herrmann* asserts that every detail in the traditional account of Christ is *historically* open to criticism; how, then, can His moral sanctity — as contrasted to His miracles — appear as an undoubted fact? *Herrmann* replies: "The evident force and perfection of this spiritual life fills us with such reverence that it is *impossible* for us to regard it as a *product of the human imagination*." Therefore *Herrmann* first breaks off the traditional connection with Christ, and then proceeds to reestablish from his own inner consciousness the *historical fact* that Christ led a holy

¹ *Herrmann*, p. 57.

² *Ethik*, p. 95 etc.

life, making it the actual foundation of his faith. No less clear and "certain" is it in his opinion that God speaks to him in this inner consciousness; this is the second, formal foundation of his faith. *Herrmann* ought not to be surprised if most people "who can lay any claim to higher intellectual training" regard such an argument on his part as another "naïve reflection."¹

A. Messer has severely criticised *Herrmann's* theory of religious knowledge in his "Einführung in die Erkenntnistheorie," 1909, p. 172, etc. With reference to a lecture given by *Herrmann* on "Faith in God and modern science," *A. Neumann* remarks that, judging it from a religious-theoretical point of view, it produced a most unpleasant impression; the ideas with which *Herrmann* started were "obscure and very carefully limited," his standpoint was "a constructive kind of scepticism," involving serious danger of illusionism, and that he has absolutely no right to look with scornful compassion at Christian philosophy, which still accepts theoretical truths in matters of religion.²

Herrmann's strange confusion of contradictory assertions, relegating religion to the sphere of the imagination, and self-assured, critical superiority, reaches its climax in the statements in the third edition of his "Römische und evangelische Sittlichkeit," pp. 59-80, where he attempts to refute my arguments given in the preceding pages. All that he says proves that his ideas of knowledge, truth, and reality differ so widely from those of other people that we cannot hope to arrive at a mutual understanding. Throughout his discussion he places himself upon the standpoint of so-called psychologism and pragmatism, according to which truth consists, not in the real substance of thought, but in its psychological reality or practical utility. *Herrmann's* remarks suggest a serious doubt whether, in speaking of "the life of the spirit," "the supreme power," and the "spirit of goodness and justice," he is really alluding to the living, supramundane God, or to some pantheistic universal spirit; if to the latter, his "experience of

¹ The picture of Christ contained in the Gospel would not make so powerful an impression upon us as it does if all the miracles and supernatural truths were eliminated. If Christ's miracles are not divine actions, but natural processes, we could not successfully maintain even His morality from the facts of His life as recorded in the Gospels.

² Theolog. Jahresbericht, 1905, p. 960, etc

the Godhead," and his description of piety as "an interior recollection in the self-evolved thought of the everlasting power of the good will," become intelligible, and his rejection of revelation and faith in authority would be self-evident.

However this may be, it was obviously *Herrmann's* duty, in defending himself, to reproduce objectively his opponent's arguments. I had said that we appropriate mentally many facts and thoughts and much information that we have not evolved for ourselves nor experienced; and yet we take them as the basis of our actions. This statement showed the falsity of his alternative: *either* self-evolved thoughts *or* the thoughts of others, forced upon us and "not expressing our own opinion," although we say "nothing against them." What is *Herrmann's* answer? "*Mausbach* ought not to urge that we often make use of ideas regarding things connected with geography, physics, etc., although we could not evolve them from ourselves. That we do so is a matter of course. But *Mausbach* assumes, after the genuine Romish fashion, that what is true in everyday concerns is still more true in matters of religion" (p. 60). In this passage *Herrmann* suppresses the chief point — viz., our "*mental appropriation*" of the thoughts and knowledge of others; he represents me as alluding to the use of ideas not understood, and of external concerns, whereas I had expressly said that we appropriated the thoughts and made them our own, and although I was speaking of a "knowledge of truth" which I defined as an acceptance and following of objectively imparted truth.

It is characteristic of *Herrmann* that he makes no reference to the *historical* facts and truths that I had mentioned with the geographical and physical; they would probably have too plainly recalled the historical character of Christianity, the personality of Christ and His works, our knowledge of which is based upon the testimony of others. In the same way *Herrmann* passes over *St. Paul* and his claim that we should have faith in the work of our salvation. With regard to *St. Athanasius*, *St. Augustine*, *Bossuet*, *Leibniz*, and *Luther*, however, *Herrmann* is obliged to admit that I am justified in quoting them in support of my own views; but he thinks that their erroneous idea of faith must be ascribed to the opinions current in their time, and that on the subject of religion the

only questions asked were what was customary and what was traditional (p. 61). "For this reason it was not difficult for Christians at that time to allow ideas to be foisted upon them, of which their own souls knew nothing, so long as it was for the sake of religion. The more alien these ideas were, the more did they stimulate the imagination, provided that they appeared to be in some way connected with tradition" (p. 65). What a contemptuous degradation of the great minds of Christianity! No one reading *St. Augustine's* "Confessions" could believe that he had allowed ideas of others to be foisted upon him of which his own soul knew nothing! *Herrmann* speaks of the old faith as a religion based on the imagination, and yet he himself asserts that our hearts derive from God's revelation *courage* to produce new — therefore not already experienced — and wonderful thoughts, the substance of which *thereby* — i.e., through their courageous production — becomes reality; and he again declares the actuality of Christ to be an effect of the wonderful charm and beauty of His character (pp. 67, 8, 52, 78). Might not this much more reasonably be called a religion based on the imagination?

It is only too plain that no amount of repetitions or ingenious arguments can make such a philosophy of religion acceptable to an unprejudiced mind. Hence one of *Herrmann's* followers, who rejects as impossible all belief in doctrines, and defines faith as "a personal relation of intellects, an ebb and flow of mental forces, in which the strongest force makes the weaker subservient to it," complains that "it is a pity that so much mischief is done in the use of the words 'faith,' 'faithful,' and 'unbelieving.' In our use of these words we are still trammelled by the Middle Ages, and things have come to such a pass that we are almost compelled to devise a new terminology in order to express our thoughts."¹

This remark is quite true, but it only shows how far these modern theologians have diverged from universal usage in thought and language. To be consistent, these inventors of a new terminology ought to begin with the ideas of "truth" and "reality," for these words, too, have a new meaning on their lips. Would any one telling a story, and wishing to asseverate the truth of his report, make use of *Herrmann's* expression and say that "he had

¹ Christl. Welt., 1904, p. 267.

evolved the whole out of his inner consciousness" (p. 59)? What would an ordinary man think if to his question "Is that true?" he would receive the answer: "Of course it is true, I have produced it from my own heart and evolved it from sources contained in my own consciousness" (p. 59)?

The phenomenon that Protestantism is far more than Catholicism susceptible to critical attacks upon faith in dogmas and to religious subjectivism, is not due solely to the fact that the Reformation identifies justifying faith with a conviction of personal salvation. Catholicism also requires besides faith, which believes in the truth of redemption, the hope that grasps it with confidence. The chief reason of this phenomenon is that the teaching office of the Church is denied and in its place the principle of "independent investigation" is established. Further, in connection with this, all the historical arguments in support of Christianity upon which the Catholic Church relies, and with right, are cast aside as worthless, in favour of subjective grounds for faith. The straining of the contrast between reason and faith, which appears so prominently with *Luther*, has called forth from enlightened thinkers a severe and reckless criticism of faith. Finally, however, — and this is essential also for the doctrine of faith, — all comprehension of the truths of faith that lie beyond the sphere of reason must disappear in the degree that men deny the *supernatural dignity* of the Christian *aim and standard in life*. To the present day Protestant theology has continued to attack the Catholic teaching as to the twofold condition of man, the natural and the supernatural, maintaining that it involves taking a superficial view of the relation existing between nature and grace.

According to the New Testament, the final aim and heavenly calling of a Christian surpasses all human thoughts and imagination and is comprehensible only by the help of the Spirit of God¹; it is free and mysterious, decreed by God for His own glory and for the welfare of His creatures,² and it includes the riches of divine glory and the exceeding greatness of His power.³ Christ is the mediator and surety of this calling, and when we are mystically united to Him in baptism, the higher life begins in us here below

¹ 1 Cor. ii. 7, etc.

² Eph. i. 15, etc.

³ Eph. i. 3, etc.

and the powers of the world to come are planted in us¹; we become God's children, endued with His Spirit, new creatures, in the form of God.²

While, according to Protestant opinions, the union with God of one in a state of grace is exhausted in the conscious activity of man and in submission to God's will, *St. Paul* says that the Holy Ghost worketh in us "more abundantly than we desire or understand,"³ and asketh "for us with unspeakable groanings."⁴ *St. John* describes the mystical new birth and uplifting of the soul in a similar way; he says that we are born of God and have His seed abiding in us, so that we live in Him and He in us,⁵ and all because "He hath given us of His Spirit."⁶

The Church has never lost sight of this supernatural and mystical side of Christian sanctity, which was especially extolled by the Greek Fathers and subsequently received its definite theological expression in the doctrine of sanctifying grace. That this theory is based upon the New Testament is acknowledged by modern Protestant theologians. According to *Holtzmann*, *St. Paul* teaches a "real, genuine new creation, a renewal of the whole personality from its lowest foundation."⁷ *Jacoby* says: "Through the *πνεῦμα* of God, acting within a Christian, there is formed in him also a *πνεῦμα*, an ethical quality, which is essentially akin to God's quality."⁸ In another place he remarks that in *St. John* "the mystical union between Christ and His followers is represented as the *mysterious source of moral action*."⁹

Not only the Greek Fathers, but also *St. Augustine* speaks of man in the state of grace as no "mere creature" or "only a human being," but as "participating in the divine nature" and "deified."

¹ Heb. vi. 4.

² Rom. viii. 9; Gal. iii. 26, vi. 15.

³ Eph. iii. 20.

⁴ Rom. viii. 26.

⁵ 1 John iii. 9, 24, iv. 13.

⁶ Cf. *Rademacher*, *Die übernatürliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und johanneischen Theologie*, 1903.

⁷ *Neutestam. Theologie*, II, 150.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 302.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 52. Cf. *J. Wendland*, *op. cit.*, p. 120. According to *Lagarde* (*op. cit.*, p. 45) the primitive Christian idea of justification was not *Luther's* "faith," but the "new creation."

This is more than a mere rhetorical phrase. Just as the humanity of Christ was supernaturally exalted by personal union with the Son of God, so does every Christian receive in grace a supernatural restoration to life. This restoration is mystical and lies beyond our consciousness. Baptized children "know not the Holy Ghost that dwelleth in them," and its full meaning is hidden even from adult Christians, who resemble trees in winter — their life is concealed and will reveal itself resplendent only in the spring of the world to come.¹

St. Thomas alludes to the fact that, according to Holy Scripture, God loves those in a state of grace in a peculiar manner, looking upon them as His friends. But His love has a creative force and *gives rise* to the good that makes us worthy of love, whereas human love is caused and evoked by the goodness already present in the beloved. Therefore whenever God has special love for any human being, special goodness must be communicated to him by God, and he must possess a special perfection. The advance of man towards his supernatural goal cannot, according to *St. Thomas*, be effected solely by means of actual graces; it is only when grace is a permanent condition, an interior principle of existence and action, that the Christian life is revealed as a spontaneous development, homogeneous with the final end, and the supernatural life of virtue forms a higher analogy and culmination of the natural life with its inward motive powers.²

But how is this higher life communicated to man? The spirit bloweth where it listeth, but just as God, being a spirit, chose the human nature of Christ in order by its means to procure grace for mankind, so did He destine the Church, the mystical body of Christ, to be the permanent channel for the distribution of His grace. At the Incarnation He divested Himself of His Godhead to assume our flesh, and in His death on the cross He gave up His vital force by visibly shedding His Blood. In the same way in the sacraments the Holy Ghost effects the sanctification of the soul through the agency of created means. These mysteries become intelligible not merely through their deep, underlying connection with the humanity of Jesus Christ, they are venerable and beneficial also

¹ *Mausbach*, *Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus*, p. 126, etc.

² *S. c. Gentil.*, III, 150 (*Thomas Texte*, § 48).

as significant symbols, as consoling pledges, as belonging to the common cultus, and as means of furthering the faith.

The grace of the Holy Ghost, which communicates a higher existence to Christians, is designed to render their *actions* more fruitful. Their *mystical* communion with God is, as we have seen, the mysterious source of *ethical* communion in God. "If we live in the spirit, let us also walk in the spirit."¹ The close relation between grace and morality is apparent throughout the Catholic doctrine of justification. Catholicism teaches that man, in spite of the loss of power due to the Fall, still retains in his mind and will a capacity for natural morality and ability to receive a higher supernatural endowment; hence he can and must freely coöperate with the grace that arouses him to action. Although he cannot merit the higher life of grace, he can prepare himself for it by moral activity. Grace plays a prominent part also in this moral preparation. Every higher effort of the will presupposes a corresponding enlightenment of the mind; our Lord's miracles in the Gospel were invariably dependent upon the faith of those in whose favour they were worked. In the same way, with regard to justification, faith must recognize the supernatural destiny of a Christian and the wonderful sanctification offered in Christ, before the will can exert itself to strive after salvation and make it the guiding star in life. Through fear and hope the will is then enabled resolutely to turn away from sin and to begin to love God; i.e., it resolves to dedicate its life to God and to order its moral actions in conformity with His laws and the example of Christ. Only he who approaches the sacrament in this spirit will receive remission of his sins and sanctifying grace.² When grace has thus entered into the soul, its connection with morality becomes still more manifest. As it is life, it must grow and be fruitful in good works, and good works contain in themselves the germ of eternal glory.³

On more than one point the dogma of the Reformers destroyed

¹ Gal. v. 25.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 154.

³ In the liturgy of the Church the connexion between grace and morality is again and again clearly expressed; for instance, it is suggested with inimitable brevity in the prayers: "ut tuæ redemptionis effectum et *mysteriis* capiamus et *moribus*" (Postcommunio at the ordination of priests); "ut sacramentum *vivendo* teneant, quod *fide* perceperunt" (Collect for Tuesday in Easter week).

this harmonious connection. According to *Luther*, sin did not deprive us of supernatural gifts, but degraded our nature. The will is not free, but merely the instrument of some divine or diabolical power, incapable of answering to the call of grace by making an independent moral choice. Our only salvation is the redemption effected by Christ and laid hold of by us in faith. This justice, however, remains something essentially exterior and foreign to ourselves; it really and properly belongs only to Christ and is simply imputed to us. Thus fundamentally the work of redemption was completed for all men when Christ died on the cross; subjective redemption is limited to a process of the mind whereby the individual arrives at certainty regarding the absolute sufficiency of Christ's holiness.

The profoundly realistic Catholic theory of grace as a higher life implanted in the soul cannot be reconciled with this nominalism, according to which God declares the soul to be just, although it is not so. The weakening of this fundamental doctrine by emphasizing the ethical effects of faith, new birth, etc., does not alter its dominating character. *Luther's* retention of the sacraments of Baptism and Holy Communion was altogether inconsistent with his doctrine of justification by faith alone. In maintaining the importance of infant baptism and the justification resulting from it, *Luther* sacrificed the "great doctrine of the Reformers regarding faith" and reintroduced the idea of *opus operatum*¹; and in admitting the Real Presence, he allowed the greatest "mystery," the vital point in every "mystical view" of Christian sanctity, to resume its prominent position. Even during *Luther's* lifetime this contradiction led to divisions among Protestants, and its destructive influence continued to be felt in subsequent years.² A great many gradually ceased to understand these remnants of a supernatural view of Christian salvation, and the more learned were quite right in declaring that the Christian doctrines regarding grace and redemption, as understood and formulated by *Luther*, were antagonistic to natural religion and morality, and consequently they were right in treating these doctrines as they did.

Even to the mind of a believer there is much obscurity and

¹ *Hase*, op. cit., p. 347.

² *Harnack*, *Dogmengesch.*, III, 881, etc.

mystery attaching to the relation in which nature stands to grace; and therefore some thoughts, old indeed but full of wisdom, are theoretically and practically important on this subject. Not all mysticism is superstition; the most profound philosophy reveals a mystical feature. We gain access to God not only by searching after Him with our understanding, but also by a direct uplifting of our hearts in faith or in inspired contemplation. Not only the postulates of practical reason and the exertion of the will promote moral progress, but also the immediate stimulus given to the spirit by God's light and strength.

This is the thought underlying all sound mysticism; the great pagan philosophers had some foreshadowing of it, but it reached its full development in Christianity. Such immediate, inconceivable contact with what is divine occurs in the efficacy of the sacraments and in the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. This is far different from the effects of "magic." We call a process "magical" when insufficient causes are expected to produce a higher effect, when what is material is thought to give rise to what is spiritual, what is created to what is divine.

Now the efficacy of the sacraments depends not upon the human being who administers them, nor upon signs used by creatures, but upon the Holy Ghost, who employs the human being and human action as His instruments. Let us take an illustration from everyday life: It would be magical, if a pen wrote words and thoughts by itself; but there is nothing magical about it when the pen is guided by the hand of an intelligent being. The means of grace have not a magical effect because in their case the cause is not only equal to the result, but it is the divine and universal Cause, the source of all being and all life. "God's grace, given to be our aid, flows from the same source as that whence we have received our existence, the beginning of our being, the forces and tendencies of our nature"¹; viz., God Himself. In this way we exclude altogether the pagan idea that some rite or formula, devised by human beings, could force God to change His mind and determine upon certain actions. The sacraments have no "magical" effect for the further reason that they do not eliminate, but take for granted, promote, and fructify the moral dispositions of men.

¹ *Schell, Apologie*, 2d ed., I, 448.

What we may call the "supermorality," contained in them, includes morality; but all magic is below the standard of morals and therefore immoral.

It is impossible to think too seriously of the connection between the divine and the human factor in Christian virtue. In the first place, the human ideal of morality is not destroyed in the order of grace; as morality is essentially directed towards the highest, absolute Good, it may be transfigured by grace, but not altered. The supernatural truths of faith supply fresh motives to virtue, intensifying the fervour of our efforts, but not disturbing the rules laid down by the natural law for morality. *St. Augustine* says of the Old and New Testaments: *praecepta eadem, sacramenta non eadem*, and *St. Thomas* applies these words to the relation in which morality stands to religious knowledge; faith has increased, but the moral law has remained the same.¹

In its realization, also, the claims of morality are not diminished, and moral activity is not, as *Kant* feared would be the case, weakened or replaced by grace, but it receives fresh impulse. It belongs to the marvels of grace, rather than the order of grace, for divine activity to release a man from moral exertions. To believe that the more God does, the less there is for man to do, is as fatal a mistake as it is to suppose that the more we pray, the less need is there for work. A false assumption of this kind is the cause of the discouragement felt when, in spite of many prayers, our efforts on behalf of education and our battling for the Church, etc., are unsuccessful; and the same cause underlies our despondency when, after spending hours in prayer, we again fall a prey to our old frailties and faults. Not only in order to make us practise faith and humility does God hide His activity behind created forces, but He acts thus also because the interior order of things requires the divine and human factors to work together, and not one independently of the other. Otherwise the natural sequence of life would be broken up into a series of miracles and the motive power of natural virtue, and especially of prudence, would be destroyed, whilst the relations of creatures to one another would cease to exist and be merged into one sole relation towards God. According to Catholic teaching, as a rule the reverse holds good: the more

¹ S. theol., I, II, q. 108, a. 2 ad 1; de verit., q. 14, a. 10 ad 3.

abundant the grace, the higher is the independent activity required of man, and thus grace is shown to be a principle of life and of perfection. Grace, including sanctifying grace, is not a substance cut off from God and resting in the soul of man, but it is the light and life ever proceeding from the Holy Ghost and ever being communicated to the soul, which it penetrates, transfigures, and renders ardent and eager for good.¹

In supernatural matters it is not possible to add and subtract grace and individual activity so as to make a *plus* on one side denote a *minus* on the other; the good is wholly the action of grace and wholly the action of man.² Mediæval asceticism laid down the golden rule: "Trust in God, as if the whole issue depended upon Him, but work as if all must be accomplished by thyself alone and unaided."

A striking illustration is afforded us by organic life, which even in Holy Scripture is used as a type of grace. Modern biology shows that the chemical and physical forces are not suspended in animals and plants, but make themselves felt in every part and in every manifestation of organic life. At no point does the mysterious vital force take the place of these lower forces, and yet life is something far above the sum of chemical forces, because a higher wisdom, having an aim in view, controls their action; and the soul is more than a vortex of millions of atoms, because the whole as a unit takes precedence of and dominates the particles of matter. The connection between mind and the senses in man supplies us with another, perhaps still more apt, comparison. Our thought is dependent upon our imagination, upon our brain; we cannot form an idea unless we have some sense conception and an analogous

¹ *Thom.*, S. theol., II, II, q. 4, a. 4, ad 3.

² *St. Bernard*, De gratia et lib. arb., c. 14: Non partim gratia, partim liberum arbitrium, sed totum singula opere individuo peragunt. Totum quidem hoc et totum illa; sed, ut totum in illo, sic totum ex illa. *A. Weiss*, op. cit., III, 538: "God's activity is indeed the beginning of and stimulus to our own; it is the strength in which we do everything, the completion and perfection of our work, but it is not a substitute for our exertions. God acts *before* us, otherwise we should be unable to be active at all. God acts *in* us, by inspiring our weakness and indolence with the desire and resolution to act. God acts *with* us, for through Him alone can we translate our wishes and powers into action. But God does *not* act *instead* of us." *Ibid.*, p. 1079: "The whole supernatural life, if it is to continue undisturbed and reach its goal, must be a constant alternation, or rather an unbroken coöperation of grace and nature."

action of the brain. We are incapable of thought if our sensitive faculties fail in consequence of excessive stimulation of the brain. Yet the mind of man is more than the animal soul, and the great achievement of thought cannot be explained by stimulus of the nerve centres. In the same way the supernatural forces imparted by grace require, it is true, natural freedom, and morality in their action, but on the other hand in their essence, dignity, and fruits they are absolutely superior to freedom and morality.¹ From the supernatural character of grace itself it follows that it is not directly and infallibly recognizable by our self-consciousness. Moreover, the gifts infused by grace are not primarily definite forces, but tendencies to and capacity for supernatural activity.²

Now even in the natural life of the soul we have direct cognizance only of acts, the substance of the faculties, not of the faculties themselves; otherwise there could not be so many different opinions regarding the reality and number of the faculties of the soul. It is true that indirectly, from facts belonging to the religious and moral consciousness, there are certain *points d'appui* which afford us moral certainty of being in the state of grace. The Catho-

¹ *Thom.* in III sent. dist. 23, q. 3, a. 2 ad 1. The angelic doctor remarks in this passage that infused virtue, i.e., virtue imparted by grace, resembles an innate rather than an acquired *habitus*, and he goes on to say: *Naturalis autem habitus sicut intellectus principiorum indiget, ut cognitio determinetur per sensum, quod acquisitus non indiget, quia, dum acquiritur per actum, determinationem acquirit. Et similiter oportet, quod fidei habitus determinationem recipiat ex parte nostra* (by means of instruction in the faith and theological knowledge, as he goes on to say). There is a very clear and definite statement in *Qu. disp. de virt. card.*, q. un. a. 2 ad 2: "Just as the use of knowledge is hindered by sleepiness or drunkenness, that is to say, by disturbances in the sensitive part of the soul, so is the action of the supernatural virtue, imparted with sanctifying grace, impeded by the evil inclinations or similar perverse dispositions remaining as a result of previous sins." The fundamental idea of the comparison — it is not intended to be anything more — is expressed by *St. Thomas* again in *De virt. in com.* a. 10 ad 1 and ad 17. The conclusion is worded thus: "Just as the lower animal forces do not suffice, at the conception of a human being, to produce a human soul; so all our natural knowledge and morality is not able to produce the *life of grace*, although in both cases, according to the order established by God, there is an intimate relation between the higher and the lower factors" (*In I. sent. dist. 14, q. 3. De virt. in com.* q. 1, a. 10). This analogy can be applied most advantageously in support of the doctrine regarding the life of grace.

² *Cf.* also note 1, *de verit.* q. 10, a. 10: *Certitudinaliter nullus potest scire se caritatem habere, nisi ei divinitus reveletur.*

lic system also admits of such a certainty, but not of an absolute, dogmatic assurance of salvation, in the sense required by *Luther*.

It is true that, in the Christian life, there are workings of grace which suggest most forcibly its divine origin; there are thoughts full of light and consolation that arise out of the soul; impulses filling an undecided or dispirited will with assurance and energy. When we look back over long periods of life, and see wisdom and mercy revealing a design that gives unity to all the accidents of our earthly existence, and a mighty will steadying our wavering tendencies and turning them into the right path, we feel still more convinced that grace is of divine origin. Man is lord only of each moment as it passes; the guidance of times and events is in God's hand. The supremacy of a higher principle is much more obvious in the lives of the saints, where it amounts to extraordinary manifestations, to those "ethical miracles" which, like miracles in the physical order, afford certainty of divine causality.

From the time of *St. Paul's* miraculous conversion and mysterious ecstasy, grace has never ceased to raise to heights of heroic sanctity those chosen to receive it in overpowering fulness, and by its marvellous consolations it has lifted them above all earthly sufferings and trials. With regard to the moral perfection of the saints, it has been rightly said that it is possible to challenge individual actions of a saint, but that their sanctity as a whole is beyond question and forms one of the brightest spots in the history of the world. In the same way many mystical occurrences in the story of the saints provoke criticism, but mysticism as a whole is included in Catholic sanctity and is upheld and justified by it. Moreover, considering the life of the Church as a whole, we find the divine element characterized by the *permanence*, participating in the eternal, which it bestows upon the temporal struggles of mankind. The slender seedling planted by men like *St. Benedict* and *St. Francis* seems placed in a soil far richer and more productive than the measure of their actual human talent, their natural power and foresight. Many other works of the saints display the greatest disproportion between the natural gifts and conscious intentions of their author and the magnificent and permanent results of his labour. As the Psalmist says, the works of

the wicked perish like dust, but the righteous is "like a tree which is planted near the running waters, which shall bring forth its fruit in due season, and his leaf shall not fall off."¹

As has been said above (p. 315), like the natural, so the supernatural forms a kingdom or cosmos. Although the splendour of this kingdom, like the life of grace in the individual, is at present "hidden with Christ in God" and will be revealed completely only in the Church Triumphant, yet the *Church Militant*, being the congregation of the redeemed and inspired by the Holy Ghost, is even now the most imposing historical manifestation of the supernatural. Miraculous, supernatural events accompanied her entrance into the world and have shed their light on her course through history. Her solid foundation, that none can move, and her living growth have always distinguished her from all, even the greatest, temporal institutions, with their liability to fluctuation and change. She teaches with divine authority, and with logical accuracy she develops the dogmatic truth committed to her charge. She interweaves most precious and mysterious means of grace with the natural life of man, thus bringing it into immediate connection with the world to come; in specific states, dedicated to God, she removes souls with noble aspirations from earthly interests, to devote their undivided attention to the supernatural. The imperishable, fruitful "tree" of moral sanctity on earth, of which there was mention, is planted beside running waters of the *Church* and derives its vigorous life from *her* sources. Here, too, it is plain that grace, far from injuring nature, actually uplifts and furthers it. The Church of the supernatural life protects and strengthens the foundations of all natural, spiritual, and social civilization. She preserves philosophy from destructive errors; she encourages ethics to keep in view what is universal and beyond the sphere of the senses; she purifies and inspires the productive genius of the arts, and she upholds those principles and rights without which the state and society would eventually perish, in spite of their possessing great authority and power.

Protestants, in their recent researches, show that the mystical and sacramental element was far more highly developed in primi-

¹ Ps. I, 3, 4.

tive Christianity than was formerly supposed to be the case.¹ As a matter of fact, everything essential in the mediæval doctrine of the *opus operatum* was already taught then. Cardinal Newman regarded the doctrine of spiritual regeneration as a fundamental idea in Christianity, which the Church has rightly placed as the central point in her dogmatic teaching and practically developed in her liturgy and cultus.²

Kant, the enemy of all mysticism, to whom most modern objections against the doctrine of grace and the sacraments can be traced, nevertheless admits that the impossibility of grace cannot be proved, and that ultimately the freedom of the will is "as incomprehensible as the supernatural."³ Even during *Kant's* lifetime many great men, with more emotional dispositions, rejected his ethical rationalism. *Goethe* was inclined to recognize in all productivity of the highest kind the action of a divine influence, beyond the control of man. In "*Faust*" he expressed as a fundamental idea the theory that we are saved not merely through our own strength, but "through divine grace added to our strength." In describing the release and salvation of his hero, he makes use of thoughts and descriptions borrowed from Catholic mysticism, and he does so in a way that deserves for him, far more than for the Church, the reproach of seeing in it something magical.

Goethe's brilliant and appreciative account of the Seven Sacraments in "*Dichtung und Wahrheit*" (Bk. VII) is well known. He expresses, above all, great admiration for the organic connection between the various means of grace, and for the way in which the Catholic priesthood is adapted to them. *Jean Paul Richter* asks on one occasion: "Is it not a consoling thought that we possess this hidden wealth in our souls? May we not hope that, without being aware of it, we love God better than we know, and that some silent instinct is preparing us for the world to come?"

Of more recent writers *Eucken* should be mentioned, who abandons the optimistic valuation of morality based on reason, and regards it as essential that fresh forces should be brought to bear

¹ *Harnack* in his "Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums" and *Heilmüller* and *Wrede* in their studies of *St. Paul*.

² *Apologia pro vita sua*, 1895, p. 247, etc.

³ *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bl. Vernunft.*, IV, 2, § 4.

upon the soul, and its renewal effected, if the moral principle is to be saved and an absolute consecration to be given to life. "A breach with the past, a fresh beginning, a new existence, an inward miracle is necessary, if life is not to succumb to vast destructive and impeding forces and if our best energies are not to be frittered away to no purpose. This breach with the past and fresh beginning are required by all interior development; and, under the forms of grace and reconciliation, of self-conquest and self-sacrifice, it affects all human relations." Thus a higher life is communicated to ours; viz., the force of divine love and wisdom. "In these associations the gain is not to be regarded as the result of the exertions of an individual, but as the work of that supreme power which raises us from our embarrassments into a new world. In this way the achievement becomes a boon received, a gift of free grace. Without such a foundation all human life fades away and falls into decay; the victory of reason in the individual is inconceivable apart from its triumph in the whole race. Even the freedom of man, without which he cannot make the new world his own, is not a possession independent of that power, but it is something determined by it and continually proceeding from it."¹

The idea, so emphatically stated above, that supernatural grace is something apart from human self-consciousness, that its action, however, is naturally perceptible at least if a wider view be taken of its whole development, agrees with the teaching of the theologians that grace is primarily the condition of supernatural, meritorious action, but that it is necessary also if natural morality is to be *permanently* maintained and if the manifold temptations, which we can resist singly with our natural strength, are to be overcome collectively.

In this sense some addition is needed to the analogy, already

¹ *Eucken*, *Der Kampf um einen geist. Lebensinhalt*, 1907, pp. 254, 259: Even *Jodl* (*Gesch. der Ethik*, I, 75) sees in the idea of grace the expression of an important ethical fact, viz., the sense "that between the moral ideal and the self-judgment inevitably resulting from it, there is an unknown something which does not proceed from man, or at least not from his consciousness, and which cannot destroy his moral judgment; but the ultimate decision regarding the moral worth or worthlessness of a man rests with a power, mysterious indeed, whatever name may be given to it, and the operation of which is independent of all human influence."

pointed out, with natural life. It seems that, at every point in the organism of a plant, the physical and chemical connection between cause and effect is enough to explain what is going on there; but for the whole, in its morphological and biological formation, a higher principle, making for some definite end, must be assumed to exist. In agreement with this theory *Hilty* remarks: "At the end of a great crisis there often comes a moment in human thought when a man looks backward and forward over his own life with almost superhuman impartiality. If, in looking at the past, he perceives many occasions when he might have gone astray, and was deterred only by what seems an almost miraculous intervention and providence of God, his heart swells with gratitude for graces received and rises to full confidence that the rest of his life will also be rich in blessings."¹

It is desirable that Catholic writers on dogma should not only theoretically trace the principles of the doctrine of grace to their source, but should compare them, more accurately than has hitherto been done, *with the facts of actual morality* and illustrate them by means of experiences derived from the ascetic and mystical life. Such a defence of dogma from the point of view of morality is desirable, not only to ward off attacks made by scholars upon the mystical element in the sacraments,² but also because from time to time educated Catholic laymen find difficulties in the teaching of the Church on grace and on the means of grace. Difficulties of this kind are apt to result from the unsatisfactory state of Catholic districts where religion is zealously practised by priests, religious Orders, and influential classes of the people, yet no corresponding advancement and triumph of the principles that they represent is observed. The solution of the problem is to be found in the fact that grace refuses to act alone, but makes its claim upon human nature and liberty; it does not exclude spiritual, social, and moral efforts, but demands and blesses them. Many Christians use the means of grace and make intelligent and vigorous

¹ *Hilty*, *Schlaflöse Nächte*, 1903, p. 186: "From another point of view, in considering the objective varieties and forms of the supernatural, *J. Pohle* arrives at a similar conclusion: "While detail is a matter of faith, the whole by its magnitude and harmony affects the reason with convincing force" (*Natur und Uebernatur*, in *Religion, Christentum, Kirche* I, 327, etc.

² Cf. e.g., *K. Jentsch*, *Christentum und Kirche*, p. 560, etc.

efforts to advance, but their progress is subject to so many conditions, the opposition of the sensual and individual is so strong, the conflict so bewildering and exhausting, that, in comparison with all this, the brilliant descriptions of the magnificence of grace, found in devotional writings, have a depressing rather than a convincing and encouraging effect.

Other dogmas regarding God, Christ, the angels, etc., are naturally beyond the sphere of human experience, but the doctrine of grace is so intimately connected with the moral life that no sharp dividing line can be drawn between its dogmatic and empirical aspects. For this reason we require a more profound and thorough appreciation of psychological and ethical knowledge in order to defend successfully the real truth and the harmonious structure of the dogma. If I may indicate a few thoughts needing consideration, I should like to see a demonstration of the fact that the life of grace as a rule has a very insignificant beginning and grows imperceptibly; that the obligation of the natural life to conform to law is not removed by the action of grace, and that only by steady perseverance this life is raised and adjusted; that a growing force may be for years habitual and latent, like a stream of water flowing underground, before it finally shows itself alive and victorious over obstacles; that a cultured and refined existence is, more so than a simpler one, liable to strong emotions and conflicts; that Christianity, being the religion of faith, humility, and struggle, must inevitably attach particular value to that kind of virtue which perseveres in spite of obscurity, poverty, and labour, and has no thought of its own greatness.

CHAPTER VIII

CHURCH AND STATE

PROTESTANT writers on science and religious controversy show great unanimity in regarding the position and power which the Church holds in the Catholic view of life as a danger to the State, and as an obstacle to the Catholic in assisting in the work of modern life. According to many critics, a spirit of hostility prevailed even in early ages of Christianity against the State as the "kingdom of Satan." It is said that even to some of the early Fathers the State appeared to be not of divine origin, like the Church, but as "a work of the evil one."¹ In the opinion of the Church, the State was at best "an earthly, morally indifferent organization," having moral justification only "if it willingly submitted to the guidance of the Church."²

The dominant position of the Church in the Middle Ages was, we are told, the only position consistent with Catholic dogma and Canon Law; and it is said that this idea has been in our own day revived without modification in the Syllabus of *Pius IX*, in which "the fundamental *opposition of the Church to the political supremacy of the State* was clearly expressed."³ The Church is said to be still, essentially, a power ever ready to attack the modern State, a foreign element in the body of the State, always threatening to develop into a most dangerous parasite.⁴ The weakening of the

¹ Jellinek, *Das Recht des modernen Staates*, 1905, I, 180.

² Geffcken (*Sell*, *Die Religion in Leben der Gegenwart*, 1910), p. 123; cf. Treitschke, *Politik*, 1897, I, 15. The latter author asserts that the Jesuits described the State as "a kingdom of sin and of the flesh, morally without justification, and capable of being justified before God only if it used its power in the service of the Church."

³ *Sell*, *Katholizismus und Protestantismus*, p. 166. He says that the Curia is reckoning upon the bankruptcy of the modern national form of government, because it appears to the Church to be contrary to Christianity (p. 221); cf. v. Hoensbroech, *Moderner Staat und Katholische Kirche*, 1906, p. 37, etc.

⁴ Cf. the quotations from Hinschius and W. Köhler given by Böckenhoff, *Katholische Kirche und moderner Staat*, 1911, p. 5, etc.

State is declared to be the actual *raison d'être* of the Roman Church.¹

At the Congress of German Catholics in Strassburg in 1905 I delivered a lecture which serves as the basis for the following discussion. I took as my motto the words used by *Leo XIII* in his Encyclical of January 10, 1890, on the duties of citizens: "Supernatural love for the Church and the natural love of one's own country are sisters, springing from the same eternal principle, since God Himself is their author and originating cause. . . . Our duties (to civil and ecclesiastical authority) are not antagonistic, but they must not be confused with one another. The former tend to the prosperity of the State, the latter to the general welfare of the Church, and both to the perfection of mankind. From this distinction of rights and duties it is evident that the rulers of States are independent in the management of their own affairs, and they are so not merely with the assent of the Church but with her constant support; for although she requires first of all the practice of piety, i.e., justice towards God, she promotes at the same time justice towards civil rulers."

The Encyclical to which I referred begins with the words *Sapientiae christianae praecepta*, and in it the Pope endeavoured to recall to the minds of men the precepts of Christian wisdom. These precepts are essentially unchanging; yet they are not unchanging in the way that a rock does not change, but rather they resemble a living tree, which is always growing and developing, although it remains the same tree. The moral ideas of Christianity are spiritually living forces, revealing their full value in their effect upon the mind of man and upon the history of mankind. While they remain ever the same, they may be clothed in various forms, according to the needs and capabilities of men in different ages. In his brief to the bishops of Italy, issued at Pentecost, 1905, our late Holy Father, *Pius X*, said: "The Church has at all times clearly shown that she possesses the admirable power of adapting herself to the changing conditions of society; so that, whilst preserving faith and morals in their integrity, she easily assimilates herself to all the unessential and accidental circum-

¹ *Chamberlain*, *Die Grundlagen des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* (preface to the 4th edition).

stances belonging to various stages of civilization and to the new requirements of human society."

Such moral law, a "word of everlasting life," is contained in our Lord's plain and dignified command to "Render to *Cæsar* the things that are *Cæsar's*, and to God the things that are God's." Of the Jews was required obedience to the Emperor, a foreign pagan sovereign whose rule was most distasteful to their national pride. They were ordered to obey *Tiberius*, a wicked, cruel tyrant, for whom not even the Romans could feel any respect, and they were to obey him not simply under compulsion, but "for conscience sake."¹ This obedience was not, however, to involve the sacrifice of conscience itself: "Render to God the things that are God's." A limit is assigned to the secular power, and thenceforth the State ceased to be an embodiment of the deity. There is a sphere of human action over which decrees of the Senate and imperial orders have no control. A subject is no longer a slave; in what constitutes the true dignity of his personality he is free and responsible to God alone. Henceforth we belong to a kingdom "not of this world"; we are citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem, where the Eternal is king. And this kingdom, too, has its permanent and visible organization on earth, an organization embracing all the world: "Going, therefore, teach ye all nations, baptizing them and teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."

St. Peter, Christ's first vicar in this kingdom of the Church, followed in his Master's footsteps and taught respect for secular authority. At a time when signs of persecution were already visible, and the capital of the Empire could already be described as "Babylon," *St. Peter* nevertheless, in addressing the Christians, bade them "Be subject to every human creature for God's sake. . . . Love the brotherhood, fear God, honour the king."²

The next occupant of the see of *Peter* who has left us a pastoral letter, *St. Clement*, gave evidence of his patriotism and loyalty in times of great trouble. During the persecution under *Domitian* he addresses a distant community in words that conclude with a touching prayer for the Church as well as for secular rulers: "Grant unto them health, peace, concord, and firmness, that they

¹ Rom. xiii. 5.

² 1 Peter ii. 13, 17.

may carry on without offence the government that Thou hast intrusted to them. . . . Turn their counsels towards that which is good and pleasing in Thy sight, that in peace and mercy they may use the power that Thou hast conferred upon them and rejoice in Thy protection."¹

How faithfully these directions were obeyed is shown in a document belonging to early Christian literature rediscovered not long ago—the speech of *Apollonius*, a distinguished Roman, made in his own defence before the Senate during the time of *Commodus*. He refused to swear by the Emperor's *Fortuna*, and added: "According to God's commandment we pray to the one great God, who dwelleth in heaven, and implore Him that princes may rule the world with justice, for we are convinced that the Emperor, too, has been appointed by God, the King who holds all things in His hand."²

A great deal more evidence might be adduced to prove that the early Christians by no means regarded the State as a "kingdom of Satan." Of course the officially recognized *worship of false gods*, the immorality displayed at the *public games*, and the *cruelty* and violence of the *Cæsars*, all aroused the most determined opposition on the part of the Christians; these were the sins of ancient Babylon, and through them the State incurred the guilt of idolatry, adultery, and murder, three sins regarded as mortal in the discipline of penance. This opposition released the conscience of men from the supreme control of the pagan government and facilitated the rise of a new Christian civilization and social order. As *Gierke* writes: "The human being was thenceforth no longer lost in the citizen, and society was no longer merged in the State. The great rule, that we ought to obey God rather than man, began to prevail, and before it the omnipotence of the pagan State disappeared. . . . The right, and even the duty, of disobedience when the State attempted by force to control conscience was proclaimed and confirmed by the blood of the martyrs."³

In later times *St. Augustine's* opinions greatly influenced men's views on politics and the Church. To him is ascribed the theory

¹ Clem. Rom.. Ep. ad Cor. c. 61.

² Report of the Akademie der Wiss. zu Berlin, 1893, p. 730.

³ Das Genossenschaftsrecht, III, 123.

that the State is an organization opposed to God, that it is an organism of sin, or at best an institution promoting physical power and prosperity, which can be morally sanctioned only on account of the service that it renders to God's kingdom, the Church. *St. Augustine* is far from setting the contrast between Church and State on a level with the imposing contrast between the kingdoms of God and of the world, which he represents as no less than that between light and darkness. If occasionally he speaks of egoism and the violent desire for conquest as the *historical* motives for the foundation of States, he expresses an opinion that some learned men at the present day share with him (*Treitschke, Ihering*). But he regards human nature and the *will of God* as the real title and justification of civil government: "God gave human justice through emperors and kings."¹

Although elsewhere he traces back the rise of the civil power in its present form to the fall of man, this is not anything disgraceful in itself, for the same cause necessitated the foundation of the Church as a means of securing redemption. What *St. Augustine* really derives from the Fall is the harsh, tyrannical spirit displayed by the civil power, and the slavery and bondage that it imposes upon its subjects. In his opinion the State as such is a natural development of the family, a social unit superior to the community of the household.²

When *St. Augustine* extols the marvels of creation, he delights in looking beyond nature into the realm of the spirit, and almost always he alludes not only to the mind of man and his intelligence, but also to the organization of the State. "Consider," he says, "how the whole world is arranged in States governed by men! How many are the means of administration! how elaborate the gradation of power, the constitutions of cities and their laws, customs and arts!"³ He describes eloquently all the natural and moral aims of the State, the maintenance of law and order, the preservation of peace, the development of civilization. There is no need of ecclesiastical sanction to keep off any demoniacal and sinful element from the State as such; nothing is sinful except the

¹ In Job. Ev. Tr., 6, 25.

² De civ. dei, XIX, c. 15, 16.

³ In Job. Ev. Tr., s. 2.

self-exaltation of the State, the symbol of which was the idolatrous worship offered it by pagans. The restriction of the State to worldly matters is allowed: "We must not blame the State for what it does for the reason that it does not do everything."¹ Hence the Church, too, rejoices in the prosperity and good order of the State: "She does not hesitate to obey the laws of the secular government, by which the affairs of this mortal life are regulated." The members of the Church are found in all nations, for she cares nothing for varieties of laws and customs, and "destroys none of the arrangements made for civil peace, but rather respects and complies with them."² Only in the service of God does she stand aloof from the State, but in this she confers the greatest benefit upon it, since she places the moral conditions of the State's prosperity upon the foundation of true religion.³

In the Middle Ages there prevailed a magnificent coöperation of Church and State for the welfare of mankind; and though not without glaring contrasts and deep shadows, the picture of this coöperation shows vigorous lines and great splendour. We are reproached for looking back regretfully at the departed glories of that period; we are told that as Catholics we could not do otherwise than to strive to restore, as far as possible, the mediæval power of the Papacy. It is true that we cannot help admiring the position of the Church in the Middle Ages, but at the same time we do not hesitate to admit that, in the words of *Pius X*, her position may alter in accordance with new "stages of civilization and requirements of human society."⁴ The mediæval supremacy of the Church over *all departments of social life* was not the result of any love of power on part of the Popes,—only fanatics nowadays maintain this to have been the case,—but neither was it as a whole the outcome of a dogmatic principle of the "Catholic system,"

¹ De lib. arb., I, n. 13.

² De civ. dei, XIX, c. 17.

³ Cf. *Mausbach*, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, 1909, p. 326, etc.; *O. Schilling*, Die Staats- und Soziallehre des hl. Augustinus.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 338. On July 20, 1871, *Pius IX* remarked in an allocution that certain rights of supremacy in secular matters had in the Middle Ages resulted to the Pope, "from the idea of public justice then prevailing, with the consent of Christian nations," the right for instance to depose sovereigns; but at the present time circumstances were altogether different. See *Archiv für Kath. Kirchenrecht*, XXVI (1871), 80; cf. *Böckenhoff*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

as many believe. In more than one respect this supremacy was the natural result of the historical development of national life and of spiritual nations, a result which, it is true, men endeavoured to defend and support by passages in the Bible and theological grounds. Even *Treitschke* says: "The intellectual superiority of the Church contributed to her position in the Middle Ages. We cannot say that at that time the State was the highest institution for educating the human race; the Church relieved the State of tasks which in the weakness of its youth it was incapable of performing. . . . Hence the theory of the superiority of Church over State came quite consistently into prominence, and was not unreasonable at that period."

The mediæval States displayed "weakness of youth" in comparison with the Church; and, what is more significant, it was through the Church that they had come into existence as States; i.e., as well-regulated communities possessing authority and aiming at prosperous independence, after the migration of peoples had caused the ancient universal empire to break up. Pope *Zacharias* wrote to the Franks that the man possessing authority ought to rule in the State, and it was in this spirit that society in the Middle Ages felt it necessary for the Church to direct the nations of the West, because she had organized them, and alone possessed authority to guide them through the confusion and obscurity of the times, and to lead them onwards to greater aims. After the stubborn seclusion of the nations of antiquity, after the disrapture of the Germanic races, the Church introduced into the world the idea of unity amongst all civilized humanity and, to a great extent, carried this idea into realization. This was a task requiring infinite strength and patience, and we are still reaping the benefits of it, though unable to properly appreciate its difficulty. The Church of Rome had to give powerful support to her establishments in various nations to enable them to withstand the violence of rulers often disposed to acts of tyranny. In this way it is obvious that she could not help assuming a more and more prominent position in the eyes of the world. The Church promoted peace amongst the nations and often secured peace within States when their secular rulers could not maintain it. She exhorted the peoples of the West to forget their differences and to unite in protecting Christendom

against the assault of Islam. It has been rightly said that at that time the sovereignty of the various States was overshadowed by the Roman empire. But this empire had to a great extent derived its prestige from the Papacy, and when this fact is borne in mind the well-known comparison of the spiritual authority with the sun and the secular with the moon (as used by Popes and theologians in the Middle Ages) becomes intelligible and justifiable.¹

It is possible, nevertheless, to show from documents issued by the most powerful and self-assertive of the Popes, that, in spite of their claims upon temporal authority, — claims sanctioned by the circumstances and the public opinion of the age, — the independence of the secular power was recognized and not challenged. In his *Apparatus decretalium*, *Innocent IV* says: "Things temporal and spiritual are distinct and have different judges. The one must not interfere with the rights of the other, although they should mutually support one another."²

Let us consider also a passage in *St. Thomas Aquinas*, which expresses a combination of two ideas, one of principle, and the other of contemporaneous history. "Both kinds of power, the spiritual and the temporal, are derived from God. Hence the secular authority is subordinate to the spiritual in as far as it is arranged so by God, namely, in matters affecting the salvation of souls, and for this reason we must in these respects obey the spiritual rather than the secular power. But in those matters which affect the prosperity of the State, we must obey the secular rather than the spiritual authority, since it is written in Matt. xxii: 'Render to

¹ In the historical growth of the temporal power of the Church, we must not overlook the judicial position given to *early Christian bishops*, in consequence of the stress of existing circumstances and bestowed by imperial legislation. They had power to try cases and inflict penalties, not only in spiritual but also in temporal matters. The idea underlying this arrangement was the same as that expressed by *St. Paul* (1 Cor. vi.), who called upon Christians not to carry their disputes before pagan tribunals, and suggested that a spiritually minded man was able to decide any question. Measures thus taken by the infant Church, when she was a small flock in the midst of paganism, in order to realize her ideals with vigour, gradually caused her, under the influence of the above-mentioned factors, to grow into the theocratic institution of the Middle Ages.

² *S. Michael*, *Gesch. des deutschen Volkes*, III, 269. On the other hand, with reference to other statements made by this Pope, we must, as *Michael* observes, "discriminate accurately between the theological and the historical elements" (267).

Cæsar the things that are *Cæsar's*, 'unless, indeed, the secular and spiritual powers are united, as is the case with the Pope, who possesses both powers, namely the spiritual and the temporal, in their highest perfection, according to the ordinance (*disponente*) of Him who is Priest and King for all eternity."¹

According to the unanimous opinion of scholastic writers the State is theoretically a thing required by the natural law and created by God. *St. Thomas* clearly distinguishes the higher character of public justice from the lower one of private justice, and says that the aim of the State is the "common welfare" of its members, or the "due order by which the citizens are constrained to respect the common benefits of justice and peace."

The obliteration of certain border lines between spiritual and temporal power in the Middle Ages was to some extent due to the unity of religious belief and the joint endeavour of the western nations in the cause of civilization, and not only the ecclesiastical but also the secular authority benefited by this. We see, for instance, that ever since the time of *Charlemagne* temporal rulers have enacted laws affecting the Church, have exerted their influence over assemblies convoked by her, and have apprehended and punished persons guilty of offences against religion. The stringent laws *against heretics* owe their origin to this connection. Apart from the revolutionary and disorderly tenets of some sects, even the revolt against the common faith of Christians was in the opinion of the age a revolt also against the State. *H. Delbrück*, in speaking of the intolerance of the Middle Ages, says that it was not merely a display of fanaticism but a political necessity. "It was characteristic of the whole period known as the Middle Ages that the State was too weak to stand alone, and consequently it sought support in the spiritual authority of the Church, and, in order to rule through her aid, the State assisted her in attaining supremacy, and used the secular power to put down deviations from the faith."²

¹ In II dist. 44, q. 2, a. 3 ad 4. It seems doubtful whether it is possible to restrict the "*utriusque potestatis apicem tenere*" to the supremacy of the Pope within the territory over which the Church has temporal dominion.

² Preuss. Jahrb., 96 (1899), 206; cf. *Cavagnis*, *Instit. iur. publ.* 3d ed., I, n. 314: *Tunc procedebat Ecclesia non tantum ut Ecclesia sed ut societas christiani populi, utens potestate civili in defectu organisationis civilis. Ibid., II,*

The mediæval principle that the ecclesiastical authority was not itself to inflict secular penalties, but to hand the guilty person over to the secular power, was not an empty formality. It expressed the *far-reaching idea* that the shedding of blood did not belong to the nature and spirit of the Church's office; and that in future times, when constitution and principles would forbid the State to punish heresy, all infliction of penalties for offences against faith would inevitably fall into disuse. Those who reproach the Middle Ages on this point ought to consider *Paulsen's* remark on this subject. He says: "The discipline imposed on men by the Church may have been necessary for the transition to higher civilization, to such an extent that historically the Middle Ages were justified in using most energetic means to repress any attempt to withdraw from this discipline, and this as a rule was the aim of heretics." Our own modern humanity was rendered possible, in *Paulsen's* opinion, by the harsh training of the Middle Ages.¹

Mediæval civilization was so completely steeped in the spirit of the Church as to save the nations of the West from the absolute authority exercised by the ancient State, and from the disastrous effects which such absolutism has upon moral and political liberty.

The superiority of the spiritual office, and the friction between Popes and Emperors, caused the limits of political authority to be clearly defined, and thus the western nations escaped the yoke of Cæsaropapism, that rested so heavily upon Byzantium and Russia. Although the State now regards itself as no less absolute than it did of old, it recognizes the individual as possessing moral and judicial independence. *Jellinek* ascribes this advance very largely to the Middle Ages, first to the opposition between the people and their rulers, and, secondly, to that between Church and State, which by a long series of struggles set up an insurmountable barrier against any tendency to absolutism on the part of the State.²

The ancient world subordinated religion and the priesthood to

n. 260: Hinc titulus cumulativis procedebant (Pontifices) pluribus in negotiis, i.e., jure mere divino et iure etiam humano. Cf. III, n. 480.

¹ Op. cit., pp. 1, 22: cf. the remark made by *Philip II* in *Schiller's* "Don Carlos" (III, 10): "When, do you suppose, would these humane centuries dawn, had I trembled at the curse of the present one?" Cf. also *Casagnis*, op. cit., n. 316, and *Vermacerck*, *La tolerance*, Louvain, 1912.

² Op. cit., p. 297, etc.; cf. *F. W. Förster*, *Autorität und Freiheit*, p. 110, etc.

the State; there were tendencies in the Middle Ages to place the temporal power in the hands of the Pope, and there were many who advocated the assumption of such a power; in modern times men have adopted the idea that Church and State are absolutely independent, as each has its own peculiar sphere, differing from that of the other in its purposes, extent, and dignity. The ancient Church simply accepted this idea; the mediæval Church never questioned it in theory, but now it has been brought to full development. This has, however, been effected very gradually, and we may say that, apart from the guidance of Providence, the most various forces, intellectual and historical, and, in fact, the whole course of events since the close of the Middle Ages, have contributed to its growth.

An altered relation between Church and State was brought about by the Reformation, and, from the Christian and moral point of view, we cannot but regard it as a retrograde rather than a progressive change; indeed it is to some extent a lapse into the pagan idea of a State Church. The good things of the spirit and of the future life are far above all earthly interests, and the salvation of the soul is above all temporal prosperity and security, — this is the fundamental thought of Christianity, — and as a consequence the subordination of religion to political authority must be much more offensive to a Christian than the mediæval dependence of the State upon the Church. From this point of view, *A. Comte* described the absorption of the rights of the Church by the State, due to the Reformation, as a “relapse into barbarism.” A Protestant jurist refers, by way of excuse, to the revival of the ancient conception of the State in Catholic countries at the time of the Renaissance, but he goes on to acknowledge that the domination of the temporal sovereign over the Church, as introduced by *Luther*, was “the most telling product of police rule in the sixteenth century.”¹

Starting with his subjective-spiritualistic idea, *Luther* proceeded by insisting upon the full religious liberty of the individual, and in his work on the temporal power (“*Von weltlicher Obrigkeit*”), published in 1523, he denied that princes had any right to interfere with matters of faith and religious worship. Then, however, he was speaking of Catholic rulers; and he also subsequently asserted his

¹ *O. Meyer* in the *Realenzyklopädie für Prot. Theologie*, 3d ed., XVIII, 712.

liberty as far as they were concerned. In the same manner, however, as he quickly revoked his doctrine about freedom of research and universal priesthood as soon as it was, within his own fold, used against himself and his colleagues, so he quickly appealed to Protestant princes for assistance, as soon as he saw that the authority of the preacher was not enough to ensure the spread of the "Gospel," to prevent Protestantism from splitting up into sects, and to avert the decay of morality. *Luther* denied and overthrew the teaching and pastoral authority of the Church as transmitted from Christ and His Apostles to Popes and Bishops. By an intolerable abuse of his power and by real coercion of conscience, he forced his own personal opinions and the views of certain "doctors" upon the people as "the compelling word of God." It was an abandonment of the Christian idea when he transferred to secular rulers the responsibility of watching over the Church, and impressed upon them, as a ruler's most important duty, that they must tolerate no "idolatrous" (i.e., Catholic) worship and no heresy in their lands. In this way the principle *cuius regio illius religio* came to underlie all subsequent development in the attitude of State to Church, and later even Catholic rulers with a tendency to absolutism were willing enough to adopt it.

From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century the State, acting as guardian to the Church, controlled religion far more than the Church in the Middle Ages had ever in practice dominated over the State. Not only were questions lying on the border line between the two powers assumed to belong to the State, but all spiritual matters were arbitrarily regarded as being subject to its authority.¹

This reckless overthrow of the mediæval idea of the Church, and of her relation to the State, makes it impossible to excuse *Luther's* intolerance on the plea that it was a remnant of mediævalism. A man who rebelled so radically against all the principles of antiquity would certainly have thrown off the yoke of tradition on this point also, unless his personal inclination led him to retain it. *Luther's* own sanction of constraint in matters of religion is all the more offensive because he had ceased to recognize the universal authority and unity of faith, which formerly lay at the root of such

¹ Cf. *Lämmer*, Institutionen des Kath. Kirchenrechts, 2 A., 430, note 2.

constraint, and he denied and resisted it. In their persecution of heretics *Luther* and *Calvin* sought justification not in the tradition of the Church, but in the natural law, and in "the pious kings of the Jews," who put down idolatry and blasphemy with the sword.¹

Even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the State showed little sign of *toleration*, because the tendency to meddle with every department of life was too strong. Whilst among philosophers and students of natural law more liberal opinions prevailed in regard to the rights of religion, even to them complete liberty of thought and conscience was as a rule an unknown ideal. Hence men like *Locke* and *Rousseau* imposed upon the State the duty of punishing atheists with banishment. In a letter dated April 8, 1773, *Lessing* remarks that with regard to liberal theologians he is convinced that "if once they get the upper hand they will in time rule more tyrannically than the orthodox have ever done." As a matter of fact, political Liberalism again and again revealed most plainly this characteristic trait of free thought in the years that followed. I do not question the fact that the resulting spirit of indifference has tended to produce a general disposition to toleration. Greater influence has, however, been exerted by external circumstances, — the exhaustion following the long wars of religion, the increasing intercourse between men professing different creeds, and the closer communication between Catholics and Protestants in economic life and in various spheres of activity. It is a fact worthy of notice that the Catholic colony of Maryland in North America was the first State to pass a law giving freedom of conscience; this was in the middle of the seventeenth century.

Without surrender to an abstract doctrinarianism it is a very

¹ Cf. *N. Paulus*, *Luther und die Gewissensfreiheit* (Glauben und Wissen, No. 4), 1905. *W. Köhler* remarks with reference to this article that *Paulus* and other Catholics were quite right in maintaining that the Reformers had not taught the doctrine of religious liberty, and in pointing emphatically to instances of their intolerance, and this not only in the case of *Calvin* (op. cit., p. 53). *Wappler*, a Protestant theologian, discusses in great detail the numerous death sentences carried out in the Electorate of Saxony, and says that *Luther* and *Melanchthon* officially declared it to be a duty to condemn heretics "unheard and undefended," and maintained that though a prince might be over-hasty in his dealings with the individual, he is nevertheless acting rightly in putting down heresy (*Die Stellung Kursachsens zur Täuferbewegung*, 1910, p. 121).

difficult task to draw a hard and fast line between ecclesiastical and State authority. Our antagonists delight in speaking of Catholic arguments and institutions as "out of date" and "behind the times," but many remains of a narrow ecclesiastical State policy are still found in Protestant States. Even in our own days, England, so proud of its freedom, has treated Ireland and Catholicism with contempt and violence. In one of his early works, "The State in its Relations with the Church," *Gladstone* expressed the opinion that it was the first duty of the State to spread religious truth, that every government, the same as every individual, must have a certain faith, and ought consistently to admit to official positions none but those professing that faith. *Macaulay*, the historian, wrote a very clever essay against this theory, pointing out that if *Gladstone* supposed himself to be more tolerant than men in the Middle Ages, because he wished only to exclude non-Anglicans from office, and not to deprive them of life or liberty, he should ask himself whether a Catholic nobleman would not feel it more deeply to see his son permanently shut out from all the honours and dignities of the State, than to know that he must spend a few months in prison as a sufferer for his faith. Some years later, *Bismarck*, then a young man, began to speak in the German Parliament, and in one of his first speeches challenged the right of the Jews to political equality, saying: "To my mind the words 'by the grace of God,' appended to the name of a sovereign, are not an empty sound, but I see in them the acknowledgment that earthly rulers intend to use the power given them by God according to His will. Now I cannot recognize as God's Will anything not revealed in the Christian Gospels, and I think I am right in holding that no government is Christian that does not aim at realizing the teaching of Christianity." If any one compares the political principles of the Catholic politicians of the last hundred years with those of men professing other creeds and opinions, he will find that *Montalembert* and *O'Connell*, *v. Radowitz* and *v. Ketteler*, *Windthorst* and *Freiherr v. Hertling* not only have strongly emphasized the Christian foundation of the State, but have judged political and ecclesiastical matters in an essentially modern spirit, tending to civic liberty in a higher degree than has been the case with Protestant statesmen.

In the ninth century the great Pope *Nicholas I*, in writing to the Byzantine Emperor, said that Christ "distinguished the duties and rights of the two kinds of authority by giving them peculiar spheres of activity and separate dignities," so that the Emperor could not assume the rights of a high priest, nor the Pope the imperial title.¹ A thousand years later, *Leo XIII* expressed the same thoughts in vigorous and solemn language, surpassing that used by controversialists of the older schools, and thus he laid down a firm foundation, so as to prevent exaggerations on the one hand and bitter reproaches on the other. Let us examine carefully the chief points in his Encyclicals.

1. The State is not the work either of the devil or of mankind alone; it was designed *by the Creator* for the *development* and ordering of humanity *in accordance with the natural law*. "Every civilized community must have a ruling authority, and this authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has, consequently, God for its author. Hence it follows that all public power must proceed from God."²

The right of the State to exist does not depend upon any positive ordinance of God, nor upon any decision or permission on the part of the Church; it must be traced to the natural needs of mankind and to the goal assigned it by God. For this reason the Apostles and early Christians were most loyal in the discharge of their duty even to pagan States. This does not exclude the idea that the immediate occasion for founding a State may be the outcome of historical events, and not unfrequently it is due to the will of the people. As the need for authority is universal, it follows that "no one of the several forms of government is in itself condemned, inasmuch as . . . all of them are capable . . . to ensure the welfare of the State."³

The Church, on the contrary, was founded by Christ, the Son of

¹ Ap. Denz., Enchir., p. 333.

² *Immortale Dei*; *The Pope and the People*, p. 73.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 92 c. t. s.; cf. *Humanum genus*, pp. 31, 35; *Diuturnum illud*, p. 7, etc.; *Libertas*, p. 117 c. t. s.; *Sapientiae Christ.*, p. 152, etc., c. t. s.; *Annum ingressi*, p. 21.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE. "The Pope and the People," Catholic Truth Society, contains several of these Encyclicals, and wherever c. t. s. is appended to the reference, it is to this volume.

God, who determined its essential features *for all time*, and at the same time made it a society "chartered as of right divine . . . to possess in itself and by itself, . . . all needful provision for its maintenance and action."¹ The Church is not merely the infallible guardian of Christian truth and the "embodiment" of Christian grace and worship, but Christians are a *lawfully united people*, one in having a common faith, a common goal, and the common means of reaching this goal; moreover, they are subject to one and the same *authority*, so that the natural social principle finds in the Church a higher, supernatural realization. As every community gains in unity and strength by authority, so did Christ found His Church upon *Peter*, and give to him and to his successors a real jurisdiction over the whole Church, and over the bishops collectively, and "not merely precedence in honour or the feeble prerogative of issuing counsels and admonitions." Bishops, too, belong essentially to the constitution of the Church; they are not only representatives (*vicarii*) of the Pope, but "regular" rulers (*antistites ordinarii*), because they possess an authority of their own.²

2. Church and State have a *different* authority; each has its own defined sphere of command, within which it can act freely, though it respects the other power. Consequently the Church, like the State, possesses real *sovereignty*, i.e., the highest authority within her own sphere. Owing to her supernatural and heavenly aim she is the highest of all societies. "This is the office appointed to her by God, that she may watch over, and may order, all that concerns religion, and may, without let or hindrance, exercise, according to her judgment, her charge over Christianity. Wherefore they who pretend that the Church has any wish to interfere in civil matters, or to infringe upon the rights of the State, know her not, or wickedly calumniate her."³

The Church acknowledges and teaches that secular matters are under the control and dominion (*supremo imperio*) of secular rulers.⁴ "The Almighty has appointed the charge of the human race between two powers, the ecclesiastical and the civil, the one being

¹ *Immortale*, p. 77 c. t. s.; *Sapientiae*, p. 154 c. t. s.

² *Satis cognitum*, pp. 47, 55.

³ *Satis cognitum*, p. 69.

⁴ *Diuturnum*, p. 29.

set over divine, and the other over human things. Each in its kind is supreme (*in suo genere maxima*); each has fixed limits within which it is contained, limits which are defined by the nature and special object of the province of each."¹

"The Church alike and the State doubtless both possess individual sovereignty; hence, in the carrying out of public affairs, neither obeys the other within the limits to which each is restricted by its Constitution. It does not follow, however, that Church and State are in any manner severed, and still less antagonistic."²

This frank recognition of the supremacy of the State may be compared with the principles of modern politicians, who regard the State as the *sole* power, and ascribe to it full authority to govern, even supreme ecclesiastical authority, although in practice this theory does not realize. A comparison of this kind will inevitably lead to the conclusion that this teaching of the Church tends far more than that of these politicians to bring about a peaceable understanding between Church and State.³

3. If we ask what are the *special objects* of Church and State respectively, we have already been told that the former controls "divine" and the latter "human" affairs. This distinction is worked out more fully as follows: "To the domain of the ecclesiastical authority belongs all that is sacred (*sacrum*), all that relates to the salvation of souls and the worship of God (*cultus Dei*), all that is heavenly, eternal, supernatural, and religious, all that tends to eternal happiness, peace, and the sanctification of souls, the welfare of the Church, and the *pietas erga Deum*. The State has to decide on matters affecting general prosperity and the common good, civil and political business, things connected with public order and well-being, the prestige of the country, the protection of public and civil interests, and of society in general."⁴

In as far as Church and State both owe their origin to God, and possess complete authority, independently one of the other, we

¹ *Immortale*, p. 79 c. t. s. It is clear from the context that *causa (proxima)* ought here to be translated "object." Reference to parallel passages in "*Libertas*," "*Rerum novarum*," and "*Sapientiae*" leaves no doubt on the subject.

² *Sapientiae*, p. 166 c. t. s.; cf. *Arcanum*, *Praeclara*, and *Annum ingressi*.

³ Cf. *Böckenhoff*, op. cit., pp. 64, 72.

⁴ *Diuturnum*, p. 13; *Immortale*, p. 80 c. t. s.; *Libertas*, p. 115 c. t. s.; *Sapientiae*, p. 150 c. t. s.; *Rerum novarum*, p. 198 c. t. s.

sometimes hear of their "juxtaposition" or "coördination."¹ But the Church is superior to the State in virtue of her supernatural origin, her world-embracing magnitude, and, above all, through her lofty, supernatural object. Besides having power to rule (*potestas regiminis*), with regard to which alone she can be compared with the State, she has power to instruct and to dispense grace, and the State possesses nothing at all analogous to this. "Just as the end at which the Church aims is by far the noblest of ends, so is her authority the most exalted of all authority."²

"We are bound to love dearly the country whence we have received the means of enjoyment that this mortal life affords, but we have a much more urgent obligation to love with ardent love the Church to which we owe the life of the soul, a life that will endure forever."³

That the Church should thus take precedence has always been a matter of course to Christians. But connected with this precedence is the superiority of her authority to govern, for thereby the whole life of the Church is supported and protected, and she is enabled to accomplish her peculiar aim, which is at the same time the highest aim of human life. Consequently, as the authors, to whom I have just referred, assert, a State law may lose its obligatory character if it is contrary to this highest aim. It would be, as *Leo XIII* says, a reversal of the proper order for things natural to be put above things supernatural.

4. The ecclesiastical and civil authority, having different aims, have also different spheres of action. In order to fulfil her mission, the Church has to attend directly to the *supernatural* element in faith and life, that is to say, she has to preserve and make known what has been revealed regarding faith and morals, and she has to administer the sacraments. In the second place, she is concerned with *religion*, i.e., with honouring God by observing festivals and by making vows and sacrifices. Individuals as well as

¹ See *Hergenröther-Hollweck*, Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts, pp. 63, 73; *Lämmer*, Lehrbuch des Kirchenrechts, p. 436; *Sägmüller*, Lehrbuch des Katholischen Kirchenrechts, pp. 38, 107; *Böckenhoff*, op. cit., p. 81; *Scherer*, Staatslexikon, III, 123, 138; *Bachofen*, Summa iur. eccl. publ., pp. 133, 138, prefers the word *correlatio*.

² *Immortale*, p. 77 c. t. s.

³ *Sapientiae*, p. 150 c. t. s.

society are bound by a natural obligation to support religion, and even among pagans public regulations, and in many cases laws, were made for this purpose. After the institution of the Church the management of public worship belonged to the administrative office of the Church. In the third place she regulates things that we describe as *ecclesiastical* in the narrower sense of the word, such as the organization, order, and discipline of the Church herself as the visible kingdom of God. This includes decisions regarding offices in the Church, the clergy, supervision of the buildings and property of the Church, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and penalties, etc. It would, however, be wrong to say that the Church is concerned with the *spiritual* so as to imply that she has no control at all over what is corporal, external, and visible. She is herself a visible society, and her means of grace and cultus have an outer side and require temporal means; her hierarchy and moral discipline both have a great effect upon the outward aspect of life; and thus there are temporal, external things directly subject to the authority of the Church.

On the other hand the State has to provide for what is *natural*, *temporal*, and *civil*, though here again it would be a mistake to refer these expressions too exclusively to the physical authority, since the State, being designed by God, also possesses a moral importance and authority, and in civil life not only may, but must protect the morals of society by punishing theft, murder, adultery, etc. Even if its special aim is to maintain order and promote earthly happiness, it cannot be indifferent to the training of mind and heart, and to the encouragement of good moral and religious principles, since external and internal matters stand in such close connection with one another. It is the duty of the State by means of good discipline to make its citizens obey the natural law; it has to care not only for worldly goods and advantages, but much more for spiritual ones, for morality of life, for justice, and purity, and it must keep religion sacred and inviolate.¹

Where the moral law, based immovably on God alone, is respected, the true prosperity of mankind, and peace and order in civil life, are effectually ensured.

We see then that Church and State have to some extent com-

¹ *Libertas*, p. 115; *Sapientiae*, pp. 150, 166; *Rerum novarum*, p. 218 c. t. s.

mon aims and common activity. The relation between them may be expressed by saying that the "moral perfection of man," "Christian culture and civilization" is their *common aim*, and that this is the thing that unites their distinct spheres of activity.¹ This general aim extends beyond the direct sphere of influence of either Church or State, as becomes plain when we think of the numerous secular undertakings that are nevertheless not subject to any direct control on the part of the State. At the present time "society" is designated as the bearer of civilized life in general, and as a social force with neither definite limitations nor authority secured by law, and yet it undeniably possesses intellectual and economic unity, and within the boundaries of Church and State finds scope for free and beneficial activity.²

In the age of Gallicanism and intellectualism, men propounded theories which aimed at withdrawing everything connected with external life and activity from the jurisdiction of the Church in order to transfer it to that of the State. These theories originated partly in an excessively spiritualistic idea of religion, and partly in an erroneous conception of the relation between Church and

¹ Cf. the passage quoted from the Encyclical "Sapientiae" on page 338: alterum genus ad prosperitatem pertinet civitatis, alterum ad commune Ecclesiae bonum, utrumque *pariendae hominum perfectioni* natum; cf. also Sapientiae, p. 166 c. t. s.: ejusdem (hominis indolis) *curanda perfectio*. Cf. Praeclara, p. 231 c. t. s., where the aim of both Church and State is said to be the commune *societatis humanae* bonum, and in "Annum ingressi" it is described as the *explicanda christiana urbanitas*. The fundamental ideas expressed by *Leo XIII* in his various Encyclicals are summed up briefly by *Pius X*, who in writing to Cardinal Fischer of Cologne, on October 31, 1906, said: "Obedience to the authority of the Church leaves to every one full and unrestricted liberty in matters unconnected with religion. It produces in men's minds a sense of harmony which, extending from the individual to society, confirms the *welfare of society*, which welfare depends upon two factors, one civil and one religious."

² Cf. *infra*, p. 414. *A. Weiss*, Apologie des Christentums, IV, 1117: "All these organizations, the family, the economic society, the State, the Church, free associations of every kind for educational and other purposes, are in themselves independent, like the limbs of a body . . . but they are mutually responsible to one another, just as individual men are mutually bound together as a whole. They must work together to realize the *great aims of human society in general*." With reference to civil society, see page 656: "The aggregate of all these great and small associations is what is called *civil society*. By society we mean, therefore, the sum total of all the institutions, confederations, and active agencies established for the purpose of promoting and ensuring spiritual, moral, and material progress." Cf. also *Willmann*, Didaktik, I, 32; II, 507.

State. In opposition to them *Benedict XIV* and *Pius VI* emphatically declared that the Church had a right to teach and exercise jurisdiction regarding visible and external things also.¹

Recently *Pius X* condemned a similar tendency to subjectivity in the modernist idea of religion, — a tendency to separate everything external from religion and to assign it to the State, the logical result of which would be to destroy altogether the independence of the Church. "Assuming that the State alone has anything to say in temporal matters, any one who from the *interior* practice of religion proceeds to *exterior* acts, such as the administration and reception of the sacraments, would come thus under the control of the State. What would become then of ecclesiastical authority? Since it can assert itself only by exterior acts, it would become completely subordinate to the State."²

The allusions to the administration of the sacraments and the exercise of ecclesiastical authority show that *res temporales* here mean not secular, but temporal, external things. The same expression occurs in the famous twenty-fourth thesis of *Pius IX's* syllabus, which aroused so much opposition: *Ecclesia vis inferendae potestatem non habet, neque potestatem ullam temporalem directam vel indirectam*. *Heiner* remarks that according to the authentic source, the subject discussed in this thesis is not "a mediæval control over various States," but "only the preservation of the rights of the Church, with reference to her power to guide and govern the *external* life of the faithful, from which an attempt was being made to restrict and exclude her completely."³

As illustrations *Heiner* mentions the material aspect of the sacraments, contributions to the maintenance of public worship, Church property, appointments to benefices, and the infliction of ecclesiastical penalties that have temporal results. The first part of the condemned proposition deals with diminishing the power of the Church to impose such penalties, and thus it corresponds with the spirit of religious individualism. The assertion had been made that the Church could influence the lives of the faithful only by means of counsels, admonitions, and instructions, but possessed

¹ See *Denziger*, *Enchir.*, pp. 1504, 1505.

² Encyclical "Pascendi," p. 48.

³ *Heiner*, *Der Syllabus*, 1905, p. 138.

no power to legislate or punish. As a matter of fact, the Church possesses a peculiar power to govern as well as to teach; in order to discharge her mission she can make laws and see that they are observed, and hence she has also a right to inflict suitable punishment upon those who refuse to obey her (*potestas coactiva vel executiva*).¹

5. *St. Augustine* demonstrates to the teachers of Roman law that the mere name and idea of "justice" are not enough to secure good government, as the greatest confusion prevails regarding the rules of justice and their binding force. *Leo XIII* similarly points out that the State cannot attain to and realize its aim, the maintenance of justice and morals, unless it makes *faith in God* its strongest and surest support. Because it reflects God's majesty, the kingly office, even if held by an unworthy ruler, is respected by the subjects, and reverence for God obliges men as a matter of conscience to submit to the laws of their country. Hence no State can dispense with religion, and an atheistic, naturalistic government sins against its own safety and prosperity. God has given us in Christianity a positive religion, most spiritual, most perfect, and suited to every age, and as in course of time a close connection between Church and State has grown up, the so-called *separation* of the one from the other is contrary both to the principles of the Church and the recognized interests of the State. As they both have the same subjects, their jurisdictions are interwoven so intimately that no absolute separation is possible, and where an attempt has been made to force them asunder it has generally resulted in persecution of the Church and the exclusion of all religion from public life.²

Leo XIII regards that State as having an ideal government which in its moral and religious principles listens to the Church as the medium of revelation and professes the Catholic faith in the same way as individuals profess it. We learn from our own experience and from history that when the authority of the Church is rejected in matters of faith, morality suffers and gradually de-

¹ *Hergenröther-Hollweck*, op. cit., p. 536; *Casagnis*, I, n. 277, etc.

² *Immortale*, p. 90; *Sapientiae*, p. 154, etc.; *Rerum novarum*, p. 200, etc., c. r. s. In his brief "*Vehementer nos*" *Pius X* most emphatically condemns the Separation Law in France, that was the outcome of hatred for religion. Cf. *Denziger*, *Enchir.*, p. 1995.

cays, and the foundations of political and social life are undermined. The political autonomy of a State is not injured by its being inspired with Catholic ideas that promote rather than hinder its progress. Preference shown to the only true religion need not necessarily involve any injustice to other forms of worship. The Church is not the enemy of sane *toleration*, and she does not "condemn those rulers who, for the sake of securing some great good, or of hindering some great evil, allow patiently custom or usage to be a kind of sanction for each kind of religion having its place in the State. And in fact the Church is wont to take earnest heed that no one shall be forced to embrace the Catholic faith against his will, for, as *St. Augustine* wisely reminds us, "Man cannot believe otherwise than of his own free will."¹

We read also in the Encyclical "*Libertas*"² that the Church does not ignore the circumstances of the age, and makes allowance for the difficulties encountered by those who govern. Although she herself cannot "concede any right to anything save what is true and honest, she does not forbid public authority to tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice for the sake of avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preserving some greater good." If in other passages of this Encyclical the Pope calls upon the State to give preference to the Catholic faith and to ward off erroneous opinions, the form of the statement (*promiscua libertas, infinita, immoderata licentia*) shows that he was thinking of the contrary thereto, i.e., that all moral and religious opinions are to be deemed to be on a level; and, directly, of the propaganda of naturalism, freemasonry, and other tendencies hostile to the Church. In trying to establish the Catholic idea of the State, *Leo XIII* again and again points out that every man can easily recognize the Catholic Church as the only one founded by Christ.³ In one place⁴ he amplifies this statement by adding "especially in Catholic States"; and in another⁵ he acknowledges that "very many are far from Christ more through ignorance than ill will." In writing to Cardinal *Gibbons*, on January 22, 1899, he says:

¹ *Immortale*, pp. 92, 93 c. t. s.

² *Libertas*, p. 124 c. t. s.

³ *Immortale*, p. 76; *Libertas*, p. 116 c. t. s.

⁴ *Libertas*, p. 118.

⁵ *Tametsi*, p. 31.

"We believe that very many people (*plurimos*) stand aloof from Catholics more through ignorance than by deliberation." He refers also to the constitution of the United States, which is not of a definitely Christian character, but involves *to some extent* separation between Church and State, and says: "If by the name 'Americanism' are meant special mental qualities enjoyed by the nations of America, as also by others, or your *civil constitution*, your laws and customs, we have no reason to raise any protest against it."¹

There are Catholic canonists and theologians who regard the country with a State religion, namely, "a Catholic State," as something that has disappeared forever. This is true if they have in mind a State such as existed in the Middle Ages, with its intolerance of all other forms of worship. *Leo XIII* was not thinking of the Catholic State religion as occupying any such favoured position; but where all, or at least the great majority of the people in a country, profess the Catholic faith, it is only natural that the citizens collectively, or, in other words, the State, should feel impelled to recognize the moral force and blessing of this faith by conceding to it particular public respect and by trying to further its growth; and there is in this nothing incompatible with toleration of other forms of worship. "From the very nature of the case Church and State then stand naturally in a close mutual relation to one another. On the one hand the State, being enlightened and guided by the principles of Christianity, will not only appreciate the great force that, in the fulness of its spiritual strength, it can exert for the preservation and prosperity of the State, but on account of the essential relation which it bears to the highest interests and aims of mankind, the State will regard Christianity as most vitally affecting its subjects, and will be filled with zeal and loyalty towards it. Hence the State will honour and protect the Church as the organ of Christianity, uphold her laws, support her institutions,

¹ In his reply to the congratulations offered him by the Catholics of North America on the twenty-fifth anniversary of his elevation to the Papacy (1902), *Leo XIII* begins by contrasting the vigorous growth of the Church in America with her condition in some nominally Catholic countries, and goes on to say: "It is true that you enjoy no sort of legal preference on the part of the government, yet your rulers deserve gratitude because they do not interfere with your enjoyment of just liberty."

and assist in furthering her aims by all suitable means. On the other hand, the Church will approach rulers filled with such a spirit with confidence, will gladly regard their wishes in regulating her own life, and will give civil institution the support of her moral prestige.”¹

As a matter of fact, in those countries where religious liberty prevails preference is shown to the officially recognized forms of Christianity, as against Jews, Dissenters, Adventists, etc. In England the king must be a Protestant, and the High Church party enjoys very considerable privileges, and yet we regard the English as a nation enjoying much liberty. In fact, countries where Protestantism is the official religion and where obstacles are put in the way of the practice of Catholicism are at the present time more numerous than the so-called Catholic countries. When attempts were made recently in Spain to destroy the Catholic character of the State, the Church protested against them, not because she wished to prevent Protestants from having fair liberty of worship, — as a matter of fact there is more liberty in Spain than in most other countries, even for radical and destructive tendencies, — but because the Liberal government was carrying out its reforms with reckless abuse of authority and disregarding long-established rights of the Church.²

6. Pope *Leo XIII* declares that “it is expedient to *take part in the administration of public affairs*, unless it be otherwise determined by reason of some exceptional condition of things. And the Church approves of every one devoting his services to the common good, and doing all that he can for the defence, preservation, and prosperity of his country.”³

Were Catholics to withdraw from public life, the reins of government would very likely pass into the hands of those who are hostile to religion. The duty of taking part in public life remains even where much evil has crept into the State, as the example of

¹ *Walter*, *Naturrecht und Politik*, 1871, p. 374, etc.

² In these matters the State theories of philosophers are as little conclusive as the facts of history regarding States. *Spinoza*, for instance, imposed upon the State a most extensive religious task, even required it to organize an official Church; yet, on the other hand, he demanded the greatest toleration for religious opinions of all sorts.

³ *Libertas*, p. 129 c. t. s.

early Christian soldiers and magistrates shows us, provided always that there is no abandonment of *the fundamental law of God and of nature*. It is impossible to lay down general directions for Catholics regarding their political activity; the means adopted must suit times and places widely differing from one another, and many purely civil questions admit of various answers and solutions. Where there are diversities of opinion in one and the same country, it is unjust and wrong to lower the advocates of one political opinion in the eyes of others, by suggesting that they are less loyal to their faith.¹

7. A very difficult question arises when the two powers are in contact with one another and their interests apparently conflict, especially with regard to matters lying on the border line between them. *Leo XIII* declares that if Christians at times have the duty of resisting the authority of the State owing to convictions that are ever present in the Christian conscience, he is careful to mention, as the reason for doing so, the violation of God's law by the civil power. "There is," he says, "only one reason justifying men in disobedience, and that is when anything is required of them *that is manifestly contrary to the divine or natural law*. For in all things violating the law of nature or the will of God, it is equally wrong to command and to obey."² Elsewhere he refers more explicitly to antagonism between Church and State, but he invariably presumes that the Church upholds a divine law, made known through nature or by Revelation, and that she represents "truth and divine reason," the honour of God and of religion, which includes, of course, her own position as *designed by God*. Moreover, the Pope takes it for granted that the conflict of duties is unmistakable; but in such cases there cannot be a real State interest, and no one ought to hesitate for an instant as to which should be preferred.³

The Pope is not only bound to use his supreme authority in ex-

¹ *Immortale*, p. 97, etc., c. 7. s.; cf. also *Sapientiae*, p. 165: *Non dubium est quin quaedam sit in genere politico honesta contentio, cum scil. incolumi veritate iustitiaque certatur, ut opiniones re usuque valeant, quae ad commune bonum prae ceteris conducibiles videantur. Sed Ecclesiam trahere ad partes aut omnino adiutricem velle ad eos, quibuscum contenditur, superandos, hominum est religione intemperanter abutentium.*

² *Diuturnum*, p. 15.

³ *Sapientiae*, p. 151 c. 7. s.

pounding the revealed truths of faith, but he is also entitled and bound to maintain Christian principles of action in every department of life. "Wherefore it belongs to the Pope to judge authoritatively what things the *Sacred Oracles* contain, as well as what doctrines are in harmony and what are in disagreement with them; and also, for the same reason, to show forth what things are *to be accepted as right, and what are to be rejected as worthless*; what it is necessary to do and what to avoid doing in order to attain to eternal salvation. For otherwise there would be no sure interpreter of the *commands of God*, nor would there be any safe guide showing man the way he should live."¹ The Church is not concerned with the political side of legislation, but as the men, who are subjects of the State, have certain moral and religious duties, she "cannot stand by, indifferent as to the import and significance of the laws enacted."²

The matters of so-called mixed jurisdiction (such as the education of the young, some points connected with marriage, holy days, and theological faculties in State-supported universities) lie on the border line between Church and State, and with regard to them the principle applies that the Church looks after their spiritual and the State after their secular arrangements. It is, however, not always possible to discriminate their spheres of action; hence: "In matters of mixed jurisdiction, it is in the highest degree consonant to nature, as also to the designs of God, that so far from one of the powers separating itself from the other, or still less coming into conflict with it, complete harmony, such as is suited to the end for which each power exists, should be preserved between them."³

Such an agreement finds its most tangible expression in the compacts (*pacta*) and concordats between Church and State. In concluding them the Church shows generous love of peace, and,

¹ *Sapientiae*, p. 162 c. t. s. In his letter to the bishops of Italy (*Acta S. Sedis*, 1904-5, p. 746) *Pius X* also expresses a wish that all the laws of the State might be subordinated to the divine laws of the Gospel, and that harmony might exist between the two powers, Church and State, so that whilst provision is made for the temporal welfare of the nations, their eternal good may not suffer injury.

² *Sapientiae*, p. 166 c. t. s.

³ *Immortale*, p. 92 c. t. s.

as experience shows, she adheres to her engagements more faithfully than most States.¹ Apart from such compacts, it must be borne in mind that God intended "an *orderly* connection" to exist between the two powers, similar to the connection existing in the physical causes, so that there will be no occasion for conflict of duty in the minds of their common subjects. This connection may be compared with the union of the soul and body in man. "The nature and scope of that connection can be determined only . . . by having regard to the nature of each power, and by taking account of the relative excellence and nobleness of their purpose. One of the two has for its proximate and chief object the well-being of this mortal life; the other the everlasting joys of heaven."²

Leo XIII's clear and vigorous statements quoted above are of great importance to the age in which we live, especially as technical terms and scientific theories are not everywhere understood in the

¹ *Diuturnum*, p. 29; *Libertas*, p. 115 c. t. s.; *Immortale*, p. 80 c. t. s.; *Praeclara*, p. 230 c. t. s.; *Rer. nov.*, p. 211 c. t. s., contains the remark that *collegia et ordines religiosi* claim rightly to be responsible to the Church alone *qua parte religionem attingunt*.

² *Immortale*, p. 80 c. t. s.; *Arcanum*, p. 62 c. t. s. Timid persons looked forward to disastrous results when *Pius IX* rejected the forty-second thesis of the Syllabus: "Where the laws of the two powers are at variance, the secular power takes precedence." The reference is not to any judicial and administrative requirements, but to *laws*; besides, the condemned thesis contains a *general* proposition to the effect that in *every* dispute the civil law ranks higher than the ecclesiastical (*Heiner*, *Der Syllabus*, p. 208); hence the direct contrary is asserted as a positive thesis: "The secular power does *not* take precedence in every dispute." The Church, however, goes further than this, and argues that, as her final aim is higher, *natura sua*, her law must take precedence, since it makes for this higher aim. This principle throws much light on ethical considerations, and in no way is detrimental to the civil order, since the Church, in construing her laws and in the practical application which she desires them to receive, takes account of all the true interests of human society. It may happen that some demand or service tends directly to the welfare of the State, and only indirectly to that of the Church. In times of great distress saintly princes of the Church have thought it their duty not to insist upon the immunity of her possessions and have deviated in other respects from the ecclesiastical law. We read in *Hergenröther-Hollweck*, p. 68: "In any dispute between the ecclesiastical and civil law, preference naturally must be given to the former, since the Church has the higher aim. To individual cases we may apply the rule regarding conflicting duties, and distinguish between positive and negative obligations . . . moreover, we must take into account the degree of obligation and the greater or less necessity, etc." Cf. *Cavagnis*, I, n. 410; *Böckenhoff*, p. 87 f.; *Giesler*, *Der Modernismus*, 1912, p. 206; *Mausbach*, *Staatslexikon*, II, 438.

same sense; and hence there appear to be differences in Catholic teaching, which, however, may be traced in most cases to a dispute about the meaning of words. For instance, as I have pointed out, some writers on Canon Law use the word "coördination" to designate the relation between Church and State,¹ whilst others retain the older term "subordination." Both parties, however, agree essentially, inasmuch as both admit the sovereignty and supreme authority of the State in its own sphere of action, both acknowledge the higher dignity of the Church, a dignity due to her divine origin and supernatural aim, and both give precedence to the ecclesiastical authority, which is rendered necessary in order that this aim may be realized. At first sight a new difference seems to present itself when this precedence is explained and defined; as there are various theories regarding what is meant by *potestas directa*, *indirecta* and *directiva in temporalia*. In this context the word *temporalia* has not the more general meaning of "external," "sensible,"² but is equivalent to "secular" or "civil." A full elucidation of the question, especially on its historical side, is possible only after profound research, but for practical purposes it is sufficient to remark that the use of words in various senses, and their application to different forms of government, cause much confusion. As to the latter point, many writers, especially the authors of Latin works, have had in view only Catholic countries. Cardinal *Cavagnis* dedicates about a hundred pages to such States, whereas he devotes only six to countries that are either heretical, indifferent or infidel, or tolerate all forms of religion. He attempts to describe "ideal relations" between Church and State, where God's designs are *fully* realized, and restricts himself accordingly to a form of government the members of which are Catholics, recognizing Catholic principles in legislation.³

Most German authors, on the other hand, think of States as they actually exist, a few of which are Catholic, some tolerate Protestantism as well as Catholicism, others are neutral in matters of religion, and others non-Christian. Such writers start with the simple idea of the State, not with that of the perfect State; and they ask what is valid and permissible for *all* States. Any one, therefore, who maintained that there was an antagonism between

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 354, note 1.

² Cf. p. 356.

³ Op. cit., I, n. 397.

these two parties, because they do not altogether agree in determining the rights of the Church, or who found fault with the writers of the latter class for being less loyal to the Church, would not only be doing them an injustice, but would be at variance with those of his own party. *Cavagnis*, for instance, restricts the rights of the Church very considerably in the case of non-Catholic States, and with reference to non-Christian States he states, quite contrary to the claim otherwise made for *subordinatio*: *Status infidelis non est subditus Ecclesiae, hinc minora sunt jura Ecclesiae erga ipsum etiam in abstracto* (p. 573). In the same way any one reading the work in which *R. Schultes* deals with the subject under discussion must, if he wishes to do justice to the *status questionis*, bear in mind his introductory note: "In the following treatise the word 'State' always means a *Catholic State*."¹

Whoever applies this point of view, which is objectively demanded, to the matter in hand, will find that there is not much practical difference between the two classes of writers, although the views of one appear to be strict, and those of the other less so. In order to avoid any obscurity arising from the diversity in the constitutions of States, other theologians maintain that instead of speaking of indirect subordination of States to the Church, it is better to say that the jurisdiction of the Church extends to *mankind*, and hence to princes and subjects who belong to the Church by baptism, as members of the human race.²

At any rate there is at the present day complete unanimity of opinion regarding the so-called *potestas directa*, which all admit is not maintainable. This theory was brought forward late in the Middle Ages, and upheld by many canonists and theologians.³

¹ *R. Schultes*, *Die Autorität der Kirche in weltlichen Dingen*, 1912, p. 11.

² *Biederlack*, *Zeitschr. für Kathol. Theol.*, 1902, p. 159; *Schneemann*, *Die Kirchl. Gewalt*, 1867, p. 48; *Bachofen*, op. cit., p. 137. Cf. *Denziger*, *Enchir.*, p. 1697; *Cavagnis*, n. 572, says with reference to "modern States" that in them the obligations of religion rested chiefly upon individuals (*devolvi ad privatos*) and their social activity. On these obligations as affecting Catholics, see Chapter IX.

³ *Suarez*, *De leg.*, III, c. 6, n. 1, speaks of *multi doctores*. The best known amongst them, and those who supported the theory most warmly, were *Alvarus Pelagius* and *Augustinus Triumphus*. As to isolated expressions used by mediæval Popes, see *Michael*, *Gesch. des deutschen Volkes*, III (1903), 266.

According to it the Pope possesses not only supreme spiritual, but also supreme temporal power throughout the world, not, of course, for temporal, but for spiritual purposes. But in accordance with the will of Christ he has transferred his temporal power to secular rulers, and must not, under ordinary circumstances, cancel this transference. In cases, however, where the higher interests of religion demand it, the Pope is entitled to use the temporal power, which in its foundation always remained with him notwithstanding such transference. This view is incompatible with the principles laid down by *Leo XIII* concerning the independent origin and character of Church and State.

On the other hand, authors are *unanimous, and rightly so*, in thinking that the Church has *indirect* authority over temporal matters and public life, since, in all that concerns religion and morals in the highest questions of life, she is and must be the court of last resort. It is only with regard to the traditional interpretation of *potestas indirecta* that any difference of opinion exists. The term seems to have been used in the first instance by *Innocent IV*,¹ but the thought that it expresses was in the mind of *Innocent III*, when, in commenting upon a dispute between the kings of France and England about their feudal rights, he remarked that he had no intention of judging *de feudo*, since this duty belonged to the secular ruler, but he judged *de peccato*, since it was in his province as head of the Church to punish sin.²

Some great theological writers of the Middle Ages, and subsequently *Bellarmino* and *Suarez*, developed the theory that the Church has indirect authority over temporal matters, basing it upon these words of *Innocent III*, as well as upon other arguments, some of a speculative nature, and others derived from the Bible and from history. These authors say that the Church received from her Founder only one kind of authority, viz., spiritual. But as she has a very high, supernatural aim, far surpassing in importance and necessity that of the State, she can and must express a judgment in secular affairs, in so far as the glory of God and care for the spiritual welfare of the faithful require her to do so; and that she can logically deprive antagonistic enactments by the

¹ *Michael*, op cit., p. 270.

² Cf. *J. Hergenröther*, *Kath. Kirche und christl. Staat*, 1872, p. 402, etc.

State of all their force (*ratione peccati*). When *Suarez* ascribes this power to the Church, he distinguishes it from direct authority by saying that it enables the Church to *correct* and *abrogate* laws prejudicial to morality, but not to replace them by *new enactments*.¹ In this way the Church would be using her own spiritual jurisdiction to carry out and uphold God's will and law against secular attacks; God's will, which must be respected in matters of the world as much as in those of the Church. She would not, however, proceed to lay down positive laws and regulations of a civil nature herself, but she can oblige those who hold the civil authority to do so (and, if necessary, constrain them by means of ecclesiastical punishments).²

Being influenced by the legal tradition of the time, *Suarez*, like *Bellarmino*, went a step further and ascribed to the Pope, in case of necessity, power to govern temporal affairs; e.g., to depose kings, to alter the boundaries of kingdoms and transfer them to other rulers, to reduce free nations to a state of dependency, and to assume jurisdiction in secular matters.³

Later advocates of this system agree as to the fundamental idea, but tacitly or explicitly abandon the last-named applications of it. But this very attempt, to avoid making any deduction from it that would affect politics, contributed to the setting up of a third system, according to which the Church possesses a *potestas directiva*. When Gallicanism prevailed, this expression was understood as designating authority to counsel and to teach, and nothing further. Cardinal *Hergenröther*, too, uses it primarily by way of contrast to real jurisdiction; but he goes on to show that *Gerson*, who originated the system, uses the word *directiva* only to contrast

¹ *Suarez*, De leg., III, c. 6, n. 6: Haec autem potestas indirecta, licet sufficiat ad corrigendas interdum vel abrogandas leges civiles, quando vergere possunt in perniciem animarum, non tamen proprie ad ferendas et statuendas leges civiles, praesertim mere positivas et formaliter loquendo. Dico autem mere positivas; quia declarando jus naturale . . . potest Papa legem condere, quia talis lex non est proprie constitutiva juris, sed declarativa et definitiva, quae definitio ad Papam spectat.

² Cf. also *Wernz*, Jus decretal., I (1898), 16.

³ *Suarez*, III, c. 7, n. 12; c. 10, n. 6; IV, c. 11, n. 12. Defens. fid. cath., III, c. 23. *Bellarmino*, De contr. fid., I; De Rom. Pontif., V, c. 6. Regarding *Molina*, see *J. Hergenröther*, op. cit., §§ 423, etc., 443, etc. Cf. also the statement made by *Pius IX* on July 20, 1871, *supra*, p. 342, note 4.

this power with the Pope's "*potestas civilis et iuridica*"; and that other, later, theologians include in the *potestas directiva* authority not only to teach, but also to command, judge, and punish.¹

After surveying the whole dispute about the *potestas indirecta* and *directiva*, Hergenröther asks: "Does not the controversy turn on the *name* rather than on the *thing*? . . . In essentials the two kinds of power appear to be identical."²

The modern advocates of the theory do not question the fact that the authority of the Church involves jurisdiction.³ Some add, indeed, that strictly speaking, not the judicial but the teaching office of the Church is concerned, meaning that the *foundation* of jurisdiction in secular matters is the *jus divinum*, which the Church has to expound and observe in practice, viz., the carrying out of God's law; it is not a *jus humanum* which she creates as her own legislative will.

Since God has assigned to Church and State their respective offices, interference by the Church in secular matters must be justified by the aims given her by God and by her own rules and rights; whereas in the sphere of religion she is free to set up aims for herself, as circumstances require, and to make entirely new laws. Should any dispute arise, she can in all matters directly concerning religion and the Church assert that she has exclusive jurisdiction, and can act with a *free will* according to her own desires; but in secular matters she has to appeal to God's rights, and to her own *duties* towards Him, as the appointed guardian of His laws.⁴

¹ J. Hergenröther, I, 448, etc.; cf. v. Scherer, Staatslexikon, III, 133.

² *Ibid.*, p. 452. Suarez himself employs and defends the expression *potestas directiva* (Def. fid. cath., III, 22, 1).

³ This is true especially of Böckenhoff (p. 90), who would like to regard certain definite acts of recent Popes as instances of the exercise of the "directive authority" (e.g., the condemnation as invalid of the Austrian constitution and of laws connected with the Kulturkampf in Germany and the separation of Church and State in France). Cf. Böckenhoff in the Köln. Volksztg., 1913, No. 246.

⁴ Within its own sphere of action every public authority has a right to impose as obligatory the means *indispensable* to the attainment to its end, and also to select *any* means as obligatory, when several, all equally suitable, are available. However, from the principle that secular matters should be left to the State, it follows "that the State alone is entitled to order secular affairs in accordance with the secular aim, i.e., in as far as they are not *opposed* to the spiritual aim, nor *indispensable* to it in the opinion of the Church." Cavagnis, I, n. 80; 73, n. 399.

Long before this, *Suarez* had expressed practically the same opinion (see p. 368, note 1)¹; and it is shared by the modern advocates of the theory of *potestas indirecta*. Referring to the *ratio peccati*, the starting point of the whole question of terminology, or to the internal moral ordering of things to their end, these writers mention, as formal justification for the interference of the Church in secular matters, any "violation of the moral law" or of "the will of God," or any urgent need for maintaining the aims and rights of the Church, as given her by God.²

¹ Cf. also *Lehmkuhl*, *infra*, p. 386, n. 1.

² Cf. the quotations from *Leo XIII* (*supra*, p. 361, *seq.*) and from *Pius X* (*infra*, p. 404). *Bellarmino*, *De contr. fid.*, I; *De Rom. Pontif.*, V, 6: "Spiritalis potestas non se miscet temporalibus negotiis sed sinit omnia procedere, sicut antequam essent conjunctae (potestates) dummodo non obsint fini spiritali aut non sint necessaria ad eum consequendum." *Schneemann*, *Die Kirchh. Gewalt*, 1867, p. 47: The Pope "claims for the Church authority in political affairs, not because they are political, but because they are connected with the *divine law*, of which the Church is the appointed guardian. Whoever questions this assertion must either assume that sin is impossible in political matters, and that they are not subject to God and His law, or he must suppose that the Church has received no authority to warn men against sin and to judge concerning it." *Lämmer*, p. 419: . . . "only in as far as things temporal are opposed to the supernatural aim or necessary to its attainment." *Hergenröther-Hollweck*, *op. cit.*, p. 70: "Only indirectly, in as far as they can be ordered to the aim of the Church and must be regulated in accordance with God's will. For man in the use of all earthly authority . . . is dependent upon God, who in the moral law has given him a barrier that he cannot set aside." *Cathrein*, *op. cit.*, II, 584: "The Church has indeed a right to take measures lest her subjects should be led astray into sin by the orders of the secular power, and so suffer the loss of their souls." *Tauber* (*Manuale iur. canonici*, 1908, p. 98): "non attingit temporalia, nisi in quantum necesse est, ut finis alterius ordinis, quem sibi proponit et necessario debet assequi, revera obtineatur" (apud *Schultes*, *op. cit.*, p. 16). Cf. *Laurentius* (*ibid.*, p. 23): "The authority to regulate temporal and political matters from the spiritual point of view is limited to cases in which temporal affairs are so badly managed that great harm to religion and the spiritual welfare of the nations threatens to result." *Michael*, *op. cit.*, p. 265: "In the exercise of their rights in purely secular matters princes are absolutely free; the Pope claims no authority to interfere with them in any way, as long as they do not go beyond the purely secular sphere of action. The right of interference by the Pope, as the guardian of the higher spiritual order, begins at the point where the temporal ruler leaves his own sphere and encroaches upon that of morals." *Cavagnis* (*l. c.* I, n. 407): "Ecclesia jure exercet potestatem suam et in rebus temporalibus, quatenus *necessariae sunt pro fine spiritali*." In a previous passage he writes: "finis inferior fit inhonestus, quoties *adversatur fini majori*"; and again (n. 430): *Res temporales "sunt competentiae civilis, salva subordinatione, i.e., dummodo moderando temporalia non impediuntur aut frustrentur spiritalia."* Cf. n. 570

In cases where greater claims are made, the authors have only *Catholic* countries in view; the close connection between the spiritual and temporal order in such countries is a reason why the State should support the Church more generously than elsewhere, but it also pledges the Church to use more extensive care in promoting the welfare of the citizens.¹

Leo XIII did well to remind us of a beautiful remark made by *Ivo of Chartres*, in which he expressed the idea current in the Middle Ages regarding the relation between Church and State. "When kingdoms and priesthood are at one, in complete accord, the world is well ruled, and the Church flourishes and brings forth abundant fruit."²

The limitations assigned by the Church to the power of the State are in agreement with *St. Peter's* words: "We ought to obey God rather than men."³ Such limitations are at the same time a powerful bulwark against the onslaught of a godless view of society, based upon nothing but purely human passions and power. *St. Paul* writes: "There is no power but from God, and those that are, are ordained of God."⁴ Would it be possible to discover any more solid or more sacred foundation for the authority of the State? Every modern State acknowledges, or will at least not long refuse to acknowledge, that it needs such a foundation. It can no longer hope to maintain itself by compulsion, by the exercise of brute force, as was possible in the ages of barbarism and heathenism; now it must have *authority*, a moral right to command. As the masses increase in importance and in the consciousness of their own power, the more dangerous will become the reliance upon pure force and upon external repression. How can modern rulers succeed in inspiring the people with respect for authority if they themselves regard the State as merely the product of accidental development, and think that all rights, even their own, and *supra*, p. 369, n. 4. *Hergenröther*, pp. 427-444, quotes similar statements from *Turrecremata* and *Molina*. It is scarcely necessary to draw attention to the fact that any attack upon well-established *historical rights* and positive laws of the Church may involve formal injustice, and is therefore a transgression of the *law of God*.

¹ *Cavagnis*, n. 175, 413, 558, and *Walter*, *supra*, p. 361.

² *Immortale*, p. 84, c. t. s.

³ *Acts* v. 29.

⁴ *Rom.* xiii. 1.

originate in nothing but the growth of power, or the historical impulse of the masses? Here the importance of the Church's idea of a *natural* law, derived from God Himself and firmly established in Catholic philosophy and science, receives emphasis, and shows that in the natural, social, necessities that lead to civil authority, there is evident the will of God, and that when we speak of the king as reigning "by the grace of God," we are not using an expression borrowed from obsolete mysticism. Freethinkers would never have ridiculed this title had not modern philosophy so persistently represented the natural law as something quite out of date and to be ignored.

The Catholic Church has always upheld a *supernatural authority*, surpassing all human moral force in strength and security; this authority has developed in millions of her faithful subjects from their very youth the spirit of moral subordination and of ready obedience, and has inculcated loyalty to the State as a sacred duty. There will be no remedy for the disintegrating individualism of our own day if religion, the thing that touches men most closely, is cut off from authority and thrown back upon its own resources, for in itself individualism lacks all rejuvenation. And where to-day, outside the Catholic Church, is there any deep religious feeling binding men to true, living authority?

It may be claimed that since the halo of authority has ceased to impress men of the present time, and since the dignity and prestige of princes have been diminished by democratic changes in the government, there is in every *constitutional State* an intensified perception of the sanctity of *law*, and of the inner necessity of State control. But is this really the case? Must not any one who studies the method of modern legislation acknowledge that it is frequently superficial and mechanical, dependent upon the will of a fluctuating majority? Do not immoral passions, excitement, and calumny often lead to measures which call forth indignant protests of the conscience? Do not the rapid changes in legislation seriously hinder the laws from taking root in the minds of the people, and prevent them from being incorporated in their moral perceptions and demands? The Church supplies a deeper and sounder foundation to the laws of the State, and to the legal status of marriage, family life, and industry, and she does this primarily

by referring to the law of God, which is reflected in human nature, and is clearly and authoritatively made known by Revelation. Not only the government, but the whole life of the State breaks up if there are no "eternal laws" superior to the will of the State, "laws absolutely inalienable and indestructible as the stars in heaven."¹

Throughout the course of history the Church has always raised the life of the people above the changes and caprices of the age; she brings the individual and the passing generations into touch with previous centuries and with their accumulated wisdom. The Church is the stout guardian of *tradition* as well as the bearer of authority. She respects and sanctifies every venerable tradition; alongside of the law she places customs through which we become familiar with and learn to love what is necessary and good for us. Many firmly established customs, that have come down to Germans from remote antiquity, indicate that the law and civilization of the Germanic people were most intimately permeated by their morals and piety. This strongly conservative feature, which is essentially indestructible in the Church, and which reveals itself in the legislative acts of recent Popes, has had the effect of imparting a conservative tendency to the ferment of political life. A population loyal to the Church and zealous in her service affords the strongest support to the government, and counteracts anarchical tendencies.

The last argument that might be adduced by those who think the State must be absolutely independent of the Church, is this: Because the authority and constitution of the State cannot stand alone, and are not enough to secure the welfare of the nations, we have nowadays States that make education and general prosperity their aim, and such States impress the people by their wisdom and progressive spirit, and by the intellectual and material benefits that they bestow; and in this way they become strong enough to resist all dangers. By this zeal for education and

¹ O. Willmann, *Gesch. des Idealismus*, III, 973: "If the State creates rights, it can also create a right to property, and set aside private rights of ownership. . . . If the State is the sole source of law, hence also of the law of marriage, it does not exceed its powers when it allows marriage to be temporary, on trial, or terminable upon due notice."

progress a modern State shows, we are told, that it has attained maturity as the highest social organization, and consequently is able to discharge the functions that formerly belonged to the Church; in other words, there is no further need for a Church at all. The direct contrary is actually the truth. The more a government goes beyond the organization of its authority and power, and begins to deal with the problems of social life in general, the sooner will it come to the conclusion that it cannot deal with moral and social questions *unaided*, and is forced to welcome the coöperation of the Church. We may describe the State governed by brute force as merely a body; the State governed by law possesses reason and will; the modern civilized State aiming at education and prosperity, has a soul. *F.W. Förster* writes: "The State must have a soul, unless it is to become an inanimate piece of machinery or fall into decay. But the soul of the State requires pastoral care, and this in turn must be *independent* of the authority and interests of the State, if it is consistently to foster the deeper spiritual conditions essential to all unity in the life of the State."¹

Let us for instance think of the objects at which the reform of the penal system aims. The State governed by brute force is content to secure outward peace by inflicting punishment as a deterrent; the constitutional State sternly exacts retribution according to the letter of the law, but the civilized State, aiming at education and progress, wishes to reform and raise the criminal, and, by means of moral training to prevent the law from being violated. This is a result that cannot possibly be attained as long as the State itself is mistaken as to the true character of moral rules and forces, and despises the assistance offered by religion in affecting and raising the souls of men. Family life, the education of the young, and the encouragement and fostering of art all belong to the sphere of morality; hence it must be a short-sighted policy to use the authority of the State for combating the excesses of youthful scamps, and at the same time to exclude all religious instruction and the influence of the Church from the schools intended to complete the education of this young element. When a modern State earnestly desires the welfare of all classes, and turns its attention to

¹ *Autorität und Freiheit*, p. 105.

encouraging every kind of movement for the good of the people, it has to decide whether it will adopt a purely worldly and naturalistic ideal of happiness and culture, which will eventually bring about its ruin, or return to the aims, rules, and the vital force of Christianity, which the Catholic Church alone preserves as a clear and definite whole, capable of influencing social life.

CHAPTER IX

THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH AND THE LIBERTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

ACCORDING to another charge brought against the Catholic Church by her antagonists, she "understands by morality the upright behaviour in a theocracy the laws of which are regarded and treated as one would regard and treat police regulations."¹ She demands "obedience to the Church and to her requirements and ordinances, and thus her morals become a matter of Church laws and of externals."² "Towards her own laity in particular, but also towards all other Churches and creeds, as well as towards the State, she displays such supreme consciousness of power, such intolerance and *love of authority*, as to suggest the Roman *imperium* rather than the spirit and endeavour of Christ's flock." (The promulgation of the dogma of papal infallibility is mentioned here as an illustration.)³ "The moral principle of ecclesiastical authority declares morality and immorality to depend upon one thing only — viz., obedience or disobedience to the laws of the Church"; this principle, however, has a "poisonous" effect upon nations not altogether barbarous, because it reduces the "active body to the condition of a *lifeless machine*."⁴

That the Reformation as a matter of principle denounced Catholic morality, with its immoral superficiality and *worthless heed of ecclesiastical laws*, is claimed to have been one of the achievements which altered the whole human life.⁵ German Protestants are never likely to become Catholics, because they can never forget "the struggle against priest domination."⁶ In works hostile to the Church, the term "ultramontanism" is much used to designate

¹ Herrmann, Röm. n. evang. Sittlichkeit, p. 31, etc.

² Luthardt, p. 15.

⁴ V. Hartmann, pp. 80, 94.

³ H. Weiss, p. 175.

⁵ Ziegler, p. 512.

⁶ Harnack, Protestantismus und Katholizismus, p. 30.

a tendency on her part to "unjustifiable interference in secular matters and to keeping the laity in clerical leading strings."¹

The assertion that Catholic moral teaching insists exclusively, or even chiefly, upon obedience, not to God and conscience, but to the authority of the Church, and that Catholic morality is nothing but practical, exterior uprightness in a theocracy, has been shown by all that has been said to be due to foolish or malicious ignorance of the fundamental principles of Catholic teaching. On the other hand, however, it must not be denied that a Catholic is bound by the laws and regulations of the Church, and that it is difficult for a Protestant to place himself actually in the state of conscience of a Catholic loyal to his Church. The modern tendency to liberty and individualism makes it even harder for men of the present than it was for men in the past to subordinate their individuality, and to let it become a part of the well-ordered whole of the Church. The charges above quoted, against the "ultramontane system," and the compassionate tone adopted towards Catholics as the "victims" of this system, have not been without effect, especially amongst those Catholics who, in consequence of liberal surroundings or education, fear nothing so much as "priest domination." The objective intermingling of ecclesiastical ideas and demands with burning questions of modern life, and the diversity in the intellectual, social, and political circumstances in various countries, have carried certain difficulties into this eminently practical issue. Finally, the codification of Canon Law now in progress, and various decisions given by Rome, have contributed towards turning the attention of educated laymen to these questions. They show, however, that the order and discipline of the Church are working along definite lines, and are ready to cope with the new requirements of the age, without abandoning the old, fundamental principles. Hence, if we desire the conscience to

¹ Cf. Götz, *Der Ultramontanismus als Weltanschauung auf Grund des Syllabus*, 1905; *Klerikalismus und Laizismus*, 1906, p. 56: "On the whole we may probably sum up the instructions given by *Leo XIII* and *Pius X* as amounting to this: the laity are to be nothing more than the 'faithful'; i.e., that in everything, even in their ordinary work in the world, they have nothing to do but to obey the 'Church'; that is to say, to obey the clergy and the Pope. They are permitted to support and defend the claim of the clergy to direct the civilization of the world, but must not display any *independent* cultural activity."

obey the Church willingly and with conviction; if we desire to protect men against the attractive but misleading idea that Christianity is something "purely personal," it is indispensable that the laity of this day should be instructed in the theological principles regarding the extent and gradation of the Church's authority. On the other hand, the decay of all discipline in the Protestant Churches, and the resulting abandonment of all fixed religious ideas, is a portentous sign in the heavens of the present-day world.

I

Though we are considering the sphere of life and action, rather than that of faith and thought, it is nevertheless necessary to begin with a short explanation of what is meant by the *infallibility of the Pope* in his teaching office, because the charges against the moral and religious liberty of Catholics emanate invariably from a distorted or false interpretation of this dogma. The Vatican Council declared the Pope to be infallible when he speaks *ex cathedra*, i.e., when in the exercise of his office as shepherd and teacher of all Christians, and in accordance with his supreme apostolic authority, he defines some doctrine regarding faith or morals as a doctrine to be held by the universal Church. This infallibility is based upon the "divine assistance" promised to *St. Peter*; it is that infallibility with which our divine Redeemer desired to endow His Church for the decision of points of faith and morals.¹ The assistance of the Holy Ghost, promised by Christ to the apostles, is especially given to their head; it is given in the most complete and absolute sense when that head speaks authoritatively and decisively. It is scarcely necessary to say that personal opinions expressed by the Pope in his activity as a preacher, as an author, or a bishop, have nothing to do with infallibility. Moreover, the great majority of his official utterances are not *ex cathedra* decisions.

According to the actual words used by the Council and the general consensus of theologians, "the decision must define a *doctrine*, that is to say, a truth or a principle of universal validity. This excludes any application of a universal principle to a particular

¹ S. 4, c. 4.

case such as occurs in a decision given in a judicial capacity, . . . or in rules laid down for the *administration* and discipline of the Church. It must be a *doctrina de fide et moribus*, i.e., it must affect the Church's teaching on faith or morals. . . ." "For a decision to be made *ex cathedra*, it is not enough that the Pope should merely state a truth, but he must do so in virtue of his supreme apostolic authority, and lay it down as a *rule* of faith or of moral and religious action, *binding upon the whole Church* and to be so accepted. The essence of a decision *ex cathedra Petri* is that, being a *definite* sentence given by the *supreme* judge of faith,¹ it *irrevocably* binds the Church *as a whole*, and establishes an *unchangeable rule* that must be accepted with faith."¹ The acts of the Council show clearly that "not any manner of stating a doctrine is included, even when the Pope is exercising his office of supreme pastor and teacher; but that he must have the manifest intention (*intentio manifestata*) of defining a dogma, i.e., he must intend to put an end to all doubt regarding the doctrine or fact to be defined, by expressing a *definite judgment*; and furthermore the dogma in question must be made known to the whole Church as one to be believed."²

The enemies of the Church have always been fond of confusing *ex cathedra* decisions with utterances of the Pope in which he is liable to be in error. *Bellarmino* and *Stapleton* combated this trick of *Calvin's*, and in the same way *Franzelin*, *Hergenröther* and *Scheeben* have shown how the modern so-called Old-Catholics do the same thing. *W. Cappellari*, afterwards *Gregory XVI*, in his work on the "Triumph of the Holy See," pointed out that the obliteration of this distinction, even when due to zeal for the Church, does not conduce to her true glory. Cardinal *Franzelin* remarks: "There are papal documents, not only private, but even such issued by the Pope in his capacity as head of the Church, whose purpose it is to convey admonitions, counsels, and commands regarding matters of faith and morals, or to condemn certain opinions and prevent their spreading, but which do not aim at giving a decision, definite and binding, upon the whole Church; and for this reason they contain no *ex cathedra* announcement."

¹ *Heinrich*, *Dogmatische Theologie*, II, 249.

² *Granderath*, *Constit. dogm.*, ss. *Conc. Vatic.*, 1892, p. 233.

By way of illustration *Franzelin* refers to the letters addressed by Pope *Honorius I* to *Sergius*, Patriarch of Constantinople.¹

In support of the dogma, the Vatican Council referred not only to our *Saviour's promises*, but also to facts in the *history of the Church and of dogma*, and especially to the solemn declarations of General Councils in favour of papal infallibility.

Scholars have collected much evidence which show, in a convincing manner, that already at a very early period in the history of the Church men believed in the Pope's infallibility. When the decision of the Council was first promulgated, an attempt was made to represent it as a violent alteration of tradition; but even Protestant scholars² have been forced to admit that it was nothing more than the logical result of the whole development of the Church, whilst others confess that the essence of the dogma is contained in Holy Scripture, particularly in our Lord's words to *St. Peter* recorded in Matt. xvi. 18.³ When considered with reference to the Church, to Christianity, and religion in general the logical character of the dogma and its suitability and propriety will commend it also to the reason.

All those who, like the Old-Catholics, believe in a divinely guided Church and in episcopacy, must admit that the concentration of the episcopal power in *St. Peter's* successor is in harmony with the earliest consciousness of the Church; and that in the weight attached to the voice of the Pope, we have a more suitable expression of the divine assistance guiding the Church in all truth than there would be in the vote of a majority. Moreover, the cases where a majority in the Councils of the Church has expressed an opinion afford additional evidence of the Pope's infallibility, for a matter was never regarded as settled until the Pope's voice endorsed the majority. Apart from the strong evidence derived from our Lord's words in Matt. xvi. 18., Protestants who reverence the Bible as the unerring word of God, are bound to acknowledge that this priceless written document is exposed to many attacks and misunderstandings, and that therefore there must be a living voice, a ministry, to bear witness to and defend the contents of this document, to preserve its true spirit, pure and

¹ *Franzelin*, De div. trad. et script, p. 119.

² *Lagarde*, *Hinschius*.

³ *Pfleiderer*, *Krüger*.

living, from all the errors of the ages. In fact, any one who still believes in a *Revelation*, i.e., in the historical announcement to mankind of the salvation in God, and whoever sees in the historical person of Christ the culmination of this Revelation, must also consider it natural and probable that this Revelation should be transmitted and protected by one holding a central position in history as the accredited vicar of Christ, rather than that this message, after being so forcibly proclaimed from heaven, should now be exposed to every current of controversy and abandoned as a prey to the laws of natural evolution. Indeed, I believe that every friend of *religion as such*, every man who values certainty and truth in the highest questions, to strengthen and renew both the moral and the social life, would thankfully acknowledge the importance and benefit of such an authority; and, as philosophy seems more and more to be fruitless, and the religion of sentiment untrustworthy, he would perceive that the existence of an infallible guide is a "postulate" of the human conscience.

With regard to the matter of infallibility, the Council says plainly that it is "a doctrine of faith or morals," and goes on to explain that "the Holy Ghost was promised to *St. Peter's* successors, not to make known *new* doctrines (*eo revelante*), but to assist in guarding and in faithfully expounding the doctrine transmitted through the apostles, viz., the deposit of faith." The doctrines in question were revealed, therefore, primarily by God, and preserved by tradition and by written documents. According to the universal Catholic opinion, however, the gift of infallibility is not actually restricted to the sphere of revelation, but extends to those natural truths and facts that are so closely connected with Revelation that their truth cannot be challenged without Revelation itself being imperilled. There are philosophical opinions regarding God and the world which are bound up with the Christian dogma of God and creation. Christian teaching on morals takes for granted certain truths about the soul and its freedom and its relation to the body, etc.; and again there are truths belonging not to the substance, but to the integrity of the faith. The Church could not shed forth her light upon the whole spiritual life of mankind, or really leaven all civilization with her grace and moral force, if, in her teaching capacity, she were entirely limited to what has

been supernaturally revealed, and were cut off from all natural thought and action. As Cardinal *Newman* aptly points out, the teaching authority of the Church "could not properly defend religious truth, without claiming for that truth what may be called its *pomoeria*; or, to take another illustration, without acting as we act, as a nation, in claiming as our own, not only the land on which we live, but what are called British waters."¹

The influence of the teaching authority of the Church is by no means limited to the sphere where its activity is infallible. To some extent it makes itself felt throughout all preaching and work for souls. It reveals itself effectually in pronouncements made by bishops, by the Roman Congregations, and the Holy See, which, though not infallible, are for other reasons binding upon the moral conscience and religious thought (*assensus religiosus*). Much is true, and accepted by the mind as true, and much is expedient and necessary for the welfare of the Church, that does not actually bear the unequivocal stamp of divine truth. Even in secular life, parents, teachers, and men conspicuous for their wisdom, knowledge, and ripe experience, have an authority so great that it would be an outrage to refuse them belief. Above them are the inheritances of moral and philosophical wisdom, the dignified utterances of the past, of saints and of sages, that are accepted by the average mind. Protestants, too, have creeds and religious opinions which they piously value and hold as sacred, without regarding them as infallible. To us Catholics the teaching and admonitions of the Church, even where she does not use her full authority, are worthy of reverence; for on the basis of her unique universality, experience and fundamental certainty, as well as on that of her supernatural gifts, she offers us salutary guidance and assurance that are both trustworthy and beneficial to our thought and action.²

¹ *Newman*, *Apologia pro vita sua*, 1895, p. 257. Cf. also thesis 5, condemned in the Syllabus of *Pius X*, according to which the Church is in no way entitled to give an opinion regarding the assertions of human sciences (Denz., p. 2005).

² There are various kinds and degrees of intellectual assent, and not every certainty is infallible, and guaranteed by God's inability to deceive. Hence the same kind of assent is not required for all decisions of the Church. In saying that a statement is not infallible, it is admitted that it may possibly contain some error or deviation from the truth. Now truth is the highest law of the spirit, and in things, accessible to human reason, it demands admission to the mind of man, for truth is knowable. The Church has above all the desire

No student of the history of the intellect can shut his eyes to the fact that for almost two thousand years Catholicism has possessed a unity and consistency that are all the more wonderful because this faith contains most subtle and far-reaching ideas, which, when logically developed, have led to results having an important bearing upon religion and morals; whilst all the time the Church has occupied a central position in the intellectual growth going on around her, and her doctrines have undergone considerable internal development. The stability and conciseness of Catholic dogma would be inexplicable if there were no higher power upholding the Church; for the history of philosophy and of heresies reveals to us so many conflicting opinions, so many deviations from and distortions of the truth, and the human leaders in the Church have varied so much in ability and education, in their political views and their attitude towards contemporary events, that without supernatural assistance she could not have stood firm. Many have attempted to make bold innovations, and their erroneous doctrines have seemed certain of triumph; but posterity has invariably been forced to acknowledge that these men did not abide by the Christian tradition, but strayed on to courses inevitably tending to the destruction of the spirit and truth of the Gospel. No other Church could rival that of Rome in her vigilance against heresy and in her dignified assurance in making known the truth. Wherever the successor of *St. Peter* led the way it has meant success for the Catholic Church in her resistance to the attacks of heresy.

Enough has been said to show that the gift of infallibility is not an "usurpation of divine predicates," nor does it presuppose omniscience. The Council distinguishes carefully the enlightenment imparted to the instruments of Revelation (*revelatio*) from the guidance given to the Church in her capacity as teacher (*assis-*

to promote the knowledge of truth, according to *St. Paul's* words: "We can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth" (2 Cor. xiii. 8). Hence, for instance, the duty of accepting the decisions of the Roman Congregations cannot be so binding as that of accepting the infallible decisions of the Pope. Cf. *Hurter*, Theol. dogm. comp., I, n. 516; *Chr. Pesch*, Praelect. dogm., I, n. 521; *Heinrich*, Dogm. Theol., II, 553; *Schiffini*, de virt. inf., 1904, p. 349; *Granderath*, Zeitschr. für Kath. Theol., 1895, p. 649; *Grisar*, Galileistudien, 1882, pp. 152-213, and especially p. 171.

tentia). Theology emphasizes this distinction, and sees in the inspiration of biblical authors (which need not invariably be a revelation of truths previously unknown) a more positive exercise of the influence of the Holy Ghost than is displayed in the *assistance* given to the teaching body in the Church. It is most important that the Revelation contained in the Bible and tradition should remain the immovable foundation of all subsequent development of doctrine. Those who are the official teachers of the Church must, aided by the Holy Ghost, bring their human faculties to bear upon this Revelation, and in clearly deducing from it the truth to be propounded they are preserved from error. "For this reason the Pope must, in accordance with his office and the importance of the matter, apply all suitable means of duly discovering and proclaiming the truth. Such means are the convocation of councils and the consultation of bishops, cardinals, theologians, etc. These means vary in different cases, and we must believe that in promising help to *St. Peter* and his successors, Christ promised to supply the means that are necessary and suitable to enable the Pope to give an infallible decision." ¹

Jeiler's remarks on the manner in which the guidance of the Holy Ghost affects the threefold authority of the Church are very much to the point. In the exercise of the priestly office, the Holy Ghost, who alone can infuse grace into the hearts of men, is the really active principle or cause; the priest is a completely subordinate instrument. In the exercise of her teaching authority, charged with the task of preserving and explaining revealed truth in its substance and integrity, the human activity of the Church is the efficient cause, but in the assistance of the Holy Ghost she possesses a guarantee of truth. In matters of government the Church enjoys the guidance of her divine Head, "but where only questions of discipline are concerned, bearing often only a distant relation to revealed truth, the guidance thus given is not the charisma of infallible truth." ²

Truth is in itself everlasting and unchanging, but the object of government and legislation is something temporal and liable to

¹ Report of *Mgr. Gasser*, prince-bishop of Brixen, on the Vaticanum (Gran-derath, p. 180, etc.).

² *Kirchenlexikon*, III, 1821.

change. Even *Aristotle* taught that in practical matters it was impossible to speak of one absolute truth, one unalterable necessity, in the same sense as in theoretical matters; since the practical reason has to deal with material that is subject to accidents and to change, because it orders and controls the manifold circumstances of life according to the needs of the time.¹

The Church, in the exercise of her pastoral authority, has the right to *legislate, to govern, and to decide*. The highest of these functions is unquestionably legislation. Besides this threefold division of authority, analogous to the threefold ministry of Christ,² there is a twofold division by older theologians into the *potestas ordinis*, or power to consecrate, and the *potestas jurisdictionis*, or power to govern. According to this division, the teaching authority is, on the one hand, the chief part in the ruling power or jurisdiction of the Church; on the other hand, it is connected with the sacerdotal authority. Just as the priesthood dispenses the graces of the Holy Ghost, supplying and propagating supernatural gifts, so does the teaching authority dispense the truth of the Holy Ghost, supplying the supernatural doctrines of salvation to feed the minds of men.

This "feeding," in the sense of teaching and supplying spiritual nourishment, is at the same time "pasturing," as a shepherd guides and rules his flock. The bishops, who hold authority to teach, are not only witnesses of the truth (*testes fidei*), but also authoritative guides and judges in matters of faith (*judices fidei*); by expounding the doctrines of the Church, they impose upon their flocks the duty of believing these doctrines. This authoritative feature is still more prominent when the Church, in her office of teacher, proclaims Christ's doctrines *regarding morals*. Dogmatic decisions, in the narrower sense, aim only at protecting the purity of truth and facilitating its inward development; but when a moral question is decided it brings the morality of the Gospels to bear upon the actual circumstances of life and the practical acts of the faithful. There is an essential difference between the communication of a religious and a moral truth by a scientist or a saint, even if privately instructed by God, and the announcement of such truth with all the official authority of the Church.

¹ Eth. Nicom., V, 8; VI, 3.

² Cf. Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.

As long as she restricts her activity in the moral sphere to expounding the law of God, both natural and positive, and to carrying it out to its necessary consequences, she is exercising a real jurisdiction, but a jurisdiction of a vicegerent and judge rather than that of a supreme legislator; and her activity remains bound to the *jus divinum*. But the Church exercises a jurisdiction of *her own* in the more precise sense, which includes legislation only when to the natural and to the revealed laws of God she adds new rules and regulations, which, however, must have an aim analogous to that of the divine law. In exercising this *jus ecclesiasticum* she acts freely and independently. The significance of the distinction appears most plainly in the moral and judicial principles regarding the power of the Church to alter laws and to grant dispensations.¹

In speaking of the definition given by the Vatican Council (*res fidei et morum*) I have already shown that in virtue of his infallibility the Pope has to maintain the doctrines of faith in their integrity as well as to expound the law of God and impress on men the duty of obeying it. What is the case, however, with the Church's own jurisdiction? The general laws of the Church are the permanent and definite expression of what she desires and demands; therefore, through the assistance of the Holy Ghost that is promised to her, she is prevented from imposing upon men as a duty anything contrary to faith, to the will of God, or the welfare of their own souls. A practical law may differ formally from a definition intended to instruct; yet an error in the law would virtually be a falling away from the truth and the sanctity essential to the Church of Christ, and thus it would thwart the intention of the Church to lead mankind onwards to their moral end. In so

¹ Cf. *Hergenröther-Hollweck*, op. cit., p. 145; *Lehmkuhl*, op. cit., I, 136: Illa (auctoritas ecclesiastica) duplicis generis est, una potius est *divina* potestas, altera vere *humana*. Nam quia Ecclesia vere humana societas est, humano modo dirigenda, propterea moderatorem supremum habet, qui propria auctoritate leges condit, praecepta fert: hanc voco auctoritatem humanam. Attamen etiam alia sunt, quae humanam societatem excedunt, in quibus Ecclesia aut instrumentum Dei et Christi agit aut legis divinae interpretem, cui Deus ipse infallibiliter assistit. Haec omnia, si objectum legis aut praecepti fiunt per superiores vel ministros Ecclesiae, non *propria* potestate exercentur; immo ne ab ipso supremo quidem capite Ecclesiae visibili exerceri possunt nisi *vicaria* potestate.

far, therefore, an unchanging element, divinely protected, passes through the whole discipline of the Church.¹

At the same time the disciplinary laws of the Church contain also an accidental and fallible element, owing to the relation in which they stand to actual contingencies and to the individuality of the legislator. All Catholic theologians are agreed on this point, although they do not of course admit that every one has a right to express an opinion on the subject. *Bellarmino* says that a law of the Church might possibly be inexpedient, ill-advised, superfluous, opposed to human rights and claims, or too severe in imposing penalties.

Many things, of themselves permissible or even praiseworthy, cannot be made universally obligatory, because they are too difficult; that which has a beneficial result in one country and in certain surroundings may be harmful elsewhere. What is profitable to an ideal people may be a stumbling-block to the less perfect. What is necessary in time of struggle may appear excessively strict under other circumstances.²

These considerations are not makeshifts, but express the intention and spirit of the Canon Law. There is no human legislation less deserving the reproach of unyielding severity and of harsh

¹ Cf. *Bellarmino*, De Rom. Pontif., IV, 5, 15. *Suarez*, De leg., VI, 7, 25; *Tanner*, De fide, I, 4, 7; *Heinrich*, op. cit., p. 612, etc; *Simar*, Dogmatik, 4th ed., p. 747; *M. Canus*, De loc. theol., V, c. 5, q. 5: "Ecclesia in morum doctrina eorum, qui ad salutem necessarii sunt, errare non potest. . . . Ecclesia non potest definire, quippiam esse vitium, quod honestum est, aut contra honestum esse, quod est turpe; ergo nec sua edita lege probare quicquam, quod evangelio rationive inimicum sit. Si enim ecclesia expresse vel iudicio vel lege lata turpia probaret aut reprobaret honesta, hic jam nimirum error non solum fidelibus pestem perniciemque afferret sed fidei etiam quodammodo adversaretur, quae omnem virtutem probat, universa vitia condemnat. Accedunt illa. . . . Qui vos audit, me audit. . . . Ita si errat illa, Christus nobis erroris auctor est. Quae qui videat, non modo indocte verum etiam impie faciat, si ecclesiam in morum doctrina errare contendat, praesertim si mores et praecepta vivendi sint ad salutem necessaria." *Canus* remarks in a subsequent passage: "Non ego hic omnes ecclesiae leges approbo. . . . Scio nonnullas ejusmodi leges esse, in quibus, si non aliud praeterea quicquam, at prudentiam certe modumque desideres."

² *Heinrich*, op. cit., p. 613: "Where it is only a matter of expediency, much freer scope is given to human discretion, and mistakes and sins of omission may occur, which are permitted by divine Providence in as far as they do not injure the faith and the law of God." Cf. the quotations above, note 1, and also *Suarez*, op. cit., IV, c. 16, 4, 7; c. 9; VII, c. 18; *Cavagnis*, II, 206.

treatment of subjects than that of the Church. In my treatise "De Legibus," I have cited many proofs that these laws are interpreted objectively and by no means "mechanically," and that the necessity of diminishing or altogether removing an obligation is frequently recognized in cases where either the bishops consider it expedient, or where the customs and requirements of certain countries or some sudden crisis demands it, and even where conscientious individual decision considers it justified (*epikeia*).

The history of the Church shows, furthermore, that a demand for reform of discipline has never drawn upon its author the suspicion of being false to the Church, and has often even won for him the esteem of the Church, as long as he adhered to the true faith and remained within the limits of reverence and moderation. As a rule, a demand of this kind has been concerned less with the actual laws of the Church than with their administration. In applying the discipline of the Church to individual cases, it is plain that the ecclesiastical authorities are to an extent dependent upon human and therefore fallible factors, such as reports of events and private observations. On the subject of excommunication and its revocation, *Innocent III* says in his decretals: "God's judgment is always based upon truth, which neither deceives nor is deceived; but the judgment of the Church is based sometimes on mere opinion, which often is deceived and deceives."¹

When *Leo IX* felt death approaching, he caused himself to be carried into St. Peter's, and there, close to the spot where he was to be buried, he prayed for the blessing of God to rest upon the Church, and begged for special grace for any one whom he might have excommunicated wrongfully.² The so-called case of Pope *Honorius* has nothing to do with the infallibility of the Pope in his office as teacher; but it cannot be denied that the Church herself subsequently condemned *Honorius I* for want of vigilance in dealing with questions connected with the faith. There are certainly few, if any, Catholic authors, who think that *Clement XIV* acted in the interests of the Church when he suppressed the Jesuit Order.

¹ C. 28, X. 5, 39; cf. c. 5, X. 5, 20.

² *Montalembert, Monks of the West*, Eng. trans., 1879, VI, 340, 341.

We have seen that the teaching authority of the Church, as well as the duty of accepting her doctrine, extend further than the gift of infallibility. With regard both to the natural and the supernatural, there are some things that we may reasonably be required to believe, and to which we must subordinate our own thought, although there is no divine charisma to vouch for their truth. This applies particularly to *obedience*, to the practical submission to the rules laid down by those in authority in the Church. All obedience, in the family, in the State, and in the army, is based upon the superior will of those in command, not upon their infallible knowledge. This will, of course, presumes reasonable judgment, but it commands in its capacity of will, by its own power and in the name of Him from whom all earthly authority is derived. No education, no social order, would be possible if the subject, apart from the unusual case of a manifestly unjust command, were to make his obedience dependent on his own personal opinion; or if he were to demand absolute guarantees for the correctness of the view taken by his superior. This argument is applicable in a higher degree to the Church, whose laws depend so completely upon the moral sentiments, veneration, unanimity, and free submission of the people. In her the pastoral office is most closely connected with the teaching office, and though she is guided by men, such guidance rests upon a foundation of divine truth.

In the teaching body of the Church, and amongst the faithful, no doubt has ever arisen regarding the fact that our Lord bestowed upon certain men the right to rule the Church. The apostles and their successors felt themselves empowered to issue laws and to govern the visible Church, not merely to explain with authority the teaching and commandments of God. *Plato's* idea that philosophers ought also to be the rulers, was actually realized in the sphere of religion in the Church of Christ. When our Lord conferred upon the apostles, and especially upon *Peter*, the power to bind and to loose, His words, interpreted according to the usage of the period, conveyed a twofold power, viz., to teach and expound God's law and to lay down laws themselves. When He commissioned *Peter* to feed His sheep and lambs and to rule over His flock, He formally expressed the pastoral authority bestowed upon the prince of the apostles. The apostles founded and organized the

first Christian communities, appointing men to govern them, threatening and punishing transgressors, and establishing a moral code; and they did all this not only in the Lord's name, but by their own authority.¹ Beginning with the words, "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us," they issued a command to the assembly at Jerusalem, that was not simply a repetition of a divine enactment, but was also the expression of their own will, and was intended to have a particular character to meet the needs of the time.²

The Modernists maintain that there is in the New Testament nothing about the hierarchy and obedience to the Church, but to us it seems not only to contain clear allusions to the whole of the hierarchy, but also to the rudimentary organization of the teaching, judicial, and sacerdotal office in the Church. Thus, for instance, in the pastoral epistles we find it expressed, as conviction and experience, that "the solid structure of the Church, her sound doctrine, and the sanctity of her office constitutes the only possible form for the religious life of mankind in general."³

We can trace the succession of bishops following the apostles back to the first centuries and observe that their authority was really the support of all ecclesiastical life, and that to their sacerdotal and teaching activity they added a vigorous exercise of spiritual authority. This authority extended from matters of public worship to the practice of charity, to morality, and to the expenditures of the Church, and, ultimately, to the settlement of disputes and to giving decisions on points of law. Although at first the officials of the Church did not bear the names by which they were afterwards known, they nevertheless existed. Although the manner in which they exercised their authority was in many respects personal and patriarchal, their exclusive right to govern the Church was acknowledged; and as the first outburst of enthusiasm amongst

¹ 1 Cor. vii. 12.

² We read that *St. Paul* emphatically declared the *Jewish* law to be abrogated and that he insisted upon Christian liberty where the law was opposed to the Christian doctrines regarding salvation. Yet he "confirmed the churches, commanding them to keep the *precepts of the apostles and the ancients*" (Acts xv. 41); "the decrees . . . that were decreed by the apostles and ancients who were at Jerusalem" (Acts xvi. 4).

³ *Schell, Christus*, 2d ed., p. 155.

the faithful died away, this right had to be expressed by means of laws and formulæ, stated with increasing stringency and lucidity. In *St. Peter* and his successors the firm foundation was laid, resting upon a rock, and this supports and holds together all the powers conferred upon the apostles. *St. Peter* received from our Lord Jesus Christ full authority to feed, guide, and govern the whole Church, namely, the supreme, regular, and direct jurisdiction of a chief shepherd over all other shepherds and over the faithful committed to their charge.¹

II

If we ask what is the *meaning* and *substance* of the pastoral authority in the Church, we find that the Church, being a visible community, established for the glory of God and the salvation of souls, possesses a right to *control her own internal discipline*, and, therefore, she must not only watch over the doctrines of faith, but also regulate the supernatural and *religious life*, and she does this by means of the commandments of the Church. Here we at once encounter objections raised by the Protestant and the modern idea of liberty. We are told that by thus fixing religious duties, by exacting attendance at church and the observance of certain festivals, and by insisting upon fasting and the reception of the sacraments, the Church is outraging Christian liberty and falling back into a system resembling the Jewish law.

We have already seen that, according to a really moral view and to the teaching of the New Testament, Christian liberty consists not in the denial and abolition of all obligation, but in an internal comprehension of it and a full, lively, and generous performance of its demands.²

If the Christian law of liberty, namely, inward enlightenment and love, had complete dominion over us, it would not be necessary, at least for our personal life and progress, to define and impress upon us any positive duties. For this reason there are no Church commandments in the Church Triumphant. But in this life there is

¹ Vatic., s. 4, c. 3; cf. v. *Dunin-Borkowski*, *Die Kirche als Stiftung Jesu* (in "Religion, Christentum, Kirche"), 1913.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 177, *seq.*

invariably another law opposed to the law of love with its exalted and eternal tendency. The spirit of the pagan world, with its attachment to the things of this world, still drags us down, and the fickleness and superficiality that characterized the Jews, likewise distract us and fix our thoughts on what is external. We are not yet thorough Christians, but are only striving to attain "the age of the fulness of Christ"; each of us still has within him a good deal of paganism and Judaism. Hence a training, *according to plain, definite rules*, is beneficial *for every Christian*, and so we ought not to fear the reproach of being immature and subject to pre-Christian bondage so long as we have not the courage to proclaim ourselves mature and perfect in all things.

It is true that in moments of enthusiasm we all fancy ourselves able to dispense with every support, and to soar to the height of our goal, carried aloft by the impetus of our ardent desires. But how soon is the fire of our enthusiasm quenched, how suddenly do the dispositions of our heart change, and how often do the dreariness of daily life, our passions, our love of comfort, and even our forgetfulness put an end to our good resolutions, if they be only resolutions and nothing more! No one, who does not wilfully deceive himself, can deny that human nature is so fickle as to require an external support, such as is supplied by the duties and customs of the Church; and this support is just as beneficial to those who are earnestly striving to make progress as to the moral weaklings.¹

I do not imply that, assuming this to be true, the will obeys the external law *only*, instead of entering into the spirit of the action with love. But very often the plain stimulus of the law helps us to overcome an incipient dislike and repugnance, so that afterwards, when the nobler part of our disposition is set at liberty and becomes active, we perform the action with interest and pleasure. A man who is always so thoroughly inclined to do what is good that he does not need any encouragement to help him over the stagnant points of waiting and delaying, may at once, freely and naturally, assume the practice of virtue imposed upon him; but even

¹ *Shakespeare* says in *Hamlet* III, 2: "Purpose is but the slave to memory, of violent birth, but poor validity. . . . Most necessary 'tis, that we forget to pay ourselves what to ourselves is debt."

he will be thankful to the law for giving to him an opportunity of uniting with the practice of piety the merit of *obedience*.

It is not difficult for a Christian to enter into the spirit of the commandments of the Church, for what they contain is the product of *the innermost essence of Christianity*. The Jewish law had to fall, because in its whole character it was only a preparation for, a shadow of, the future law. It was the husk containing the seed, and the husk must split if the seed is to grow. The immediate object of the laws of the Church is the external formation and the regulation of religion, but in addition to that they have a permanent value of their own, for they are the expression of eternal Christian ideas, the embodiment and security of the Christian life; they are, as it were, the bark of the tree that has grown from the seed sown before the coming of Christ. The Church demands of all Christians that they shall sanctify their lives by observing certain days as holy, by assisting at the Holy Sacrifice, by receiving the sacraments, and by practising certain mortifications; but these things are only a minimum of what lively faith and true charity would impel men to do; they are a mere remnant of the tradition created by our fervent forefathers out of the free impulse of their hearts. "If," said *Lavater* on one occasion, "I could believe in Christ's real presence in the sacrament, I should never again rise from my knees in adoration." Now every Catholic *believes* in this real presence, and in the mystery of the sacrifice on our altars; how then can the obligation to hear Holy Mass on Sunday seem to him to be a burden? According to the Reformers, fasting is salutary, and keeping the Sunday holy is a truly Christian custom, but both practices are left to the "discretion of the individual," and to the *libera observatio* of the faithful. One feels inclined to ask, what has become of this "free observance" of fasting, and what attention would have been paid to Sunday if stringent regulations had not been made by the Church (in spite of these principles), or if the State had not passed laws compelling its observance?

True liberty grows best on the soil of obedience, and generous spontaneity of action on that of duty. Those Catholics who conscientiously obey the commandments of the Church are also those who fast voluntarily, go to Church on week days, and say their prayers in their silent chamber. But those who rebel against all

obligations imposed by the Church, in order to live in a free spiritual intercourse with God, are seldom fruitful in works that would bear witness to the depth of their spiritual life. The Catholic Church, with her "domineering tendencies" and her "compulsory regulations," has already been infinitely rich in voluntary manifestations of piety, in generous works of charity, and in touching instances of self-devotion; Protestantism, on the other hand, by depriving the religious feeling of the support afforded by ecclesiastical laws, has gradually weakened it, and brought about a wide-spread worldliness in men's lives.¹

Rules of discipline, however, are chiefly laid down for the sake of the Christian *community life*. If it were true that people of education could personally dispense with the commandments of the Church in their daily life, if they understood the commandment of love, they would still have to say with the apostle: "We that are stronger ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves."² As members of the same body, each Christian ought to feel the needs of every other member as if they were his own. This old truth, proclaimed long ago by *Menenius Agrippa* to the Plebeians, deserves, now as then, to be impressed with just as much force upon the Patricians. The Gospel was intended, above all, to bring good tidings to the poor; it therefore requires *all* to be poor in spirit and to have the simplicity of children. The Church considers the welfare of all her children, and not the least that of the lame and the weak; hence she demands the strong to take thought for them. If for a moment we leave out of sight the supernatural duties of authority, we shall see that there is a certain amount of truth in the saying: *La médiocrité fonde l'autorité*,—the backward and uneducated most of all need discipline and training—but for the sake of mankind in general, all individuals, even men of the strongest personality, are subject to authority. Although the privileges of the aristocrats everywhere tend to weaken the force of legislation, such privileges would be singularly

¹ *Paulsen*, *Ethik*, 6th ed., 134: "*Melanchthon* in his panegyric on *Luther* commends him for having delivered us from the *paedagogia puerilis* of the ancient Church. It is, however, not yet certain that religion can dispense with a *paedagogia puerilis*, which reminds us of it daily by means of little religious exercises."

² *Rom.* xv. 1.

disastrous if every one were able to confer upon himself such a title on the score of being strong and capable. History teaches that the destruction of ecclesiastical discipline effectually puts an end to "conformity to a Jewish law," but at the same time it takes away the Christian character of society and throws men back into pagan lawlessness.¹

Just as charity and the social sense facilitate and ennoble obedience to the Church, so, conversely, the very closeness of men's connection with the Church awakens their sense of social union. Wherever public worship flourishes, the harshness of class distinctions is unwittingly diminished. Princes and beggars meet under one roof in God's house, and all derive, from the same sources of Christian truth and art, food for heart and soul; high and low kneel at the same altar, and in the tribunal of penance all alike receive encouragement in their troubles and reproof for their sins. "The most burning social question at the present time," says *Thalhofer*, "would easily be settled, or rather would not exist at all, if all the faithful, according to the rule and spirit of the Church, assisted at public worship, and especially at the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. In the early centuries of Christianity true Christian socialism prevailed amongst the faithful, having its origin and further support in the common worship of God."²

The Church is a well-ordered kingdom, a city set on a hill, whither the people go up to receive the law of the Lord³; and thus she fulfils the great aim of Christianity, to exalt the name of God amongst the nations. Christianity is designed to be a visible force, *a universal glorification of God*; it is not intended merely to leaven the hearts of men. Hence Christian piety and charity must be displayed openly in the common action of mankind; definite rules are required to ensure uniformity and dignity to the work of instructing the whole human race, and to bring into prominence its

¹ *Jentsch* (*Christentum und Kirche*, p. 675) misunderstands the nature of men and the solidarity of society when he represents the commandments of the Church as binding only "upon such persons as, owing to their age or degree of culture, still require training." With regard to those who are "of age," he remarks that they must be left free to decide whether they will or will not comply with the commandments of the Church, which are for them, at the most, only expressions of her wishes.

² *Thalhofer*, *Handbuch der Kath. Liturgik*, Freiburg, 1883, I, 245.

³ *Is.* II, 2, 3.

social and brotherly spirit. The sanctification of the customs of the people, and all the glorious productions of Christian civilization (cathedrals, shrines, monasteries, altars, bells, pictures of saints), are connected with the need of a great, uniform, orderly cultus, and they could not conceivably exist in the splendour and magnitude with which we are familiar if they were the expression only of a religion of the inner man and not of the mass of mankind, since such a religion would reject all outward regulations as contrary to genuine piety.

With her striving for uniformity the Church combines a generous spirit of accommodation to the requirements of time and people. The history of the discipline of penance, and of the commandment regarding fasting, etc., show her consideration for justifiable desires and for altered circumstances. Of course the conservative character of the Church prevents her from at once making every new need and every local grievance a ground for legislative changes. Cases may occur in which zeal for ecclesiastical discipline and a reaction against false mysticism and vagueness cause men to lay too much stress upon externals; but as I have already said, there is no mechanical, hard, and fast conformity to law in the spirit of the Church. Where obedience does harm rather than good, where higher aims are incompatible with the letter of the law, and above all, where charity, the chief of all virtues, forbids, we see that the most loyal servants of the Church have always and willingly sacrificed the letter to the spirit of the law. *St. Thomas* distinguishes two ways in which men fulfil their duty towards Church and State, — *iustitia legalis*, giving heed to the letter of the law, and *aequitas*, disregarding the letter and adhering to its spirit and purpose. He calls the latter the higher and more noble virtue.¹

If the vast number of laws imposed by the State, and the mechanical and harsh manner in which they are carried into execution, be compared with the demands made by the Church upon her members, we cannot help feeling astonished that by the use of foolish catch words men should be able to convince the public that Catholics are languishing under a burden of regulations unworthy of men of the present day.

¹ *S. theol.*, II, II, q. 120, a. 2

Attendance at Mass is required on Sundays and certain festivals, Confession and Communion are obligatory at Easter, and there is the law of fasting and abstinence, the severity of which is now much mitigated; besides these there are very few rules of general obligation imposed by the Church. When anything difficult, extraordinary, or even heroic is required in the confessional, in matters connected with marriage, etc., it is due *not* to the laws of the Church, but to the natural and divine law, which the Church has to expound and maintain. On priests, and in a still higher degree on religious, she has imposed duties the compliance with which demands great moral force and self-sacrifice; but here again it is not, strictly speaking, the law of the Church that imposes the burden — the free will of the individual assumes it when he voluntarily elects to become a priest or religious. In comparison, how hampering and unavoidable are the intricate obligations laid by a modern State upon its subjects! Our whole life is spent under the control of laws, ordinances, and police regulations. In levying taxes the State interferes with our property; in the interests of public welfare it attempts to check free and arbitrary action, to make claims based on expediency into laws, etc.

An ordinary man does not look upon all this "compulsion" as an "insult." On the contrary, he is told that the progress of civilization demands this increasing limitation of personal freedom; that the process of gradually raising a savage to the level of a modern citizen has been all along a continued restriction and suppression of his natural love of liberty. For this reason the citizen of to-day, with his higher education and social perception, ought to look upon the restrictions of the law as a benefit conducing to his happiness. If all this be taken into account, the feeling of a Catholic towards the Church, and his public spirit, must have sunk to the freezing point if he complains that the demands made upon him by the commandments of the Church are an unjustifiable interference with his moral and religious liberty.

These considerations gain additional weight if, in conclusion, we glance at the results of freedom from all restraint in matters of religion such as in course of time has inevitably developed in Protestantism. *Luther's* ideas of faith as the free outcome of individual experience, and of the Church as a purely spiritual

association of brethren, underwent modification from the very beginning. The teaching authority of the Church was replaced by that of *Luther*, who in a domineering manner claimed that his word was the word of Christ, and exalted his theories above the decisions of Popes and councils, and also above the opinions of his Protestant opponents. Instead of the Pope and bishops, secular princes and magistrates assumed control over the Church, and issued regulations concerning the practice of religion, attendance at public worship, etc., which savoured far more of outward violence than do the commandments of the old Church. For a time the stately liturgy of the Catholic Church was outwardly retained in order that the people, who were attached to it, might more easily be won over to the new doctrines; but when its kernel, the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, was abolished, and its profound and morally elevating influence ceased to be felt, the house of God and public worship in general lost their attraction more and more and the whole life of the Church lost its binding, vivifying, and moral force.¹

In the name of Protestant freedom many fruits of Christian piety, many venerable monuments and customs, were destroyed; and then, wherever *Calvinism* predominated, there soon appeared in the exercise of religion a system of tutelage as in Old Testament times, and a construction of the law according to the letter that in severity far exceeded the discipline of the Middle Ages. Among the Puritans of North America this discipline went so far as to place every detail of private life under police regulations; any one who stayed away from public worship was punished with flogging and with the pillory, and mothers were forbidden even to kiss their babies on the Sabbath.² With the rise of Rationalism in the Protestant Church, the outward practice of religion decayed more

¹ According to *Gallwitz* (Christl. Welt, 1902, p. 201, etc.) the low value set upon attendance at divine worship gave rise to "habitual neglect of the same, which rests like a curse upon our parishes and has a deadening effect upon the naturally dull, indolent spirit of our rural population." *Sell* displays a strange obtuseness when he says that the Protestant Church was intended to be an *institution for educating the people*, and that with this intention the faith was offered to each individual for his free acceptance, but for membership of the Church it was enough for a man not publicly to renounce all connection with her (p. 228).

² Cf. *A. Baumgartner*, *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, XIII, 42, etc.

and more, and the sense of spiritual union and of the universal priesthood completely lost its religious and social significance.

At the present time there is great diversity of opinion amongst Protestants on the subject of the Church and the meaning of ecclesiastical authority. *Kaftan* and other positive theologians wish to have a free Church as a counterpart to the community of the State, such a Church to have a constitution, government, and discipline of her own. Others think that the only way to put an end to the present ambiguous state of affairs is to make the Church a mere department of the State, and to abolish every trace of independence in her organization. Extreme radicals interpret liberty of thought and conscience in such a way as to exclude all supervision of doctrine and all interference with preachers. Liberals consider some such measures indispensable, in order to banish destructive and erroneous doctrines from the teaching chair and the pulpit. Others, again, wish to subject preachers, but not professors of theology, to this sort of control. The cases of men like *Jatho*, *Traub*, etc., show, on the one hand, with appalling clearness, how urgent there is need for Protestant Christianity to be protected against unbridled freedom in teaching; but on the other hand, they enable us to see plainly that it is impossible to start from Protestant principles and organize an orderly system of doctrine and worship, and that every attempt to guard a religious community from disintegration by means of legislative and judicial measures, deserves to be described as "a piece of human legislation" with far more justice than do the Catholic rules governing faith and life.

III

Let us now approach the question as to the authority which the Church exerts in her pastoral and administrative office over the *secular life* and work of her members. We must first recall the principles underlying the relation between Church and State, as stated in the Encyclicals of *Leo XIII* as well as in theology. The State is the most perfect organization of the mundane activity of mankind; and as the State has now in many places assumed an attitude of hostility, or distrust, towards the Church, not a few of the duties for the welfare of society properly belonging to the State,

and connected with Christian life and social order, now fall upon the Catholic citizen and his social efforts.¹

We have noticed, as an important point in the relation between Church and State, that the special and immediate task of the former is to realize the highest supernatural end of life, whilst the latter retains absolute independence in its own sphere; but inasmuch as the end kept in view by the Church is superior to, and controls, all things that are temporal and of a worldly nature, she may incidentally make her authority felt in such matters also. We arrived at this conclusion after studying the teaching and pastoral office of the Church. As Revelation consists of the truths of the natural moral law, as well as of the supernatural doctrines of faith, the Church, being the guardian of Revelation, possesses the right and duty of carrying out God's will in the natural life of mankind.

The history of the Church shows also that she is to be a kingdom, "not indeed *of* this world," but still "*in* it," as she has to fulfil her mission here. The side of her activity most appreciated by friends of education, culture, and civilization would be altogether absent in the Church's development, or at any rate less conspicuous, if her rulers had aimed *only* at the religious and supernatural improvement of humanity. I have already pointed out how, ever since the age of the apostles, the bishops used their exalted position to restore law and order to society, and how the Popes in particular promoted the advance of Christian civilization both by teaching and by forceful practical intervention. In a lucid description of "the spirit of the Eastern Church as contrasted with that of the Western," *Harnack* recently emphasized the fact that the Western Church was not so exclusively occupied as the Eastern with the things of the other world, with the mystical element, and with liturgical matters. Without losing sight of the future life, the Western Church, he says, always kept in view that "it was her task to permeate *this* world in every part with the forces of goodness and holiness." Having recognized this as her aim, she "never permanently allowed any power to deter her from directing the education of nations and of individuals, and resisted with energy and success all attempts to reduce her to the level of a mere institu-

¹ See *supra*, p. 368, note 1.

tion for the maintenance of public worship. In the West the Church stood as an independent factor beside the State."¹

On the other hand, many opponents who have, as they acknowledge, no objection to the religious and purely spiritual authority of the Church, cannot forgive her for making her influence felt in secular matters also, and for raising her voice in social, economic, and political questions. They maintain that in this way, and especially by "hierarchical tutelage," she seeks to recover the lost supremacy that she enjoyed in the Middle Ages. Götz, for instance, asserts that according to the instructions issued by the last two or three Popes, the laity, even in the secular work of civilization, "are bound always to obey only the orders of the Church; i.e., of clergy and Papacy."² The "complete state of dependence" on the part of the laity is being justified, he says, by the fact that all, even the most thoroughly secular activity, is subject to the *moral law*, that the Church regards herself as alone competent to judge, and lays down rules for Catholics that bear the stamp of ultramontane narrowness, and that this keeping of the laity in leading strings constitutes a danger to modern States, especially since the clergy have created a very powerful instrument for the control of the masses in their ultramontane societies and associations (p. 87).

Others acknowledge that we consider secular matters to be under the control of the Church only *in as far* as they concern morality; but, they say, has not *all* free action a moral character? Even the duties connected with business and politics are morally binding. Defending one's country, combating infectious disease, regulating private rights, — all these are matters that belong to the moral problems of society, which every one will admit come within the province of the civil and not the ecclesiastical authority. Let us see what ground there is for these assertions and fears.

Leo XIII devoted an Encyclical to the discussion of human liberty, which he extols as one of the greatest gifts of nature and the moral order. He claims for the Church credit for having in theory always upheld the freedom of the will, and in practice

¹ Report of the proceedings of the Royal Academy of Science, Berlin, 1913, VII, 182.

² Klerikalismus und Laizismus, 1906, p. 56.

promoted that of society. All freedom of choice must, however, be guided by regard for truth and goodness, and the will, being in itself blind, must be enlightened by the reason, by the laws of what is good and true. Precisely because the Church upholds the idea of the natural law and its universal validity, she has always used her influence "in the custody and protection of the civil and political liberty of the people," against violence and tyranny, so as to enable the family and the State to have freedom for development.¹ The intimate connection between civilization and morality is, and always will be, a source of strength and benefit; "the higher the morality of States, the greater are the liberty and wealth and power which they enjoy."²

The Church does not indiscriminately sanction *every* modern development of liberty, for she cannot approve of error and moral corruption, but in all that is naturally permissible she leaves "a vast field . . . to man's industry and genius"³; she even accommodates herself to the extravagant demands of the times for freedom as far as she can without losing sight of what is for the good of all. She is in sympathy with all the various forms of government, and considers men justified in desiring independence from foreign control, and constitutional government within their own countries, provided that these desires are not accompanied by deeds of injustice and violence. "Nor does she blame those who wish to assign to the State the power of *self-government*, and to its citizens the *greatest possible measure* of prosperity." The Church has always most faithfully fostered *civil liberty*, and this was seen especially in Italy, in the municipal prosperity and wealth and glory, which were obtained at a time when the salutary power of the Church had spread, without opposition, to all parts of the State."⁴

The words "the truth shall make you free," that occur in the Encyclical on Human Liberty (p. 122), are again used by *Leo XIII* when speaking of the spirit of the times (p. 95). He says in the same Encyclical (p. 98): "It is the duty of all

¹ *Libertas*, p. 110 c. t. s.

² *Ibid.*, p. 118 c. t. s.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 130; cf. *Graves de communi*, p. 244 c. t. s., where workmen are commended for wishing to acquire economic independence.

Catholics . . . to make use of popular institutions, so far as can *honestly* be done, for the advancement of truth and righteousness; to strive that liberty of action shall not *transgress* the bounds marked out by *nature and the law of God*; to endeavour to bring back all civil society to the pattern and form of Christianity. . . . It is hardly possible to lay down any fixed method by which such purposes are to be attained, because the means adopted must suit places and times widely differing from one another." In religious matters the principle *in dubiis libertas* holds good, and in politics there is still greater liberty in thoughts and acts. But the Church will never agree to the theory that in private life a man may recognize the importance of morality and the authority of the Church, and disregard both in his public life.

Since the Church admits the moral necessity of the State as such, she does "among the various kinds of State rule not disapprove of any, provided the respect due to religion and the observance of good morals be upheld." "There is no doubt but that in the sphere of politics ample matter may exist for legitimate difference of opinion, and that, the single reserve being made of the rights of justice and truth, all may strive to bring into actual working the ideas believed likely to be more conducive than others to the general welfare."¹

The immediate purpose of all civil society is to secure tranquillity of public order "that this may . . . supply the sheltering care which perfects a man's moral life," "therefore they who are engaged in framing constitutions and enacting laws should bear in mind the moral and religious nature of man, and take care to help him, but in a right and orderly way, to gain perfection, neither enjoining nor forbidding anything save what is reasonably consistent with civil as well as with religious requirements. On this very account the Church cannot stand by indifferent as to the import and significance of laws enacted by the State, not in as far, indeed, as they refer to the State, but in so far as, *passing beyond their due limits, they trench upon the rights of the Church*. From God

¹ Sapientiae, p. 165 c. t. s. Non dubium est, quin quaedam sit in genere politico honesta contentio, cum scilicet incolumi veritate iustitiaeque certatur, ut opiniones re usque valeant, quae ad bonum commune prae ceteris conducibiles videantur.

has been assigned to the Church the duty, not only to interpose resistance, if at any time the State rule should run counter to religion, but further to make a strong endeavour that the power of the Gospel may pervade the laws and institutions of the nations."¹

Would it be possible for the head of the Church to use other language in speaking of the relation of secular life to religion? Does he not here fully recognize the liberty of citizens within the natural limits of the order instituted by God, assigning to the Church the duty of preserving these limits? There is here no sign of "ultramontane narrowness" in reference to the natural law; when *Leo XIII* speaks of defining and expanding this law in *secular* matters, he says that to do so belongs to the civil and not to the ecclesiastical authority.²

We have already seen that *Pius X* points out how obedience to the authority of the Church imposes no restrictions on the liberty of Catholics in purely secular matters.³ Some remarks in the Encyclical "*Singulari quadam*," issued in 1912, are very important in their bearing upon our subject. The Pope begins by stating emphatically that the principles of Christian truth, as made known by the Church, and as applied with great acumen by *Leo XIII* to the social question, ought to guide our actions, not only in private, but in social and public life. He then goes on to say: "Whatever a Christian does, even in worldly affairs, he is not at liberty to disregard what is supernaturally good, but he must order everything towards the highest good as his final aim, in accordance with the precepts of Christian wisdom. All his actions, however, *as far as they are morally good or bad, that is to say, as far as they are in accord with or transgress the natural and divine law, are subject to the judgment and jurisdiction of the Church.*"⁴

¹ *Sapientiea*, p. 166 c. t. s.

² *Libertas*, p. 108 c. t. s.

³ See *supra*, p. 356, note 1.

⁴ *Quidquid homo christianus agat, etiam in ordine rerum terrenarum, non ei licere bona negligere, quae sunt supra naturam, immo oportere, ad summum bonum, tanquam ad ultimum finem, ex christianae sapientiae praescriptis, omnia dirigat; omnes autem actiones eius, quatenus bonae aut malae sunt in genere morum, id est cum jure naturali et divino congruunt aut discrepant, judicio et jurisdictioni Ecclesiae subesse.*

In the first sentence, therefore, the Pope impresses upon every Christian that it is his duty to direct and order his whole life and work towards the supernatural and moral *final end*. The special task allotted to the Church is to support and uphold this final end, the aim of all religious life, raising it above all the personal and social aims of this world. We have seen how man's natural conscience and sense of duty urge him to strive after the highest good, how his desire for happiness leads him beyond the joys of earth to those of heaven, and how the objects of all morality and progress find their complete realization only in God's glory.¹ But besides this we have seen that this exalted aim imposes no invidious or petty restrictions in the choice of earthly goods, and that whatever is naturally precious, noble, and beautiful is naturally akin to the highest creative good, and, if used aright, can be consecrated to the service of God. God, the infinite, omnipotent Good, imposes, it is true, a general obligation upon all our actions; but precisely because we are required to order *everything*, great and small, spiritual and secular, with reference to Him, we are free to choose for ourselves and are not the slaves of any creature. The authority of the Church confers the greatest benefit upon the spiritual and social life of society by insisting, in so unyielding a manner, upon a morality which modern ethical and intellectual teaching does not care to understand.²

The Church is in duty bound to judge all human actions, in so far as they are morally good or bad. Man ought to turn to God, not with some vague kind of desire, nor simply with a general good intention; but he must aim at his final end by doing his duty in a practical, specified way. Hence any institution designed to lead men to God and to everlasting perfection must be able to point the way to the goal by means of instruction and commandments, and to distinguish clearly between good and evil in human actions. "Teach ye all nations . . . to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you."

The Church judges nothing but the *moral* quality of an action, and this depends upon whether it is directed towards our highest aim. Man is left perfectly free to decide whether any action having reference to his immediate worldly interests is beneficial or

¹ See *supra*, Chaps. I, IV, VI.

² Cf. *infra*, Chap. 10, II.

prejudicial; and there are a multitude of such actions that are permitted and in fact necessary for the completion of life, and though these actions are subordinated to his highest aim, yet they cover a wide field of activity. The question for the Church to decide is whether a thing is morally good or bad, not whether it is economically useful, advantageous to the State, beautiful in art, important in literature, or technically successful. This point is brought out still more clearly in the next sentence in the Encyclical: "as far as they (i.e., man's actions) are in accord with or transgress the *natural and divine law*."

The law requires all human action to be directed to the highest aim of life and of the world; now this law is twofold: there is the law that God has impressed on the very nature of things and of the mind of man, and there is also the positive law of Revelation.

All action is subject to the authority of the Church, in so far as it harmonizes with, or is opposed to, this expression of God's will, made known in our reason and in Revelation. With regard to this, the moral aspect of human action, the Church has a right to the final judgment (*judicium*), because, according to the will of Christ, she is the highest teacher of mankind on points of faith and morals. For the same reason she possesses also the jurisdiction (*jurisdictio*) necessary for that purpose, having received from Christ the keys of the kingdom of heaven, viz., the commission to govern the Church of God. Since the rulers of the Church declare "the natural and the divine law" to be binding, not only in matters of doctrine, but also in practical life, they exercise a true, spiritual jurisdiction. Since they use their power according to the meaning and substance of the divine law (*quatenus . . . congruunt aut discrepant*), they show that they are not tyrants, but servants; that they do not narrow down the natural law, acting as an intolerant hierarchy, but interpret it faithfully; that they do not wish to keep the laity in leading strings, but to train them to use a real maturity, which consists in serving God.

The contents of the Encyclical "Singulari" are in absolute agreement with what was said on pages 365 *seq.* regarding the relation between Church and State. Secular matters are only indirectly subordinated to the jurisdiction of the Church, and are left to the free disposition of the State or to the individual (see pp. 361, 384).

The old description of this indirect relation—*sub ratione peccati*—means the same as *quatenus bonae aut malae sunt in genere morum*. The former expression refers primarily to the Church's power of punishment (*Innocent III: censura*), the latter to *jurisdictio* in general. It is obvious that what applies to sin is applicable also to the opposite of sin; for sin is sin because it is an offence against moral duty. In the passages quoted on page 370, on the *potestas indirecta*, emphasis was invariably laid upon the fact, that its exercise was to prevent sin, i.e., offences against the moral law, and also to secure what is "necessary," i.e., compliance with the demands of this law. We raise the same alternative when we ask whether a given action is good or bad. When this question is answered, and when, having considered the contrast between duty and sin, on which depend our relation to our final end and our lot for all eternity, as well as all moral order on earth, we decide in favour of duty, we may proceed with a quiet conscience to use our freedom of choice in all other respects.

Between and beside the contrasting extremes of duty and sin, there is a wide range of things that are indifferent, permitted, more or less good, and yet not commanded. We are left free to choose amongst objects and actions of this kind. We have here a complete refutation of the objection mentioned before, according to which the indirect subordination of everything moral to the authority of the Church leaves practically nothing to free choice. The *potestas indirecta* does not limit our selection of things morally permissible, or of means desirable but not compulsory, in attaining our final end. When this selection has to be limited because of the general welfare, it is in spiritual matters effected by the Church and by the State in secular.

The Church is bound to watch over secular affairs only for the purpose of preventing the aim for which she was founded, the highest good of mankind, from being frustrated or imperilled, of which there is danger in a secular way because all aims are intimately connected. When this danger does not exist, the Church gives free rein to secular government and action.¹

¹ Cf. *Bellarmino* (*supra*, p. 370) and *Leo XIII* (*supra*, p. 402). To a genuine Christian *attingere religionem et legem moralem* means more than a mere external contract, such as would restrict purely secular action unaffected by

In matters of religion, on the contrary, even in the choice of things that are permitted and counselled, the Church imposes obligations binding upon the conscience of the individual; as, for instance, in defining how Sundays and feast days are to be observed, and in laying down rules for fasting, for ecclesiastical offices, vestments, rites, religious Orders, etc.

A similar refutation of the objection mentioned above may be derived from the words: *quatenus . . . cum jure naturali et divino congruunt aut discrepant*. In God's law as a whole there are laws that bind (*leges imperantes*), but also such as declare subjective rights and liberty (*leges permittentes*). If, therefore, the authority of the Church, in as far as it controls all things, and hence secular actions also, desires to conform to the standard and scope (*quatenus*) of the divine law, it must certainly have the purpose of maintaining and protecting, not of curtailing, the *leges permittentes*, the moral rights and liberty proclaimed by the natural law, when it declares secular aims and work to be universally permissible.¹

ethical considerations. From the foundation of his religious consciousness and his conscience a Christian must in some way know that a worldly aim or action is *morally permissible* before he can venture upon it and use his liberty in connection with it. In this sense the word *attingere* implies touching the innermost moral centre of all life and action. The Church is vigilant to protect this centre and to uphold moral duty on all sides; what lies on the periphery in the sphere of the indifferent or permissible, is left free.

¹ H. Pesch, *Lehrbuch der Nationalökonomie*, II (1909), 221: "On the other hand, none ought to question the Church's glorious mission to bring the divine law of morality to bear suitably upon every department of human, and therefore also of economic life; nor should she be hindered in directing the conscience of her members. In this sense there can be for us *no separation between society and the Church*." Biederlack, *Theol. Fragen über die gewerkschaftl. Bewegung*, 1910, p. 7: "Therefore the Church, being empowered to exercise both the teaching and pastoral offices, has a right, as well as the duty, to issue general regulations for the movements in the interest of labour, for the purpose of upholding the laws of morality, and, in case anything hostile to the Christian moral law is planned or carried out, to bring the movement back again into the right path." Cavagnis, *op. cit.*, II, n. 204: *Nemini jus est inhoneste agendi; qui enim independens est, non subest alterius imperio, donec limites honestatis non egrediatur; intra hos limites libere administrat, cum modum eligendo, qui ei placeat. E contra, qui (directe) subditus est, tenetur parere praecepto superioris non modo, ut inhoneste non agat, sed etiam, ut eo tantum ex honestis modis utatur, qui a superiore praescribitur. . . . Qui independens est in suo ordine temporali, corrigitur ab Ecclesia, quia proprium ordinem praetergressus est, offendendo moralitatem, cujus ratione subditus est Ecclesiae. Hoc autem sub respectu generico omnes fideles subditi sunt Ecclesiae sive privati sive principes.*

The *jurisdictio* with which the Church watches over the natural and divine law may bring about permanent protective regulations in the form of canonical laws (*leges humano-ecclesiasticae*). Just as the State enacts positive laws and imposes penalties, thus adding weight to the natural law that forbids murder and theft, so the Church, too, has power to inflict *punishment* for spiritual and secular offences, and so support the law of God by ecclesiastical laws. As we have already seen, the *ratio peccati* does not only repress and limit, but it also prevents and averts sin. Not only sin committed but also the danger of sinning justify both State and Church in the issuance of laws. Hence when *Suarez* is trying to define the nature of *potestas indirecta*¹ he points out in reference thereto that theoretically this power aims at preserving the divine law inviolate, but that practically, in order to prevent any such violation, it is forced to have recourse to canonical legislation of its own. It would be possible to argue that in such cases the obligation even to avoid all danger of sin is already prescribed by the divine law. This is undoubtedly true in the case of many who are personally in danger of sinning, but it is seldom or never true for all. If then, for the sake of the public good, the authority proceeds to demand definite guarantees and to issue definite prohibitions and restrictions, they have a binding force for those Christians also who were previously not bound at all. In such cases the heads of the Church are as a rule satisfied with proclaiming what is strictly moral, with issuing paternal warnings and admonitions, and with using their influence to counteract evil and promote the welfare of souls. Sometimes, however, things not in themselves sinful, but only morally doubtful, are formally forbidden, as, for instance, when secular works are placed on the index, and when Catholics are ordered to refrain from joining certain secular societies, or from attending non-Catholic schools, etc.²

The Encyclical of *Pius X* contains, besides the important passages that we have already discussed, a number of others in which he speaks of bringing authoritative influence to bear upon secular life, and especially upon the labour associations of workmen, and he mentions as the motive for so doing its "*direct or indirect contact*

¹ See p. 368, note 1. Cf. also De leg., IV, c. II, 9.

² Cf. *Cavagnis*, III, n. 29.

with the sphere of religion and morality." The social question as a whole is not merely economic, but "also a moral and religious question"; and important problems connected with it, since they touch the sphere of religion and morality, come under the judgment of the Church. Under certain conditions associations of workmen of different creeds are permitted; but they involve or "may" involve *dangers* to the religion and morals of Catholics, dangers to their faith, their obedience to the Church, and to the virtues of justice and charity in their relations to other workmen; hence the Church, in her pastoral office, is justified in taking precautions. In carrying out their worldly objects, these associations are not allowed to uphold any doctrines or perform any actions *contrary* to the principles laid down by the Church. With regard to individual Catholics it is taken for granted that they are "to suffer no harm" through membership in such associations, and that they are "*not to neglect the morality taught by Catholicism or to diverge from it even by a hair's breadth.*" Over these conditions the bishops are to watch most carefully (*attentissime vigilabunt*), since they are essential if Catholics are to be allowed to join these societies. With reference to the other precautionary measure, — it stands first in the text of the Encyclical — we are told, in a less peremptory fashion, that "care must be taken" (*curandum est*) to induce the Catholic members of trades unions to join also Catholic industrial associations; "we are certain" (*pro certo habemus*), writes the Holy Father, "that in their zeal for the integrity of the faith, these members will be ready to make some sacrifices to secure this end."

The Encyclical contains also an allusion to the difference between purely Catholic countries and those where various denominations prevail; and it points out the consequences, resulting from this difference, in the contact between things ecclesiastical and secular. If we look at history, we shall find many differences due to causes of this kind; in some cases we shall discover an *extension* of the spiritual authority beyond its theoretical limits, such as is sometimes called for by the backward, immature state of the people, sometimes due to the voluntary submission of the faithful to the bishops in a patriarchal relation between them, sometimes due to an historical intermingling of spiritual and civic rights and laws.

There are cases where a newly connected community forms, as it were, one family; where a little flock of Christians holds closely together against a superior hostile power; where the faithful, on account of their natural weakness, or their Christian idealism, bestow upon their spiritual shepherd also the rights of a father and of a temporal shepherd, and where the shepherd stoutly upholds these rights and uses them for the benefit of the community. We have instances of such a theocratic rule in some of the early Christian communities and in the position occupied in them by the bishop in his religious, social, and judicial functions. In later times we have a very remarkable instance of theocratic rule in the Reductions founded by the Jesuits in Paraguay. In a different manner, and by a special dispensation of Providence, the secular authority of the bishops developed into the Church-State. Furthermore, as already stated, things spiritual and secular were throughout the Middle Ages in close contact and connection.

The Holy See at the present time watches authoritatively over the political organization and activity of Catholics in Italy, because the Pope claims a right to the Church-State, and the Italian government has in consequence assumed an attitude of hostility against him. Here again we have the *ratio peccati*, the danger of sanctioning this wrong, or any other injury to morals or religion which has given rise to the precautionary measure *Non expedit*. It contrasts with, and forms an exception to, the reserve displayed otherwise by *Leo XIII* and *Pius X* on questions of political life.

The first sentence of the new programme of the *Unione Elettorale Cattolica* contains a clear recognition of the fact that Italy occupies a peculiar position, unlike that of other nations. "If all the Catholic associations in Italy ought to be more closely connected with and more thoroughly subject to the Holy See than those of other countries, owing to the peculiar circumstances of our native land, the home of the Papacy, the association of Catholic voters (*Unione Elettorale Cattolica*) has still more urgent need of this close connection and submissive obedience."¹

Throughout our defence of Catholic morals we have observed the profound and *harmonious connection existing between liberty*

¹ Westf. Merkur, 1911, No. 184; cf. the Encyclical of *Pius X* quoted on page 363, note 1.

and necessity, between authority and rational independence. There is no less a harmonious connection between God's absolute dominion and power and a relative autonomy of the created intellect¹; between the unyielding obligation of the moral law and personal freedom of choice in the case of probable duties²; between the absolute necessity and worth of the highest Good and the conditional value attaching to finite good and aims³; and between the complete submission of the heart to the law of charity and the limited obligation of other virtues.⁴

In the question that we are now discussing it is also evident that all human action, in virtue of its moral nature, is connected with the one thing needful, the preparation for the next life, and with the authority of the Church; but that at the same time it retains its truly human liberty of movement, which is even more assured and more beneficial the more firmly it is based upon these religious forces. What could be more decisive for a man's moral lifework than his *choice of a vocation*? Yet the Church exerts her influence upon his choice only to the extent of upholding and making more important the seriousness of the moral decision; whilst at the same time she insists upon the liberty of the individual, and protects it from all coercion on the part of parents, teachers, or State — yes, even from all ecclesiastical pressure.

The *state of matrimony* is regarded by the Church, not as a purely secular condition, but as sanctified by morality and religion, and from this point of view it is subject to her laws; but having once declared these laws to be binding, the Church, more than any other power, champions free choice of husband or wife; she protects the weaker partner and the children, and does not allow the happiness of married life to be violated by any destructive ideas of liberty.

In *art* she insists that moral aims and rules should be respected and forbids any productive genius to disregard them; but this severity is beneficial, since it guards the sanctuary of art from sensual desecration and yet leaves both religious and worldly artists free to choose their subjects and styles. *Industrial and economic activity* is regarded by the Church from a high, moral point of view, as connected "with justice and charity" (*Singulari quadam*).

¹ See Chap. I.

² See Chap. III.

³ See Chap. VI.

⁴ See *supra*, pp. 193, *seq.*

Only where justice prevails is a truly free interchange of service possible; only where charity is added to justice can men be just to human dignity. Even the effort to acquire wealth, an effort less in accord with ideal Christianity, has never been restricted by any attempt on the part of the Church to fix a limit to property, or to demand a definite sum to be given in alms. In the Encyclical the Pope expresses the wish that workmen may succeed in their efforts to attain to worldly prosperity and increase, and declares that they have a right to aim at securing a better position in life and at fairer (*aequiores*) conditions of labour and wages.¹

St. Thomas says: "All men are by nature equal, as, for instance, in what belongs to the preservation of the body and the propagation of the race. Hence, in matters relating to marriage, to the preservation of chastity, or in things of a similar nature, servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents."² In another place he says: "There are things regarding which man is so completely his own master, that he may do them contrary even to the commands of the Pope; for instance, in observing chastity and heeding other divine counsels."³

Christianity proclaimed these "natural rights of man" long before humanism or the Revolution did so; and to the present day the Church defends them with greater fidelity than the politics or world views of Liberalism. *Leo XIII* insisted that the liberty of choice in the matters of matrimony and vocation, and in acquiring property, is a natural-born right of the human personality. He emphasized particularly the natural constitution and justification of the family. "The *family*, the society of the home, is a society, limited indeed in numbers, but no less a true society, anterior to every kind of State or nation, invested with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the civil community."⁴

A father's authority has the same exalted source as human life

¹ To give a few more modern instances of the difference between indirect and direct authority: the Church can and does forbid the use of the cinematograph in churches; she may have reasons for forbidding priests and religious to ride bicycles, but she cannot generally prohibit bicycles, and to cinematograph performances in secular places she objects only if they are morally bad or dangerous.

² *S. theol.*, II, II, qu. 104, a. 5.

³ In IV sent. dist., 38, q. 1, a. 4 c.

⁴ *Rerum novarum*, p. 184 c. t. s.

itself, and neither State nor Church can interfere with the natural rights that God has assigned to him. Family life leads to progress, to material effort, and mental education. The advance of civilization and the improvement of mankind by means of art and science, technical knowledge and industry, are to a great extent dependent upon the use made of liberty and upon the awakening of the energy of the individual. We have already seen that Church and State do not aim at bringing all human actions directly under their control, although occasionally the State has chosen to assume undue powers, and certain modern theories of government would assign to it the right to do so. Parents decide how to arrange their household, how to bring up their children, how to manage their property. A merchant may choose the market for his goods, a manufacturer may determine what he will produce, all without any interference from governmental supervision. A student is free to carry on his scientific research, and an artist creates his works at the impulse of his own inspiration; neither Church nor State is concerned with our place of residence, our work and recreation, our friendships, our social intercourse or our travels. All these things appear to be in the widest sense indifferent to Church and State and are not directly connected with either authority. "Civilization," too, extends beyond the direct influence of these two powers. When we speak of "society," we have a somewhat more definite factor of human life parallel to Church and State; its peculiarity consists chiefly in the freedom with which its functions are discharged.¹

The indirect dependence of civil society upon these two supreme authorities remains, however, undisturbed, and there are plainly innumerable ways in which society benefits by its relation to them both. Civilization would break up into chaos and confusion without the strong support of these divinely instituted powers. The State affords outward protection, the security of the law, and the economic conditions of life; the Church, having actually given rise to modern civilization, stands in still closer connection with society, and supplies it with the moral ideas and forces and the

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 356. H. Pesch (Nationalökonomie, I, 71) thinks that the collective name "society" expresses an important principle of social life, and emphasizes the prominence assigned in it to liberty.

religious inspiration and sanctification indispensable to its well-being. In order to carry out this task, the Church must have full independence and maintain her reputation inviolate. She knows that real liberty of thought and conscience invariably tends to her own good, and that an appeal to freedom is always a powerful means of awakening vigorous religious life.¹

I have already pointed out how few restrictions the Church has laid down in matters of religion, matters which are peculiarly her own sphere; from the outset she has been guided by an idea, put into words by *St. Augustine*, that a religion which had received from its Founder only a few easy and simple means of salvation, ought not to be weighed down in her development by slavish burdens.² This is still more true with regard to general progressive activity. In civil and secular matters the rights of subjects have with the lapse of time largely increased in number and extent; the standard of education has been raised and the mental outlook expanded. At the present time individuals are more clearly differentiated, and are more capable of independent thought, feeling, and action. And the Church takes this into account; she has to see that her regulations are useful and efficacious to mankind as actually existing, and she knows, as Cardinal *Cavagnis* remarks, that whilst a too great restriction on liberty may deter men from much evil, it is also apt to destroy the energy to do good.³

In the same manner as the freedom of the individual manifested itself first in the founding of the family, the earliest form of society, so does a high and progressive civilization lead to the establishment of various *free associations*. The more a State

¹ *A. Weiss*, op. cit., IV, 1084. "The growth of true education of heart and mind, and the strengthening of the sense of personal freedom, ultimately promote devotion to the interests of the Church. It is only in moments of excitement, when the masses become devoid of will and judgment and are swayed by catch phrases and the influence of so-called public opinion, that they allow themselves for a time to be stirred up to hostility against the Church."

² *St. Augustine*, Ep. 55, 35; 54, 1; De doct. christ., III, 13. In writing against *Calvin*, *Bellarmino* remarked that these passages expressly justify the Church in making commandments, and by no means condemn her.

³ *Cavagnis*, I, n. 117; cf. III, n. 114. In the passage quoted on page 363 *Pius X* also referred to "many radical changes in social and public life," especially to the present possibility and duty of making an energetic use of civil liberties.

appreciates civil and intellectual energy, the more readily will it facilitate and encourage such associations.¹

Such an association resembles a personality, with this difference, that it may single out certain aims of the human being and centre its interest upon them. During the ages of persecution the Church herself made use of the Roman system of association in order to secure her existence; and subsequently she gave free scope to the formation of religious and secular associations by her members. In doing so she was careful to prevent them from going astray and to maintain their living union with Christianity as a whole; and she accomplished this by intensifying the love of the Church in the members of these associations, and by introducing into them practices calculated to edify and to stimulate the religious spirit.

Leo XIII refers here to the guilds of the Middle Ages, and says: "they were not only the means of affording many advantages to the workmen, but in no small degree promoted the advancement of art." He alludes also to the confraternities and similar societies which, "in their religious aspect, claim rightly to be responsible to the Church alone."²

According to the ecclesiastical right of association *religious* societies are naturally subject to the authority of the Church, either because they have received special authorization, and so rank as Church associations, or because they owe their origin to the pious intentions of individuals, and so are private, religious associations. The Church does not only watch over such associations spiritually, but she may issue regulations for their practical organization and management. To this class belong associations formed simply for pious purposes, for beautifying public worship,

¹ *Rerum novarum*, p. 210 c. t. s. "Natural impulse . . . binds men together in civil society, and it likewise leads them to join together in associations of citizen with citizen; associations which, it is true, cannot be called societies in the full sense of the word, but which, notwithstanding, are societies. . . . The State has not the privilege to prohibit them as a general thing. For to form a "society" of this kind is the natural right of man; the State, however, is there to protect natural rights, not to destroy them." *A. Weiss*, op. cit., p. 117. "Of course all these proper, great, and necessary societies cannot be an obstacle to the formation of *free associations*, as long as the latter offer no hindrance to what is for the public good" (*Cavagnis*, III, n. 369).

² *Rerum novarum*, pp. 209, 211 c. t. s.

for imparting religious instruction, for helping foreign missions, etc.¹

Numerous other organizations exist amongst Catholics for the promotion of the *social* and *spiritual* welfare of the people, and to encourage education and the growth of arts and sciences, and in such a way as to *include* the treatment of questions of morals and world views, in the light of the final end of mankind. They deal also with subjects of a "mixed" nature, analogous to those that lie on the border line between Church and State; and so we have to recognize the right of the Church to issue orders and exercise supervision over all that affects the interest of religion. To this class of organizations belong mothers' guilds, charitable associations, the society of St. Vincent de Paul, associations of Catholic teachers, students' associations, boys' clubs, workmen's guilds, local or national Catholic women's leagues, and Catholic federations. All these have relation to the authority of the Church in many different ways. In some cases the bishops have taken a part in establishing these associations and in laying down their rules; in others they have grown from small beginnings and private undertakings, or have arisen spontaneously. Priests are official directors of some, advisers of others, whilst in others again there is only the consciousness of a community of interests between laity and clergy.

But there are still other associations of Catholics, formed for purely *secular purposes*, for asserting political rights, for trade and economic advantage, for promoting art and science, sports and social intercourse. From the point of view of civil and ecclesiastical law, these associations, too, must bear a moral character of some sort, and be morally permissible or beneficial.²

As their character is determined by their secular aim, we may say of them what we say of the State, the largest secular organization, and of the individual with regard to his secular occupation, viz., that they are subject to the authority of the Church only indirectly, in as far as their activity affects the sphere of religious and moral obligations. Of Catholic associations in general (as distinguished from ecclesiastical) *Hollweck* says: "These associa-

¹ *Cavagnis*, III, n. 358, etc.; *Hergenröther-Hollweck*, p. 398, etc.

² *Cavagnis*, I, n. 390; III, n. 365, etc.

tions do not *as such* belong to the jurisdiction of the Church, unless they expressly and of their own accord submit to it. They are free in their sphere of activity as they are in their formation. But precisely because they call themselves *Catholic*, the Church is to some extent responsible for them, and cannot ignore them. It is also self-evident that they are bound to do honour to the Church, both in their official management and in their whole activity; they must support and not injure her. Consequently they must always stand in some sort of relation to the authorities in the Church, who doubtless have the right to interpose instructions and admonitions, or even to punish and to suppress any association that threatens to be prejudicial to the interests of the Church, or that encourages a state of affairs opposed to religion and morality." The Church, however, has no desire to restrict and limit the freedom of action, which alone renders possible a full development of the resources of such associations.¹

Direct control by the Church, or representation of her authority "within the organization itself," is not necessary, nor even desirable, in the case of associations formed for secular purposes.²

We have seen how, in his Encyclical "*Rerum novarum*," *Leo XIII* refers to the splendid organization of civil life in the Middle Ages (see p. 402). The guilds and confraternities of artisans, artificers and merchants, were not only Catholic in fact, but they were most intimately connected with the Church, by special services, and by their own altars and chaplains. According to the best authorities, however, they were not, as economic organizations, directly under the control of the Church, and were neither sanctioned nor officially directed by the bishops, unless these happened to be also secular rulers. There are still many Catholic associations having a free relation with the Church, but not subject to her, and no abuses have arisen in consequence.

On the other hand, the *dangers* resulting from times of religious

¹ *Hergenröther-Hollweck*, op. cit., p. 405.

² Cf. *H. Pesch*, *Nationalökonomie*, II, 221. *Biederlack*, op. cit., p. 13. *Ozanam's* centenary has drawn attention particularly to the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, so highly esteemed by the Church. This society was founded by laymen, and according to its rules is managed by them, priests acting only as advisers, though the whole aim and object of the association is religious and moral.

discord and unsettled social conditions are undoubtedly greater to the associations of to-day than they were formerly; and they effect more particularly such associations that have a wide range of activity and come into contact with various religious beliefs. Attention was drawn to these dangers in the introduction to the Encyclical "Singulari." In the case of associations designated "Catholic," it must be borne in mind that the public prestige of the Church is bound up with this title, and is affected by it even more than by the behaviour of an individual Catholic. Moreover, the force of any tendency is increased by the weight of corporate union and by the extent to which it is felt. Hence Church and State are both entitled to watch over the activities of corporations and associations, and, if necessary, to demand of them formal guarantees, such as would not be required of private persons. In joining an association the individual in some degree renounces his liberty and places his resources and his confidence at the disposal of its officers, and in this way these acquire a more or less public position and influence. The highest authorities in Church and State may, therefore, consider themselves bound to watch over the interests of the individual, and see to it that the associations are managed in accordance with the objects for which they were formed and for the general good.

In writing to the bishops of Italy, on June 11, 1905, *Pius X* urged them seriously to study the social question, and then to take firm, energetic, and organized measures for the revival of "Christian action" in Italy. Purely religious undertakings ought, he said, to be under the direct control of the bishop of the diocese; but other endeavours, having a more general reference to Christian life, may have a freer organization, adapted to their aims and extending beyond the limits of the various dioceses. "But these associations are not independent of the counsel and supreme guidance of the ecclesiastical authorities, and must be based upon the fundamental principles of Christian doctrine and morals; moreover, they are all subject to the 'motherly vigilance' of the Church. They must, however, from their nature enjoy reasonable freedom of action, as they are themselves responsible for what they do, especially in secular and economic matters and in things connected with the public administration of the State, with which the purely

spiritual office is not concerned.”¹ No less important is Rome’s attitude towards the *Sillon*, a famous association of young men in France. Far from regarding it with suspicion, *Leo XIII* allowed these young Catholics to draw up their far-reaching programme themselves, and gave them much encouragement. The experience of the French bishops, however, showed that the *Sillon* was doing harm, and their report to this effect caused *Pius X* on August 25, 1910, to require the various groups of the association to be confined each to one diocese, and to be subject to the bishop of that diocese. The reason for this drastic proceeding is given in the introduction to the brief: “The directors of the *Sillon* maintain that their sphere of activity is not that of the Church, and say that they aim only at worldly, not at spiritual advantages, and that the *Sillonist* . . . is subject to the universal laws of morality in neither a greater nor a less degree than every Catholic labourer, artisan, agriculturist, or politician, without being in a social sense any more dependent upon the authority of the Church than they are. It is easy to answer this argument. Who will believe that Catholic *Sillonists*, and the priests and seminarists who have joined their association, have nothing in view in their social activity except to promote the *material interests* of the workers? . . . The truth is that the directors of the *Sillon* acknowledge themselves to be inveterate idealists; that they propose to raise the working classes by first raising human consciousness; that they possess a sociology as well as *philosophical and religious* principles, by which human society is to be rebuilt upon a new foundation; that they have ideas of their own regarding the dignity of man, freedom, justice, and fraternity, and that in order to justify their social dreams they appeal to an interpretation of the Gospel all their own, and — what is still more fatal — they have a distorted and degraded idea of Christ. Moreover, they propagate these views in their students’ societies, impress the same upon their members, and allow them to appear in their writings. They actually profess, therefore, to uphold a peculiar social, civil, and religious code of morals.”²

The bishops are required to direct the new *Sillons*, because it is

¹ *Acta S. Sedis*, 1904–5, p. 760, etc.

² Cf. *Études*, Paris, 1910, tom. 125, p. 108.

their object "to work for the Christian and Catholic revival of the people and at the same time for the betterment of their lot as labourers." It is regarded as a matter of course that "every Catholic *Sillonist* is left free in other respects and may retain his *political convictions* after he has purged them of all that is not in harmony with the doctrine of the Church. If isolated groups refuse to accept these conditions, the bishops are required to regard them as actually refusing to submit to their guidance. They will then have to find out whether these associations restrict themselves to promoting *purely political and economical interests*, or whether they adhere to their old errors. In the former case the bishops have no more to do with them than with the business affairs of the faithful in general; in the latter, however, they have to deal with them with firmness as well as with prudence."¹

The good and bad characteristics of the age in which we live have caused the rulers of the Church to give all possible freedom to the laity within their own sphere of action, and at the same time to insist upon the authority of the Church and to make it felt. There is a great deal of good (1) in the high value set upon the Christian character and the development of its personality. The advance of education and the growth of social freedom have made men wish to be guided in their actions by their own intelligence. Christian education aims at producing this inward independence. The cardinal virtue of prudence is a kind of moral self-guidance; fortitude adds decision in action to theoretical insight, and every Christian ought to possess both these virtues. Supernatural sanctity intensifies and does not weaken our ability to think and act. "They shall all be taught of God."² "His unction teacheth you of all things."³ Just as a youth never develops into manhood if he is always kept by his parents in leading strings, so Catholics, who have grown up in seclusion under too close guardianship are often exposed to double danger when they encounter men of other religious beliefs. The inert strata of society may be easily guided, but when once they have been led astray, it is difficult to enlighten them and win them back to what is good and true. The Polish sect known as the Mariavites is an illustration of this fact.

¹ *Études*, tom. 125, p. 126, etc.

² 1 John vi. 45.

³ 1 John ii. 27.

If the erroneous socialistic doctrines now prevalent amongst the labouring classes are to be overcome, we must have Christian workmen with active minds who have received a moral and technical training. In the Encyclical "Singulari" we are told that the directors of Catholic workingmen's associations, since they have a clear insight into the circumstances of the time, especially with reference to the duties of justice and charity, would undoubtedly be prepared to instruct the *workingmen* concerning those commandments and precepts *which it is necessary or expedient for them to know thoroughly*, in order to be able to take part in the work of their associations in accordance with the principles of Catholic teaching.

(2) Every department of labour is constantly becoming more complex and more finely differentiated, and this makes it harder for priests to acquire *enough technical knowledge* to settle concrete questions that may arise out of secular occupations. Moreover, after individuals have been taught the Christian principles of morality, by means of sermons and religious instruction, they can decide ordinary matters concerning their occupation for themselves. But in the case of associations, the significance of their decisions is generally greater and affects more the public respect of their faith; but at the same time they benefit by gaining a wider experience, so that they afford to men, who are well disposed, an opportunity of obtaining information and correcting mistakes. Provided, therefore, that the conscience of the laity has been carefully trained in the manner mentioned above, and that the associations are following a normal course and not giving occasion for complaints, the concrete application of moral principles can frequently be left to their decision. Exceptional difficulties may occur in corporate, as well as in individual life, and then it is well to be able to have recourse to a spiritual adviser; it is also important for associations to be actively in touch with the clergy.¹

(3) Too close a connection, between secular interests and disputes on the one hand and the pastoral activity of the Church on the other, would tend to make the Church *responsible for failures*, and thus might do considerable harm to the work of the clergy.

The Pastoral admonishes parish priests in general not to be too

¹ *Biederlack*, op. cit., p. 16, etc.

ready to interfere in secular disputes.¹ In a decree issued by *Pius X* in 1910, he forbids priests to act as trustees of the finances of charitable institutions, and points out that such occupations have tended to withdraw the clergy from the work of their high calling and to entangle them in secular business, with all the anxieties, troubles, and dangers inseparable from it. Similar and perhaps greater improprieties result when priests take too direct a part in the proceedings and quarrels of trades unions.² He goes on to say that a priest ought to stand superior to the conflicting interests of different classes. However much he would desire to promote Catholic economic organizations in general, he ought to think seriously how far he can practically coöperate in such business without involving himself in unedifying obligations, injurious to his spiritual dignity. In a brief addressed on April 22, 1911, to the Archbishop of Toledo, the Holy Father urges the Spanish bishops, in the interest of their own authority, not to take part in any political strife without very good reason for doing so. He says: "In all that concerns public elections and political combinations, honourable liberty of action should be left to Catholic men without detriment to the obedience due to the laws and authority of the Church." Preventive censorship of newspapers is to cease, and the corrective censorship prescribed in the Encyclical "*Pascendi*" is to be carried on *opportune et secreto*. The censors are to refrain from touching upon purely civil and political matters, "as on these subjects Catholic writers are perfectly free to say and think what they like, having due respect to charity and justice."³

In recent times, therefore, the Popes have repeatedly and most clearly expressed their desire that the independent activity of the laity should be respected, where it rests on a foundation of Catholic faith and life. It would, however, be a disastrous error to assume that in our age of universal education and political and social liberty, the conscience of the faithful needs, on matters not concerned with supernatural dogmas, no longer to be guided by authority. On the contrary, reverence and practical obedience to the authority of the Church are still indispensable and most bene-

¹ Luke xii. 14.

² Cf. the quotation on p. 415 from the Pastoral of *Pius X*.

³ The Latin text is given in the "*Canoniste Contemporain*," Paris, 1912, p. 216.

ficial, since (1) they counteract the *individualism* that threatens to split up Christian civilization. Not dogma alone, but also the lofty morality of Christianity and the disposition of mind and social feeling engendered by it, have, through the spiritual authority and the obedience of the laity, become a great power in the world, and it cannot be detached from this support without destroying all its vitality, universal validity, and efficacy. Too many consider themselves qualified to criticise the rulers of the Church, although the tone and substance of their arguments show plainly how far they are from having fathomed the moral problem or grasped the bearing of the law upon society. They are rather influenced by their own personal experience and interests, and by their national and social prejudices. In the discussion of political legislation affecting only a single State, conflicting opinions and interests reveal themselves and appear almost irreconcilable, so that often men have to be admonished to use self-restraint and to regard distributive justice; indeed, the authority of the State is needed to prevent disruption. What would become of the Church, that embraces all the nations of the world, if the self-glorifying will of each individual be allowed to interpret the law of Christian morality as he thought fit; if the sense of reverence for Pope and bishops did not form a bond of union between Catholics far stronger than any external compulsion?

(2) A further reason for regarding obedience to the Church as indispensable may be found in the widely spread tendency to overvalue *everything new*, — a tendency that might well be called *Modernism* if another definite meaning had not been assigned to this word. Never so much as at the present time has the spirit of the age been so perceptible a force; and never has it so thoroughly confused men's judgment. Never, too, have the phases of its development succeeded one another so rapidly. As the external conditions of life have changed so unmistakably, many people believe that they may base their moral life and aspirations on new foundations, or at least disregard Christian morality altogether in important individual matters. What is old is assumed to be obsolete, and the strict adherence to inherited laws and customs, upon which the Church insists, is regarded as opposed to all progress. Even Catholics are affected by these new theories of ethical reform,

which are actually the outcome of an unworthy, pagan view of life; the marriage bond is loosened, forbidden practices prevail in married life, dangerous innovations in pedagogy, and dishonourable maxims in commerce and politics, corrupt the judgment of the masses and threaten to destroy national life. The "enlightened conscience" of the educated classes often proves to be shortsighted and incapable of averting the danger; and it is not until the disastrous results of all these things are felt by society, not until some popular movement ends in a fiasco, not until some sober student of ethics utters impressive words of warning, that men to some extent return to their senses and to the tried wisdom of their ancestors, — in other words, to the Catholic principles underlying society. Is it not therefore much more suitable and advantageous for Catholics to remember this wisdom in the first place and to be true to its practical expression, and to ascribe to the admonitions of the Church greater importance than to the current ideas of the moment, since she deals with these social problems dispassionately, having profound knowledge and experience of mankind? It is true of course that this submission involves some humiliation of human nature, and perhaps even painful self-renunciation in some cases where the demands of the Church clash with the favourite opinions of the individual.

(3) Finally there is a sort of *naturalism*, a tendency to follow one's own way, which rebels against all restrictions; sometimes also a disposition, that is not in fact arrogant self-assertion, but which desires to defend the natural human rights of Christians, and even the importance and reputation of the Church. However much justification there may be for this sense of human liberty, and how noble this enthusiasm for the Church, we must not forget that Christianity is professedly *not* a religion encouraging the unbridled development of a man's natural self, but that from the very beginning it has regarded humility in faith and life, and the willing acceptance of the Cross and suffering for the sake of eternal salvation, as the very central points in its doctrines. Christ came into the world, not to be served, nor to command, but to serve and be obedient even to the death on the Cross; and He taught His followers that the disciple was not to be above his Master, nor the servant above his Lord. The time will never come when the pure and

devoted practice of the Catholic religion can vie with the "world" in encouraging *unrestricted* development of man's natural faculties, for this is impossible, unless our Lord's words and example and the constant teaching of Christianity are to lose all force.

A Catholic in such circumstances will inevitably be aware that in the eyes of the children of this world he is not "up to date"; but in compensation he enjoys peculiar privileges, natural as well as supernatural. Even an unmerited slight, a consequence which might seem undesirable to the individual, ought not to depress a true Catholic, or make him pessimistic and inclined to abandon his religion; it ought rather to prove and purify him, and add to the depth and maturity of his character.

Midway between the two extremes of individualism and socialism lies the truth regarding social life. It regards society as an *organism*; not simply an aggregate of private rights and interests, but having a higher life of its own, and embodying higher aims. The union of the atoms in a living organism does not preclude or replace their movement, and, in the same way, the union of men in society does not preclude or replace the activity of the individual, but gives it life and completeness, and makes men collectively capable of achieving what would be beyond their power singly. In the social organism more than elsewhere this union is preserved by authority, and by voluntary submission to and acquiescence in it.

Far more perfectly is this organic character realized in the Church, the Lord's body, than in the State. Not only does she in extent surpass all the kingdoms of the world, but there resides in her a higher, supernatural, and living spirit, binding individuals together to form one living whole; she possesses in abundance graces and forces, fertile in results, and such as no mere collection even of millions of units can claim. Here, again, the guarantee of this living unity is authority, an authority just as supernatural and owing its origin directly to God: "He that heareth you, heareth me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth me; and he that despiseth me, despiseth Him that sent me."¹ The vital warmth, the sense of union that animates the body of this society, is the heartfelt devotion to the Church and a cheerful obedience, based, not on compulsion, but on liberty; not on fear, but on reverence and love.

¹ Luke x. 16.

CHAPTER X

RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE

PROTESTANTS have for a long time been in the habit of reproaching Catholics with standing aloof from public life in a manner prejudicial to religious concord and to the general welfare. *Tschackert* speaks of the "Catholic practice of having nothing to do with non-Catholics," and says that it must necessarily narrow their outlook on life and tend to separate them from the rest of the nation. *Sell* considers the present "curialistic" or "ultramontane" policy to be an attempt to make all public life denominational, and to restrict, as far as possible, all intercourse between Catholics and non-Catholics. He thinks that in course of time the conciliatory force of national sentiment will thus be paralyzed. Critics inclined to speculation on such matters imagine that the ultimate reason for this state of affairs may be discovered in what they assume to be the Catholic theory that worldly and secular things have no "independent value," and that they receive their moral significance only through the instrumentality and sanction of the Church.¹ Protestants believe, we are told, that the world possesses an order of its own, apart from Christianity; but Catholics think that this order is first introduced into the world by Christianity.² Since grace is superior to nature, the Catholic distinction between them, it is said, must ultimately bring back the state of affairs that existed in the Middle Ages, when all that was natural was in complete subjection to the ecclesiastical.³

During the last ten years also Catholics have expressed various opinions regarding the permissibility and necessity of joint action in secular matters between members of different religious denominations, and in Germany they have given rise to practical differences

¹ *Dorner*, *Augustinus*, 1873, p. 312.

² *Schiele*, *Christl. Welt*, 1908, p. 905.

³ *Tröltsch*, *Intern. Wochenschrift*, 1908, p. 22.

affecting their political and economic organization, such differences being unfortunately accentuated in the question of labour unions. In consequence of these disputes *Pius X*, on September 24, 1912, issued the Encyclical "*Singulari quadam*," addressed to the bishops in Germany. This Encyclical has already been mentioned; it deals particularly with the organization of workmen in trades unions, and lays down rules for the Catholic members. In the Reichstag the representatives of the government frankly acknowledged that the question was one affecting the interests of the Church, and that she had therefore a right to express an opinion upon it; but part of the Protestant and socialistic press made this an opportunity to speak of "intolerable insults offered to non-Catholic workmen," and of a "dangerous tutelage" of German economic life.

However, as a matter of fact, the very first sentence of the Encyclical proves that it was issued in consequence of reports sent from Germany to the Holy See, that it was the outcome of the Pope's affectionate and benevolent interest in the "loyal, generous, and brave" Catholics of Germany, and that it aimed at restoring and maintaining perfect harmony amongst them. The Pope continues: "We wish and desire, moreover, that the members of our Church should live with their *non-Catholic fellow citizens* in that peace without which neither the order of human society nor the prosperity of the State can exist." Further on permission is given to Catholics to work with non-Catholics for the general good. It is true that early in the Encyclical a caution is given against "interdenominational Christianity," in the sense of a vague, universal sort of religion; but this warning, as every one must admit, is proper to the essential character of Catholicism and the Church, and has nothing to do with the question of a mutual good understanding between Catholics and Protestants. Even the Protestant members and promoters of Christian associations of workmen reject all idea of setting up "a common basis of Christianity" of a dogmatic character.

The Encyclical begins by laying down some important principles affecting faith and life, applicable to all Catholics, no matter to what country and class they belong. They are required to adhere to, and fearlessly profess, both in private and public life, all the

truths of Christianity as taught by the Church; moreover, they must acknowledge it to be the duty of every Christian, even in his secular occupations, to keep his supreme, supernatural aim always in view, and grant that the Church has a right to judge of the morality of every kind of action.¹ They are bound to live in peace with their neighbours and to avoid class hatred. Finally the Pope declares the social question not to be purely economic, but in the first place moral and religious, so that from this point of view it is subject to the authority of the Church, no less than the kindred questions regarding hours of work, wages, and strikes.

The Encyclical deals next with associations of workmen, discussing them in a general way, and not with exclusive reference to Germany. Of these associations, even if formed to promote the worldly prosperity of the working classes, "those are mostly to be approved and are best suited to do real and permanent good, which are based primarily upon the foundation of the Catholic religion, and frankly follow the guidance of the Church." Similar statements had already been made in answer to questions propounded by various nations (*gentibus*); hence it follows that such Catholic associations should be formed and supported "first in Catholic districts, and then in all others where there is reason to think that they can adequately meet the requirements of the men." In such places the formation of mixed associations for purposes connected directly or indirectly with religion and morality is to be discouraged, on account of the dangers likely to arise for the faith and the obedience towards the Church.

In accordance with this principle, the formation of purely Catholic organizations of workmen in Germany is encouraged and warmly recommended. They may work in harmony with non-Catholics for the purpose of improving their economic position, but this is best accomplished by means of a "cartel" formed by the associations.

At the request of several bishops the Holy Father then states explicitly that membership in Christian unions, consisting of Catholics and Protestants, may be "tolerated and permitted"; and in justification of this decision he refers in detail to the peculiar position of Catholics in Germany, as he had been asked to do,

¹ See *supra*, p. 403.

and alludes to the numerical superiority of these organizations, and to the need of avoiding serious disadvantages. The permission is given on the understanding, however, that no new reasons would be adduced against it, and that suitable measures shall be taken at once to avert any danger to religion and morality.

The first of these measures is the affiliation of the Catholic members with the Catholic associations of workmen directed by priests. These associations do much good by promoting faith, purity of morals, and piety; they should give to workingmen the right principles and suitable instruction "in order to be able to take part in the work of labour unions in the right way, and according to Catholic principles." The second precautionary measure is that everything forbidden or hostile to the Church be kept away, in principle as in fact, from the discussions and transactions of these unions; the Catholic members ought to see that this is carried into effect, and the bishops must use all vigilance to prevent Catholics from suffering any spiritual harm and from a neglect of the laws of Catholic morals in consequence of joining such associations.¹

The Encyclical ends with an exhortation to keep peace, a prohibition of further disputes on the subject, and an order to refer any new difficulties that may arise to the authority of the Church, and, in the first place, to the bishops. Catholic associations are once more warmly commended, and interference with them on the plea of organizing them according to dioceses is forbidden. No one is to raise any suspicions against loyal Catholics, or to accuse them of being false to the Church, if for a good reason (*recto consilio*) they join "mixed" unions, provided that the above-mentioned safeguards are respected.

Let us now consider the statements in the Encyclical that are most important from the point of view of ethics and apologetics.² The religious aim and point of view with which it was issued appears plainly in the statement that every precaution must be taken to avoid lowering Christianity to a *vague form of religion*,

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 409.

² It is of course impossible to discuss here in its practical aspect the pastoral duty imposed upon bishops of seeing that the conditions are observed.

shared by Catholics and Protestants alike, and also to prevent any injury to the purity and strength of the faith. Even the most liberal theologian of the present day will hardly encourage any suggestion of an "amalgamation" of the two creeds; but there are many who agree with *Harnack* in wishing them to develop more freely, so as to put positive dogma in the background and strive to attain "a higher unity."¹

As a matter of fact, we see how liberal Protestants and rebellious Catholics meet on the common ground of Modernism, a hazy religion of sentiment with an admixture of Christianity derived from the Bible. *Tschackert*, who holds more positive views, has in mind something else when he speaks of fostering what the two religions have in common. He thinks that where Catholics and Protestants agree in their recognition of some truth, they should cherish it in the interests of peace and patriotism; and of points of agreement he mentions the Apostles' Creed, the observance of Sunday and other Christian feasts, patriotism, etc. A good Catholic is bound to reject any interdenominationalism which would endanger his hold upon the full and compact truths of Catholic faith and morals in favour of some "compromise," or of some "common Christian basis." Even in dealing with a believing Protestantism we must not silence specific Catholic truth. A serious, unwavering statement of our dogmatic differences in scientific form — such as we aim at giving in this work — may and must accompany a peaceable attitude and intercourse in civil life. No temporal considerations should in the social and political intercourse with others prevent us from gladly and frankly acknowledging ourselves to be Catholics.

A Catholic who has a firm hold upon his faith finds to his satisfaction that non-Catholics recognize many fundamental principles of the natural law, and some things demanded by Catholicism. In the struggle against modern tendencies to unbelief and revolutionary opinions, he can act more successfully if he allies himself with non-Catholics of this kind — perhaps he cannot act at all unless he does so. It is thus that Catholics can secure the observance of Sunday, the right to Christian burial, denominational schools, the eradication of immorality, recognition and free prac-

¹ See *supra*, p. 13.

tice of religion, respect for parental and civil authority and for inherited rights, and security in the possession and enjoyment of property.¹

That a joint action in this sense and for this purpose involves no violation of Catholic principles is plainly indicated by the Holy Father, not only in his attitude towards the trades unions, but in his recommendation of cartels between Catholic and non-Catholic associations. He mentions as the object of such a cartel "any honourable advantage," and it is obvious that the only possible basis for such an alliance (*foedus*) and for joint action is that the two members of it should take the same view of law and morality.

The Encyclical rightly draws attention to the fact that the danger in question may arise "gradually and almost imperceptibly," and that the possibility of its occurrence (*versari aut certe versari possunt*) is a reason why the rulers of the Church should exercise vigilance and issue warnings. It is impossible not to see that at the present time many people are tempted to put a too free and non-Catholic interpretation upon dogma and moral principles. We have encountered in the course of our investigation no small numbers of ethical mistakes and of distortions of Christian teaching. Protestantism as a rule can offer but slight resistance to the destructive and dangerous ideas now current, and false and misleading theories regarding evolution, the natural law, individuality, marriage, and the essence and form of religion, are spread broadcast by the press and infect thousands whose hold on their faith is incomplete and weak. If even learned theologians cannot always resist this influence, if even educated laymen are often, by means of books and associates, induced to make dangerous concessions to the spirit of the age, or to a controlling Protestant "public opinion," it is impossible to overestimate the peril threatening the less educated classes of the population. A workman encounters it in workshop or factory, and his daily intercourse with others often affects him imperceptibly but strongly. When he joins an association he is exposed to a much more powerful influence, and he becomes conscious of being closely united with others, of being included in and subordinated to the

¹ Cf. *Gisler*, *Der Modernismus*, 1912, p. 215, etc.; *Meyenberg*, *Gottesminne*, VII (1912), p. 91, etc.

whole, and he is apt to abandon his personal convictions and to swim with the tide, even when it threatens to take him away from the right path and to work injury to civil society or the Church.

It has frequently been remarked that the moral principles of Christianity, clear and obvious though they be, may, in their application to the circumstances of the age, give rise to doubts and difficulties; and that in such cases the Church must make laws and give instructions showing how the divine law ought to be interpreted and what measures ought to be taken. Reference has also been made to the hindrance caused by the exaggerated sense of personal freedom which modern ideas have evoked, and which is frequently opposed to Authority. The Encyclical contains an allusion to their danger, which mixed associations might readily increase, since Catholics and Protestants differ radically on this point, unless the Catholic members and their leaders exercise very great prudence. Respect for the authority of the bishops and the Pope is a virtue that has always characterized Catholics and has become a part of their very nature. The dangers mentioned above become of course less ominous if the activity of the associations seldom touches on matters of faith and morals, and if membership in an association does not involve much permanent or close intercourse between the individual members.¹

For the reasons already stated, the Holy Father declares the Catholic associations to be the best and most suitable kind of unions, and recommends them heartily. In them there is no danger of loss of faith, and the members collectively profess themselves Catholics and acknowledge the authority of the Church. It was completely in conformity with Catholic thought and practice that the Holy Father, being asked to express an opinion, should praise and recommend organizations that declare themselves to be "based upon the foundation of the Catholic religion" and subject to the "guidance of the Church." No other reply could have been ex-

¹ The German bishops had good reason for requiring trades unions "to restrict their activity to the practical treatment of industrial questions." Any extension of their activity to celebrations, and social entertainments, intended to draw the families and individuals together, and which are unnecessary to promote the economic ends for which the unions exist, would be of questionable value, as it would naturally tend to weaken and destroy Catholic associations.

pected. The Church knows that she alone is in possession of the full truths of Christianity; she is the visible society commissioned to reveal the light and strength of faith; she has at all times sought to influence society according to the spirit of the Gospel, and in former times she actually succeeded in establishing a Christian social order in which many other associations each found a suitable place. The Church does not even at the present day abandon her ideal of a civilized community penetrated with the Catholic spirit. This general idea has been discussed again and again, and as far as workmen's associations are concerned, organizations based on Catholicism have proved to be the best and most successful.

Pius X, although he gave preference to Catholic societies, did not forbid Catholics to join "mixed" unions of Christian workmen. The words *tolerari posse* can be understood in various ways; they suggest that something is not necessarily morally bad, but that it is rather an evil to be endured than justified by circumstances. But the expanded phrase *tolerari et permitti* has a more positive meaning. To say that a thing is "permitted" is not indeed to praise or recommend it, but it undoubtedly implies that the action in question is morally permissible, and this is particularly true when such an expression is used by the head of the Church in a document issued in order to quiet men's consciences and remove grounds of dispute. This is evident from other parts of the document. Thus the Catholic associations are described as those most deserving of approbation, *maxime probandae aptissimaeque omnium*, and with reference to intercourse with Protestants the Pope remarks, "we should prefer (*malumus*) a union in the nature of a cartel." Expressions such as these indicate that there is something better, but not a condemnation of the less good.

In the same way the Holy Father takes under his protection, and defends from all charges of unorthodoxy, men who for some good reason (or with a good intention) have joined or wish to join "mixed" associations; this makes it perfectly clear that both the act itself and the resolution to perform it are morally justifiable. Permission to join such associations, however, is granted on a positive condition *ut sint tales, quibus catholici dare nomen possint*. Where this condition is fulfilled, the Holy Father permits and even

expects the members to take active part in the trades unions "in the right way (*recte*) and in accordance with Catholic principles."

This decision on the part of the Holy Father was based upon the "peculiar condition of Catholicism in Germany," but special reasons for it may be found, as was pointed out by the German bishops, in the fact that the *Christian* trades unions possess many more members, and that great drawbacks and disadvantages would result from their prohibition. Moreover, it is taken for granted that the various requirements of the members cannot be adequately supplied except by means of such associations. Where this is the case, the toleration of "mixed" unions is recognized as "just and expedient," but this does not preclude the possibility of a change *ex novis rerum adjunctis*.

The reasons put forward by *Christian* trades unions for their formation are essentially the same. They emphasize the numerical strength and success of their organizations, and the necessity of offering a strong and extensive wall of resistance to the advance of a powerful socialism, whose sole object is the acquisition of power. They draw attention to the strong financial position that these trades unions have acquired, which is of great moment to its members in cases of necessity. They refer to the close superior organization of the employers of labour, to the preponderance of non-Catholic employers, and the difficulties likely to arise from all this to purely Catholic associations. Amongst the circumstances giving the Church a "peculiar position" in Germany may be mentioned the general and steadily increasing tendency of mixture on the part of the population, the existence of many other interdenominational associations, some intended to draw together people of particular ranks and occupations, and others with aims not religious but certainly connected with morals (such as societies for the repression of vice, societies for control of the sale of spirituous liquors, etc.). As last reason it is mentioned that, on the subject of strikes, the Catholic organization adopted an attitude different from the *Christian* trades unions (although the Catholic unions in Holland have not done so), and that this attitude is not, in the opinion of the trades unions, beneficial to the industrial necessities of the labouring classes.¹

¹ This important question is not discussed in the Encyclical, but I may

We must look upon Catholic associations of workmen as the means of completing the work done by "mixed" unions, and as primary safeguards against impending dangers. Such associations, being eminently religious and closely connected with the Church, are well adapted to foster the Catholic spirit amongst workmen and to have a beneficial influence on the action of trades unions. They are under the direction of the clergy, whose aim should be not only to make the members good Christians, but to give them the moral training necessary to their economic position. The directors, being men familiar with the circumstances of the time (*gnari temporum*), are to impart to the workmen, in reference to justice and charity, those principles the exact knowledge of which is necessary or expedient for them, in order to share in the work of the trades unions in a true Catholic way. The second condition affects the bishops, at least in so far as it affects positive activity; it is to watch the proceedings of the trades unions and exercise pastoral vigilance over the Catholic members. The unions themselves are required "to *refrain*, either in public pronouncements or in practical undertakings from everything" opposed to religion and morality, and to the doctrines and commandments of the Church. The Catholic members themselves must not tolerate any violation of their conscience. These regulations affect the action of the trades unions only on the moral side, to prevent wrongdoing and any outrage on the conscience of Catholics; no attempt is made to limit their freedom of action in economic matters. The representatives of Christian trades unions have never shut their eyes to the fact that in economic matters, as elsewhere, questions may arise that enter the sphere of religion and morals. If the Christian workmen of Germany had not been convinced of this fact, they would not have formed unions distinct from those of the socialists.

The members of the Christian unions have always emphatically refused, on religious as well as on patriotic grounds, to admit to their associations any of the class hatred that characterizes socialism. Moreover, the Christian unions have always been aware that socialism is not merely an economic organization, but starts with

refer to the ethical works of *Lehmkuhl*, *Vermeersch*, *Noldin*, *Marc*, *Genicot*, *Willems*, *A. Koch*, and *Schindler*; also to *Biederlack* (*supra*, p. 408).

a materialistic view of life, and openly propagates this view. On account of this fact the Christian trades unions have always attached great importance to the secondary aim of the Christian labour movement, viz., to denominational associations for workmen, apprentices, and boys. They have given practical proof of this fact by constantly urging their members to enter these denominational class associations, expecting, of course, that these denominational associations would with equal zeal encourage their members to join the Christian trades unions.¹

Fears had been expressed, both by members of the working classes and by the official organ of the Central Federation of German Industrial Workingmen, that henceforth the Church² would attempt to control the action of the trades unions even in matters of wages and working conditions. The Encyclical neither claims, nor even hints at, any such direct control of the industrial movement. We have already seen what position is assigned to the spiritual directors of Catholic workmen's associations: it is essentially the same as that which they occupied previously. The Catholic trades unions are commended generally because they are based upon the Church and openly follow her leadership, but no suggestion is made that they should be put under the direction of priests, nor are the "mixed" unions condemned for not being subject to such direction. The passages quoted on pages 422 *seq.* show that for reasons easy to understand the Holy See does not desire priests to interfere *directly* with the details of economic and political life. The passage at the close of the Encyclical, in which reference is made to difficulties that may have in future to be submitted to the bishops, plainly does not allude to economic dis-

¹ Köln. Volksztg., 1912, No. 195.

² *Giesberts*, one of the leading men in the trades unions, writes in his pamphlet "Friede im Gewerkschaftstreit," 1909, p. 22, as follows: "We are confident that our bishops, in whose dioceses there has been for years a widespread activity of a large number of Christian trades unions, will find ways and means of reminding Catholic workmen of their duty, should the Christian unions display any tendencies antagonistic to the faith and morals taught by Holy Church. Not only are we leaders well aware of our duty as Catholics, but the Catholic workmen who are members of Christian unions possess this same sense of duty in as high a degree, so that they would never tolerate anything contrary to the Catholic faith, to the Church, or to her doctrines and principles."

putes between manufacturers and their workpeople, but to differences of opinion between Catholics on the subject of trades unions (*praecipimus bonis . . . catholicis ut . . . nunc omni inter se disputatione abstineant. . . . Quod si qua INTER EOS rerum difficultas oriatur, etc.*).

The trades unions are at the present time devoting their attention chiefly to arranging or altering the conditions of labour and the scale of wages. In order to form a practical judgment on questions arising out of these subjects there is so much technical knowledge of an economic nature needed, and so many long and tedious discussions and hearings are indispensable, that as a rule only few men, eminent for their legal and economic knowledge, are competent to act as arbitrators. This reason alone would make it impossible to transfer to the bishops a task making such large demands on time. When the Holy Father asks the authorities of the Church to counsel and direct the workmen's associations, he limits this counsel and direction to the priestly function, and restricts it to the moral duties connected with the relation between employers and employed.

The bishops are of course required to exercise care and vigilance over purely Catholic associations as well as over those of a mixed character, and this is expressly stated by the Holy Father at the end of the Encyclical, where he exhorts the members of both classes of associations to live on good terms with one another and to practise charity and perfect obedience. Any association bearing the name "Catholic" is under a peculiar obligation to display these virtues, which are so important both for the honour of the Church and for the welfare of the Catholic population.

It would certainly be too much to expect, at a time of such unrest and excitement, that all friction should at once cease, or that henceforth no mistakes will be made and no hasty words uttered. No one is free from faults, not even a Christian aiming at perfection, and it is only gradually and by constant exertion that a man can attain to moral solidity. Associations will have to work their way to their goal after a similar fashion. But just as the individual Christian does not presume to be the judge of his own moral condition, especially of his relation to his neighbour, so the associations, that we have been discussing, will benefit greatly if they

act in accordance with the Holy Father's advice and refrain from becoming a judge in their own cause, when new difficulties occur, but rather have recourse to the regular tribunal of the Church. In this way they will do most valuable service to the cause of Catholicism. The German bishops say: "The Holy See, by urging Catholics to unite, by abandoning mutual recriminations, and by adhering to the orderly and ordinary methods of settling any differences that may yet occur, has acted in accordance *with the ardent desires of German Catholics collectively.*" The abandonment of any further mutual recriminations and a peaceable effort to promote Christian social reform are most urgently needed to check the growth of socialism and radicalism.

A few questions of ethics and apologetics, connected with the Encyclical and with the charges mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, still remain to be disposed of: 1. How are we to understand the weighty statement of this document that "a Christian even in ordering his secular affairs must not neglect supernatural goods, but must order *everything* to the highest Good as his final aim?"¹ 2. Is this obligation binding upon associations as well as upon individuals? 3. Do not Catholic ethics, in thus emphasizing the aim, deny the independent substance and value of secular civilization, as Protestant critics allege?

II

In Catholic morals and asceticism it is laid down as a fundamental principle that the obligation to aim at the highest Good is universally binding. It is hardly possible for any misunderstanding to arise on the tenet that in our worldly actions it is never permissible to neglect or injure that which is supernaturally good. The conclusion that all our actions must be directed to the highest Good as their final end, follows from the words *ex christianae sapientiae praeceptis* of the Encyclica. The truth here expressed, though clear on the whole, may admit of more than one interpretation; it may be asked how every single human activity

¹ Regarding the competence of the Church to decide questions of morals, see *supra*, pp. 404, *seq.*

must be directed to the final aim. If we consult on this subject the masters of the Christian wisdom of life and the teachers of the Catholic School, we find that they for the most part base their explanation upon *St. Paul's* words: "Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God."¹ God is the "highest Good," and to promote His glory is the highest and the final aim of all activity, of existence, and of created beings. Everything that is contrary to this aim, whether serious or insignificant, is sinful, and therefore forbidden. Everything that is positively in agreement with it, and is adapted to further it, is morally good. There is a particular virtue tending to promote God's glory in human life and society, and this is religion; but everything morally good participates in reaching this highest aim, and all that is bad involves dishonour to God. Conscience pronounces the rules of morality as a supreme law, absolutely binding, as an expression of the will of God, and of the wisdom that directs the universe.²

Love of God is the highest and most lively form in which the highest Good may be conceived; this love shows us not only the will and law of God and His supreme and exalted authority, but the living personal God Himself in the fulness of His properties, in such a way that the soul abandons itself wholly to Him, becomes united with Him, and lives for His sake. A Christian's supernatural love of God is based upon faith, which makes us realize God's perfections far better than reason can do, and reveals to us the possibility of coming into personal intercourse with our Creator as our Friend. In Holy Scripture we read that faith and love ought to influence the whole thought and action of a Christian. "The just man *liveth* by faith,"³ which means, according to *St. Thomas*, by faith animated with love. The commandment of love declares that we are to love God "with *all* our strength" and to order all our free actions towards Him. By fulfilling this duty, a Christian imparts to his works the consecration that makes them meritorious for heaven.⁴ In this connection the question how all our work, and how each individual action, ought to be referred to God becomes of much practical importance.

¹ 1 Cor. x. 31.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 134, *seq.*

³ Rom. i. 17.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, pp. 182, *seq.*

St. Thomas, who is followed by most theologians, says: "In order that God, or the love of God, should be the end of an action, it is not necessary that, in doing the action itself, a man should think of God or of love of God; but again it is not enough for him to possess God and to love Him only with an habitual intention (*habitu*), as in that case he would also direct to God acts constituting venial sin, and this is impossible," — the intention to love remains even in one who sins venially, — "but it is necessary for him to have thought previously of the end, viz., love of God, and for this reason to have directed his subsequent actions to that end, so that the lawfulness of this direction may continue in the subsequent actions. This is clearly shown in the example of an artist, who would be much hindered in his work if, whilst engaged upon it, he were always thinking of the rules of his art; the fact is, he first sketches the outline according to the rules of art, and then works along this outline, thus doing justice to art and observing its rules in his production."¹

St. Thomas describes this connection between love of God and daily labour as "virtual," to distinguish it from actual and habitual intention, because from the first, actual direction of the work to God there remained not only a permanent condition, but a real force (*virtus*) is transmitted to the action, the force of moral attraction regarding the subordination or superordination of the aims, — "as the force of a supreme aim extends to all the aims ordered with reference to it."² In another place *St. Thomas* illustrates his meaning by speaking of a pilgrim who proceeds to buy a horse to carry him on his pilgrimage, and during the transaction is, without thinking of it, influenced by his religious intention. He refers also to a physician who, whilst seeking medicinal herbs in the forest, is altogether absorbed with his task, and yet practically he does not lose sight of the end for which he practises medicine, viz., the cure of the sick.³ *St. Thomas* applies these examples to the influence of the love of God. Its end is so high, and at the same time so naturally interwoven with the immediate ends of all action, that when the intention has once been

¹ In III sent. dist. 38, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4.

² *Ibid.*, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5 ad 7.

³ De malo, q. 2, a. 5, obi. 11. De carit., a. 11 ad 2.

directed to God, the force of the intention remains and affects all actions capable of being so directed, i.e., all morally good and not sinful acts. "Whoever possesses charity has directed himself and all that he has to God, to whom he clings as to his highest end. Hence whatever he does with reference to himself or his individual duties, he does in a meritorious fashion although he may not actually think of God. It is only when, by some *irregularity* in his action, he allows himself to be hindered that his work cannot be referred to God. This cannot, however, occur, unless the action is at least a venial sin." Hence the conclusion is deduced: "Every action of one who loves God is either meritorious or sinful; it cannot be indifferent."¹

Eminent theologians point out, however, that as a matter of fact the influence of love cannot always be proved to go so far as to permeate and sanctify all good actions in this way; they maintain that no one acts in virtue of love of God unless he can say: "If I had not previously awakened an act of love, this good or permitted work would not have been performed"; only in such a case is love the root and motive power of the work. The pilgrim and physician of whom *St. Thomas* speaks could say this with reference to their aim, but is it possible for a Christian to say it of eating and drinking, of many things in his daily occupation, and even of many acts of natural virtue? Are not in all these things earthly aims, natural inclinations, and social duties often the real motives, so that the actions would have been performed even if the supernatural intention of love of God had not been present? Theologians who take this view are inclined to limit merit in actions and undertakings to such works in which there is actual direction of the intention to God in faith and love, this direction being really the *efficient cause* of the action, although perhaps in a latent, indirect manner.²

Most theologians, however, agree with *St. Thomas* and stoutly maintain that the expression "virtual" bears this wider meaning, and that in the case of a man who has dedicated himself and his

¹ De malo, q. 2, a. 5, obi. 11. A collection of other quotations from *St. Thomas* having a practical application may be found in *Gury-Ballerini*, Comp. theol., mor. I, 25, etc.

² Cf e.g., *Laymann*, op. cit., l. 2, tr. 3, c. 1, n. 5, where he refers to *St. Bonaventura*. See also *Schoeben-Atsberger*, Dogmatik, IV, 129, etc.

whole life to the love of God, whatever moral acts he performs, in conformity with his conscience, are directed and supernaturally ennobled by this love. *St. Paul*, in speaking of eating and not eating, gives the same reason as *St. Thomas*: "For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself, for whether we live, we live unto the Lord, or whether we die, we die unto the Lord. Therefore, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."¹ This higher sanctification of our whole conscious existence is not only mystical, resulting from infused grace, it is at the same time something really moral, induced by the impelling forces of our desires, although perhaps this connection of motives cannot be made so evident as the critics mentioned above would desire. The conclusion drawn, however, that all real influence of an end is wanting if the question whether the action would otherwise not have been performed must be answered in the negative, is erroneous. The important thing is not what might otherwise have happened, but what did actually happen; if a man at the time when he holds another view of life eats, drinks, and takes recreation, this would not prevent him from doing all these things after he had accepted the Christian standpoint, and had now the intention of doing them in the service of God. His will to aim at the highest end may be proven in an empirical way, if he has chosen his mode of life and its expression in the light of faith and love; for he really determined the character of his future life and actions at the time when he made his choice. This supernatural direction towards an aim easily spreads over his future individual actions, conjointly with the moral deliberation and resolution without which no conscientious man proceeds to the more important, at least, of his undertakings. If, as we have seen, all morality as such involves a reference to the absolute good, the *lex aeterna*, this moral deliberation and resolution unmistakably forms a natural link between the striving for the love of God and everyday life and work. In this way the independent existence of a Christian may form one great organism, in which all immediate and earthly aims and occupations are, through faith and love, directed towards a higher end. The direction of all action, including worldly occupations, to the highest Good, is accomplished primarily by a conscious and actual surrender

¹ Rom. xiv. 7, 8.

and consecration of a man's whole self and work to God. A sinner does this when he is converted; a man who has always loved God does it when he rouses to activity the disposition or habit of love that he already possesses. It is accomplished again when religious and secular good works are proposed and carried out; such works owe their origin directly to this higher aim in life, which often causes the energy of the first resolution to be spread over an extended system of action and over long periods of time, while yielding whenever more concrete thoughts assert themselves. (Virtual influence in the narrower sense.) Just as the sun, even though its splendour may be hidden from us, is making itself felt everywhere in nature through its life-giving force; just as the power of electricity is put forth from the place where it is generated to all sorts of machinery and workshops, in the same way it often happens that *one* vigorous resolution sets a man's activity in motion in such a way that one wave urges another forward, one effort induces many smaller ones, so that work apparently worldly shares in a religious impulse, imparting higher life and moral unity to the most uninteresting and distracting occupation.

The more profound the penetration and piety of a Christian, the more constant and conscious is the ordering of all his daily actions to his moral end. This is facilitated, as I have already said, if he has the correct view of his calling being the personal life work assigned to him by God. If a man has chosen his employment with reference to God, and regards fidelity in the pursuit of it as direct service of God, the chief part of his life will naturally take the form of silent worship. Of course the obligation imposed by one's calling does as a rule not control so completely the course of one's life and work as is the case in the religious life, and it cannot be denied that many opportunities occur for free resolutions and undertakings that are accidental and spontaneous and not due to any religious motives. A merchant wishes to make a good bargain, a scholar desires to solve some real problem and thus increase his reputation, the artist seeks to produce some beautiful work of art, and an official seeks promotion. A strong feeling of attraction, an intense affection, generally influence a man who is making up his mind to marry; and even in the case of a priest, an effort, for in-

stance, to secure a better appointment is not invariably the result of striving after higher moral perfection. Can we say that matters of this sort are influenced by love of God, and that actions, performed for a man's own advantage, are directed towards the final aim of charity? The worldly motives that I have mentioned originate all alike in natural self-love, in a man's desire for happiness. *St. Thomas* remarks: "Self-love may stand in a threefold relation to charity. In the first place, it is *contrary* to love of God when a man makes love of his own welfare his final aim. In the second place, it is *included* in love of God, when a man loves himself for God's sake and in God. In the third place, it is *different* from love of God, but not opposed to it, when a man loves himself from the point of view of desiring his own welfare, but does not make this welfare his final aim. In the same way there is also a kind of love towards one's neighbour besides that which is based upon God, such as exists when a man loves his neighbour because of his attractiveness or on the ground of kinship, or for some other reason referable (*referibilis*) to charity."¹

The virtual influence of love of God, as *St. Thomas* conceives it, is undoubtedly great in comparison with these natural inclinations and motives, although it can more easily be overlooked. It does not in this case produce actions that would otherwise not have been performed at all; but it checks natural impulses, and limits and restrains the force of worldly motives, so that they cease to be contrary to love of God, and are ordered with reference to the highest end. This influence may rightly be described as *negative*, since its immediate result is to restrict natural tendencies. A mother controls her children not only when she is telling them what to do, encouraging or admonishing them, but also when she lets them work and play according to their own inclination. By her presence and glance she keeps them within bounds, and silently

¹ S. theol., II, II, q. 19, a. 6; cf. De carit., a. 7: Considerandum est, quod sic se habent dilectiones ad invicem, sicut et bona, quae sunt earum objecta. Unde, cum omnia bona humana ordinentur in beatitudinem aeternam sicut in ultimum finem, dilectio caritatis sub se comprehendit omnes dilectiones humanas nisi tantum illas, quae fundantur super peccatum, quod non est ordinabile in beatitudinem.

checks all that is unseemly. In the same way the reign of the love of God becomes universal, including not only the positive good, but also all lawful actions.¹

St. Augustine was doubtful whether sensual pleasure was a permissible motive of action. *St. Thomas* admits that the moral worth of an action is diminished by the influence of sensual emotions, but considers that the action remains morally good, as long as it proceeds from moral perception as well, and *not exclusively* from motives of pleasure and inclination. The same opinion was held by later theologians. Natural pleasures and also "the advantages of education and social life affect men so directly that, considering the way in which interior and exterior things act and react upon one another, it is impossible to love them only from the moral and religious point of view. Most men learn to appreciate their meaning and connection better from their lower side, by means of experience and practice; and of course a *natural inclination* accompanies these. It requires deep insight or great sanctity to direct from love of God the stream of living interest in a right and effectual manner, so that it affects all the lower part of our life. . . . The splendour attaching to God, our highest Good, constrains us to dedicate to Him our love and adoration, and to testify the firm direction of our will to Him by means of special actions, modes of life, and sacrifices; in this way we shall work and bring forth fruit in the spirit of charity. But the higher love asserts its supremacy even then when it assigns limits to the rest of our other and well-directed activity, and when all natural love is ready at any moment to submit to its paramount decision, although to do so may involve its own death sentence. The moral

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 487 *seq.* The question suggested above: "Is it not a fact that I should do this work even if I did not love God as my supreme good?" is less conclusive than: "Should I not at once relinquish this work if love of God forbade me to perform it?" Those who put the stricter interpretation upon "virtual influence" are of course inclined to exclude from the sphere of what is morally good a great many actions contributing to natural and lawful gratification, and to describe them as indifferent. In this way they reduce *St. Paul's* injunction to do *all* for the glory of God to the rank of a *counsel of perfection*; it loses the character of a universal command, at least on the positive side. Cf. *St. Bonaventura*, In sent. 1. 2 dist. 41, a. 1, q. 3. *A. Schmid*, *Adaphora* (Kirchenlexikon I, 229).

and religious life as a rule receives its vigour from above and from below at the same time."¹

A young man must above all things be trained in faith and love of God, but this alone will not enable him to discover his duties to his family and to society, and the path to follow in his future career in God's service. Natural love of father, mother, family, and home, and an innate pleasure in and capacity for certain arts and occupations, are all good as motives. But these natural motives must be ennobled and directed towards the superior impulse given by love of God; and in this way the Christian character gradually matures, and the divine and human, the natural and supernatural, become more and more interwoven in it, until it is possible to say with *St. Paul*: "Whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die unto the Lord."

The inner life receives a higher moral character through the fact that beside the three theological virtues, and the *religio* which aims at honouring God by acts of piety, it is affected also by a number of "moral virtues," resident in the faculties of the soul, giving a moral form and strength to a man's will and feelings, analogous to his various duties in life. Scholastic writers discuss particularly the cardinal virtues — prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, — deriving from them a great number of other virtues which ought to impart moral security and ease to our secular activity in civil life. In the natural man these virtues are subject to moral prudence, in the supernatural life they are under the higher guidance of charity.

It is not necessary that the acts of these virtues should *always* be referred to the aim of love; to make them meritorious it is enough that they should be referred to the *aims of other virtues*. For instance, one who is striving to preserve chastity, being in the state of grace, obtains merit even though he does not think at all about love of God. Every act, aimed at something good, provided it is not performed in impropriety, has as its object the good of some virtue.²

Eating and drinking in moderation, playing games for recreation, within the limits of that decorum which assigns a proper measure to

¹ *Mausbach*, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, I, 255.

² *Thom.*, In II sent. dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5 ad 3.

such things, are meritorious in the case of one who possesses charity, and who, by means of it, has made God the supreme aim of his life.¹

The reason why this indirect influence and fruitfulness of love suffices is that all affirmative and positive commandments are "always" but not perpetually binding. At every moment of our life we are under obligation to obey the negative commandments: not to blaspheme, not to steal, etc.; but it is possible for us only occasionally to actually obey the positive commandments: to love God, to pray, to give alms, etc., because even in matters of morals the temporary, partial, and uneven nature of our life on earth makes some alternation and some kind of division of labour even in moral effort absolutely necessary.

St. Thomas applies the same principle to the faith of a Christian, and he draws from it conclusions in favour of the possibility of doing good works even in a state of *unbelief*. "We are not bound actually to refer every action to the aim to which faith alone can guide us, for the affirmative commandments are not binding for all times although they are always binding. Hence the actions of an unbeliever, not directed to that aim are not necessarily always sinful, but are so only when he is bound to direct his actions to the highest end."²

Another factor contributes to the same conclusion, viz., the conviction that a *natural moral disposition* exists even in sinners and unbelievers, and may reveal itself in good works, in spite of his error.³ It might be supposed that the whole life of an unbeliever was sinful, since the whole life of a believer, in as far as it tends to the glory of God, is meritorious.⁴ "As a matter of fact, however, the attitude of the believer towards what is good differs from that of the unbeliever towards what is evil. In the man who professes faith animated by love 'there is no condemnation,'⁵ in an unbeliever however there is *natural goodness* together with

¹ *Thom.*, In II sent. dist. 40, c. art. *St. Thomas* makes the same remark (in cap. 3 *Isaiae ad fin.*) about sumptuous clothing and ornaments worn by women. It can be meritorious to take pains about such things if women restrict themselves to what is customary and in keeping with their rank, and avoid all that may give occasion to sin.

² In II sent. dist. 41, q. 1, a. 2 ad 4.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 152 *seq.*

⁴ 1 Cor. x. 31.

⁵ Rom. viii. 1.

his unbelief. Hence an unbeliever does not sin when, in compliance with the dictates of reason, he does something good, provided that he does not do it for a bad end; his work is not, however, meritorious because it is not possessed by grace."¹

St. Thomas establishes his theory very beautifully by pointing out how the various values of human action are graduated, and by comparing them with the various stages of things in nature. Thus each act is to some extent good as an act, as being the result of a natural force. Besides this goodness there is a relative goodness, which grows out of the correct relation of the act to its object, and there is yet another, due to the relation to the aim and to the circumstances. The highest and crowning goodness, however, is derived from supernatural grace and love. "Now even if the latter be withdrawn, the former will remain. Therefore, although the actions of unbelievers lose that excellence which renders an act meritorious, they retain another kind of goodness, either of *civic virtue* or that derived from circumstances or from the class to which they belong. Hence it does not follow that their actions are bad, but only that they are defective in goodness."²

Even the *desire* for virtue (*habitus*) cannot in the case of an unbeliever be called "true" virtue in the sense of being genuine, embracing the whole of a man's life, and ordering it to its end. However, as a single virtue, as an effort to attain a definite moral aim, such as the safety of one's country, it is a "true" virtue.³ With *St. Paul*, *St. Augustine*, and all the mystics, the Catholic Church has invariably represented love of God as the fundamental duty and essential perfection of man; and in opposition to *Bajus*, *Jansenius*, *Quesnel*, and others, she has steadily denied that all the virtues of pagans are sins, that all love of creatures is either

¹ In Epist. ad Rom., c. xiv., lect. 3. Cf. De Verit., q. 23, a. 7 ad 8: We must distinguish between obligation in the "literal sense," in which it is contrasted with sin and its punishment, and the obligation to perform supernatural and meritorious works. In the former sense: "non tenemur ad faciendum aliquid ex caritate sed ad faciendum aliquid ex dilectione naturali, sine qua ad minus, quidquid fit, male fit. Et dico dilectionem naturalem nom (solum) illam, quae est nobis naturaliter indita et est omnibus communis, ut quod omnes beatitudinem appetunt, sed illam, ad quam aliquis per principia naturalia pervenire potest, quae invenitur in bonis ex genere et in virtutibus politicis."

² In II sent. dist. 41, q. 1, a. 2.

³ S. theol., II, II, q. 23, a. 7; cf. Müller, Theol. mor., I, 408, etc.

caritas or evil *cupiditas*, and that all morality and obedience to law must necessarily proceed from faith and charity.¹

By clearly distinguishing natural and supernatural spheres of action, the Church facilitates an appreciation of the general work of civilization, and the possibility of the Christian to coöperate with *unbelievers or with men of other creeds* in certain departments of life. A well-meant assertion, but one liable to be misunderstood, is made by an author who writes that "profane civilization in its specific form has as its root the religious view of the world, and is permeated by it"; and he proceeds to derive thence the "Catholic unity of Church and world."²

Of course, all civilization, including the worldly, ought to be "permeated" by religion, but if it were really its peculiarity to spring from religion as its root, it certainly ought not to be called "profane" or even worldly. Faith is the root of justification and of every action tending to salvation; and in the same way love of God is the principle of the supernatural life, and consequently the completion and soul of all virtues. But as we have seen, there is a kind of moral thought and activity, there is a sphere of secular education, technical knowledge, and science that is not rooted in faith and charity. *Leo XIII* says that the political order requires the moral support which religion gives, for "religion . . . is the queen of virtues, because in binding these to God it *completes* them all and *perfects* them" (*revocando ad Deum explet et cumulat universas*).³

The same writer is opposed to any joint work with Protestants even in political matters, maintaining that as the art of halving a man has not yet been discovered, it is not right for a man to act in private life in accordance with his Catholic view of the world, but in politics to put this view on the shelf as readily as he would his hat. Every Catholic must endorse the latter remark: we are never permitted to abandon our faith and our religious view of life; or even to deny them in our life in the world (*negligere bona supernaturalia*); in fact, we have acknowledged it to be our duty to act in all things under the virtual guidance of

¹ Denz. Enchir., 1025, 1038, 1377, 1397.

² *Köln*, Eine innere Gefahr für den Katholizismus, 1910, p. 48.

³ *Sapientiae christ.*, p. 166 c. r. s.

love of God.¹ But it is not possible, nor does duty require, that we should continually be actually referring all our actions to God. An uninterrupted positive assertion and profession of our faith is not demanded by Catholic morals. As long as we are in this world, subject to various obligations, and able to attend at any given moment to only one of them, we are often forced and in duty bound to "halve" ourselves, and even for a considerable time to put aside the things that we value most highly. The "art" that we have to study is how, amidst the distracting changes of duties and occupations, we may, in the depths of our souls, preserve our disposition to God so as never to devote immoderate anxiety to worldly aims. Catholic philosophers, historians, politicians, and business men must often for hours at a time turn their thoughts away from the highest ideas and aims and devote them intently to worldly objects; in fact, they must sometimes even adopt methodically a hostile standpoint; but by this division of labour they serve the cause of a Catholic view of the world better than they could do were they never to turn their attention from things above this world. They do not, indeed, divide themselves in acting thus, for their habitual faith and love sanctions and demands this concentration of mind upon worldly concerns, and guides them during it so that they tolerate nothing opposed to faith or morals. Thus a Catholic diplomatist at a political Congress, a Catholic partner in a modern corporation, a Catholic workman in a mixed association of workingmen, can act with others not sharing his faith on the ground of possessing just and moral standards in common. A man joins any society as a Catholic, if he does so *recto consilio*, and if, after joining it, he examines and decides *secundum doctrinae catholicae principia* how far he can coöperate in its work. In matters affecting the interests of religion, he allows faith and obedience to the Church to be a positive rule, guiding him in public as well as in private life.

But in order to do this a Christian must often collect his thoughts in religious consciousness and desire, and by means of faith and charity rise above the world and its aims, so as to think with undivided attention of the things of God. In the life of a Christian it is necessary to stir up actually the theological virtues

¹ See *supra*, pp. 443, *seq.*

and a good intention, and to do so frequently, that the habitual direction of his thoughts to God may not be destroyed by grievous sin. The more intimately a man comes in contact with worldly affairs, and the more he is brought under influences hostile to faith and morals, the more does he need supernatural motives to counteract their effect. This lively turning of the soul to God is important, also, because it submits the individual actions to a strict scrutiny, and purifies them from even those slight irregularities which are capable of preventing them from being directed towards God. Finally, this good intention is generally valuable and advisable, because of every form of activity the supernatural virtues form the highest sphere, and because it indicates a higher degree of perfection when a man in his secular occupation is animated with thoughts of eternity. The blessing of Christianity is more perfectly realized when thinkers and artists, men in social work and labourers, all have recourse to the truth and strength of the ideals of faith, and with the fulness of this inner life engage in the distracting and often conspicuous tasks of modern civilization.

Hence, as the working classes are involved in the struggle for worldly advantage, and are at the same time exposed to the storm threatening the moral foundations of individual and family life, they need especially to be reminded of that supernatural final end whence life derives its value and hope its assurance. In the Pastoral issued by the Bishop of Fulda in 1900, we are told that religion "*ought to penetrate a man's whole being*; it is not enough for him to remember it occasionally, and obey its precepts and comply with its principles now and then; it ought to influence his whole nature, his thoughts and feelings, his endeavours and forbearances, his actions and non-actions; they ought to be his guide and his angel, warning him when he is going astray and encouraging him when he is exhausted with work, struggles, and sufferings."

We often hear complaints that, in spite of many legal enactments and social efforts, the spirit of discontent and the estrangement between different classes of society are as strong as ever. But all external and social remedies for the betterment of social conditions are sure to fail unless men possess the inner calm and conciliatory spirit which adherence to God and peace with Him alone

can supply. A great void, a silent despair is felt by the masses. . . . Their natural, worldly selfishness is not broken down by any considerations for law and society; only love of God and of their crucified Redeemer can soften and remove it. The rough, envious struggle for earthly possessions will not end in a harmonious union of forces, unless the minds of men are first lifted above their natural prejudices, their hearts inspired, and their whole intentions and hopes centred upon God in such a way that in spite of social inequality, their inner liberty and security is preserved. The inevitable dependence of the economic weak is apt to lead to unwilling servitude or violent rebellion where the religious justification for, and disposition to, obedience is lacking. "Whatsoever you do, do it from the heart as to the Lord, and not to men."¹

III

The moral justification of the formation and of the work of societies is that man possesses a social nature and has various spiritual and material needs. He comes into existence in consequence of the union of two other human beings; he is by his nature dependent upon union with others; and he has a right to found private associations or societies.²

The most general idea of a society is the permanent union of several persons for the purpose of attaining an end, by means of united effort. Single individuals are in a particular sense the material of which society is composed; the purpose that it recognizes and desires is its interior form (*entelechy*) which makes one moral whole out of many constituent parts. A society may well be compared with a living organism, because in it the members form a fruitful unity and enter into reciprocal relations that are determined by an inner principle.³

The personal independence of the individual must not, however, be overlooked; and all exaggeration and a too precise inter-

¹ Co. iii. 23.

² *Leo XIII*, *Rerum novarum*, p. 210 c. t. s.

³ Thus *Leo XIII* says that the State ought not to interfere with the inner concerns and organization of societies: "for things move and live by the spirit prompting them, and may be killed by the rough grasp of a hand from without" (*Ibid.*, p. 214).

pretation of the comparison must be avoided. For the sake of its integrity every society must possess an authority, representing with a moral and external force the common will of the members, and this authority must seek to promote the aim of the society as a whole by directing the individual members towards its realization.¹

Enough has been said to show that it is *the end or aim* which more than anything else determines the nature of societies, and thereby their peculiarity and variety — *societas specificatur a fine*; and just as the nature of a living creature is the principle and rule of its life, so the sphere of activity of the society — and of its individual members — is determined by the peculiar purpose for which it exists.²

In natural societies, and in fact in all those instituted by God, the object is absolutely fixed with regard to all that is essential. Thus the family is intended to produce and rear posterity, and to be the foundation of all social life; the State has to secure the earthly safety and welfare of the nation, and the Church aims at the supernatural happiness and perfection of mankind. Within the limits of the last two great societies, with their far-reaching aims and sovereign power (*societates perfectae*), are many associations and organizations with narrower aims, public and private organizations, not necessary to all men, but contributing to the full social development of the human race, or even indispensable to it.

The greater the progress of civilization, and the greater the liberty of the individual during any period, the more marked is the tendency to form various associations. Individuals realize their inability to discharge all the duties and to satisfy all the needs of life in the way demanded by the advance in education and taste. Hence they form all kinds of associations in order that, by uniting their strength, they may become stronger and able to accomplish more. In the early part of the Middle Ages the labourers on an estate did all the various work, possessing a rudimentary knowledge

¹ The inward aim (*finis operis*), which belongs to the *essence* of the society, may be distinguished from the outward aim (*finis operantis*) which it seeks to realize by its *activity*.

² *Cathrein*, op. cit., II, 388. *Willems*, *Philos. moral.*, p. 365: "Natura igitur societatis ejusque finis normam adaequatam activitatis socialis constituunt."

of every trade; but gradually each particular trade separated itself from the rest, and finally, in the formation of guilds, the standard of work was raised to perfection and control. In the same way associations are formed in our day, each promoting one of the many interests, or discharging one of the functions, of individual existence; and these grow into independent organizations, concerned exclusively and systematically with one definite branch of work.¹

A society, because of its moral entity, is described as a social organism, and in the moral or judicial sense it is given the character of a "personality." This is justifiable in so far as the association is a self-contained whole, with uniform action, and as it frequently represents itself as "an independent subject with rights and duties, a sharp distinction being drawn between the sphere of action of the society as a whole and of its members individually." We are not now concerned with mere fictitious rights or with social ethics; there is a great difference between the "personality" of an association and that of an individual, a living man with his substantial existence and his mental and physical powers.²

The rights of the association must, of course, eventually tend to the temporal and eternal welfare of the individual; and its duties, too, must fall ultimately to individuals, according to their position and importance in the whole corporation, giving them a sense of moral responsibility, moral guilt or moral merit. If we examine the difference closely in the case of free confederations, we find (1) that the association does not possess the individuality of a human being, nor the simplicity, subjectivity, and immortality of the soul, nor its moral freedom and destiny for eternity. (2) The object and activity of an association is primarily and directly exterior and not interior, since every corporate union between individuals is exterior, and even the authority of the society reaches directly to what is external only, to what is attainable in a social sense.³ Indirectly, it is true, the interior life is affected by the activity of an association, sometimes on the side of knowledge, sometimes on that of the emotions, and sometimes in its moral

¹ Cf. *A. Weiss*, op. cit., IX, 652, etc.

² *H. Pesch*, *Nationalökonomie*, I, 143.

³ *Willems*, p. 363.

and religious aspect. On the other hand, in the case of an individual, his interior thoughts and intentions are the chief and fundamental things, animating all his actions. (3) The living unity apparent in all the actions of an individual shows that in spite of the variety of his faculties and their fluctuating manifestations in action, his personality is indivisible both in his own consciousness and in his moral responsibility. The law of morality requires every man to practise *all* the virtues, and human society, too, makes claims upon him in very various ways. But the duty of an association, as we have seen, is limited to the purpose of its foundation; in most cases this purpose is to secure division of work, and restriction of intellectual or material activity to certain departments; and these things determine its social value. Thereby the individual is enabled to belong to many associations (patriotic, scientific, charitable, artistic, and social) without confusing his energies. We may assert that every form of activity, honourable, justifiable, or permissible, may be made the object of a social association. An individual takes up various occupations *successively*; while by associations they are carried on *side by side*. An interest which in an individual, on account of the strict unity of his life, remains inseparably connected with his whole spiritual and moral life, may develop a separate existence when it is made the exclusive object of an association. (4) In speaking of moral and religious obligations we saw that in all his actions man ought to be guided by faith and love of God; but that after these virtues were aroused, other motives were necessary to influence his will, motives perhaps of common honesty or of interest neither good nor bad, but capable of being reconciled with the supernatural direction of his life to God. Motives of this kind may become the objects for which associations are formed. There are, of course, associations for religious purposes, associations for the encouragement of natural virtues, such as patriotic leagues and temperance societies, but also others whose object is not definitely of a moral character, such as trading associations and clubs for sports and recreation.

Since there are undoubtedly actions which are indifferent on their outward material side, and since associations as such have to do with this outward, objective side of our actions, it is

impossible to deny that the aims of associations may be indifferent as well as naturally good. An individual is bound to inwardly sanctify, by the spirit of faith and charity, what is naturally good or indifferent, and this duty cannot simply be transferred to an association, because, in the first place, an association as such possesses no heart bound to devote itself constantly to God, and, therefore, it has no purely interior obligations; and, in the second place, the members are not bound to awaken supernatural, good intention for every work they perform, therefore, not for every work in connection with the activity of the association. There is, however, one thing that is demanded of associations as well as of individuals, in the same way and with the same universality, viz., that they undertake nothing *contrary* to the highest aim of life, or that would be contrary to faith and good morals. Moreover, every association has the duty to have an objectively suitable and morally permissible object for its activity, which the members may dedicate subjectively to the highest aim.¹

"The supernatural and Christian view of life must penetrate and control economic life, especially in regulating wages and the conditions of labour; this is true not only of the economic efforts of individuals, but of the work of economic associations." This statement is correct if the words "penetrate" and "control" be understood in the sense given above, but not if *St. Thomas's* doctrine, that there are no morally indifferent actions *in concreto*, be simply transferred from the individual to the association. *Cavagnis* says: "If the object of an association has no bearing upon the spiritual order, as is the case with associations of merchants, manufacturers, etc., it is enough that this object be attained in a way *not opposed to the spiritual order*, i.e., by morally permissible means." Such an *ordinatio negativa et objectiva* suffices for associations, as the positive and subjective ordering to the final end is a matter concerning the individual.²

This limitation of scope and aim is not present to the same degree in all societies, especially not in those that are the natural social

¹ A saying of *St. Augustine*, that has already been quoted, may be applied also to associations, viz., we must not find fault with what is done for the reason that not *everything* is done.

² *Cavagnis*, l. c. 1, 390. Cf. *Y. de la Brière*, *Études*, 1912, tom. 133, p. 706.

units. The *family*, the origin of all community life, does not affect a man only on one side of his nature; it lays hold of and fashions him as a whole, bringing all his powers, especially his moral powers, into play. This is why the positive practice of religion and morality is so important in family life.

The *State*, too, is superior to any other association, because it affects our life in many different ways, connected with the aim of its existence, viz., the good order and prosperity of the whole nation. Strictly speaking, it has only earthly prosperity in view, but because it has to promote this prosperity in every possible manner, it must not overlook the dependence of morality upon religion, which becomes thus indirectly essential to the happiness and peace of society. Therefore, indirectly, the State also stands in a positive relation to the highest aim of life.¹

Thus a Catholic can maintain the full supremacy of faith and charity over his inward and outward life, his private and public actions, without being bound to hold aloof from all associations and agencies of civilized life which aim at things that are permitted, without, however, referring them to the highest aim of all. Of course, in such associations people are brought together whose views on the vital questions of life are absolutely opposed. Even in Catholic countries the members of trade societies, of automobile or aeronautic clubs, are not all practical Catholics, and a former or nominal adherence to the Church is no guarantee of Catholic principles. Yet contact with people of different religious opinions is practically not only unavoidable, but necessary in the interests of the Catholic position in civilization and for Catholic influence.² This is particularly true in countries where the people profess various creeds.

Nevertheless, "interdenominationalism," both dogmatic and practical, is, as a system, to be condemned. Careful investigation

¹ *Cavagnis*, op. cit.; cf. *supra*, pp. 358, seq.; *Suarez* (De leg., III, c. 11, n. 9, etc.) remarks that even in a Christian State legislation need take the supernatural into account only in as far as it affects the aim of the State. The ruler of a Christian country does his duty if he faithfully does all that he can for the welfare of the State, and in no way injures the supernatural aim; to refer the act of legislation directly to this aim is, as a rule, not *in praecepto*, but *in consilio*.

² I may just mention the fact that the Canon Law, since the time of *Martin V*, has expressly sanctioned civil intercourse with *excommunicati tolerati*.

is required to decide *which associations* must have a Catholic character, in order to meet the needs of the time, and which may, or must, be "mixed." If we begin with the highest aims for which associations are formed, it is clear that those intended to promote the interests of *religion and the Church*, such as missionary and devotional confraternities, cannot possibly be interdenominational, but must rest upon the foundation of a definite creed. I have already pointed out that every mixture of religions, every compact between Catholicism and Protestantism, must be excluded as a matter of principle.

The question of *education* borders very closely upon that of religion, just as a Christian household resembles the Church. Most German States have therefore established denominational schools, at any rate for elementary education. And associations for the young, not intended simply to give formal instruction or to teach a particular subject, but to supply moral training of the individual, ought to be very closely connected with the Church.

Some *charitable* associations that aim at resisting moral degradation and at doing good to the souls as well as to the bodies of men, need the support of religion, since their task is to supply education of a most difficult sort; and the same may be said of associations requiring the surrender of one's entire activity to the service of the sick and poor. Practical experience has taught the women of Germany, both Catholics and Protestants, that such work cannot be undenominational.

As far as *social* organizations include charitable or educational work, or come into contact with divergent views on religion and morals — I may remind my readers of the different opinions now current regarding marriage — they also have to rest upon some definite religious basis. In this way there were established, in addition to the German Women's League, first the Evangelical and then the Catholic League; and the undenominational league was compelled to exclude the Society for the Protection of Mothers from affiliation, in consequence of the attitude assumed by the latter society towards marriage reform. Similar remarks would apply to the antagonistic opinions held with regard to social-economic questions, some of which directly affect religion

and morality, whilst others display the bitter feeling aroused by conflicting interests in the sphere of industry. The divergence of opinions is revealed by the fact that Christian trades unions were founded in opposition to those of the socialists, and it is emphasized by the Encyclical "Singulari," which requires Catholic organizations to be established wherever it is possible, to promote the interests of workingmen in matters not exclusively industrial, but involving dangers to faith and morals. Where there is no such danger, and where the activity of an association is limited to *purely* secular matters, not affecting the religious and moral duties of Catholics, the Encyclical does not attempt to deter Catholics from joining associations that are "mixed." Moreover, where weighty reasons exist, such as the "peculiar position" of Catholics in non-Catholic countries, and where it would be impossible otherwise to assure their worldly interests, still greater liberty is allowed. In no case is a separation on the ground of religious difference to be taken as indicating hostility, but rather a desire to live peaceably side by side, and to unite on important matters by arriving at a practical mutual understanding, where such is possible, by means of a permanent *cartel*.

In the case of many German societies, the above-mentioned reasons for regarding it as essential, or at least desirable, that they should be *Catholic in character*, gain support from the circumstances of the time. The chief of these are the antagonism between the spirit of the age and Christian thought and sentiment, and here and there the deep-rooted prejudices of Protestants, which dispose them to treat Catholics as inferiors. The dangers of university life and the practice of duelling have led to the formation of *Associations for Catholic students*, which, like other associations for young men, aim at imparting a sort of training, so that the youth may develop into a Christian man whilst passing through the difficult time of transition from a state of strict discipline to one of academic freedom. The *Görres-Gesellschaft* was founded at a time when a violent attack was being made upon the foundations of the faith, and when the position of Catholic scholars was endangered by the *Kulturkampf*. It fosters science, moreover, in that deeper and all-embracing sense which includes its relation to questions of faith and views of life.

Associations of Catholics who have received a university education have recently been formed in many towns; they arrange for lectures on religious and scientific subjects, some of them being delivered by their own members; and this fact in itself shows that they do not aim at setting up unnatural "barriers in the way of social intercourse," but rather at familiarizing Catholics with the doctrines of their own faith. It is obvious that towards the great religious questions of the time an educated Catholic must adopt an attitude quite unlike that of a Protestant, who is accustomed to rely upon private judgment. The Catholic religion is a world of objective thought, with many ramifications, and intimately connected with every form of progress; and it requires considerable effort to assimilate its teaching. The danger that the stronger religious feeling of a Catholic in dogma, ethics, and mysticism will lose its force in a worldly atmosphere is far greater than the chance of a Protestant to develop contrary to his religious convictions.¹

Non-Catholics who are inclined to envy the successful Catholic associations in Germany, must acknowledge that these associations are based upon the real interests of religion, or upon a practical wish to promote morality. Besides the numerous confraternities, congregations, and pious guilds, and those having direct religious aims (missionary societies, etc.), must also be mentioned the societies of St. Vincent de Paul and St. Elizabeth, many other charitable associations, the Society of St. Charles Borromeo, the *Görres-Gesellschaft*, the *Albertus Magnus-Verein*, and many others, some of which have thousands of members, whilst even these are surpassed by the *Volksverein für das Katholische Deutschland* with its seven or eight hundred thousand members. In the case of organizations for particular classes of people, it must be borne in mind that they do not seek only to promote the interests of their members' calling, but to encourage them to perform all the duties of Christians, or to further and protect definite religious and apologetic aims, according to the needs of the class concerned.

On the other hand, Catholics do not hesitate to take part in really indifferent, mixed associations, that have nothing to do with religious and moral questions (choral and gymnastic societies, antiquarian and philological associations, etc.). Many classes, with

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 53, *seq.*

important tasks to perform, have joint associations for Catholics and Protestants, such as naturalists, lawyers, farmers, manufacturers, workingmen, etc.; financial alliances and societies for patriotic and social purposes are, like the Christian trades unions, devoid of any denominational character.

The mixed nature of the German State which secures equal rights to all denominations, has chiefly contributed to the development of the state of affairs now existing. Public political associations both in the Empire and in the individual States, in provinces, districts, towns, and villages, are interdenominational as a matter of principle; and as they exert great influence upon the life and civilization of the nation, the necessity of common action arises, and thus affects many kindred departments, where the formation of free associations is permissible. It frequently happens that the government appeals directly to the initiative and self-reliance of the citizens, and urges them to unite into new associations. Were Catholics to stand aloof from such formations, they would be depriving themselves of *abundant resources*, placed at their disposal by the State, and they would only add to their own economic burdens. Their difficulties in securing fair treatment, and their efforts to obtain complete equality in political life, would be greatly increased, and they would expose themselves to the charge of refusing to coöperate actively in the life of the nation. This would inevitably have the result of making the position of the Catholic Church in Germany more difficult. This general consideration must not, however, lead to feeble compromises, nor tolerate any vague undenominationalism, likely to injure the purity of our faith. Modern developments show that an intelligent respect for denominational organization is possible within the limits of common national and political aims. I need only remind my readers of the strictly denominational charitable institutions and to the various establishments for the care of the young. Another illustration is the fact that the various associations of women or of teachers unite from time to time to secure some definite objects. Such developments coincide on all essential points with the kind of unity recommended in the Encyclical "Singulari," viz., combined effort between various associations. In this way the dangers are avoided to which in mixed associations

individual members are exposed, especially if they are uneducated and do not possess much strength of character. Amongst such dangers are the risk of confusion in religious matters, mistaken readiness to make concessions in practical questions, and disputes and disunion in the association itself. Each denomination can thus independently and fully develop its principles and moral strength, and the fact that the associations are distinct serves to promote a healthy rivalry, whilst the friendly relation existing between them and their common patriotic aim avert any kind of estrangement or hostility.¹

From the fundamental idea of the meaning and object of associations, it follows that even where the Catholic character is not essential, it is by no means antagonistic to secular and purely natural activity, but rather indicates a valuable completion and perfection of it. All that is natural is purified in Christianity; all that is indifferent, or expedient from the worldly point of view, is capable of being directed to a higher, supernatural aim; all that is concrete and isolated seems to demand participation in the purpose of life. There can be no question that uniformity of religious belief and agreement on the most important concerns in life afford the most favourable basis for the formal side of the association, as they tend to draw men together and to promote peaceable intercourse. The comparison of a living organism shows that this must be the case. A plant may be able to reveal and develop its specific character in a certain location, but as soon as transplanted from shade into sunshine, from poor into rich soil, it gains in size, strength, and beauty. In the corporations of the Middle Ages things sacred and secular were closely interwoven. Guilds and confraternities derived a certain consecration from having saints as their patrons, and from the blessing of the Church. Their members shared in common devotions and in works of charity, and all these things had an elevating and conciliatory effect upon society. In the great works of art, that owe their origin to the piety of these early associations, we can still see, as it were, the afterglow of this connection between things sacred and secular; but it shines as a

¹ Thus a formal agreement was, with the approval of the bishops, made in Germany between the Catholic associations for young men and the denominational "Jungdeutschlandbund."

new light in the numerous Catholic organizations of the present day, and our societies for Catholic apprentices and workingmen are worthy to be ranked with the ancient guilds.

The difference, pointed out in a former passage, between the obligation of the individual and of the association, is confirmed by the clear and precise statements of the Encyclical. Every *homo christianus* is bound inwardly to refer all his work to God, i.e., he must have a supernatural intention; both individuals and societies (*vel singuli vel consociati*) must act so as to maintain peace and charity amongst all ranks of the population, and to avoid all discord.¹

The Catholic members of mixed unions (*ipsi catholici*) are required to be obedient to the Church, and to fulfil all their religious and moral duties as Catholics; the only condition imposed upon trades unions as such (*qua tales*) is that they should neither propose, nor carry into effect, anything contrary to these duties.²

The bishops are required to watch (*observare*) the proceedings of the trades unions, and to exercise vigilant care (*vigilare*) over the Catholic members of them. With regard to the Catholic organizations mentioned in the Encyclical, the associations of workingmen are to be under the direction of the clergy, and must do their best to promote the positive practice of religion in a pious life and in moral instruction. The purely industrial associations are commended in general terms for resting on a Catholic foundation and for recognizing the guidance of the Church, — as the characteristics of a Catholic association, — but positive religious obligations are not imposed upon them. Their chief advantage is that they avoid the danger of ignoring religious obligations, a danger to which mixed associations are peculiarly exposed.

It remains for us to discuss briefly the *basis* upon which coöperation of Catholics with non-Catholics, whether permissible or necessary, is to be arranged. Here we touch upon the so-called “general Christian basis” of industrial and political organizations. I have repeatedly said that the idea of a general Christian basis, if

¹ If associations were bound to have a supernatural intention in the same way as individuals, this might, in the case of mixed organizations, actually bring about a false mixture of religious ideas.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 409. A positive declaration on this subject is not required of the mixed associations.

it involves a vague, hazy form of Christianity, is both reprehensible and impractical. A Catholic takes into such associations his strong Catholic view of life and of the world as the groundwork of his activity as a member; and starting with this basis, he enters into the common work of the society only to the extent permitted by his Catholic principles. If a Protestant, starting with the principles of his religion, arrives at the same demands, they may both work together for these demands and use their combined strength to preserve moral and natural advantages, without in the least abandoning their respective principles.¹

Many people are not satisfied with this practical solution of the problem; and as such coöperation usually occurs with adherents of the positive tendency in Protestantism, they try to define theoretically what they have in common with Catholics, or at least think that to do so is important for critical reasons.²

Practically, however, the problem is by no means limited to the question of trades unions, or to the coöperation with faithful Protestants. In many mixed societies, e.g., in trading associations, corporations, etc., there are Jews as well as Protestants. Theoretically any attempt to determine upon a programme of what all Christians hold in common suggests that an amalgamation of religions is the end in view. The Encyclical "Singulari" is instructive on this subject also. In reference to coöperation in economic matters by men of different denominations, it does not allude to the points of dogma on which they agree, but rather to their common interest in the good order of human society (*disciplina societatis humanae*) and in the welfare of the State (*prosperitas civitatis*). In recommending a permanent understanding between Catholic and non-Catholic unions, it uses the word *foedus* or *cartel*, plainly indicating that definite principles of equity are assumed to be its basis. It describes, as the material aim that they have in common, some "morally permissible advantage," "the general welfare," "better conditions for the working classes," and "fairer adjustment of wages and labour." We may sum up all these objects and say that the essential bases for common activity in secular matters are the rules and aims of *natural morality and natural right*,

¹ *Gisler*, op. cit., p. 215, gives instances of such coöperation.

² Cf. *Theol. Revue*, 1913, p. 182.

which are very closely connected with man and human society, and are inculcated both by reason and by Christianity. As we have seen, each association has some definite aim, and if we study it in the light of moral principles, according to its nature and connection with the general aims of mankind and of society, we shall discover practical requirements and rules of action, which must commend themselves to every reasonable man, and especially to every Christian.¹

By looking at things in this way, we (1) avoid *various difficulties* inseparable from any attempt to formulate the ideas common to different forms of Christianity. Moreover, this solution can be applied not only to Protestants but to all non-Catholics; it does not depend upon finding out what Christian principles the former still retain, and how far they have orthodox or liberal tendencies, — as matters stand at the present time this would be practically impossible and a hopeless task. Catholic liberty of action is better assured, and the very reasonable and justifiable inclination to form a political alliance with parties, that approach us closely in matters of religion, must be checked at the point which a true view of natural justice and political wisdom will fix. Among the members of any mixed organization an appeal to reason is more likely to gain a hearing than a discussion of common religious principles.² (2) If we adopt the fundamental position mentioned above, we shall find it easier to show the *objective reality* of our proceedings and to defend our right to our own point of view. We start with the order inherent in things, and show the inner justice imparted by divine wisdom to our natural aims. We defend the welfare of the family, the order of the State, the law of contracts, the dignity of labour, liberty of religious worship in States where all religions are tolerated, and the legal rights of subjects, giving for all these things

¹ On the subject of membership in Christian trades unions *Meyenberg* writes (op. cit., p. 95): "The *natural principles* regarding private and public property, hours of labour and wages, workingmen's associations, strikes and innumerable similar questions, are the principles of our whole Catholic theory of God and of the universe. In Christianity all that is supernatural is founded upon the strong basis of sound human intelligence, natural truth, and natural law."

² It is known that often the adherents of orthodox Protestantism are more than liberal theologians and philosophers antagonistic to Catholics.

reasons that any one can understand. The higher light that we derive from our faith does not lose its value in this way; in fact, to it we owe a peculiar clearness and assurance in dealing with these natural questions. But in the same way as scholastic philosophers justified their teaching about usury not only by the laws of the Church, but also by the nature of loans and the natural claims of justice, and as Catholic moralists at the present day quote also reason and human welfare in support of the indissoluble character of marriage, — thus, when discussing social and political subjects, we derive substantial support if we can refer to the *natural* necessity, justice, and expediency of our course.¹

This view agrees perfectly with the teaching of *St. Thomas* on nature and grace, which we have already discussed. Supernatural love of God comprehends all permissible *dilectiones humane*, and the theological virtues do not exclude the *virtutes civiles*. If Christian faith is lacking, the *bonum nature* still remains, and although the “later” stage of supernatural goodness may have been removed, the “earlier” stage of civic virtue may be left.²

The metaphysical ground for these ethical arguments is to be found in the aims laid down in creation by God’s wisdom, and intended by Him to be the material basis of morality. The essential point in the moral order is reference to the *highest* aim, the direction to God of one’s whole being and of all one’s actions. This direction, however, and the duty to glorify God and to strive to possess Him, are realized outwardly when we respect the natural order of things in relation to one another, when we strive to attain the highest end by attaining our own particular aims, and when we value the *fines particulares* of the single virtues as being in *se ordinabiles ad finem caritatis*, and seek to make them our own.³

The opinion as to the kind of common foundation possible for mixed associations gains further weight from some words addressed

¹ That this solution may be regarded as a consistent rule appears from the fact that it is applicable to mixed associations which are concerned neither *directe* nor *oblique* with religion and morals, and therefore are not considered in the Encyclical. In their case also there must be a common basis, but no one would require the doctrines of Christianity to be guaranteed by glee clubs and that sort of societies.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 445, *seq.*

³ S. theol., II, II, q. 23 a. 7, c. and ad 1.

by *Leo XIII* in 1892 to the Bishop of Grenoble, on the occasion of a congress of the Federation of young Catholics in that city: "In aiming at what is good either for individuals or for society, it is a matter of Christian prudence not to reject, but rather to invite the coöperation of all well-meaning men. The great majority of the French people is Catholic, but even amongst those who are not so fortunate, many still preserve sound common sense and a certain uprightness that we may describe as the sense of a *naturally Christian soul*. Now this sense, united with an inclination to what is good, gives them also the power to realize it. . . . If all men rise superior to party strife and work together, — the honest people with their sense of justice and straightforwardness, and the faithful with the resources supplied by religion, — the masses will at last find out who are their true friends."¹

Even *H. Holzamer* does not condemn unions of workers of various denominations to secure better conditions of labour, i.e., for a specifically secular purpose; he opposes only any suggestion of "a common Christian basis." "The only conceivable, suitable, and possible ground for justifying or recommending such unions (they ought to be called 'undenominational' and not 'Christian'), is that it is possible to insist upon the specifically secular purposes as the bond of union, and to declare that in carrying out these aims, the conscientious scruples of every denomination shall be carefully respected."² *Holzamer* thus adopts our point of view, but in limiting "the bond of union" to the immediate aim he goes further than we have done.

But it may be asked, is it not proper, then, to describe as "Christian" the joint action of Catholics and Protestants in public life, thereby gladly welcoming the real agreement in faith and morals that exists between Catholics and "positive" Protestants? We certainly do not suggest to any economical, political, or national union that they first investigate the common "Christian basis." What we do is to place ourselves as persons upon the basis of Catholicism, and we place the union upon the objective, natural excellence of its specific aim, and upon the civic virtues recognized both by reason and religion.

¹ Cf. *H. Platz*, *Der Sillon*, Hochland, VIII, II, 4.

² *Turn und Block*. Trier (Petrus-Verlag) 1912, p. 224, etc.

But may we not regard it as beneficial to the prestige of Christianity, and as facilitating our task, that we, though aware of deep religious differences, can nevertheless speak of Christian States, Christian society, Christian schools and education, and Christian associations of workingmen, and in doing so call to mind the things that we have in common with others and which justify us in speaking thus? Undoubtedly this question must be answered in the affirmative.

(1) The designation "Christian" implies an allegiance to Christ which is not merely external. It expresses the fact that our Redeemer's work still exerts a powerful influence upon mankind, beyond the limits of His visible Church, and that nations, though to a great extent alienated from the Catholic Church, still retain of her teaching much that they regard as a precious possession and as the heaven of public and civil life. Freethinkers and atheists would welcome with joy the sacrifice of the word "Christian" in favour of "undenominational" by States in which religious equality prevails. They would regard it as a proof that their exertions have been successful, and would see in it a prospect of soon destroying religion in the specifically Catholic and Protestant countries. (2) If we consider what most politicians, sociologists, and orators (including Catholics) actually mean when they speak of a Christian theory of life and of the universe, we shall find that very frequently, if not usually, they are thinking of the truths of *natural religion, morality, and order*, such as the existence of God, the spiritual character and immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, respect for authority, monogamy, the sacredness of human life, and similar truths closely connected with political and social questions. In themselves these ideas are suggested by reason and philosophy, yet there is good reason for calling them Christian, since Christianity first disentagled them from the errors of paganism and planted them permanently in the consciousness of the human race. These truths and rules follow as a necessary result from the correct, theistic theory of the universe. But the word "theistic" is surely not suitable for popular use, even if it were desired to introduce it. (3) Over and above these natural truths there are a number of common possessions derived from the treasury of the *revealed Christian religion*. It would be difficult, and

often impossible, to state them to an association with many Protestant members, in such a way as to make them *theologically* intelligible and capable of serving as a basis of common activity. Practically, however, as an element of social life, and in civil and national culture, there are many ideas and institutions belonging to this field that are very valuable as a basis for joint action, although opinions differ as to their precise significance. Or is it a matter of indifference if in a country the person of Christ is regarded as sacred and protected against blasphemy or not? If the Bible is treated as a sacred book or not? If the head of the State speaks with respect of the Trinity and of the Apostles' Creed? If the observance of Sunday and of the great feasts of Christianity is enforced by law? If oaths in their Christian form, the Christian burial of the dead, denominational schools with religious instruction, theology as a faculty of the universities, have survived? If Catholicism is officially and publicly recognized by the State? Or if, on the other hand, the *contrary* of all this is the fact? Great numbers of Protestants cling to these elements of the ancient, common faith with deep conviction, or at least with strong feelings of piety.

The present time, so restless and full of exciting contrasts, is drawing a sharp dividing line between the people who believe and the masses who drift into naturalism and socialism and who would fain remove from public life all traces of Christian tradition. Such being the state of affairs, no Catholic will deny that it is often our *duty* to join forces with Protestants, even in the interests of Catholicism; but where this is the case, it would certainly be unwise and unreasonable to try to avoid using the watchword "Christian," in fighting side by side for sacred institutions, not to interpret them theologically, but simply to defend and preserve them in the form in which they still exist amongst the people — foundation stones saved from the time when all men professed the same faith. It would be unwise and unreasonable to try to ignore what still remains of the faith in the fundamental dogmas of Christianity and of the sentiments of respect for them, for the reason that they are contaminated by error, since the force of such faith and feelings is of great practical and political value in counteracting the destructive tendencies of the social and religious revolution.

Still, in spite of all these considerations, this "Christian" community of thought seems less suited to serve as the real foundation or basis for an association, a party or a *cartel*; it can, however, be of assistance in facilitating, maintaining, and strengthening the natural law foundation, which has been previously discussed.¹

It may be urged that the discord and uncertainty existing outside the Church extends not only to dogmas, but also to those natural truths and rules that we have accepted as a basis for common action, and we may be told that Protestant scholars question the existence of a *natural law*. But then (1) many, who deny the existence of the natural law, still admit that of a natural *moral law*. They maintain indeed that an immoral law can create a formal right, as a right coincides essentially with the power of the State to enforce obedience; but they acknowledge that *conscience* and morality may forbid obedience to such a law. Because a man holds a positive theory regarding law, it does not follow that he does so regarding morals. (2) In questions of social life and work, we are concerned less with the opinions and definitions of scholars than with the sound *common sense of the people*. The masses still believe in a natural law, as something born in them; and they look upon all violence done to the weak, all withholding of wages, all partiality in the administration of justice, all breaches of contracts, as wrongs done to their neighbours, quite apart from any State enactments. In daily life this natural sense of justice is strength-

¹ On November 28, 1909 the leaders of the Centre party in the German Parliament issued a manifesto declaring this party to be "political and undenominational," taking its "stand on the constitution of the German Empire," and aiming at the protection of the rights and interests of all the citizens, "the welfare of the nation as a whole, and the prosperity of all classes." As one of its aims is mentioned particularly "to assert the justifiable interests of German Catholics in every department of public life." Although every deputy is bound to be guided by the principles of his own denomination in all that affects religion, there is still a wide range of "principles and interests," common to all Christians, and experience shows it to be at once possible and desirable for both Catholics and non-Catholics to coöperate in the Centre party on these points. With regard to *Christian trades unions*, the founders chose to designate them thus to mark their opposition to the revolutionary tendencies of the age. Enough has been said to show that the mere use of the word "Christian" does much to avert errors and excesses. The obliteration of this word would strengthen the opponents of the organization, no matter to what party they might belong, and would give rise to a very disastrous confusion of mind in its friends and adherents.

ened by the reciprocity of interests as well as by the influence of Christian customs—dishonest maxims seldom find acceptance for any length of time, so that in many Protestant districts commercial honesty and trustworthiness are exemplary. If the principles of the natural law had altogether ceased to affect social and political life outside the Church, it would be impossible for Catholic minorities ever to hope for success in a mixed parliament, or for a Catholic trades union to form any sort of alliance with a Protestant society. The ambiguity prevailing on fundamental questions of morality, and the still greater difficulty of applying them to individual cases, again warn us of the *dangers* which may arise when mixed associations are formed in any indifferent way. It is most necessary to train men to think and act in accordance with Catholic principles, and there must also be a strong and enlightened guidance on the part of the ecclesiastical authorities;—these are the two *cautelae* required by *Pius X* in his Encyclical.

This brief survey is enough to show us what happiness we enjoy, as Catholics, in being perfectly agreed regarding the substance and scope of Christian principles, and in possessing, as one harmonious whole, all the Christian doctrines and institutions that those outside the Church possess only as isolated fragments. With Catholicism as their foundation, the truths and laws of natural, ethical, and social thought are more firmly established than could otherwise be the case. The Catholic theory of life is our “tower of strength,” and it must be the basis and support of all our activity, even when we step out to combine with others in the common struggle for the preservation of what is good. It would be pessimism to stand aloof from this common struggle, and to insist upon an exclusively Catholic equipment, fearing that the radical and unbelieving tendency would be victorious in the end, and thus destroy the remains of the old Christianity. In any case we must beware of incurring any responsibility for such injury, and however great our hindrances may be, we must hope for the eventual triumph of Christianity and pray *Ut omnes unum sint*. We may take into account the sad possibility of defeat, as a spur to drive us on in our efforts to preserve and intensify in our own ranks the living force and energy of Catholic Christianity and to combine the readiness to make sacrifices for the Church with the

labour for our country. And while we avail ourselves of the permission to join mixed associations, we must exert ourselves to develop and strengthen our purely Catholic societies. In this way we shall supply those of our faith with the inward support and power of resistance that they need in interdenominational intercourse; and at the same time, in case any industrial revolution should occur, we shall be laying up a store of inward strength, self-control, and enthusiasm, that may then serve as the foundation of a new order of society.¹

IV

A suitable conclusion to this chapter, and also an opportunity to cast further light upon some of the points we have been discussing, is suggested by the objection that the close connection between this world and the next, between nature and grace, destroys all natural spontaneity, and deprives art, politics, and economic industry of their *independent form and value*, so that they can no longer be governed by their own internal laws; that

¹ In his Lenten Pastoral for 1910, Cardinal Fischer condemns indiscriminate interdenominationalism, and says: "Quite apart from the private relations arising out of the mixture of Catholics and Protestants in many districts, there are many departments in social and public life, where we Catholics can without difficulty work hand in hand with our fellow countrymen who profess another, but a positive, form of Christianity, in protecting our common possessions and to ward off common dangers; in fact we are obliged to help one another. The increasing strength and the aggressive attitude of unbelief makes it necessary for all believers in Christ to unite, if our country is not to be injured to its very vitals, and if the nation is not to be gradually robbed of Christianity." In July of the same year Cardinal Kopp addressed to Catholic associations of workmen the following words: "We Catholics are not in the habit of bringing into prominence the differences marking us off in matters of religion. We are content to practise, maintain, and protect our own religious conviction; and we wish to be guided by it. It should affect our whole life, both religious and civil, and sustain us in all our actions. We refuse to conceal or suppress our religious conviction for any earthly advantage. We cannot alter or remove the existing religious differences, but we can prevent their giving rise to friction and being an obstacle to our peaceable existence with others. We cannot obliterate them, but we can soften them and not allow them to intrude upon our social and civil relations. . . . We may cling to our own faith, and order our behaviour in accordance with it. But does this prevent us from living in peace and concord with our fellow countrymen who have another faith, or from working harmoniously with them to improve and perfect the conditions of life in this world?"

they are thus reduced to a state of mere dependence upon religion, Christianity, and the Catholic Church. We are told that a pious Catholic is not allowed to have any sense of "independence" of conscience with regard to the laws of God and the Church, nor of the value of things temporal as compared with things eternal, nor of the secular as compared with the religious life, nor of the "autonomy" of economic life and the independence of science and art. Isolated charges of this kind are found continually in the works of Protestants and freethinkers, although they often contradict one another, and occasionally they are collected so as to give a more or less unpleasant picture of Catholicism.¹

On the other hand, many people profess to discover in Catholicism a mistaken tendency to represent as independent some things that have only a relative and derived value. Thus the followers of *Kant* criticize the "independence" of our form of worship as opposed to general morality. Protestant theologians complain that we set an "independent value" upon asceticism and mortification, as being practices holy in themselves, and not merely means to an end; and both alike blame the "independent emphasis" that we lay upon good works as objective duties, necessary even apart from the intention with which they are performed.

The word "independent" is used with many different meanings, and not infrequently quite wrongly, and this gives rise sometimes

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 427. In a criticism of a speech against Modernism that I delivered at the Catholic congress at Düsseldorf, *Fr. Schiele*, speaking as one of the Protestant Modernists, says that my words revealed to him plainly the difference between his attitude and that of the Catholic Church towards progress. "We are convinced that the 'world' has its own order, independently of Christianity; a Catholic seeks to bring order into the world by means of Christianity. Politics, law, industry, science, and art all are, in our opinion, governed by their own laws; to a Catholic they all have to wait for religion to give them their true and higher principles. We fear for the purity of our faith as well as for the safety and order of civilized life, if Christianity should encroach upon these subjects; but a Catholic welcomes such encroachment as tending *omnia instaurare in Christo*. We distinguish religion and theology, faith and knowledge, morality and politics, Christianity and art; but a Catholic cannot unite all these too closely. We know that Revelation has an interior mission only for the individual soul; a Catholic believes it to have a public mission to all universally. We desire as individuals to do everything in the world with the aid of religion, but nothing for the sake of religion; a Catholic looks upon religion as his strongest motive of action, and does everything for the sake of his religion" (*Christl. Welt*, 1908, p. 905).

to misunderstandings and fears, even amongst Catholics, although a more careful investigation would remove them. This is true in cases where theologians speak of the "independence" of what is natural as contrasted with the life of grace; of the "independence" of lay action within the ranks of the Church, and of Church history as an "independent" branch of knowledge, as contrasted with history of dogma, etc.¹

We must begin by distinguishing absolute from *relative independence*. God alone is absolutely independent; "I am who am." God alone exists of Himself (*a se*) by an inward, essential necessity. He alone exists so completely in Himself (*in se*), with such infinite fulness of being, that no other being can increase or add to it; He alone exists completely by and for Himself (*per se* and *propter se*) as the supreme, perfect, and personal God, whose rights, worth, and dignity depend on Himself alone; He thinks and wills with that supreme independence which knows no rules and laws apart from its own being; He alone commands and rules with that sovereign power which is dependent upon no one, and is limited and influenced by no other force. In this way, in comparison with God, the Creator, all that is created and outside of God is absolutely dependent; it originates in the thoughts and will of God, it is called into existence from nothingness by His free decision, it remains in existence and action by His power, it is subject in every respect to His physical guidance and moral laws, and in every moment and aspect of its being it is directed towards God as its highest aim.

Nevertheless there is such a thing in creation as a real, though *relative, independence*. And as God's words: "I am who am" conveyed to the Israelites a sense of His fidelity to His promises, and of the abiding character of His covenant with them, in the same way, from the philosophical point of view, the absolute fulness and majesty of God's being is the surest guarantee of the independent

¹ One aspect of independence, viz., the relation between subjective liberty of action and ecclesiastical authority, was discussed in Chapter IX. I am restricting myself here to the objective independence of the *value* of actions and of the interior *rules* for action. The misunderstandings to which I have just referred are partly due to the fact that the Latin languages possess no word exactly equivalent to the German *selbstständig*, which does not mean exactly "independent," but rather "self-dependent."

existence of things in this world and especially of spiritual beings. The work of the infinite, almighty God cannot be merely a dream or a phantom; it is reality, though a finite reality, far inferior to God. There are in the world *substances*, i.e., beings that exist in themselves (*in se*), and possess a uniform, permanent sort of being, each according to the ideas implanted in them by the Creator. We may and must call them independent, if we contrast them with the properties, faculties, and processes that belong to them and do not exist alone (*accidentia*). There is in the world a *causality*, i.e., an activity and productiveness, originating in the substances, but expressing and realizing its own being; the first Cause called into existence a wonderful variety and order of secondary causes. When such a cause produces a result, we may say that it is independent, that it has reached its goal independently, which we could not say of a mere instrument employed by the cause.

There are spiritual beings in the world, *persons*, who in a more perfect sense exist independently and have a more definite individuality, than the lower substances. Christian philosophy regards increased independence and individuality (*per se esse*) as their most conspicuous characteristic. In virtue of his spiritual nature and personal dignity, man is God's likeness, and is at once the centre and climax of creation. He is the *ruler*, and external nature is destined to serve him. His personal individuality justifies us, moreover, in saying of man that he exists *for his own sake* (*propter se*), not in the sense that he is his own aim, but that he is no mere instrument for realizing the aim of creation as a whole, being himself a microcosmos, a being resembling God, and destined to belong directly to God.¹

This fact expresses most plainly the independent dignity of each individual human being, and the difference between man and the brute creation. In consequence of man's interior independence, he is capable of the more perfect action that belongs to spiritual beings. In his self-consciousness and in the *exercise of his free will* man acts according to his own perceptions, he chooses his own aims, and is his own master (*dominus sui*). It is difficult for us to understand how God can unite, in the human will, both freedom

¹ *Thom.*, S. c. Gentil., III, c. 112: Sola igitur intellectualis natura est propter se quæsita in universo, alia autem omnia propter ipsam.

and dependence upon His power; and it is equally difficult to fathom His reason for allowing man to abuse his liberty and do evil; but every thoughtful person must acknowledge that on this point the Church ascribes to man a high degree of independence. In consequence of man's power to govern his inner life, he has a right to *personal liberty*, and to claim certain external possessions; every man is to some extent independent in the eyes of the law (*sui iuris*) — and this is another principle which the Christian view of man, as opposed to pagan ideas regarding slavery, and total dependence, introduced into the conscience of the people.

If we look more closely at the activity of the mind and will itself, at their nature, rules, aims, and productions, we shall see quite plainly that from one point of view, God, the Creator of the universe, is the Alpha and Omega of all intellectual life and progress; but from another point of view it is obvious that man must use his own resources, his own consciousness, and its immediate objects, in order to lay hold of God in thought, arriving thus at knowledge and, as it were, self-evident truths. God, the first and highest Truth, is not the truth first recognized by us. His existence, *per se notum*, is discovered by us through the instrumentality of creatures, which are for us *magis nota*, and from the first principles of our reason, which are *per se nota*.¹

Hence we collect information regarding things internal and external, and by means of methodical and systematic work we build up sciences, that control our thought by the evidence of those principles and facts, which have for us an independent validity, not dependent in the first place upon our knowledge of God. The same impartial view of the universe, and the same laws of thought, carry us beyond the single sciences to philosophy; and they constrain a philosopher, like any man with sound common sense, to acknowledge that this finite and limited universe and the order and wisdom displayed in its government must be referred to God, as the Creator and first Cause. This natural recognition of God is progressive, and rises from the effects to the Cause by way of natural knowledge. Scholasticism does not appeal to any innate conception of God, nor even, as *Descartes* does, to God's real existence, in order to arrive at a trustworthy knowledge of the universe. The

¹ S. theol., 1, q. 2, a. 1.

natural tendency of our own minds compels us to use and study the materials supplied by our sense perception, if we desire to make the universe our own and to rise up to God, and thus we employ what lies close at hand, and belongs to us, as a foundation for further progress to what is higher. Hence it follows that all practical control of nature, and technical work in the widest sense (trades, agriculture, manufactures, etc.), are closely connected with the actuality of the universe and with the laws of nature revealed to us by science, and consequently they must avail themselves of the forces of nature with logical consideration and appreciation of the same.

Men have observed the properties of fire, water, steam, etc.; and have found out how to employ them for definite purposes. In course of time the methods of employing them have become more refined, more complicated, and more successful, but it is perfectly clear that all this technical work cannot deviate from the laws of nature without incurring the penalty imposed by nature, and that thus technical knowledge, like science, is independent in its own department, and rests on foundations of its own.

Art, although it very often serves moral and religious purposes, has its own particular formal object, viz., beauty; and wherever we encounter this in nature or in the works of men's ingenuity, it has a direct influence on our feelings. Whoever wishes to reproduce this beauty artistically, must study the hidden relations of forms, grouping, and rhythm, and must master the technical rules of art; in other words, he must know and apply the inner laws of æsthetics. Art, too, has its independent sphere and interior standard of merit; not everything practically advantageous or morally good is artistically beautiful.

The economic activity of individuals and of society in general has, as a rule, another tendency, and aims at solid advantage, and at the multiplying and ordering of material possessions. But still more is it dependent on the natural wealth and energies of the earth, and still more does it seek to satisfy most elementary needs; it forms the material foundation for higher intellectual culture. Moreover, the whole great system of industry, trade, and commerce, however much it may be raised by the intelligence and free activity of men, displays an inward necessity and conformity to law. There is an

economic calculation of what is attractive and profitable, and any one attempting to dispense with it would soon pay the penalty.

The same remarks apply in a wider sense to the social field. "Social politics undoubtedly make for an aim peculiar to itself alone and limited to its sphere. To this extent it must be admitted that it is independent, and competent to deal with matters belonging to this department."¹

With regard to the society of the State, we have already seen that, being the highest organization in secular life, it possesses independence in its legal authority and self-sufficiency in its means of existence, in virtue of which we are bound to impute sovereignty to it, and describe it as the *societas perfecta*, "in suo genere *suprema*."

As compared with the substance, the accidental is really, inwardly dependent; so an irrational being in comparison with the human being, an instrument in comparison with the determining cause, means that are only "used" in comparison with an end that is "attained," a slave in comparison with one legally free. In the same way, in the sphere of intellectual and social activity, the mere collecting of materials and all subordinate work connected with science, all that is purely external and technical in art, the necessary, but in itself unproductive, labour of economic life,—these are all dependent occupations. It is clear, however, that in these matters, the aims and limits of which are so dependent upon the intentions and opinions of men, the idea of "independence" can only be relative, according as the standpoint is raised or lowered. Thus an auxiliary science like palæography is dependent when compared with the science of history, but as a science it is independent. Money-making is an aim in itself, from the point of view of a financier, but it is only a means to an end from that of an economist. In the same way within the State a province or a city may be self-governing, and yet subject to the control of the State.

In the sphere of our efforts and desires *St. Thomas* distinguishes the *bonum honestum, utile, delectabile*. In the narrowest sense what is useful is that "which in itself contains no reason why it should be sought and is sought only in as far as it tends to something

¹ *Fr. Walter, Socialpolitik und Moral, 1899, p. 24.*

else, as, e.g., taking unpleasant medicine." On the other hand, that which is honourable and morally good (*honestum*) is sought for its own sake (*propter se*), because it is in harmony with the mind and reason. What is pleasant (*delectabile*) is, like what is honourable, an end (*terminus*) for our efforts, not merely a point of transition like that which is useful. It is sought, however, for the subjective pleasure that it affords, and not for its objective beauty. Above all other good things, virtue is an independent aim for our efforts, and on this point, too, the circles intersect. If we think of the supreme aim of all our efforts, virtue appears as a means to that aim (*bonum utile*), without, however, losing its character of being in itself good.¹

St. Augustine, who influenced *St. Thomas* in drawing this distinction,² considers more particularly the difference between *frui* and *uti*, and says that *frui* means: *amore alicui rei inhaerere propter se ipsam*. As he frequently employs *frui* in the absolute sense, in speaking of the highest aim, he has to face the question whether we may not love earthly things, especially our friends, for their own sake. He answers it in the affirmative, pointing out that we may love them both for their worthiness as human beings and with reference to the highest Good, loving them in God.³

Morality is superior to every other department of life and existence, since it aims at leading back to God the being that proceeded from God. It makes God's honour, which is the final end of creation, the highest aim of human activity, and thus guides man to his true perfection. Owing to this relation to the absolute, morality is essentially different from an activity that affects only a proximate and finite end. Everything strives to attain the infinite good, and all aims are subordinate to the absolute aim, so that the moral law is superior to all individual laws.

The value of moral virtue is, indeed, incomparable and infinite, and cannot have its ultimate basis in the personality of creatures. The moral obligation is absolute and unlimited; whether the action belongs to the sphere of politics, industry or art, the obligation cannot be derived from any of these things. Their claims are

¹ S. theol., I, q. 5, a. 6; II, II, q. 145, a. 3.

² De div., 83 quaest., q. 30.

³ Cf. *Mausbach*, Die Ethik des hl. Augustinus, I, 223.

relative and conditional, and whenever they come into conflict with the law of morality they must give way, as the accidental invariably must give way to the essential. This dependence may be traced ultimately to the most universal conception of good. We cannot absolutely assert a thing to be good, unless we know the object for which it is good, and have traced it up to the highest aim, i.e., to an aim that from *every* point of view is worthy to be loved and sought for its own sake. It is only possible to state, with complete and permanent assurance, what is good for man and for his conduct, if we regard him not as a philosopher, artist, citizen or contractor, but as man, a human being, having in his innermost nature a soul related to infinite truth and goodness. Thus the isolated departments of human activity lose their independence in the presence of the force and obligation of morality, and yet it is no loss, because from the very outset they could not regard their special aims as absolute, but must look, for their crown and completion, to life as a whole, in the light of true wisdom.

This is the distinction between truth and goodness, — even before we have a knowledge of God, even before recognition of the divine truth, there is absolutely valid truth, such as that of the principles of thought; but there is no absolutely binding goodness until we have grasped what is absolutely good and valuable. The foundation of our knowledge lies in the actuality of the created world, but the ultimate ground of our volition is in our final aim. The truth of the statment $2 \times 2 = 4$ is not increased for us when there is added to it a knowledge of the source of truth and being; but in the sentence "A child must obey his parents," the "must" receives a fresh and intensified meaning, if we first derive its meaning from the ideas of "child" and "parents," without reference to a higher aim and Lawgiver, and then, as our natural conscience does, bring the idea "must" into relation with a higher, absolute aim and law.¹

The Commandment: "Thou shalt honour thy father and thy mother" appears at first sight to be sufficiently justified by the natural relation of a child to its parents and by the value of family life; but what are we to say when people of the modern type regard the family in its present form as a hindrance to genuine

¹ Cf. Philos. Jahrbuch, 1899, p. 420. *Cathrein*, Moralphilosophie, I, 394, etc.

development? We may refer them to a higher aim, to the welfare and life of society, the foundation of which is the family, but this reference will have no effect, if the absolute value of this aim is called in question. Not every kind of society deserves respect, indiscriminately, and so we are forced to seek a higher standard of genuine goodness. Even life and the preservation of the human race do not seem to a philosopher such absolute advantages as to a sociologist, as pessimism looks at it. If all created being and life did not, in its order and direction to an aim, reveal God to us, — God, who desires the life, order, and perfection of humanity as the true good, as His *own* aim, — then we might well raise the question whether human life, the alleged “highest good,” is really a good thing in all cases, and whether the elimination of this highest point in the series of our aims does not destroy the whole purpose of morality.

The justifiable independence of human action *gains* rather than loses by its subordination to morality. Not only are due limits assigned to the various departments of life and law, but any encroachment of one upon the other is averted. Their interior laws and postulates, too, are confirmed and established by morals, as are also parental authority, fidelity to the marriage bond, commercial honesty, civil liberty, the dignity of art, and in fact all rules and methods upon which work in the various departments must depend, if it is to be productive of good results. The highest aim, as we have seen, works through all the *lower aims*, not destroying, but *maintaining* and raising them. The practical relations, arising out of the nature and position of man in the world, remain authoritative in morality also. These *foundations, based on natural law*, the Catholic teaching on ethics defends against the doctrines of a radical evolution of morals as well as against those theorists who represent the whole moral law as the outcome of a free, arbitrary determination on part of the Creator.¹

The system of morality that builds up so as to preserve the right relation of things to one another, whilst ordering all to the highest end, appears again as important. We see how the department of morality is higher than other departments of civilized life, but is still akin to them; it is superior to them, but does not crush nor

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 134, *seq.*

confuse them; and thus they remain truly *independent*, — not independent of morality, but *within* the limits of morality.

The whole consideration assumes another aspect, if morality be separated in some way from its natural foundation, if the principle of good and evil be relegated to the subjective consciousness or habits of mankind, or made dependent upon some arbitrary action on the part of God. When this is done, it destroys the inner teleological connection between the advantages of civilization and the excellence of morality, and as nevertheless the moral law is the highest positive command, it must in that case almost inevitably imperil true independence in all other matters.

The empiricists, in writing on ethics, try to show that ordering life to God neutralizes all earthly and temporal interests, and that the divine law deprives all independent effort of its value, and actually destroys it. But as things in this world owe their natural being and energy to the fact that they were created *by* God, so it is impossible for them to lose their natural significance and expediency by being destined and used *for* God. I have repeatedly pointed out that Catholic morals represent certain actions as necessary and good in themselves, whilst others are condemned as bad because they are opposed to the nature of man, and frustrate the object for which things are created. For instance, a lie frustrates the object of speech, impurity that of marriage, and deeds of violence that of liberty. Thus out of the very nature of things proceeds a law, and from existence an obligation; God Himself cannot reverse the law, — not that He is dependent upon the things, but because He has created them according to His own ideas, and cannot contradict Himself. Our reason recognizes such a law out of our concepts of things, before it thinks of any special commandment given by God. It sees that family love and the virtues of justice and truthfulness are in necessary agreement with the will and glory of God. Thus these moral obligations possess a certain independence, not because they have produced an absolute obligation irrespective of the highest end, but because in their very nature they are included in the order making for the highest end. In this way we arrive at a sort of natural ethics, the simplest rules of which may be traced in all philosophies and in every nation, even amongst pagans.

Not only are the laws of action in harmony with the nature of things, but Catholic moralists recognize that there is a natural *value* attached to the corresponding actions. There is only one *summum bonum*, and only one fundamental morality, that subjects everything to this supreme good. But there are many *bona honesta*, which, though inferior to it, must to some extent be valued for their own sake, and there are many virtues, which, as *virtutes politicae*, possess a moral value, although perfection is not brought about until all are ordered to God. Thus as Christians we may still speak of asceticism as having an independent value, meaning that mortification is not only a means for the preservation of other virtues, but is estimable in itself, through its peculiar moral beauty (*honestas*). In the same way, whilst acknowledging that the life of a Christian must be directed to God alone, we may speak of the independent value of public worship, of family affection, of patriotism, etc., provided we remember that the independence in these cases is only relative.

Owing to the greatness and universality of the moral aim, there is an essential difference between morals and secular civilization. In secular occupations much exclusiveness and specialization are permissible and even beneficial, but in matters of morality the part seeks the whole, and each single virtue with its *finis particularis* makes for the highest end of life. There are no limitations, no specialists and amateurs. A poet or artist may select for himself an "independent" sphere in poetry or painting; a merchant may take one thing or another as the object of his industry; and both may occasionally suspend their activities and take a holiday. But the moral law is always binding, and it pledges us always to what is highest, i.e., to become like God. Although for hours at a time we may not think of Him, and devote our days to secular occupations, anxieties, and pleasures, still, to some extent, all that we do must be done in His light. Parents may bring up their children in accordance with the rules of hygiene, train them according to the laws of psychology, and instruct them according to the best didactic methods, without reference to religion; but they cannot educate them, i.e., make them moral beings, without God and the fear of God; not even by teaching them to practise civic virtues.

When once the moral consciousness is awakened, it cannot be isolated and lulled to rest; it tolerates no self-sufficiency on the part of single moral tendencies; these are virtues only in the sense that they are the beginnings (*inchoatio*) of the perfect virtue of charity, and they have a moral value only as offshoots and partial manifestations (*participatio*) of the effort made by the soul to apply itself, whole and undivided, to the highest Good.¹

We also maintain that law and politics, industry, science, and art, are all governed by their own laws, but we assert at the same time that they all have to wait for religion to give them their *true* and *higher* principles.²

There is in human nature a true independence, that submits to higher laws—God loves willing service, rendered by independent beings, not by slaves. As to *Schiele's* further remark: "We are convinced that the world has its own order, independently of Christianity; a Catholic seeks to bring order into the world by means of Christianity," we must make a distinction: Christianity is a supernatural religion; the world of nature received its order at the Creation, and preserves it quite apart from Christianity. This is true of conformity to the physical laws of the universe and also of the natural law of morality, and of the aims assigned by God to govern the natural life of man. If we speak of "the world," in the sense in which the word is used in the New Testament, as

¹ S. theol., II, II, q. 23, a. 7: Si accipiat^r virtus, secundum quod est in ordine ad finem aliquem particularem, sic potest aliqua virtus dici sine caritate. . . . Erit quidem vera virtus sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum bonum. *Ibid.*, ad 2 and 3; I, II, q. 57, a. 4 ad 3: Prudentia est bene consiliativa de his, quae pertinent ad *totam vitam* hominis et ad *ultimum finem* vitae humanae. Sed in *artibus* aliquibus est consilium de his qui pertinent ad fines proprios illarum artium. Unde aliqui, inquantum sunt bene consiliativi in rebus bellicis vel nauticis, dicuntur prudentes duces vel gubernatores, non autem prudentes simpliciter; sed illi solum, qui bene consiliantur de his, qui conferunt ad *totam vitam*. I, II, q. 65, a. 2: Ad rectam autem rationem prudentiae multo magis requiritur, quod homo bene se habeat circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios fines, quod fit per virtutes morales. I, II, q. 1, a. 6: Quidquid homo appetit, appetit sub ratione boni; quod quidem, si non appetitur ut bonum perfectum, quod est ultimus finis, necesse est ut appetatur ut *tendens* in bonum perfectum; quia semper *inchoatio* alicujus ordinatur ad consummationem ipsius, sicut patet tam in his, quae fiunt a natura, quam in his, quae fiunt ab arte; et ita omnis *inchoatio* perfectionis ordinatur in perfectionem consummatum, quae est per ultimum finem.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 474, note 1.

meaning men who have departed from the moral order, of course we can assert that Christianity ought to bring order into the world, for as the world has been false to its moral aim, it needs the restoration and renewed health that revealed religion can supply. Does any student of ethics doubt that the world as it now exists, with its modern revival of paganism, requires improvement, purification, and rearrangement?

Moreover, Christianity gives back to us the supernatural life of grace that was lost by sin; and it is probably chiefly to this point that reference is made, when fears are expressed lest the security and well-being of civilized society would suffer, should we apply the phrase "to renew all things in Christ"¹ to the world. The same fear seems to give rise to the assertion that "revelation has an interior mission only to the individual soul," and not "a public mission to all universally." The origin and history of Christianity do not afford the slightest justification for this distinction. The Gospel was to be preached to all nations, not only to individuals; and the words quoted from the epistle to the Ephesians refer to all things "that are in heaven and on earth," and in the same epistle *St. Paul* goes on to apply them to marriage, slavery, and other social questions. The distinction between the interior and the public mission of Revelation is in itself unnatural, for the life of the individual is organically connected with that of society, and the former cannot be developed fully without the latter, which embodies it. In the course of history, whenever any great upward tendency has affected the souls of men, the outward results have invariably been manifest. If it were true that Revelation was a danger to exterior civilization, security, and order, it would have to imperil the inner life in a similar fashion. But as a matter of fact, the case is quite different; the new and incomprehensible qualities with which grace endows us and by which it makes us resemble God, are not a sign of danger and a hindrance, but a completion and perfection of nature.

The words so often quoted: *Gratia non destruit, sed supponit et perficit naturam*, imply that our natural faculties and powers presuppose, as a permanent foundation, the life of grace. The supernatural light and life of grace can be communicated only to

¹ Eph. i. 10.

a spiritual being, and it affects the reason and free will of man. What is natural, being the *suppositum* of grace, must be preserved in its security and order, in its independence as designed by God, if the Catholic idea of the supernatural life is to be fully realized.¹

Faith is reached by way of the so-called *praeambula fidei*, the natural knowledge of certain philosophical and historical truths; the supernatural desire contained in hope and charity are connected with our innate longing for happiness and perfection; and in both the natural conscience must coöperate in the process of justification by means of admonitions and demands. Charity, the most perfect expression of the life of grace, includes the "whole law" of the decalogue; it is the *finis praecepti*, the end in the sense of completion, not in that of destroying and rendering void the moral law.²

The Vatican Council emphatically insists upon both, the difference and the connection between the natural and the supernatural order, and incidentally refers to the independent character of the natural arts and sciences. Faith and reason mutually support each other, "since true reason authenticates the foundations of faith, and, by the light of faith, perfects our knowledge of divine things, whilst faith delivers and preserves reason from error, and equips it with many kinds of perception. The Church, far from opposing the practice of human arts and sciences, encourages and promotes them in various ways, for she is well aware of, and far from despising, the advantages accruing therefrom to human life; in fact, she confesses that all knowledge proceeds from God, the Lord of knowledge, and that when its pursuit is carried on by the aid of His grace, it leads men to God. The Church does not forbid any branch of learning to employ its *own* principles and methods, but

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 313, *seq.*; *St. Thomas's* statement: "Fides praesupponit cognitionem naturalem sicut gratia naturam" is supplemented by the Vatican Council in the words "recta ratio fidei fundamenta demonstrat." Cf. *A. Weiss*, *op. cit.*, I, 700: "First the foundation, then the structure built upon it. The foundation is nature, the structure is grace. Grace presupposes nature. Not as if it grew out of nature, for it is a new and higher creation from above. But grace builds on nature, and cannot thrive where nature is unhealthy. In order to thrive, grace perfects nature." Cf. *Meyenberg, supra*, p. 466, note 1.

² *Augustin*, *En. 2*, in ps. 31, 5; Non ergo hic finem praecepti dixit, quo quasi pereant praecepta, sed quo perficiantur et consummentur, non consumantur.

whilst recognizing this independence (*libertas*), she is careful to prevent the sciences from suffering any contamination by error through denying her divine teaching, and from *overstepping their own limits* so as to encroach upon the sphere of faith."¹

The Church has always warned her children against false wisdom and civilization; even in the earliest ages of Christianity she made it her task to discover and appropriate whatever was true and trustworthy in pagan philosophy and learning, the gold and silver that the heathen nations "had dug, as it were, out of the mines of divine Providence, that diffused itself in all directions."²

Even with regard to ethics, some of the doctors of the Church, such as *St. Clement* of Alexandria and *St. Ambrose*, often adhered to ancient models on points of method and of natural morality. The Stoic philosophers investigated the natural law and their research found a place in Christian science, and the study of the Classics was after due consideration introduced into the instruction of the young, who were taught to imitate their style. Scholasticism showed a generous appreciation of the connection between natural and supernatural wisdom by assigning to the works of *Plato* and *Aristotle* so high a value and position in education. The very name of the Renaissance indicates a revival of other important elements in the old learning, viz., the sense of artistic form and a closer adherence to nature. From that period dates the rise of secular knowledge, which does not indeed deny its connection with the Christian form of intellectual development that preceded it, but owes its marvellous results primarily to the most exact study of nature and to mathematical methods. Of such scientific research it is even more true than of philosophy, that it must proceed according to its own methods and on its own lines, and in so doing

¹ Sess. 3, c. 4 (Denz. 10th ed., p. 1799). *Granderath* (Gesch. des Vatik. Konzils, II, 1903, 453) remarks that all who have discussed the passage quoted above have come to the following conclusion: "Science has its own rules and methods, by means of which it can, within its own domain, carry on investigations, free and unimpeded. It is under no external obligation, hence is not constrained by revelation and the Church to accept anything at which it would not have arrived by following its own rules, or to carry on its investigations according to the orders of others. Its dependence is *negative*, not positive; it may not assert and maintain anything contradictory to one of the truths of faith . . . for truth cannot be opposed to truth."

² *St. Augustine*, De doctr. christ., II, n. 60.

cannot employ principles of supernatural thought. Speaking in general terms, Cardinal *Mercier* remarks: "We ought not to approach the problems of physics, chemistry, biology, history or political economy with a preconceived intention of deriving from them a confirmation of our religious convictions. When we speak of treating anything from the scientific point of view, we mean that we isolate it, in order to look at it by itself." Therefore, in granting that each natural science, each art and each branch of technical knowledge, has a formal object, we tacitly acknowledge that it possesses interior independence.¹

Scientific thought is, however, not the only means of arriving at a knowledge of truth; hence the "isolation" must not lead to a denial of other sources of information, and least of all to a denial of faith in Revelation. Scientific thought, like everything human, is fallible, and history records many cases where it has given rise to errors on most important subjects; hence faith, being based upon the infallible teaching of God, ought to have precedence whenever alleged results of scientific research are opposed to it.

The distinction between the natural and the supernatural becomes confused by an attempt to determine the "sole validity of the Catholic ideal" and "the Catholic unity of the Church and the world," by means of such a statement as the following: "All that is truly natural is truly good, and all that is truly good is Catholic. This is the universality and breadth of the Catholic, i.e., universal idea. If this Catholic element occurs even amongst Protestants or atheists, we accept it *as being inwardly Catholic*. If Protestants or atheists offer to coöperate with us, we welcome them, *provided that they work in a Catholic spirit*. But we reject everything in literature, society, politics, and education that in this wide sense lacks the inwardly Catholic character, since not being Catholic it is *therefore* worthless and must inevitably be harmful, not only to religion, but also to industry, art, political life, and education."²

According to this sort of argument, *Alexander's* military genius and *Homer's* poetry, Greek architecture and Roman law, the invention of steam engines and of flying machines, are all inwardly Catholic; but they would have to be absolutely condemned if they

¹ *Mercier*, *Le Modernisme*.

² *Köln.*, *Eine innere Gefahr*, p. 59.

lacked "this inwardly Catholic character!" The correct view is that the universality of the Church consists in her being able in a unique manner to incorporate with herself all that is naturally good and beautiful, thus preserving it and raising it to a higher level. What is naturally good may *become* Catholic, but it *is* not Catholic until it has received a Catholic character through faith and the Church, — just as a natural man with the best dispositions and noblest intentions only becomes a Catholic when he is baptized. The Church recognizes as good and valuable many things that are not Catholic, for instance, valid marriage among pagans, although it is plainly different from Catholic marriage, and the authority of a heathen government, although it is by no means on a level with what is Christian and Catholic. She recognizes also the substance of the natural law, and teaches that it is good, not because she enforces it, but she enforces it because it is good. She approves of civic virtues originating in the natural moral disposition and freedom of mankind, though not bearing any inwardly Catholic character. How can it be possible for atheists to "work in a Catholic spirit," especially when we are told elsewhere that all progress springs from a religious theory of life?¹

God designed the natural to be the basis of the supernatural life and activity, and thus the degree and durability of human progress depend not only on the amount of graces bestowed by God, but also on the solidity of their natural foundation; in other words, upon the coöperation and loyalty of mankind. If we survey certain periods in the history of the Church, we shall find that this fact often accounts for the vigorous life displayed in some, and the stagnation and inactivity prevailing in others. As we have seen, the natural departments of labour have each their own laws, given them at their creation, and it often requires persevering research and toil to appreciate these laws. Hence for Christians to spend their energies profitably, they must not begin at the highest point *only*, relying solely on the beauty and truth of the Catholic ideals, but they must at the same time work upwards from below, striving with patience and by means adapted to each individual task to bring reality into harmony with their ideals. They must not be afraid to learn from their opponents, for it cannot be denied that

¹ *Köln.*, Eine innere Gefahr, p. 48; cf. *supra*, p. 450.

men and periods of time alien to Christianity and the supernatural have concentrated their forces exclusively upon nature, and just on account of this concentration have in some respects attained to remarkable acumen and exactness in their knowledge, and to wonderful mastery over their intellectual and practical powers.

In this connection I remind my readers once more of the perfect style and model language of the old classical writers, so highly appreciated by our Catholic educators, and of the marvellous progress made by science in the last few years, and of the increased power of expression possessed by modern art. It involves no denial of Catholic principles to recommend Catholics to acquire such mastery over natural forces and modes of thought even though it grew upon a strange soil, and even to set the example in these matters. But on the other hand, it is a higher duty to be faithful to the supernatural aim indicated by faith, hope, and charity, and gladly to acknowledge the advantages that we derive from these virtues, and their assistance in solving the most fundamental problems of natural knowledge and life. The assurance and light that they impart to our theories of life and of the universe far outweigh any "inferiority" in isolated branches of science.

Faith supplies and maintains the one thing needful, the highest truth and supreme obligation amidst the diversity of secular occupations, and it must inevitably restrict the independence of the various departments of natural knowledge to the extent that they may not oppose the supernatural direction of thought and life. This surveillance promotes the real interests of natural truth and morality, and protects important principles of the natural law and of the true ideal of civilization, for in spite of their appealing to human reason, these principles are often obscured, doubted, and even attacked by men who claim to think deeply. If religious and moral thought is not to be left isolated, powerless, and remote from all the extravagances of the natural mind of man, the Church, as guardian of the faith, must be able to condemn philosophical and social errors. Her interference with secular work and knowledge is of a *negative* character, indicating restrictions and safeguards, and it is not a substitute for natural, posi-

tive work.¹ Together with this corrective and negative action, there proceeds from the supernatural principle, as I have already said, also a positive action promoting civilization and progress by supplying a more perfect harmony and a higher vigour, fullness, and power of doing good to all important branches of learning.²

On this subject *H. Holzamer* writes as follows: "The activities which aim primarily at the attainment of natural ends, such as our political, social, scientific, and artistic work, receive their inner order and guidance from natural reason, and not from supernatural faith. Faith makes not the slightest attempt to give a man any instructions on the subject of his worldly occupations; it does not tell him which form of government he ought to select, which scientific methods he ought to apply, nor which rules of architecture and painting he ought to observe. In all his secular occupation man is referred to the positive guidance of reason. It is only negatively, as an exterior standard, that faith claims respect here. It requires man in his daily work not to violate the divine law. It sets up a barrier which secular existence must respect, so as not to encroach upon the supernatural and spiritual life."³

Science is, in *Holzamer's* opinion, autonomous and supreme within itself (p. 167), faith affects political life only negatively (p. 196), and religion is only an external, negative rule with reference to secular art (p. 234). This is, he thinks, the definite formula, which if rightly understood, will prove a means of removing the differences and effecting the union among Catholics of various opinions.

It is quite true that the sphere of secular occupation is not subject to faith as an interior rule, if the word "rule" means a law, *constraining* and forbidding. *Holzamer* states that he uses the word in this sense. But a wider meaning may be assigned to it, and it may include regulations and measures adapted to what is *better* or more expedient; and in this sense faith and the supernatural view of life *do* exercise a positive, interior influence upon ordinary occupations. Incidentally *Holzamer* also uses instead of

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 488, note 1.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 294, *seq.*

³ Turm und Block, p. 154.

the word "rule" other words such as "guidance," "suggestion," "standards," which have this wider meaning.¹

A scientist, artist or author is not *bound* to choose his subjects and carry out his work with any positive reference to faith, but it is often *imprudent* for him to restrict himself to purely secular matters, because faith may suggest to him fresh points of view, fill up *lacunae* in his line of thought and answer disturbing questions. *Holzamer* speaks of this influence as furthering and enlightening philosophical thought, which has benefited, moreover, by dogmatic teaching on the subjects of personality, substance, etc. In the same way he points out that social politics, if not enlightened by Christian principles, are very apt to run counter to reason, and frequently arrive at nothing beyond untrustworthy hypotheses, or mere criticism, and therefore they would do well to let the "standard wisdom" of Christianity be their positive guide (pp. 215, 218). In both cases of course it is taken for granted that science as such does not teach dogmatically, but expounds and explains in conformity with reason. The same remarks apply to other departments of secular knowledge, and more particularly to those that are closely connected with morals.²

Full light is thrown upon the whole question, if *Holzamer's* distinction "supernatural life — natural life" is more consistently kept in view, and if natural morality (ethics and the natural law) is included under "natural life as a whole." Under the one head *Holzamer* discusses only the supernatural = spiritual = ecclesiastical life, and under the other the secular or "profane" activity, including the scientific, political, industrial, and artistic life.

The extension of the quotation as indicated, leads to a solution less attractive but more complete and far-reaching. As soon as we touch on the sphere of morality, or on that of the civic virtues, which are indispensable even to the ethics of modern free thought and social praxis, the "isolation" of the various departments to some extent ceases, and so does all limitation to the concrete formal object of each, since each special "good" necessarily tends to the universal and supreme good. Although on this point the distinction between the positive and negative influence of faith

¹ Cf. e.g., p. 166.

² Cf. *H. Peech*, *Nationalökonomie*, I (1905), 420, etc.; III (1913), 754, etc.

and charity is justifiable, still the connection between the natural and the supernatural is undoubtedly closer and the positive influence of the supernatural greater and more evident.¹

A true consideration of the world and of life shows us that nowhere is there any absolute autonomy for a creature, either in his existence or his actions, and that we cannot grant any complete self-mastery to the various departments of intellectual and social life without at the same time destroying civilization as a whole, which underlies them all and is their very soul.

Pantheism aims at giving to human life and activity absolute independence and value, but unless it abandons its fundamental dogma of the unity of substance, it is forced to deny the actual diversity existing in nature and civilized life, and the peculiarities and independence of the various departments of knowledge and work. At the same time it takes away all the value of personality, all liberty of action, all possibility of real causation, — in fact it destroys all the essential constituents of subjective independence.

The Christian theory grants to what is finite in nature and civilized life the full reality and peculiar beauty that it possesses in the sight of natural knowledge, and admits its peculiar value and influence upon human volition and action; the Christian theory adds depth and dignity to man, since he is the subject of knowledge and action. All that an empiricist or secular thinker possesses and boasts of, is equally the property of a Christian, who is not disposed either to treat it superficially, like the idealist, or to regard it with suspicion, like the pessimist. Over and above the order of good things on earth he recognizes one supreme Good, to which all personal and human life is subservient; but this is a gain, an increment added to the possession that the Christian enjoys in common with others, and it has a most beneficial influence both upon the inner life of the individual and the outer life of mankind collectively.

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 488, *seq.* We see how the results agree with one another and turn out to be analogous. In speaking of secular associations we noted that their *necessary* basis must be an aim objectively permissible and in accordance with reason and the natural law, and the elevating force *furthering* this aim must be their Christian and Catholic character (p. 471); in the same way secular knowledge is truly independent in the sense that it is inwardly and positively obliged to *follow* only its own principles and methods, but it can be *assisted* and *perfected* by a suitable adherence to Christianity.

There are at the present time teachers of social science, such as *Sombart*, *Menger*, and others, who do not simply idolize earthly progress and do not regard industrial productiveness as the highest aim and purpose of life, but would prefer to uphold the validity of the moral law in all the various spheres of human activity. Yet at the same time they agree with earlier national economists in teaching that the "social and political ideal" is perfectly autonomous, and they deny that there is any moral limitation to economic progress. This seems to be an incomprehensible contradiction; we may comprehend it to some degree, perhaps, if we remember that some modern principles of morals are too one-sided, or too much a matter of sentiment, or too much savouring of formalism, ever to be capable of regulating life as a whole, although the principles themselves may be universally valid. The case is different when morals, in spite of their subjectivity, stand in an essential relation to the objective world around us, and when, according to the theory of *St. Thomas*, they are always in touch with the order of ideas and aims. Even in the case of philosophers who to some extent recognize this teleological principle, we can perhaps understand the contradiction when we are told that *Sombart*, for instance, considers the aim of economics to be only a "particular ideal," and with reference to the moral aim assumes it to be the final and highest aim, yet at the same time he denies that all "particular ideals" with their spheres of influence must be dominated by the highest aim. *St. Thomas* having proved that there is one and *only one* final aim for man, raises the further question whether all other aims must be desired for the sake of this final aim.¹ His answer is in the affirmative, for two reasons, first, because the will fundamentally keeps in view the most perfect conception of what is good, and all that is good only in a partial and incomplete way must be referred to, and judged by, the standard of what is perfectly and completely good. Secondly, because in the movement towards an end, the final aim occupies the same position as that which the *first* cause occupies in movements from causes, and thus all proximate ends receive from the final end their power to affect us. I cannot here discuss further the truth of this argument, or its application to the case that we

¹ S. theol., I, II, q. 1, a. 6.

are considering. It is clear, however, that if some final end, recognized or assumed by students of ethics, proves not to possess this universal value and moving force, they will be tempted to look upon the "particular ideals" as subject to no control, and to suppose that the attitude of these ideals to the highest aim ought perhaps to be one of respect, but not of subordination to it.¹

The aim of Christian morality is so exalted, and yet so intimately related with all natural goods and human endeavours, that it affects every department of civilized life, directing, moderating, and checking it, but also adding life, depth, and harmony to it. We honour God when we offer Him our heart's devotion in religious worship, but we also honour Him when we marvel at His great works in nature; we can serve Him in quiet domestic work, but also in the arena of military and political warfare; we can further His designs for mankind by means of apostolic work in the Church, but also by the acquisition and use of earthly possessions. Economic life shows by the very fact that it *serves* the aims of sustenance that it has no right to claim to be a wholly independent aim. Its close connection with law, and its place in social science, which puts a higher and more general interpretation upon the idea of welfare, reveal to us the links connecting economic life and morals. The extreme ardour to make worldly aims independent makes it easy to understand why, in worldly matters, people want to do everything *with* the help of religion, but nothing *from motives of religion*, whilst to a Catholic his religion is the strongest motive for all that he accomplishes.²

Religion means referring all one's life to God, and uniting the soul with Him, and it can no more be something running parallel

¹ Cf. on this subject *Fr. Walter*, Sozialpolitik und Moral, 1899, pp. 22, etc., 257, etc.; *H. Pesch*, Nationalökonomie, I, 264, etc., 420, etc.; *J. Beck*, Volkswirtschaft und Sittengesetz, 1908. In answer to *Dürkheim* and *Lévy-Bruhl*, French sociologists, who assert that the morals of the present day at any rate are incompatible with economics, *S. Duploige* shows (*Le confit de la morale et de la sociologie*, 1912) that *St. Thomas's* moral teaching forms an excellent and trustworthy basis for economic activity, especially because it has a firm hold upon the natural law whilst at the same time it interprets that law with great elasticity, and also because it connects morality very closely with the order of aims.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 474, note 1.

to and yet unconnected with worldly affairs, than God can be imagined as existing alongside of the world but unconnected with it.

The genuinely Catholic maxim, *Ora et labora*, shows that we too connect religion, the special service of God, with work in the world, and whilst esteeming most highly all that is religious, we acknowledge that fidelity to one's secular calling has a moral beauty of its own, and we recognize it at its natural worth in those also who do not work in the spirit of Christianity. Thus, on the one hand, we preserve the unity of life indispensable for our mind and disposition, the unity of the inner soul life with the public life in society, a unity which inevitably implies dependence upon its central point; but on the other hand, we give to the special energies and forces which work according to God's will within that unity all the scope that they need in order to develop freely and independently in conformity with their nature.

INDEX

- Æquiprobabilism*, 192
Aggressiveness, Protestant, 14
Alexander VII, 91
Alliance, Evangelical, 10, 43, 44
et seq.
Alphonsus, St., 57 *et seq.*, 96, 99,
 102, 112, 117, 126, 134, 192 *et*
seq., 272
Ambrose, St., 488
Aristotle, 73, 84, 224, 316, 488
Arts and the Catholic Church,
 412, 478
Ascetic life and life in the world,
 278 *et seq.*
 — literature, 71
 — and speculative treatment of
 morals, 69
Associations, 415 *et seq.*, 453
 — Catholic, 418, 430, 433, 460
 et seq.
 — charitable, 459
 — mixed, 433 *et seq.*
 — political, 462 *et seq.*
 — for secular purposes, 417 *et*
 seq.
 — social, 459
 — for the social and spiritual
 welfare of the people, 417 *et seq.*
 — for students, 460
 — of workingmen, 429
Attacks upon Catholic Morals, 3,
 7, 10, 106
Attritionism, 61, 101 *et seq.*
Augustine, St., 57 *et seq.*, 85, 96,
 106, 221 *et seq.*, 314, 340 *et seq.*,
 415, 457, 480
Authority, the pastoral, 391

Baur, J. C., 24
Beghards, 239
Bellarmino, 367, 370, 387
Bernard, St., 329

Bismarck, 45, 350
Bonaventure, St., 267
Bouquillon, 62
Braun, W., 171
Busenbaum, 93

Calixtus, Georg, 174
Capecelatro, Cardinal, 67
Carlyle, Thomas (on mental reser-
 vation), 123
Casuistry, 7, 57 *et seq.*, 79 *et seq.*
 — abuses in, 91
 — lax views condemned by
 Popes, 191
 — practised by Protestants, 213,
 302
*Catholic pioneers of modern sci-
 ence*, 310
 — achievement in culture, 306
 et seq.
 — books not read by Protestants,
 34 *et seq.*
 — grievances, 49
 — clergy, enjoying more confi-
 dence than Protestant clergy, 83
 — seclusiveness, 54, 427
Cathrein, V., 137, 194, 454
Cavagnis, 345, 366, 415, 457 *et seq.*
Celibacy, 292
Chamberlain, 338
Charity, its central position in the
 Catholic religion, 223 *et seq.*
Christ's teaching, 179 *et seq.*
Christian Trades Unions (see also
Associations), 466, 471
Christianity, interdenominational,
 428
Church, authority of the, 377 *et*
seq., 391
 — and the arts, 412, 478
 — and civic liberty, 402
 — universal, 36

- Church, political principles of the, 350
 — her accommodation to requirements of time and people, 396
 — her authority over *secular* life, 399
 — and the family, 413
 — and marriage, 286, 412
 — and State, 337 *et seq.*
 — and worldly activities, 412
 — false view of the, 36
 — jurisdiction of the, 409
 — and subjective liberty, 475
 Civil society, its dependence upon State and Church, 414
 Civilization due to Catholic Church, 309 *et seq.*
 — false, 488
Clement, St., 399, 480
 Clergy, Protestant, preaching contrary to their convictions, 124
 Commandment, Sixth, 103
 Commandments vs. Counsels, 270 *et seq.*
 — of the Church, 142 *et seq.*, 178, 392, 396
Comle, A., 347
 Confession, 105
 — Protestant praise of, 89
 Confessional, its influence on morality, 105
 Conscience, the law of, 131
 Contrast between Catholicism and Protestantism, 10
 Contrition, Imperfect, 101 *et seq.*
 Council of Trent, 18, 24, 32, 239
 — Vatican, 386, 487
 Counsels, Evangelical, 235

Dasbach, P., 94
Delbrück, H., 345
Denifle, H., 12, 151, 271
Descartes, 477
 Desire for happiness, human, 215
 — motive in morality, 215 *et seq.*
 Difference between mortal and venial sin, 258 *et seq.*
Döllinger, 18, 25, 57, 101, 122, 162, 167
Dornier, 427

Eckhart, 239
 Education, 459 *et seq.*
 Encyclicals, Papal, on duties of citizens, 338, 351 *et seq.*, 428
 End, the, justifies the Means? 92 *et seq.*
 Equality, civil, of creeds, 47
 Ethical scepticism, 77
 Ethics, modern, 86, 252
Eucken, 333
 Evangelical Counsels, 235
Evers, G., 41, 43
 Explicit faith, 99
 External compliance with laws of morality, 229

 Faith, Catholic conception of, 17
 — explicit, 99
 — implicit, 98
 — justifying, 20 *et seq.*, 27 *et seq.*
 — Protestant conception of, 23 *et seq.*
 — task of, 491 *et seq.*
 Family, the, and the Church, 413
 Feminism, in sexual matters, 107
Fichte, 32
 Fides Implicita, 98
Fischer, Cardinal, 473
Förster, F. W., 9, 35
 Freedom in teaching injurious to Protestant religion, 399
 — of will, denied by Luther, 146, 169 *et seq.*

Gallwitz, 398
Gass, 74, 239, 299
Gauss, 85
Geffcken, 337
Giesberts, 437
Gladstone, 350
 Gnostics, 286
 God, natural recognition of, 477
Goethe, 32, 213, 333
Gonzalez, 191
 Görres-Gesellschaft, 460
Götz, L. K., 377
 Grace, 315, 324 *et seq.*, 486
Granderath, 488
 Graveyard scandals, 41 *et seq.*
Grisar, 12
Grotius, Hugo, 74, 212

- Grünberg, P.*, 93
 Guilds of the Middle Ages, 418
Guimenius, 98
Gury, 108, 115, 126
- Haeckel*, 121
Harnack, 6, 18, 27, 28, 31, 41, 48,
 57 *et seq.*, 70, 100 *et seq.*, 167, 174,
 252, 310, 333, 376, 400, 431
Hartmann, E. von, 86, 131
Hase, K., 26
Heinrich, 387
Herrmann, W., 4, 5, 6, 9, 57, 90,
 132, 136, 140, 176, 179 *et seq.*,
 194 *et seq.*, 305, 376
Hesse, Philip of, 81, 97, 122
Hillebrand, 117
Hilty, 296, 335
Hobbes, 218
Hoensbroech, Paul von, 7, 8, 43, 62,
 94, 98, 106 *et seq.*
Hoepel, 5
Hollweck, 368, 386, 417
Holzamer, H., 468, 492
- Ihering, R. von*, 88
 Implicit Faith, 98
 Imputation of Christ's justice
 according to Luther, 165 *et seq.*
 Independent activity of the laity,
 423
 Independence of created things,
 475
 — the Catholic's lack of, 474
 Index, 34, 38
 Individual, liberty of the, 376 *et*
seq.
 Individualism, dangerous, 424, 426
 — exaggerated, introduced by
 Luther, 252
 Industrial and economic activity
 and the Church, 412
 Infallibility of the Pope, 378 *et*
seq.
Innocent IV, 344
Innocent XI, 191
 Intention, habitual, 441
 — and will, 244
 — in Oaths and Promises, 108
 Interdenominationalism (see also
 Associations), 431, 458
- Intercourse with the excommuni-
 cated, 458
Ivo of Chartres, 371
- James, W.*, 216, 311
Jansenius, 17, 449
 Jansenism, 216
 Jansenists, 191
Janssen, J., 17, 122
Jellinek, 337, 346
Jentsch, Karl, 8, 49, 89, 95, 126,
 317, 395
 Jesuits, 5, 6, 75, 92, 103, 249
John Chrysostom, St., 287
 Joint action of Catholics with
 members of other creeds (see
 also Interdenominationalism),
 427, 450, 464 *et seq.*
Jonas, Justus, 40
Jørgensen, J., 304
 Judgment, individual, 212
 Justification, Catholic doctrine on,
 21, 27 *et seq.*, 102, 150 *et seq.*
 Justifying faith, Luther's doctrine
 of (see *Sola Fides* doctrine)
- Kant*, 38, 73, 84, 87, 138 *et seq.*, 215,
 218, 305, 328, 333
Key, Ellen, 108
Köhler, W., 16, 18, 26, 27, 150, 174,
 349
Köln, 450, 489
Kopp, Cardinal, 473
Kösllin, 146, 188
Kötschke, H., 82
Krogh-Tønning, 23, 25, 35
Kulturkampf, 47, 49
- Labour Unions (see Associations,
 also Trades Unions)
Lagarde, 25, 174, 278
Lamennais, 18
Lämmer, H., 370
Lange, Helene, 108
 Law, natural, divine, human, 179
et seq.
 — of the Church, 176
 Lax views condemned by Popes,
 191
Laymann, 96, 98, 99, 102
Lehmkuhl, 99, 206, 283, 386

- Leo XIII*, 45, 50, 61, 338 *et seq.*, 351, 401, 402, 404, 413, 416, 420, 468
Lessing, 349
Lessius, 71, 81
Leyen, von der, 91
 Liberty, subjective, and ecclesiastical authority, 475
 — civil, fostered by the Church, 402
 Lie, permissible, 116 *et seq.*
 Life, ascetic (see Ascetic life)
Liguori (see *St. Alphonsus*)
Linsenmann, 72, 206, 261
Locke, 349
Los-von-Rom movement, 3, 10, 44
Lugo, de, 110
 Love of God and daily work, 441 *et seq.*
 — highest aim, 440
Luther, 10, 11, 12, 16, 18, 19, 81, 97, 252, 297, 348
 — an autonomist, 144 *et seq.*
 — on merit, 234 *et seq.*
Luther's conception of law, 187
 — denial of the moral law, 187 *et seq.*
 — doctrine, contradictions in, 300 *et seq.*, 326, 347
 — essential doctrines, 22, 145 *et seq.*
 — opinion of woman, 299
 — persecution of heretics, 349
 — person, veneration of, 16, 19, 25
 — teaching about the imputation of Christ's justice, 165 *et seq.*
 — view on *reservatio mentalis*, 121
 — views causing moral harm, 148
 — wrong done to Catholic Church, acknowledged by Protestants, 174

Macdonald, George, 32
Machiavelli, 218
Macaulay, 350
 Majoristic controversy, 25
Majunke, P., 41
 Man, autonomous, 216
 Marriage, defended by Church, 286, 412
 Marriage, Luther's view on, 107
 Maryland, Colony of, 349
Medina, B., 191
Melanchthon, 24, 75
Menger, 495
Mercier, Cardinal, 489
 Merit of good deeds, 232
Methodius, St., 106
 Modern ethical teaching hostile to Christianity, 252
 Modernism, 424, 431
Möhler, 24, 302
Molina, 75, 81
 Monism among Protestants, 305
 Montanists, 286
 Morality, superior to every other department of life, 480 *et seq.*
 — aim of Christian, 496
 — Christian, 60 *et seq.*
 — desire for happiness, motive in, 215 *et seq.*
 — external, 229
 — matter of feeling, 86
 — Protestant, 78
 Morals (see also Casuistry), ascetic and speculative treatment, 69
 — Catholic, external, 131, 229
 — a matter of reason, 79
 — a matter of sentiment, 79
 — feminism in, 107
Müller, Julius, 260

Nathusius, von, 79
 Natural and supernatural, connection and difference of, 487
 Natural vs. supernatural, 312
 Naturalism, 425
 Natural moral disposition in sinners, 448
 — motives, 447
Naumann, V. (Pilatus), 8, 95, 106
Neumann, A., 319
Newman, Cardinal, 36, 40, 287, 382
Nicholas I, Pope, 351

 Oath, simulation of, 109 *et seq.*
 — intention in taking, 108
 Orders, religious (see also Religious state), 290, 294 *et seq.*
Origen, 288

- Palmieri*, 102
 Pantheism, 254, 305, 494
Pascal, 92, 177, 191
Paulsen, 7, 104, 107, 302, 346, 394
Paulus, N., 97, 349
Pecca fortiter, 26, 164
 Perfection, Christian, in what it consists, 271
Pesch, Chr., 102
Pesch, H., 408, 414, 418
Pfleiderer, O., 131
Philip of Hesse, 81, 97, 122
 Pietism, 302
 Piety, Christian, 221
 — Protestant, 251
Pilatus (see *Naumann*)
Pius IX, 342
Pius X, 338 *et seq.*, 404, 409, 428, 434, 472
Plato, 135, 316, 488
 Position of Catholics, 33
 Probabilism, 4, 5, 6, 57, 61 *et seq.*, 176 *et seq.*
 — definition of, 189
 — practised by Protestants, 213
 Probabiliorism, 191
 Progress in civilization not due to Protestantism, 302
 Proselytism, 43
 Protestant aggressiveness, 14
 — Alliance (see Evangelical Alliance)
 — *vs.* Catholic consciousness, 41
 — clergy preaching contrary to their conviction, 124
 — contempt for Catholics, 34
 — faith more than Catholic susceptible to critical attacks, 322
 — influences, 38, 49
 — religion injured by freedom in teaching, 399
 Protestantism, 13
 — antagonistic to arts, 303
 — offers slight resistance to dangerous ideas, 432
 — severity of, 398
 Puritans of North America, 398
Quesnel, 449
 Questions of conscience decided by moral sense, 85
Rade, M., 80, 81
 Rationalism, 32
 — in the Protestant Church, 398
 Reductions of Paraguay, 411
 Reformation, 11, 13, 15, 134
 — its effect upon relation between Church and State, 347
 — "silent," 25, 31
Reichmann, M., 94
 Religious state (see also Orders), 270 *et seq.*
 Reservation, mental, 108 *et seq.*, 113 *et seq.*
 — Luther's support of it, 121
 — believed in by Protestants, 122, 125
Reusch, 57, 101
 Revelation, 316 *et seq.*, 486
 — and exterior civilization, 486
 Reward, supernatural, as due to good deeds, 232
 — motive for morality, 216 *et seq.*
Ribbing, Dr., 104
Richter, Jean Paul, 333
Riehl, W. H., 291
 Right of the Church to control her own internal discipline, 391
Ritschl, Otto, 4, 72, 86, 174, 243
Rocholl, 302
Roh, P., 92
Rolfs, 205, 213
Rousseau, 349
Ruville, A. von, 35
 Sacraments, efficacy of, 327
 Scandals in the Church, 18, 19
 Scepticism, ethical, 77
Scheeben, 58
Schiele, M., 35, 427, 474, 485
Schleiermacher, 80
Schmid, Fr., 98
 Scholasticism, 151, 224, 488
Schopenhauer, 38, 288
Schulthess-Rechberg, von, 278
Schulze, G., 132
Schurz, Karl, 93
 Seclusiveness of Catholics, 54, 427
 Secular affairs must be subject to highest aim, 439 *et seq.*
Sell, K., 13, 14, 29, 30, 34, 45, 50 *et seq.*, 78, 100, 216, 308, 337, 427

- Sello*, 118
 Severity of Protestant discipline, 398
Shaftesbury, 215
 Simulation of oath, 109 *et seq.*
 Sillon, the, 420
 Sin, 12, 150 *et seq.*
 — mortal and venial, 237 *et seq.*, 258 *et seq.*
 Sinner, yet just (see also *Pecca for-titer*), 26, 170 *et seq.*
 Sins, grievous and venial, in Luther's doctrine, 165 *et seq.*
 — mortal, 259
 — the seven chief, 248
 — venial, 268
 Social development, modern, 83
 Socialism, 426, 495
 Societies (see Associations)
Sola fides doctrine, 158 *et seq.*, 166, 237, 297 *et seq.*
Sombart, 495
Suarez, 75, 137, 277, 368, 370, 409
 Subjective conception of faith, 4
 State, the, 14
 — the Catholic, 360
 — and Church, 337 *et seq.*
 — laws against heretics, 345 *et seq.*
 — superior to any association, 458
Stäudlin, 72
Stange, 131

 Temptations, regarded as sins by Protestants, 246
Ter Haar, 192, 200
Tertullian, 18
Thalhofer, F., 280, 395
 Thirty Years' War, 40
Thomas Aquinas, St., 38, 61, 73 *et seq.*, 96, 99, 101, 133 *et seq.*, 178 *et seq.*, 184 *et seq.*, 193, 224 *et seq.*, 240 *et seq.*, 255 *et seq.*, 288, 314, 324, 330, 344, 413, 440, 441, 480, 487, 495
Titius, A., 122

 Toleration, 39 *et seq.*, 349
Tolstoi, 32
 Trades Unions (see also Associations), 433 *et seq.*
 Tradition of the Church, 7, 21
Treitschke, 341, 343
Trölsch, E., 309, 427
Tschackert, 23, 25, 34, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 48, 93, 163, 428, 431
 Tutelage of Protestantism, 398
 Tutorism, 191

Uhlhorn, 292
 Unions, Christian (see also Associations), 429, 435

Vasquez, 75, 137
 Virtue, not its own reward, 228
Viva, 100, 109
 Vocation, choice of, 412
 Volksverein, 10
Voltaire, 105

Wagner, C., 105
Walch, 148, 162
Waller, 496
Weiss, A., 67, 415, 455
Wendt, 7
Werner, J., 5, 69
Wernle, 243
Wernz, 368
Wiese, 126
Willems, 455
Willmann, O., 210, 373
 Woman, Luther's view of, 299
 — the view of the Catholic Church, 301
 Worldly achievements in the eyes of the Church, 276 *et seq.*
 Wrong done to Catholic Church by Luther acknowledged by Protestants, 174

Ziegler, 72
Zinzendorf, 35, 81
Zöckler, O., 92

